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Thesis Abstract 
Embodiment and the Other: Relationships and Alterity in Phenomenology and 
Deconstruction, Merleau-Ponty and Derrida 
4 
While there have been many essays devoted to considering the relationship between 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Jacques Derrida, there has been virtually no sustained book-
length treatment of these two French philosophers. Moreover, much of the literature that 
does exist presupposes an oppositional relationship between them, and between 
phenomenology and deconstruction more generally. In order to more systematically 
examine their relationship, this thesis is orientated around an analysis of each philosopher 
in terms of two important and related issues - embodiment and alterity. Agreeing with 
Merleau-Ponty's enduring insight that conceptions of embodiment and alterity are 
intimately linked, an effort will be made to consider each of them in relation to areas with 
which they are not commonly associated- eg. Derrida on the body, and Merleau-Ponty 
on alterity - in order to discover what insights considering them together might have. 
Such a methodology illustrates the complexity oI their relationship, in that both 
philosophers make important contributions in regard to either issue. However, as well as 
suggesting that their relationship cannot be adequately characterised in a strictly 
oppositional way ( eg. phenomenologist versus post-structuralist), it will also be argued 
that there are some important cliff erences between their respective approaches that are 
structurally contiguous whether contemplating embodiment or alterity. 
Merleau-Ponty's emphasis upon our embodied situation engenders a chiasmic 
conception of alterity in which self and other are inevitably intertwined together. One 
implication of his ontology is that questions regarding the otherness of the other risk 
being an abstraction that does not actually do justice to alterity. On the other hand, while 
Den·ida's philosophy is not a linguistic idealism that prohibits recourse to questions 
concerning embodiment, it only infrequently actually contemplates embodiment, and it 
will be argued that it is no coincidence that his conception of alterity is also not obviously 
chiasmic. That their concerns are importantly different may seem axiomatic, but after 
arguing that Merleau-Ponty' s conception of alterity does not succumb to the "imperialism 
of the same" that Levinas has associated with phenomenology, this thesis will contend 
that responsibility towards alterity might be more productively conceived of as an 
imperative to transform the notions of self and other, rather than as the valorisation of 
that which resists such a transformation. While De1Tida at times makes similar claims, 
and certainly points towards the dual necessity of both of these ideas in his descriptions 
of the messianic and the wholly other, it will be argued that he ultimately conceives of 
responsibility primarily in terms of the aspects of the other that resist transformative 
interaction. In this respect, an analysis of Merleau-Ponty' s work provides the resources 
for engaging in a critique of Derrida for downplaying the more relational conception of 
alterity that is induced by a recognition of our embodied situation. The deconstructive 
insistence that writing is in and of the world necessitates that it must also encounter a 
phenomenology that is intertwined with the world. This thesis hence proposes the 
possibility of a Merleau-Ponty inspired philosophy that does not so avowedly seek to 
extricate itself from phenomenology, but that also cannot easily be dismissed as simply 
another instantiation of the metaphysics of presence. 
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To summarise, this comparative juxtaposition of these two thinkers on the themes 
of embodiment and alterity intends to accomplish several things: 
1. It will argue that Derrida's criticisms of phenomenology, particularly in regard 
to it being a metaphysics of presence, need not apply to Merleau-Ponty' s 
phenomenology. 2. It will argue that Derrida's conception of alterity in his later 
philosophy cannot extricate itself from phenomenological concerns quite as easily as he 
sometimes seems to believe. 
3. It will highlight that Derrida's descriptions of responsibility towards alterity are 
not the only way left for a non-metaphysical philosophy, and that there are some salient 
ethico-political reasons for choosing a Merleau-Ponty inspired alternative that accords 
due attention to our embodied situation. 
1. Embodiment and the Other: Relationships and Alterity in Phenomenology and 
Deconstruction, Merleau-Ponty and Derrida. 
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It seems difficult to deny that philosophy is currently in the midst of a tumultuous 
becoming into something other than what it has been. At the very least, the possibility of 
such a change has been widely promulgated in the mid-late twentieth century. In one of 
his last lectures, Ludwig Wittgenstein explicitly suggested that philosophy had become a 
"new subject", and he also insisted that modem culture was on the verge of undergoing a 
"kink in the development of human thought comparable to that which occurred when 
Galileo and his contemporaries invented dynamics" 1• In an essay aptly titled "The End of 
Philosophy and the Task of Thinking", Martin Heidegger argued that philosophy had 
reached its end, but he nevertheless concluded that "thinking is not also at its end, but in 
transition to another beginning"2• More recently, Richard Rorty has echoed these type of 
sentiments; whereas once the dominant philosophical move was to suggest "this is how 
philosophy has been; let philosophy henceforth be like this", he claims that the typical 
question has now become "given that this is how philosophy has been, what, if anything, 
can philosophy now be?"3• Certainly, many of the twentieth century's most influential 
philosophers have undertaken the search for alternative ways of thinking, free of the 
dichotomistic problems and confusions that have plagued our metaphysical and 
rationalising thought ( of myriad possibilities consider: determinism/indeterminism, 
subject/object and, more importantly for this thesis, mind/body and self/other). Suffice to 
say that all of us recognise the type of argument that disparagingly traces the lineage of 
W estem thought to Parmenides, Plato, Cartesian doubt, or even Kant's famous 
enlightenment dictum, to take merely a few of the most prominent claims. Whether it is 
refen·ed to as the empirico-transcendental doublet, logocentric, onto-theological, or 
metaphysical, Western philosophy has been, and is being, roundly chastised. Although 
this summary of the tradition elides major differences, there are certainly some truths to 
it. While not wanting to subscribe to a blanket rule, one can admit of a predisposition, or 
a 'family resemblance' as Wittgenstein would have it, that is distinguishable among the 
'Wittgenstein, L., as cited in Martin, G. , From Nietzsche to Wittgenstein: The Problem of Truth and 
Nihilism in the Modern World, New York: Peter Lang, 1989, p 24 7-8. 
2Heidegger, M. , Th e End of Philosophy, trans. Stambaugh, New York: Harper and Row, 1973, p 96. 
3Rorty, R., "Overcoming the Tradition: Heidegger and Dewey" in Heidegger and Modern Philosophy, ed. 
Mun-ay, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1978, p 243. 
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various different guises of the Western history of philosophy. 
In twentieth century French philosophy, this denigration of the tradition has also 
become somewhat accentuated4, and two of the leading alternative approaches have been 
phenomenology and deconstruction, even if these are, of course, vastly diffuse bodies of 
thought. While phenomenology, at least in its original Husserlian form, arguably became 
an idealism by explicitly bracketing away the question of the outside world, several major 
French philosophers have sought to enrich Husserl's thought in such a way as to 
problematise any reduction to the things as they appear to consciousness. In particular, 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Jacques Den·ida are two philosophers who, while indebted to 
the work of Husserl, have nevertheless sought to go beyond him, and have paid close 
attention to the hierarchical and dualistic logic that they contend governs Western 
philosophy in all of its various forms. 
While remaining roughly within the purview of phenomenology, Merleau-Ponty 
has emphasised the way in which our embodied situation actually precludes any simple, 
dualistic account of perception, habitual activity, etc. For him, neither empiricism nor 
what he terms 'intellectualism' (ie. rationalism) has provided a coherent account of our 
embodied, perceptual life, and he has sought to rectify this situation, while also 
highlighting the impossibility of enacting any satisfactory reduction to the things 
themselves. 
Den·ida, on the other hand, has been the instigating and major representative 
behind what has come to be called deconstruction. He began his philosophical career 
attempting to distinguish himself from phenomenology through notions such as the trace 
and differance, which are precisely about that which does not appear to consciousness. 
Deconstruction considers the phenomenological method to be inadequate, and still 
susceptible to many of the problems that have afflicted Western philosophy. Indeed, 
despite Derrida's strategic disavowals to the contrary, there is a sense in which 
deconstruction considers itself to be post-phenomenological, and as will become 
apparent, this is even more true of secondary proponents of deconstruction. 
The initial and most obvious point of inquiry of this thesis will be to focus upon 
the ways in which the thoughts of these two French philosophers actually intersect. Both 
4While it can be claimed that twentieth century French philosophy has helped to engender an antagonistic 
relationship with traditional Western philosophy (primarily through the agency of 'postmodernism' and 
post-structuralism respectively), it also needs to be recognised that this tendency is frequently accompanied 
by a retrieval of certain thinkers from that tradition, perhaps most notably Nietzsche and Spinoza. 
philosophers have an enduring unease with the tradition's exaltation of the reflective 
above and beyond all else, but for several different reasons Merleau-Ponty and Derrida 
have rarely, if ever, been systematically considered at length together. The fact that 
Derrida has almost never mentioned Merleau-Ponty prior to 1990 is one important factor 
in this scarcity of prolonged comparative accounts (ie. of more than a chapter in length)5• 
Given Derrida's latent phenomenological heritage and his enduring fascination with 
Husserl, this is an interesting omission, although it is one that has been partially rectified 
by his 1991 text, Memoirs of the Blind, which considers Merleau-Ponty at some length 
(see chapter five). 
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Another reason why there has been no detailed exploration of the relationship 
between Merleau-Ponty and Derrida is because of the prevalence of a certain meta-
historicisation of philosophy, which inevitably legitimises certain questions while at the 
same time excluding others, particularly if those questions pertain to previous traditions 
(in this case phenomenology) that fall within the scope of derogatory terms like 
logocentric, metaphysical, and onto-theological. I do not think that this is Derrida or 
Heidegger's fault in particular, even though the· early stages of both of their careers were 
very much focused upon the philosophical tradition per se, but this type of preoccupation 
can be partly explained by the privileged position that certain 'postmodern' ideas have 
attained in contemporary European thought. No longer a ladder to be used and thrown 
away, as in Wittgenstein's elliptical conclusion to Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus6, a 
ce1iain postmode1n ladder is carried around, resulting in received ideas being circulated 
without analysis ( eg. Western philosophy is logocentric) and every conceivable problem 
being blamed on the metaphysical, system-building impulse ( difference is paradoxically 
eschewed by that which intends to reify difference). 
To some extent this is inevitable, but this thesis will take issue with one aspect of 
this oppositional disposition, that being the way in which traditions as intertwined as 
phenomenology and deconstruction are often precluded from any meaningful interaction, 
5In his essay "Violence and Metaphysics", Derrida devotes half a paragraph to the work of Merleau-Ponty 
(WD 104 ), and there are also isolated comments about his French predecessor in other texts of his ( cf. WD 
11), but there has been nothing of sustained significance until Memoirs of the Blind. Derrida's recently 
published text, Le Toucher: Jean-Luc Nancy (Paris: Galilee, 2000), also accords the work of Merleau-
Ponty some brief attention. 
6Wittgenstein famously concludes his book by stating that "he who understands me finally recognises them 
(my propositions) as senseless, when he has climbed out through them, on them, over them. (He must so to 
speak throw away the ladder after he has climbed up on it) ... Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must 
be silent". See Wittgenstein, L. , Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. Ogden, London: Routledge, 1996, 
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or more accurately, their interaction can take place only along certain carefully delineated 
lines. If Derrida suggests that his concerns are antithetical to those of phenomenology, 
and in places he does imply this, then a certain model of academic criticism accepts that 
this is the case and other questions are correlatively ignored, the question of embodiment 
being merely one of the most obvious. This preoccupation with the history of philosophy 
(which need not be explicit) almost inevitably insists that phenomenology is but the last 
gasp of metaphysics, and there is a resulting tendency to maintain that the relationship 
between deconstruction and phenomenology is typified by disparate and entirely distinct 
concerns. This is one formulation that this thesis will seek to transgress, particularly in 
relation to the respective thoughts of Merleau-Ponty and Derrida. 
Indeed, while these thinkers have had no full-length books devoted to considering 
their relationship, there is a growing number of chapter-length essays, as well as 
collections of essays. However, much of this literature also posits a vast difference 
between them. Where a comparative account is called for, many phenomenologists 
valorise Merleau-Ponty over what they denigrate as the linguistically inclined Derrida7• 
Those proposing this interpretation of Derrida tend to envisage a textualising of the 
notion of the body that precludes it being considered in any manner other than linguistic. 
On the other hand, many deconstructionists refuse to engage seriously with the 
philosophy of Merleau-Ponty, who is variously construed as a metaphysician of presence, 
or a foundationalist8 • The things that Merleau-Ponty is accused of lacking are often those 
that Derrida is, by contrast, said to possess, and vice versa. 
More specifically, in the collection of essays entitled Ecart and Differance: 
Merleau-Ponty and Derrida on Seeing and Writing9, and to a lesser extent, Merleau-
Ponty, Hermeneutics and Postmodernism10, the shared presupposition seems to be that 
proposition 6.54. 
7This claim is justified in chapter three, where I discuss the rather frequent accusations of semiological 
reductionism that phenomenologists bestow upon the work of Derrida. 
8Rather than condemning the work of Merleau-Ponty, deconstructionists usually just ignore it. There are, 
however, some notable exceptions, including Rodolphe Gasche, whose essay "Deconstruction as 
Criticism" acknowledges Merleau-Ponty as an important forerunner to deconstruction (see Gasche, R. , 
Inventions of Difference: On Jacques Derrida, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1994, p 29-30). 
David Farrell Krell's recent book also considers Merleau-Ponty at some length (see Krell, D. , The Purest of 
Bastards: Works of Art, Affirmation and Mourning in the Thought of Jacques Derrida, Pennsylvania: 
Pennsylvania University Press, 2000). 
9Dillon, M., ed. Ecart and Differance: Merleau-Ponty and Derrida on Seeing and Writing, Atlantic 
Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1997. 
10Busch, T. , & Gallagher, S. , eds. Merleau-Ponty, Hermeneutics and Postmodernism, Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1992. 
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Derrida and Merleau-Ponty are highly different, and even paradigmatically opposed. To 
summarise the otherwise multifarious and interesting literature, even the collection that 
has been written precisely in order to examine the relation of Merleau-Ponty's later 
philosophical notion of ecart (divergence) to Derridean differance quite vehemently ends 
up collectively asserting a disanalogy. Of course, it cannot be denied that there are many 
significant points of discord between these two philosophers, but contesting many of the 
oppositional presuppositions brought to bear upon the essays contained in these two 
volumes, as well as in many other texts, will be an enduring concern of this thesis. 
Merleau-Ponty and Derrida actually exhibit some curiously similar philosophical 
strategies in several important respects. Foremost amongst these similarities are aspects 
of their critique of the philosophy of reflection, as well as their espoused methodology for 
a 'philosophy' that might avoid the oppositional and dualistic hierarchies that they 
associate with it. Merleau-Ponty's notion of a "hyper-reflection" even pre-empts 
Derridean deconstruction in some important ways, in that both strategies point towards 
the necessity of a philosophical proposition containing contrary elements within it ( and 
do not seek an ultimate synthesis of these differences), and both also insist upon the 
impossibility of recapturing what might be termed the pre-reflective faith. Now, to persist 
with this type of comparative methodology risks effacing some of the considerable 
differences between the writings of Merleau-Ponty and Derrida, as well as unjustifiably 
problematising the respective identities of phenomenology and post-structuralism. 
However, it will be argued that the risk of this interpretive violence can not only be 
minimised, but is also worth taking, if their relationship is examined systematically in 
terms of two important and related thematic concerns - embodiment and alterity. 
Agreeing with Merleau-Ponty's enduring insight that conceptions of embodiment 
and alterity are intimately linked, this thesis will consider each philosopher in relation to 
areas with which they are not commonly associated- eg. Derrida on the body and 
Merleau-Ponty on alterity- in order to discover what insights considering them together 
might have. Such a methodology illustrates the complexity of their relationship, in that 
both Merleau-Ponty and Derrida make important contributions in regard to either issue. 
However, as well as suggesting that their relationship cannot be adequately characterised 
in a strictly oppositional way ( eg. phenomenologist versus post-structuralist), it will also 
be argued that there are some important differences between their respective approaches 
that are structurally contiguous whether contemplating embodiment or alterity. Rather 
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than existing in an antagonistic opposition, however, these thinkers ' differences can serve 
to supplement and enrich each other. 
In this respect, the more critical intention of this thesis will be to argue that 
Merleau-Ponty raises some important issues that are commonly ignored by 
deconstruction (the reverse also applies, but establishing that will not be a priority). 
Without resorting to a simplistic good/bad characterisation of these philosophers, one of 
the major arguments of the first half of this thesis is that Merleau-Ponty' s emphasis upon 
an embodied engagement in the world provides the tools to undertake a more critical 
examination of the 'undecidability' that Derrida argues is involved in all decision-
making. More specifically, it will be argued that due recognition of our habitual and 
embodied acquisition of skills is capable of reducing the aporetic difference between 
what precedes a decision and the instantiation of the decision itself. As will become 
apparent, this difference is an important aspect of Derrida's insistence upon the necessary 
"madness" involved in all decision-making. 
More generally, however, the first half of this thesis will argue that although 
Derrida is not a semiological reductionist, and although there is no a priori reason why 
deconstruction should not have considered embodiment more than it has thus far, his 
account of embodiment is nevertheless lacking in some important respects. It will 
eventually be suggested that this has some important consequences for his position in 
regard to the alterity of the other, and how it might be best respected, which will be the 
guiding concern of the second half of this thesis. 
Before summarising the argument in that respect, some explanation is necessary 
about why embodiment and alterity are significant issues beyond being helpful 
comparative tools which highlight that Merleau-Ponty and Derrida share a deep 
discontent with traditional philosophy (in the varying ways they conceive of it) and an 
all-pervasive doubt regarding reason's ability to tell us how to relate to the other. The 
main point to establish is that they are both repelled ethically, as much as philosophically, 
by the tradition that has preceded them, and while it is not in the exploration of the 
ethical that the majority of this thesis will reside, it is in the domain of ethics that it hopes 
to have at least some of its impo1i. Derrida has spent a lot of time interrogating what 
responsibility to the other might consist in, and he has repeatedly insisted that in the 
absence of some omniscient reason (ie. God, or the rational subject) capable of 
determining right from wrong in a simple and non-contingent way, ethical accounts of 
our relations with others can no longer focus upon providing Kantian or utilitarian-
inclined prescriptions on how we should relate to the other. While there are those who 
would dispute Derrida on such a point, I am in agreement with him to a significant 
extent. 
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Now, there are some important differences between Derrida and Merleau-Ponty' s 
respective accounts of responsibility towards alterity, but it is worth comparing the two 
positions, particularly given the rather pervasive acceptance of the Derridean position 
within certain schools of thought. Indeed, it will be argued that in various different texts, 
Derrida privileges a conception of responsibility towards alterity that involves respecting 
the aspects of the other that resist being known, and that resist being transformed or 
altered through interaction with the self, or subject, who is attempting to be responsible 
towards the other. While his Levinasian-inspired efforts to establish an alterity that 
cannot be reduced to a dialectic are an invaluable contribution to the philosophical 
tradition, it will be argued that his position at times goes a little too far and verges on 
becoming an 'agnosticism' in regard to the other (even when that alterity is envisaged as 
actually 'within' the self). Bereft of a sustained account of embodiment, Derrida inclines 
rather exclusively towards conceiving of responsibility along the lines of respecting the 
aspects of the other that are forever elusive, and this claim will be legitimised via an 
examination of several of his 'possible-impossible' aporias. 
However, Merleau-Ponty's embodied focus provides the resources for a different 
account of what responsibility to the other might consist in. His emphasis upon our 
eµibodied situation engenders a chiasmic conception of alterity, in which self and other 
are inevitably intertwined within one another, although never simply reducible to each 
other. One implication of Merleau-Ponty ' s ontology is that questions regarding the 
'otherness of the other' risk being abstractions that do not actually do justice to alterity. 
On the other hand, Denida only infrequently contemplates embodiment and his 
conception of alterity, particularly in his recent work, cannot be characterised as chiasmic 
in the way that this can be said of Merleau-Ponty. That their concerns are importantly 
different may seem axiomatic, but after arguing that Merleau-Ponty' s conception of 
alterity does not succumb to the "imperialism of the same" that Levinas has associated 
with phenomenology, this thesis will contend that responsibility towards alterity might be 
more productively conceived of as an imperative to transform the notions of self and 
other, rather than as the valorisation of that which resists such a transformation. While 
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Derrida at times makes similar claims, and certainly points towards the dual necessity of 
both of these ideas in his descriptions of the messianic and the wholly other (tout autre), 
it will be argued that an analysis of Merleau-Ponty's work provides the resources for 
engaging in a critique of Derrida for downplaying the more relational conception of 
alterity that is induced by a recognition of our embodied situation. The deconstructive 
insistence that writing is in and of the world, necessitates that it must also encounter a 
phenomenology that is intertwined with the world, and this thesis hence proposes the 
possibility of a Merleau-Ponty inspired philosophy that does not so avowedly seek to 
extricate itself from phenomenology, but that also cannot easily be dismissed as simply 
another instantiation of the metaphysics of presence. 
To summarise, this comparative juxtaposition of these two thinkers on the themes 
of embodiment and alterity intends to accomplish several things: 
1. It will argue that Derrida's criticisms of phenomenology, particularly in regard 
to its being a metaphysics of presence, need not apply to Merleau-Ponty' s 
phenomenology. 
2. It will argue that Derrida's conception of alterity in his later philosophy cannot 
extricate itself from phenomenological concerns quite as easily as he sometimes seems to 
believe. 
3. It will highlight that Derrida's descriptions of responsibility towards alterity are 
not the only way left for a non-metaphysical philosophy, and that there are some salient 
political and ethical reasons for choosing a Merleau-Ponty inspired alternative that 
accords due attention to our embodied situation. 
If this summary seems to reinstate an oppositional logic between Merleau-Ponty 
and Derrida, this is partly due to the 'nature' of an introduction11 • In the main body of this 
text, it should become clear that rather than Merleau-Ponty simply being correct at the 
expense of Derrida, a more sophisticated thinking regarding both embodiment and 
alterity needs to be able to conceive of a relationship between their somewhat different 
concerns that is not one of exclusion. Doing away with such oppositional tendencies 
11 According to Hegel, it is inappropriate to offer the prospective reader reflections on a work that he or she 
has not yet read. He also argues that it is impossible to summarise a philosophical work that is, if of any 
merit, always inseparable from its detailed textual development (Hegel, G. , Hegel's Phenomenology of 
Spirit, trans. Miller, New York: Oxford University Press, 1977, p 1). Of course, an introduction is also a 
necessary and unavoidable 'evil' , and one that we might, in the spirit ofDerridean deconstruction, suggest 
always already inhabits and corrupts the purity that philosophy seeks by revealing it as inherently textual 
( cf. D 9-20). 
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promises to reawaken us to those more institutive and emancipatory aspects of 
philosophy ( eg. "philosophy as a power and adventure of the question itself '12) that have 
become partly obscured by the intricate systems of oppositions and exclusionary tactics 
that the focus upon narrative stories regarding the history of philosophy has induced. This 
thesis hence hopes to enable a discussion that will move beyond a mere comparative 
account of two important theorists, and into an analysis of embodiment, alterity, and how 
we are best to conceive of their inter-relation; a project that promises to be of mutual 
benefit to both phenomenologists and deconstructionists alike. 
12Derrida, J. , as cited in Patrick, M. , Derrida, Responsibility and Politics, Ashgate Publishing, Avebury 
Series in Philosophy, Aldershot, 1997, p 5. 
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PART 1: EMBODIMENT 
Chapter 2: Merleau-Ponty, the Body-Subject, and the Disciplining of Reflection 
Focusing on Phenomenology of Perception, this chapter introduces Merleau-Ponty's 
lifelong project of seeking to avoid traditional philosophical dichotomies, which he 
represents as intellectualism and empiricism. This background is important, not least 
because it will allow a direct comparison with Derrida's strategies in regard to 
oppositions, but also because the embodied focus that Merleau-Ponty presents in this text 
is retained throughout his career. It will be argued that his concern with embodiment is an 
important factor in his conception of responsibility towards alterity that will, to some 
extent, be privileged in the latter half of this thesis. This chapter will hence involve 
consideration of the mind-body dualism that his notion of the body-subject attempts to 
overcome, as well as a discussion of other important themes of his text, including 
perception, the habitual activity of the body-subject, and the ambiguity that he has 
insisted is a necessary component of our embodied existence. 
Chapter 3: The Deconstruction of Oppositions: Speech-Writing, Mind-Body 
This chapter discusses the ways in which Derrida's philosophical career has also been an 
attempt to come to terms with the dualisms that have typified the W estem tradition. 
While there are some important differences between his and Merleau-Ponty's respective 
treatments of opposition, Derrida's famous refutation of the speech-writing hierarchy will 
be examined in order to ascertain what this might indicate about his treatment of 
dualisms more generally. Although Derrida rarely comments directly on embodiment, by 
establishing his general strategies for dealing with oppositions this chapter will enable 
some reflection on how deconstruction might approach the particularities of the mind-
body dualism. In this respect, some key notions from Of Grammatology will require 
explication, including the trace, differance, arche-writing, and the supplement. It will be 
argued that although deconstruction does not necessarily affect a reduction to the 
linguistic, Derrida does exhibit a reticence to thematise embodiment that is characteristic 
of his writings throughout much of his career. 
Moreover, in Of Grammatology, he also makes some enigmatic comments about 
the mind-body problematic being analogous to the speech-writing problematic, and it is 
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necessary to consider these statements because they are the basis for the more embodied 
interpretation of deconstruction that Vicki Kirby presents, and which will be examined in 
chapter four. By analysing such suggestions, this chapter will also broach the question 
about why Derrida goes to such lengths to distance deconstruction from the 
phenomenological tradition with which his career began. 
Chapter 4: Kirby, 'Corporeography', and the Question of an Embodied 
Deconstruction 
This chapter will contribute to the previous one in a more concrete way via a 
consideration of Vicki Kirby's book Telling Flesh , which tentatively proposes a 
deconstructive notion of embodiment. While Derrida' s treatment of dualisms does have 
some important consequences for embodiment, this chapter will highlight places where 
Kirby tries to make more use of Derridean material than she is justified in doing, and also 
reveal where some of her formulations become heavily reliant upon aphorisms. 
Moreover, it will be argued that these enigmatic formulations can be more fruitfully filled 
in by the philosophy of Merleau-Ponty- and in particular the reversibility thesis that is 
evident in The Visible and the Invisible - than by the work of Derrida. It will be 
concluded that although Derrida can be a helpful resource in such matters, the idea of 
"matter being generative through differentiation with itself ' requires a more embodied 
focus than his philosophy ever actually supplies, and that Kirby' s account would have 
been richer for the 'presence' of Merleau-Ponty. 
Chapter 5: The Later Philosophy of Merleau-Ponty and the Metaphysics of 
Presence 
This chapter will argue that the "indirect" ontology involved in The Visible and the 
Invisible cannot be refen·ed to as merely another version of the metaphysics of presence. 
Moreover, Derrida 's general criticisms of phenomenology for harbouring a nostalgia for 
a temporal 'now' moment, do not gain a critical purchase upon Merleau-Ponty' s later 
philosophy. This needs to be established if his philosophy is to be accorded the position 
that it warrants in the current intellectual climate, and if we are to take seriously the 
notion of responsibility towards alterity that will eventually be attributed to him. 
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Merleau-Ponty's notion of a "hyper-dialectic" is actually quite closely related to 
Derrida's own refusal to indulge in dialectic, and there is a curious convergence between 
these two thinkers in regard to some important aspects of their treatment of dualisms, and 
of their relationship to philosophy more generally. 
Chapter Sb: The Punctum Caecum: Memoirs of the Blind and The Visible and the 
Invisible 
In 1991, Derrida published Memoirs of the Blind, and considered the work of Merleau-
Ponty at length. This chapter will explore Derrida's text and the paradoxical blindness 
that he discerns in the vision of the painter, before considering how Derrida relates this to 
Merleau-Ponty's own thesis regarding the invisibility that must always partake in the 
visible. Once more, some important similarities between their respective positions are 
revealed that serve to augment the argument that Merleau-Ponty's philosophy does not 
conform to the metaphysics of presence, but there is also a difference between their 
positions that will become important. While both thinkers insist upon the necessary 
blindness that must accompany all sight ( the punctum caecum of the retina), Derrida 
verges on legitimising an absolute invisibility that has nothing whatsoever to do with 
visibility, and Merleau-Ponty denies this in his own account. This difference is important 
because it will be replicated in their respective conceptions of responsibility towards 
alterity, and it will eventually be argued that Merleau-Ponty's position is the more 
satisfactory. 
Chapter 6: Habituality and Undecidability: A Comparison of Merleau-Ponty and 
Derrida on the Decision 
This chapter will examine a point of dissension in their respective accounts of decision-
making. Merleau-Ponty's early philosophy emphasises the body-subject's tendency to 
seek an equilibrium with the world (by acquiring skills and establishing what he refers to 
as "intentional arcs"), and hence towards deciding in an embodied and habitual manner 
that minimises any confrontation with a decision-making aporia. On the other hand, in his 
later writings Derrida frequently points to a constitutive 'undecidability' involved in 
decision-making. He insists that a decision, if it is to genuinely be a decision, must 
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involve a leap beyond all prior preparations. One must always decide without any 
equilibrium or stability, and yet these are precisely the things that Merleau-Ponty claims 
that our body moves us towards. This chapter will explore the significance of this 
disparity, and while it is not an either/or situation, many of Merleau-Ponty's insights 
challenge Derrida's conception of the undecidability involved in decision-making. This 
becomes most obvious when comparing the decision-making processes of those expert in 
a particular field to those who are merely competent (eg. chess), and it will be argued that 
Derrida's later philosophy, like his earlier philosophy, is hence at some distance from 
considering embodiment in any sustained way. 
PART 2: THE OTHER 
Chapter 7: Solipsism and the Master-Slave Dialectic: An Onto-Ethical Dissonance 
between Sartre and Merleau-Ponty 
This chapter analyses Merleau-Ponty' s criticisms of Sartre's master-slave dialectic, as 
they appear in Phenomenology of Perception and The Visible and the Invisible. As well 
as asserting that Sartrean conflict must always presuppose something shared, Merleau-
Ponty argues that Sartre's position marks the triumph of a "disguised solipsism". He 
thinks that Sartre's "agnosticism in regard to the other's alterity" (they are nothing but a 
threat) is, paradoxically, the worst of infringements upon it. Instead, Merleau-Ponty's 
conception of responsibility towards alterity emphasises the ways in which self and other 
are chiasmically inte1iwined with one another. 
A significant question for this thesis will be to what extent Derrida's own 
exaltation of alterity might also be referred to as "agnostic" and as being symptomatic of 
a "disguised solipsism". While Derrida's position does not result in the other being 
nothing but a threat, chapters nine and ten will argue that there are some questions worth 
asking about his more recent conception of alterity, which like the Sartrean account, can 
actually be envisaged as denying the importance of the ways in which self and other are 
intertwined together. Moreover, what is significant about Merleau-Ponty's criticisms of 
Satire, is that he argues that Sartre's mistakes are intimately tied to his ontology and to a 
dualistic split between mind and body. While Derrida will not be accused of partaking in 
a simple dualism ( deconstruction is predicated upon revealing dualisms as always already 
breached), it has been established that he is reluctant to talk about embodiment and this 
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has consequences for his conception of responsibility towards alterity. 
Chapter 8 (a & b ): Merleau-Ponty, Levinas, and the Alterity of the Other 
Suggesting that phenomenology results in an "imperialism of the same" that considers 
the other only in terms of their effect upon the subject, rather than in their genuine 
alterity, Levinas initiates a line of thought that can still be discerned in the work of 
Foucault, Derrida and Claude Lefort. However, it will be argued that Merleau-Ponty's 
work is capable of avoiding this line of criticism, and that his position is an important 
alternative to the more dominant Derridean and Levinasian conceptions of alterity. 
Moreover, this chapter will also extricate Merleau-Ponty from Levinas' claim that his 
philosophy is "sustained by an unaccountable affection". Rather than ignoring the alterity 
of the other, and also without presupposing some primordial affectionate bond with the 
other, Merleau-Ponty explicates an interesting conception of what responsibility towards 
the 'otherness of the other' should consist in. Basically, he insists upon the way in which 
self and other are always already intertwined together ( or reversible), and suggests that 
respecting the alterity of the other should involve the imperative to further immerse 
oneself in this transformative bond - to transform what we think of as self, and also what 
we think of as 'other'. In filling out this claim, consideration will be given to both The 
Visible and the Invisible (part a), as well as his reflections on the task of reading in his 
abandoned text, The Prose of the World (paii b ). 
Chapter 9: The Other of Derridean Deconstruction: Levinas, Phenomenology, and 
the Problem of Responsibility 
This chapter examines an aporia that is discernible in Derrida's more recent writings: that 
is, the tension his work bears between emphasising an absolute and irrecuperable alterity 
that is always deferred and always "to come", and his simultaneous insistence that the 
other is always already within the self. These two aspects of his treatment of alterity do 
not necessarily contradict one another, but it will be argued that Derrida inclines towards 
a position that is not dissimilar to that which ·we might attribute to Levinas, and this 
despite Derrida's quite significant criticisms of Levinas throughout his career - most 
notably in "Violence and Metaphysics". However, Derrida's position need not be 
uncritically accepted, and this chapter will implicitly draw comparison with Merleau-
Ponty' s account. 
More specifically, this chapter will undertake an analysis of Th e Gift of Death. 
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Abraham's sacrifice of his son upon Mt Moriah exemplifies an aporia that Derrida 
associates with all responsibility - that being the dual imperatives between responsibility 
before a singular other ( eg. a loved one, or God) and a more general responsibility before 
all others. However, it will be argued that Derrida p1ioritises the first aspect of 
responsibility in his repeated insistence upon a "radical singularity", and this chapter will 
ask some questions about the validity of such a move, and express some dissatisfaction 
with Derrida 's account of responsibility towards alterity. In this text, it seems to depend 
on reinstalling a self-other binarism, and although such a charge is difficult to sustain 
against him on a more general level, it will be argued that his conception of responsibility 
towards the other prioritises the aspects of them that cannot be known - that is, the 
messianic aspects of the other which must prove elusive. It will be argued that although 
such aspects of responsibility are important, they also need to be counterbalanced by 
other more phenomenological considerations (ie. a relational conception of alterity) , and 
ones that are more closely aligned with the chiasmic ontology that Merleau-Ponty 
theorises. 
Chapter 10: Possible and Impossible, Self and Other, and the Reversibility of 
Merleau-Ponty and Derrida 
This chapter will conclude via reflection upon some of Derrida's 'possible-impossible ' 
aporias that have yet to be considered in any detail, including his discussions of giving, 
hospitality, forgiving, and mou1ning. He argues that the condition of the possibility of 
such themes is also, and at once, the condition of their impossibility. In order to reveal 
the shared logic upon which these aporias rely, and also to raise some questions about 
their persuasive efficacy, it will be argued that of the two polarities evoked by each of his 
possible-impossible aporias, one term of the opposition invariably posits a separation 
between "two radical singularities", or in somewhat more controversial terms, between a 
self and an other. In this respect, it will be argued that Merleau-Ponty ' s abiding emphasis 
upon the chiasmic intertwining of self and other provides the resources to challenge the 
aporetic oscillation between possible and impossible that Derrida so frequently 
delineates. 
Moreover, it will be highlighted that Derrida's methodology again equivocates 
between two main alternatives: he either remains within a possible-impossible aporia 
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( and hence implies that there is no way of escaping the paradox in which all giving is also 
always a taking); or he becomes prophetic in the face of this aporia, and hence tacitly 
privileges a rather absolute conception of an alterity (tout autre) that might yet come and 
disrupt this calculative exchange. It will be argued that Merleau-Ponty would accuse the 
latter tendency of being tantamount to an "agnosticism in regard to the other", and his 
philosophy also has some correlative implications regarding the problem of the alterity of 
the other. The important differences that obtain between Merleau-Ponty and Derrida' s 
respective treatments of alterity will be teased out via discussions of two of Derrida's 
texts - On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness, and Me,noires:for Paul De Man. 
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PART 1: EMBODIMENT 
2. Merleau-Ponty, the Body-Subject, and the Disciplining of Reflection 
When asked about whether he was contemplating retirement on account of illness and the 
ravages of advancing age, Pope John Paul II confirmed that he was and bemoaned the 
fact that "my body is no longer a docile instrument, but a cage"13 • While it is difficult to 
deny that a docile and easily manipulable body might be preferable to its decaying 
alternative - a body that prevents us acting as we wish - both positions are united by a 
rather literal adherence to the mind-body duality, and the subordination of one term of 
that duality. Of course, such a dualistic metaphysics and the denunciation of the body that 
it usually entails is not restricted to religious traditions. This denigration of embodiment 
governs most philosophical thought until at least Nietzsche. Even Heidegger's attempts at 
inaugurating a 'post-metaphysical' phenomenology, for all of their considerable merits, 
have been accused of deferring the question of the body14 • Evaluating such a claim is 
beyond the scope of this thesis, but it cannot be denied that issues regarding embodiment 
have presented something of a problem for the philosophical tradition, and David Levin 
has concluded that this implies that if we seek to move "beyond metaphysics, our new 
and more radical thinking must pass the trial posed by the human body"15• While there 
are good reasons to be wary of any philosopher who too quickly seeks to get beyond 
metaphysics 16, an exploration of the significance of our non-dualistic experience (which 
must nevertheless retain a divergence) is a project of some importance, and it is one that 
preoccupied Merleau-Ponty throughout his career. 
While a major figure in French phenomenology, Merleau-Ponty, at least until 
relatively recently, has rarely been accorded the amount of attention of many of his 
13 The Age Newspaper, 15/1/2000, Reuters, p 24. 
14Levin, D., The Body's Recollection of Being: Phenomenological Psychology and the Deconstruction of 
Nihilism, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985, p 60. According to Levin, Heidegger fails to think of 
the body as instantiating the ontic-ontological difference. Instead, he claims that Heidegger either thinks of 
the body ontically, or he asks the ontological question about the essence of our body. For Levin, the first 
method is inadequate for ontological thought, but so is the absolute ontology of the second, whose 
grammar "of essence tends to stand opposite the body" and hence perpetuates the hierarchical tendencies 
of the metaphysical tradition in which the body is rendered inessential and derivative. 
15Levin, D. , The Body's Recollection of Being, p 47. 
16By insisting that we must break out of metaphysics through more attentively thinking "the concreteness, 
specificity and immediacy" of our embodied existence, Levin, in my opinion, perpetuates a nostalgia for 
origins - the very essence of metaphysics. The arguments of this thesis are importantly distinct from the 
simple opposition of the body to metaphysics that he propounds. See Levin, D. , The Body's Recollection of 
Being, p 43. 
23 
compatriots. This has been a considerable oversight, as it is doubtful that any other 
philosopher, phenomenologist or otherwise, has ever paid such sustained attention to the 
significance of the body in relation to the self, to the world, and to others. There is no 
aspect of his phenomenology that does not implicate the body, or what he terms the 
body-subject, and more significantly, his descriptions of the constitutive ambiguity of the 
body-subject are an important attempt to overcome the mind-body dualism. As will soon 
become apparent, they allow us to reconceive the problem of embodiment in terms of the 
body's practical capacity to act, rather than in terms of any essential trait 17 • 
In Phenomenology of Perception, which is arguably his major work, Merleau-
Ponty sets about exposing the problematic nature of traditional philosophical 
dichotomies, and in particular that apparently age-old dualism involving the mind and the 
body. It is no accident that consideration of this dualism plays such an important role in 
all of his work, since the constitution of the body as an 'object' is also a pivotal moment 
in the construction of the idea of an objective world that exists 'out there' (PP 72). Once 
this conception of the body is problematised, so too, according to Merleau-Ponty, is the 
whole idea of an outside world that is entirely distinguishable from the thinking subject. 
Merleau-Ponty criticises the tendency of philosophy to fall within two main 
categories, neither of which is capable of shedding much light on the problems that it 
seeks to address. He is critical of the rationalist, Cartesian accounts of humanity, as well 
as of the more empirical and behaviouristic attempts to designate the human condition. 
Rationalism is problematic because it ignores our situation, and consequently the 
contingent nature of thought, when it makes the world, or at least meaning, the immanent 
property of the reflecting mind. One quote from Descartes is particularly illustrative of 
this type of attitude: 
If I chance to look out of the window onto men passing in the street, I do not fail 
to say, on seeing them, that I see men ... and yet, what do I see from this window, 
other than hats and cloaks, which cover ghosts or dummies who move only by 
means of springs? But I judge them to be really men, and thus I understand, by 
the sole power of judgement that resides in my mind, what I believed I saw with 
my eyes 18• 
17Dreyfus, H., & Dreyfus, S., "The Challenge ofMerleau-Ponty ' s Phenomenology of Embodiment for 
Cognitive Science" in Perspectives on Embodiment: The Intersections of Nature and Culture, eds. Haber & Weiss, London: Routledge, 1999, p 103-19. 
18Descartes, R. , Meditations on First Philosophy, trans. Cottingham, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
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Descartes' prioritising of the mental above the physical ( and indeed the duality itself) is 
obvious here and this is something that Merleau-Ponty strongly rejects. As well as being 
unjust to existential experience, it also leaves the problem of meaningful judgement 
untouched. The account presupposes the meaningful judgement of hats and cloaks, rather 
than explaining how this perception could actually be meaningful 19• We will return to 
such criticisms of Cartesianism, but for the moment it is more important to have an 
accurate understanding of where Merleau-Ponty situates his philosophy, than it is to have 
a systematic comprehension of exactly why he refutes rationalism, or what he 
synonymously terms "intellectualism". 
According to Merleau-Ponty, empiricism also makes our cultural world an 
illusion. For him, perception is not merely the result of the functioning of individual 
organs, but also a vital and performative human act in which 'I' perceive through the 
relevant organs. Each of the senses informs the others in virtue of their common 
behavioural project, or concern with a certain human endeavour, and perception is 
inconceivable without this complementary functioning. Empiricism generally ignores this 
and Merleau~ Ponty contends that whatever their efficacy in explaining certain 
phenomena, these type of scientific and analytic causalities cannot actually appraise 
meaning and human action. As one critic points out: "if we attempt to localise and 
sectionalise the various activities which manifest themselves at the bodily level, we lose 
the signification of the action itself'20 • In the terms of Merleau-Ponty' s later philosophy, 
such an analysis would "recuperate everything except itself as an effort of recuperation, it 
would clarify everything except its own role" (VI 33). 
The main point to extract from this is that, for Merleau-Ponty, both empiricism 
and intellectualism are eminently flawed positions: 
In the first case consciousness is too poor, in the second too rich for any 
phenomenon to appeal compellingly to it. Empiricism cannot see that we need to 
know what we are looking for, otherwise we would not be looking for it, and 
Press, 1986, p 21. This quotation is also cited in Crossley, N. , The Politics of Subjectivity: Between 
Foucault and Merleau-Ponty, Aldershot, England: Brookfield, USA, Avebury Series in Philosophy, 1994, p 10. I will refer to Crossley quite frequently in this chapter because he provides one of the best accounts 
of the embodied habituality that is such an important factor in Merleau-Ponty 's early philosophy. I will 
also re-employ two of Crossley' s particularly well-chosen citations of Merleau-Ponty, although both times for quite different purposes. 
19Crossley, N. , p 10. 
20Barral, M ., Merleau-Ponty: The Role of the Body-Subject in Interpersonal Relations, Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1965, p 94. 
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intellectualism fails to see that we need to be ignorant of what we are looking for, 
or equally again we should not be searching (PP 28). 
It is not difficult to see why Merleau-Ponty would be preoccupied with undermining such 
dichotomous tendencies. Essentially it ensures that one exists as a constituting thing 
(subject) or as a thing (object). Moreover, that perennial philosophical debate regarding 
whether humanity is free or determined is more than tangentially related, and all of these 
issues are inextricably intertwined in what Foucault aptly terms the "empirico-
transcendental doublet of modem thought"2 1• This ontological dualism of immanence and 
transcendence - see mind/body, thought/language, self/world, inside/outside - is at the 
forefront of all of Merleau-Ponty's attempts to re-orientate philosophy. 
As Stephen Priest points out, while Merleau-Ponty does not simplistically deny 
the possibility of cognitive relations between subject and object that underpins this 
doublet, he does repudiate the suggestion that these facts are phenomenologically 
primitive22 • It may be useful, in a particular situation, to conceive of a seer and a seen, a 
subject and an object. Many scientific endeavours fruitfully rely upon the methodological 
ideaf of a detached consciousness observing brute facts about the world. Merleau-Ponty 
can accommodate this, provided that the terms of such dualities are recognised as 
relationally constituted. In other words, for him, the seer and the seen condition one 
another and, of course, there is an obvious sense in which our capacity for seeing does 
depend on our capacity for being seen - that is, being physically embodied in what 
Merleau-Ponty has occasionally described as an "inter-individual" world23 • 
In this repudiation of traditional metaphysical philosophy and its governing 
subject-object relationship, it is unsurprising that when speaking of his phenomenological 
method, Merleau-Ponty suggests that "the demand for a pure description excludes equally 
the procedure of analytical reflection on the one hand, and that of scientific explanation 
on the other" (PP ix). Only by avoiding these tendencies, according to him, can we 
21 Foucault, M., The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, trans. anon, New York: 
Vintage Books, 1970, p xiv. Foucault's discussion of the "empirico-transcendental doublet" points towards 
a roughly similar bifurcation in the philosophical tradition to that which Merleau-Ponty discerns between intellectualism and empiricism. One major difference, however, is that Foucault considers Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology to remain within the either/or tendencies of the philosophical tradition, and while this 
thesis will not explore Foucault's own argument in this regard, the Derridean variation upon this argument is considered in chapter five. 
22Priest, S., Merleau-Ponty, London: Routledge, 1998, p 49 . 23Silverman, H., Inscriptions: Between Phenomenology and Structuralism, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1987, p 73. As Silverman suggests, by using this term Merleau-Ponty is simply trying to avoid 
remaining within the metaphysical tradition by categorising our relations with others as either 
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"rediscover, as anterior to the ideas of subject and object, the fact of my subjectivity and 
the nascent object, that primordial layer at which both things and ideas come into being" 
(PP 219). 
Phenomenology of Perception is hence united by the claim that we are our bodies, 
and that our lived experience of this body denies the detachment of subject from object, 
mind from body, etc. (PP xii). In this embodied state of being, where the ideational and 
the material are intimately linked, human existence cannot be conflated into any 
particular paradigm, as "there is no meaning which is not embodied, nor any matter that 
is not meaningful"24 • It should be clear from this, that Merleau-Ponty's statement that 'I 
am my body' cannot simply be interpreted as advocating a physicalist, behaviourist type 
position. He does not deny or ignore those aspects of our life that are commonly called 
the 'mental' - and what would be left if he did? - but he does want to suggest that the use 
of this 'mind' is inseparable from our bodily, situated, and physical nature. According to 
Elizabeth Grosz, this means simply that the perceiving mind is an incarnated body25, or as 
another commentator recognises, "he enriches the concept of the body to allow it to think, 
to perceive"26 . It is also for these reasons that we are best served by ref erring to the 
individual as not simply a body, but as a body-subject27 • 
The Phenomenology of Perception is almost entirely devoted to illustrating that 
the body cannot be viewed solely as an object or material entity of the world. Perception 
has been a prominent theme in Merleau-Ponty's efforts to establish this, and even in his 
latest work he still holds its primacy as our clearest relationship to Being, and in which 
the inadequacy of dualistic thinking is most explicitly revealed. However, despite the 
titles of two of his major works (Phenomenology of Perception and The Primacy of 
Perception), for Merleau-Ponty, perception, at least as the term is usually construed, is 
paradoxically not really a guiding principle in his work. This is because the practical 
modes of action of the body-subject are inseparable from the perceiving body-subject (or 
at least mutually informing), since it is precisely through the body that we have access to 
the world. Nick Crossley conveys this idea well when he suggests that "perception ... 
involves the perceiving subject in a situation, rather than positioning them as a 
intersubjective or interobjective. 
24Crossley, N. , p 14. 
25Grosz, E. , Volatile Bodies: Towards a Corporeal Feminism, Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1994. 
26Priest, S., p 50. 
27Langer, M. , Merleau-Ponty 's Phenomenology of Perception: A Guide and a Commentary, Hampshire: 
MacMillan Press, 1989. 
spectator"28 • There is hence an interconnection of action and perception, or as Merleau-
Ponty puts it, "every perceptual habit is still a motor habit" (PP 153 ). 
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This ensures that there is no lived distinction between the act of perceiving and 
the thing perceived. This will become clearer when his later philosophy is considered, as 
the figure of the chiasm becomes an important ontological motif for explaining how and 
why this is the case. At this stage, however, it suffices to recognise that, for Merleau-
Ponty, "in the natural attitude, I do not have perceptions" (PP 281 ). Moreover, in his 
final, unfinished work, The Visible and the Invisible, he states that "we exclude the term 
perception to the whole extent that it already implies a cutting up of what is lived into 
discontinuous acts, or a reference to things whose status is not specified, or simply an 
opposition between the visible and the invisible" (VI 157-8). Hence, as Gary Madison 
has pointed out, "what traditionally has been referred to as 'perception', no longer figures 
in Merleau-Ponty's post-foundationalist mode of thinking"29, and Derrida' s insistence 
that there is no such phenomenon as perception is also not as divergent a line of thought 
as is commonly presumed30 • 
Deferring any sustained consideration of the relationship between these two 
French thinkers until forthcoming chapters, to the degree that we can actually speak of 
Merleau-Ponty' s account of perception, it essentially suggests the same thing as the rest 
of his work: it criticises the tendency of philosophy to bifurcate between two positions. 
As Merleau-Ponty suggests: 
We started off from a world in itself, which acted upon our eyes so as to cause us 
to see it, and now we have consciousness of, or thought about the world, but the 
nature of the world remains unchanged; it is still defined by the absolute mutual 
exteriority of its parts, and is merely duplicated throughout its extent by a thought 
which sustains it (PP 39). 
As well as objecting to this kind of dichotomy, Merleau-Ponty is also concerned with the 
common perceptual paradigm that firstly involves passively seeing something, and then 
requires that brute biological perception to be interpreted. Such an account presumes that 
28Crossley, N. , p 13. 
29Madison, G. , "Did Merleau-Ponty Have a Theory of Perception?" inMerleau-Ponty, Hermeneutics and 
Postmodernism, eds. Busch & Gallagher, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992, p 83. 
30Derrida has famously stated: "I don 't know what perception is, and I don' t believe that anything like 
perception exists" (See Derrida, J. , "Structure, Sign and Play in the Human Discourse of Human Sciences" 
in The Structuralist Controversy, eds. Macksey & Donato, Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 
1972, p 272). He also propounds a similar argument in Speech and Phenomena (trans. Allison, Evanston: 
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one exists either as a thing or as a consciousness (PP 198), but according to him, the 
perceiving body-subject conforms to neither of these positions; its mode of existence is 
manifestly more complicated and ambiguous. As hard as we may try, we cannot see the 
broken shards of a beer bottle as simply the sum of its colour, shape, etc. The whole 
background apparatus of what that bottle is used for, what consuming the liquids 
contained therein means for different people, and what it is for something to be 'broken', 
comes with, and not behind, our perception of that bottle. For Merleau-Ponty, perception 
cannot be characterised as a type of thought in a classical, reflective sense, but equally 
clearly it is also far from being a third person process where we attain access to a rarefied, 
pure object. Just as for Heidegger, we cannot hear pure noise, but always a noise of some 
activity 1, the objects that we encounter in the world are always of a particular kind and 
relevant to certain human intentions ( explicit or otherwise), and we cannot step outside 
this instrumentality to some realm of purified objects, or for that matter thought. 
Perception then, is not merely passive before sensory stimulation, but as Merleau-
Ponty suggests, is a "creative receptivity". In this respect, it is interesting to observe that 
our modem vernacular incorporates this more 'active' and appropriative dimension of 
perception. After all, one is often commended for 'perceptive' observations, and for this 
to function as a compliment at all, it must admit of an individual's creative influence and 
hence some responsibility over the manner in which they perceive. 
More empirically, it is worth pointing out that if we were merely passive before a 
sensory image it would not be possible to see different aspects of things as we so often 
do, or for different individuals to construe a particular representation differently. 
Consider Jastrow's/Wittgenstein's famous example in which a picture can be variously 
interpreted as a duck or a rabbit32 , or the ubiquitous psychological diagram that highlights 
Northwestern University Press, 1973, p 75 , 104, 154). 
31Heidegger, M. , Being and Time, trans. Macquarie & Robinson, London: SCM Press, 1962, p 207. A 
detailed examination of the relationship that Merleau-Ponty 's work bears to Heidegger would take us too 
far afield of our main purposes, but at least on the most obvious level, there is a sirrularity in their 
respective notions of the pre-reflective cogito and what Heidegger terms the ready-to-hand. Both notions 
affirm the way in which objects, sounds, or even environments generally, are construed first in terms of 
their practical and instrumental relation to the perceiver - all other modes of knowing are subsidiary to this 
everyday understanding, and this is something that Merleau-Ponty also emphasises through the priority 
that he accords to the "I can", rather than the "I think" (PP 13 7). For a detailed exposition of the 
Heideggerian distinction between the ready-to-hand, the present-to-hand (the mode of understanding where 
entities become material objects rather than practical tools), and the even more subsidiary mode of pure-
presence-to-hand, see Hanna, R. , "On the Sublirruty of Logic: A Heideggerian Analysis" in The Monist, 
April 1996, Vol. 69, no. 2. 
32Wittgenstein, L. , Philosophical Investigations, trans. Anscombe, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1996, section 
2, p 194e. For a more detailed account of Wittgenstein 's contributions to perception and what he thinks is 
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the capacity of an individual to see a vase at one moment and two faces confronting one 
another at the next, depending upon which part of the diagram they determine to be the 
background. These experiential studies reinforce Merleau-Ponty' s fundamental point that 
we are not simply passive before sensorial stimulation, since the visual experience seems 
to change and yet nothing changes optically with respect to colour, shape, or distance. 
What we literally see or notice is hence not simply the objective world, but is conditioned 
by a myriad of factors that ensures the relationship between perceiving subject and the 
object perceived is not one of exclusion. Rather, each term exists only through its 
dialectical relation to the other, and from this analysis of the perceiving body-subject, 
Merleau-Ponty enigmatically concludes that "inside and outside are inseparable. The 
world is wholly inside and I am wholly outside myself' (PP 407). 
Without digressing to consider the proximity of such sentiments to some of those 
proposed by Derrida, particularly in Of Grammatology, for Merleau-Ponty this 
inseparability of inner and outer ensures that a study of the perceived ends up revealing 
the subject perceiving. It is precisely this ambiguous intertwining of inner and outer, as it 
is revealed in a phenomenological analysis of the body, which the intellectualism of 
philosophy cannot appreciate. According to Merleau-Ponty, philosophers of reflection 
ignore the paradoxical condition of all human subjectivity: that is, the fact that we are 
both a part of the world and coextensive with it, constituting but also constituted (PP 
453). However, if perception is not grounded in either an objective or subjective 
component (ie. it is not objectively received before a subjective interpretation), but by a 
reciprocal openness that resides between such categories, this would seem to endow 
perception with an instability that it clearly does not have. 
Merleau-Ponty caters for this stability through the body's tendency to seek an 
equilibrium through skilful coping, or what he often terms habituality33 • To summarise, 
he affinns how perception is learnt, primarily through imitation, in an embodied and 
communal environment. While perception is subject to change, just as communities can 
involved in "seeing an aspect", see Budd, M. , Wittgenstein 's Philosophy of Psychology, London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1989. 
33While they are involved in substantially different philosophical projects, Merleau-Ponty ' s discussions of 
habituality appear to play a curiously similar role in his philosophy to that which the concept of mastering 
a technique does for Wittgenstein. Both notions refer to a type of skilful activity that is not simply ignorant 
or non-reflective, and yet which also allows of no recourse to 'mentalistic ' terms. See Wittgenstein, L. , 
Philosophical Investigations, sections 150, 199 & 209. While a more sustained examination of the 
equivalences and divergences of their respective notions promises to be an interesting project, it cannot be 
attempted here. 
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change over periods of time, this possibility does not allow for wild fluctuations in 
perceptive experience from one moment to the next. Habit, and the production of 
schemes in regard to the body' s mobilisation, "gives our life the form of generality and 
prolongs our personal acts into stable dispositions" (PP 146). This tendency of our body 
to seek its own equilibrium and to form habits is an important component of Merleau-
Ponty' s philosophy, and it is a theme that will be returned to in chapter six. 
For the moment, however, it is necessary to tum to other manifestations of 
Merleau-Ponty' s argument for the body-subject. Another idea of central significance for 
him, is the fact that the body is always there and that its absence (and to a certain degree 
also its variation) is inconceivable (PP 91 ). It means that we cannot treat the body as an 
object available for perusal, which can or cannot be part of our world, since it is not 
something that we can possibly do without. It is the mistake of classical psychology, not 
to mention the empiricism of all sciences, that it treats the body as an object, when for 
Merleau-Ponty, an object "is an object only insofar as it can be moved away from me ... 
Its presence is such that it entails a possible absence. Now the permanence of my body is 
entirely different in kind" (PP 90). It is difficult to fault this claim that the omnipresence 
of our body prevents us treating it simply as an object of the world, even though such an 
apparently axiomatic position is not always recognised by traditional philosophy as we 
have seen exemplified by Descartes. 
Another factor against conceiving of the body as being completely constituted and 
an object in-itself, is the fact that it is that by which there are objects. Our motility 
testifies that the body cannot be the mere servant of consciousness, since "in order that 
we may be able to move our body towards an object, the object must first exist for it, our 
body must not belong to the realm of the in-itself ' (PP 139). This Kantian term (in-itself), 
which was later appropriated by Sartre, will be given more attention in later chapters, but 
for the moment it is sufficient to note that Merleau-Ponty is simply making explicit that 
the aspects of an object revealed to an individual are dependent upon their bodily 
position. 
Moreover, for Merleau-Ponty, we are not accorded quite the same privilege in 
viewing our own bodies as we have in viewing other ' objects ' . This is because "the 
presentation of objects in perspective cannot be understood except through the resistance 
of my body to all variation of perspective" (PP 92, cf. VI 9). We cannot see our own 
body as the other does, and it seems relatively clear that we do need the other to attain 
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awareness of ourselves as a body-subject. Even our vision of ourselves in a mirror is 
always mediated by body image, and hence by the other, and it would seem that we 
cannot look at our own mirror image in the same way that we can appreciate the 
appearance of others. These more existential aspects of our existence suggest that there is 
something fundamentally true about Merleau-Ponty's more general argument that our 
body should be conceived of as our means of communication with the world, rather than 
merely as an object of the world that our transcendent mind orders to perform varying 
functions. 
Merleau-Ponty offers one particularly powerful example of the body as a means 
of communication, which also makes it clear that a subject-object model of exchange 
deprives the existential phenomena of their true complexity. He suggests that: 
If I touch with my left hand my right hand while it touches an object, the right 
hand object is not the right hand touching: the first is an intertwining of bones, 
muscles and flesh bearing down on a point in space, the second traverses space as 
a rocket in order to discover the exterior object in its place (PP 92). 
This example of the hand touching itself represents the body' s capacity to occupy the 
position of both perceiving object and subject of perception. As he puts it, "when I press 
my two hands together, it is not a matter of two sensations felt together as one perceives 
two objects placed side by side, but an ambiguous set-up in which both hands can 
alternate the role of 'touching ' and being 'touched" ' (PP 93). Mark Yount expresses 
Merleau-Ponty's point well when he suggests that "the reflexivity of this touching-
touched exceeds the logic of dichotomy: the two are not entirely distinguished, since the 
roles can be reversed; but the two are not identical, since touching and touched can never 
fully coincide"34• As with the caress, this double touching and encroachment of the 
touching onto the touched (and vice versa), where subject and object cannot be 
unequivocally discerned, is representative of perception and sensibility generally. Pre-
empting the more explicit ontology of The Visible and the Invisible (with which we will 
become increasingly concerned), Merleau-Ponty tacitly argues for the "reversibility" of 
the body - its capacity to be both sentient and sensible - and reaffirms his basic 
contention that incarnate consciousness is the central phenomenon of which mind and 
body are abstract moments (PP 193). 
34Yount, M ., "Two Reversibilities: Merleau-Ponty and Derrida" in Merleau-Ponty, Hermeneutics and 
Postmodernism, eds. Busch & Gallagher, Albany : State University of New York Press, 1992, p 216-7. 
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However, Merleau-Ponty has another vitally important and related point to make 
about the status of our bodies that precludes them from being categorised simply as 
objects. According to him, we move directly and in union with our bodies. As he points 
out, "I do not need to lead it [the body] towards a movement's completion, it is in contact 
with it from the start and propels itself towards that end" (PP 94). In other words, we do 
not need to check to see if we have two legs before we stand up, since we are necessarily 
with our bodies. The consequences of this simple idea, however, are more extensive than 
one may presume. 
The sporting arena also testifies to this being with our bodies, as does the wave or 
other gesture that simply responds to given circumstances without the intervention of 
traditional philosophical conceptions of thought and/or intention. For instance, the 
basketball player who says that he or she is "in the zone" perceives the terrain in 
accordance with some general intentions, but these are modified by the situation in which 
they find themselves. Their actions are solicited by the situations that confront them in a 
constantly evolving way. 
In his early work, The Structure of Behaviour, Merleau-Ponty also makes use of a 
sporting analogy. He suggests that: 
For the player in action the football field is not an 'object', that is, the ideal term 
which can give rise to a multiplicity of perspectival views and remain equivalent 
under its apparent transformations. It is pervaded with lines of force (the 'yard 
lines'; those which demarcate the penalty area) and articulated in sectors (for 
example, the 'openings' between the adversaries) which call for a certain mode of 
action and which initiate and guide the action as if the player were unaware of it. 
The field itself is not given to him, but present as the immanent term of his 
practical intentions; the player becomes one with it and feels the direction of the 
goal, for example, just as immediately as the vertical and horizontal planes of his 
own body (SB 168). 
Nick Crossley interprets this particular passage as implying that "to perceive the football 
pitch, it is not necessary that an individual be aware of perceiving it"35, and while he is 
correct, this is not the only significance of this revealed mode of being. The perceptions 
and actions of the sportsperson reveal a form of intelligence that informs much of our 
everyday interaction, and that refutes many dichotomous positions (PP 142), most 
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obvious among these being the insistence that a separate act of interpretation (to 
determine a goal or intention) is necessary to give action a meaningful form. Moreover, 
Merleau-Ponty's descriptions of sporting activity also suggest that as we refine our skills 
for coping with existence (based upon past experiences) scenarios show up as soliciting 
those acquired skilful responses, and it is this aspect of his work that attracts Hubert and 
Stuart Dreyfus' attention. The particularities of their interpretation of Merleau-Ponty will 
become more important in chapter six, but for the moment it needs only to be pointed out 
that for them, this "skilful coping does not require a mental representation of its goal. It 
can be purposive without the agent entertaining a purpose"36, and this pre-reflective mode 
of existence reveals many of the postulations of dualistic thinking as abstractions. 
Moreover, if this purposive action without a purpose ( other than best 
accommodating oneself to the situation in which one is immersed) is forestalled, say if a 
particular golfer starts to ponder the intricacies of their swing, where their feet are 
positioned, mental outlook, etc., rather than simply responding, it is certainly probable 
that they will lose form. So what, one may ask? According to Merleau-Ponty, the point is 
that "whether a system of motor or perceptual powers, our body is not an object for an 'I 
think', it is a grouping of lived-through meanings which moves towards its equilibrium" 
(PP 153). The emphasis upon rationalistic thought and its tendency to dissect human 
behaviour through the 'I think' can conspire to turn us away from the body's 
acclimatisation to its own environment. Merleau-Ponty explores a more basic motivation 
for human action than is usually taken to be the case: rather than focusing upon our desire 
to attain certain pleasures or achieve certain goals, his analysis reveals the body's more 
primordial tendency to form what he calls "intentional arcs", and to try and achieve an 
equilibrium with the world. 
Indeed, through reference to embodied activity, Merleau-Ponty makes it clear that 
our actions and the perceptions involved in those actions are largely habitual: that is, they 
are learnt through imitation and responsiveness within an environment, and to a 
community. Without such a pre-reflective base, language-games would be unlearnable, 
and as Wittgenstein was also beginning to do at the same historical moment (the early 
1940s), Merleau-Ponty hence emphasises the philosophical importance of the act of 
learning and training. According to him, metaphysical philosophy has been unable to 
3' :icrossley, N. , p 13. 
36Dreyfus, H. , & Dreyfus, S. , p 111. 
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address these phenomena adequately (PP 142), and it is worth repeating an important 
sentence from Phenomenology of Perception. Merleau-Ponty argues that empiricism and 
intellectualism (the two logical outcomes of metaphysical thought) "are in agreement in 
that neither can grasp consciousness in the act of learning, and that neither attaches due 
importance to that circumscribed ignorance, that still empty but always determinate 
intention which is attention itself' (PP 28). 
This emphasis upon consciousness in the act of learning is also what Dreyfus and 
Dreyfus are intent on exploring in relation to Merleau-Ponty's philosophy, and they agree 
that in the act of learning, consciousness is irremediably embodied. They ask: "if 
everything is similar to everything else in an indefinitely large number of ways, what 
constrains the space of possible generalisations so that trial and error learning has a 
chance of succeeding? Here is where the body comes in"37. With a view to forthcoming 
chapters, it is worth suggesting that this emphasis upon embodiment might apply equally 
if everything is dissimilar, other to everything else - the body narrows this disparate 
range of phenomena down, or more accurately, renders them intelligible. Our skilful 
embodiment makes it possible for us to encounter "more and more differentiated 
solicitations to act"38, and enables us to react to situations in ways that have previously 
proved successful and which do not require purposive thought. 
In order to fathom what Dreyfus' "embodied solicitations to act" might involve, it 
is worth contemplating the views of another commentator who also emphasises the 
importance of the body in learning. Mary Barral suggests that: 
Movements of the body are developed almost without conscious effort, in most 
cases. There seems to be a so1i of intelligence of the body: a new dance is learned 
without analysing the sequence of movements. Children learn dances very easily 
and well ... This is also the reason why habits can be formed: the body seems to 
have understood and retained the new meaning39• 
According to this description, it is not usually through conscious reflection and analysis 
that a dance or other language-game is learnt, but through repeated embodied efforts that 
are modified until the ' right' movements are achieved. This intelligence of the body (ie. 
its capacity to innovate and retain new meaning) again denies the emphasis that much of 
the philosophical tradition has placed upon interpretation, and certainly any conception of 
37Dreyfus, H. , & Dreyfus, S. , p 117. 
38Dreyfus, H. , & Dreyfus, S. , p 104. 
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interpretation that contrasts itself with a purely passive perception. Moreover, this can 
also be envisaged to apply to so-called 'intellectual ' professions in much the same way as 
it does to dancers. In reacting to their own different but nevertheless distinct set of 
influences, they still choose modes of action in relation to past success. Even in the most 
apparently 'thoughtful' of activities, the body inclines itself towards an equilibrium 4°. 
This habituality to which we are referring is far from being merely a mechanistic 
or behaviouristic propensity to pursue a certain line of action. Our habitual mode of being 
is constantly being altered (in however small a way), and habit is hence more akin to a 
competence, or what Crossley refers to as a "flexible skill, a power of action and 
reaction"41 that can be mobilised under different conditions to achieve different effects 
(PP 143). However, we may want to ask, as Merleau-Ponty does, "if habit is neither a 
form of knowledge nor an involuntary action, what is it.then?". According to him, "it is 
knowledge in the hands, which is forthcoming only when bodily effort is made, and 
cannot be formulated in detachment from that effort" (PP 144). Merleau-Ponty suggests 
that this type of "knowledge in the hands" is primordial, and he implies that if we 
completely detach ourselves from this habitual base we risk embarking upon philosophic 
and scientific endeavours that are of no practical benefit, and that might also artificially 
serve to legitimise the mind-body dualism. 
Crossley provides another good example of this practical and embodied 
intelligence that Merleau-Ponty so insistently points us towards: he suggests that when 
we drive a car, we are intimately aware of how a particular car's gearshift needs to be 
treated, as well as its ability to tum, accelerate, brake, etc., and importantly, also of the 
dimensions of the vehicle. When we reflect on our own parking experiences, it is 
remarkable that there are so few minor collisions considering how many times we are 
forced to come very close. Indeed, when reversing, many drivers need not really monitor 
the progress of their car because they 'know' (in the sense of a harmony between aim and 
intention) what result the various movements of the steering wheel are likely to induce. 
The car is absorbed into our body schema with almost the same precision that we have 
regarding our own spatiality. It becomes an "area of sensitivity" which extends "the 
scope and active radius of the touch" (PP 143) and, as Crossley suggests, it is "not that 
39Barral, M. , p 137. 
40This suggestion is explored at length in relation to the activities of an expert chess player in chapter six. 
41Crossley, N. , p 12. 
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we think about the car, but that we think from the point of view of the car"42 and 
consequently also perceive our environment in a different way. Notably, this thinking is 
not reflective or interpretive - we do not have to perceive the distance to a car park and 
then reflect upon the fact that we are in a car of such and such proportions before the 
delicate manoeuvre can be attempted. Rather, it is a practical mastery of a technique that 
ensures that the given rules can be followed blindly ( or at least without reflective 
thought) and yet nevertheless with an embodied intelligence. 
In one paragraph from Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty captures 
these issues particularly well. He observes that: 
We said earlier that it is the body that "understands" in the acquisition of habit. 
This way of putting it will appear absurd, if understanding is subsuming a sense 
datum under an idea, and if the body is an object. But the phenomenon of habit is 
just what prompts us to revise our notion of "understand" and our notion of the 
body. To understand is to experience harmony between what we aim at and what 
is given, between the intention and the performance - and the body is our 
anchorage in the world (PP 144). 
In this paragraph, Merleau-Ponty defines understanding as a harmony between what we 
aim at and what is given, between intention and performance, and this sheds some light 
upon his assertion that consciousness is primarily not a matter of "I think", but of "I can" 
(PP 137). Action in this paradigm is spontaneous and practical, and it is clear that \\1e 
move phenomenally in a manner antithetical to the mind-body distinction (PP 145). 
Dreyfus interprets Merleau-Ponty's emphasis upon the "I can" rather than the "I 
think" of the body-subject, as "simply the body's ability to reduce tension, or to put it 
another way, to complete gestalts"43 . At least in one major respect, Dreyfus is correct: the 
body's tendency to incline towards a harmony between aim and intention does capture 
the exigencies of Merleau-Ponty's notion of embodiment well. However, it is worth 
pointing out that, for Merleau-Ponty, the gestalts are never actually completed, but 
require constant vigilance and readjustment. Indeed, while habit and the tendency to seek 
an equilibrium might help us adjust to the circumstances of our world, they do not simply 
make things easy. For Merleau-Ponty, "what enables us to centre our existence is also 
what prevents us from centering it completely, and the anonymity of our body is 
42Crossley, N. , p 16. 
43Dreyfus, H., & Dreyfus, S. , p 114. 
inseparably both freedom and servitude" (PP 85). To put the problem somewhat glibly, 
his point seems to be that although the body searches for equilibrium, as a mortal and 
temporal body it is also precluded from perpetual equilibrium ( cf. PP 346). 
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Nevertheless, if we agree with Merleau-Ponty that knowing is far from an 
imperative for human action, and also identify understanding and intention with human 
action, this has ramifications for our forthcoming discussions of the work of Derrida. 
Perhaps the heavy responsibility of the Derridean notion of 'undecidability' - in which a 
decision must always leap beyond prior preparations for that decision - can be 
counterbalanced in a way that Derrida fails to recognise by an appreciation of the 
spontaneous intelligence involved in the embodied acquisition of skills. This will be 
considered in chapter six, but for the moment, it is important to consider some aspects of 
Merleau-Ponty' s account of embodiment that have only been alluded to, particularly in 
relation to his suggestion that we move spontaneously and pre-reflectively in accord with 
our bodies. 
According to his version of the pre-reflective cogito, when one motions towards a 
friend to come nearer, there is no preceding or ancillary thought prepared within me that 
motivates my action (PP 111 ). I do not perceive a certain signal in my mind and then 
decide to act on it, or if I do, it is a rare and derivative occurrence. According to Merleau-
Ponty, the immense difference posited by the philosophical tradition between thinking 
and perceiving (and between mind and body) is hence revealed as a mistake. However, 
this suggestion that pre-reflective existence does not require interpretation, or any prior 
formulation of intention, is an important one and deserving of prolonged consideration. 
Insisting that we cannot discern an interior state that precedes the expression of that state, 
Merleau-Ponty suggests that "I am not in front of my body, I am in it or rather I am it. .. If 
we can still speak of interpretation in relation to the perception of one ' s own body, we 
shall have to say that it interprets itself ' (PP 150). One would struggle to envisage a 
much closer relationship to the body than that, and Merleau-Ponty elsewhere goes so far 
as to suggest that: 
Nothing is changed when the subject is charged with interpreting his reactions 
himself, which is what is proper to introspection. When he is asked if he can read 
the letters inscribed on a panel or distinguish the details of a shape, he will not 
trust a vague "impression of legibility" . He will attempt to read or describe what 
is presented to him (SB 183). 
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According to Merleau-Ponty then, there is no 'mental' correlate of reading that makes it 
possible to know definitively that reading is taking place. Faced with the demand that 
they prove that they have actually read, an individual can only refer with circularity to the 
words that they themselves have read, repeating what is in front of him or her. If further 
justification is demanded, one can respond only by pointing out that "this is simply what 
I do"44, and that these are the practices that I engage in. 
that: 
Refusing to accord the 'mental' any privileged status, Merleau-Ponty even argues 
If I try to study love or hate purely from inner observation, I will find very little to 
describe: a few pangs, a few heart throbs - in short, trite agitations which do not 
reveal the essence of love or hate ... We must reject the prejudice which makes 
"inner realities" out of love, hate or anger, leaving them accessible to one single 
witness: the person who feels them. Anger, shame, hate and love are not psychic 
facts hidden at the bottom of another's consciousness: they are types of behaviour 
or styles of conduct which are visible from the outside (SNS 52-3). 
Human subjectivity is no longer conceived of as residing in'an inaccessible, private 
domain of the 'mental'. Rather, Merleau-Ponty's notion of the body-subject entails an 
affirmation of public and surface interaction, and of the physiognomic qualities of our 
bodies. This does not preclude deep feelings, but merely suggests that they must 
necessarily be manifested in our public lives. A disturbance aroused in the affective life 
of an individual will have correlative repercussions in the physical, perceptive, and 
expressive life of that person. As will become apparent in chapter seven and beyond, this 
will have significant ramifications for how we conceive of relationships with the other. 
However, these are not merely flippant remarks designed only to refute intellectualism 
and empiricism. Merleau-Ponty has thought through the consequences and recognises, for 
example, that the Japanese express the emotion of love in significantly different ways to 
the archetypal French or Australian citizen. But for him, this cultural variance: 
Or to be more precise, this difference of behaviour, corresponds to a difference in 
the emotions themselves. It is not only the gesture that is contingent in relation to 
the body's organisation, it is the manner itself in which we meet the situation and 
live it. ... Feelings and passional conduct are invented like words (PP 189). 
This quote is slightly misleading, because Merleau-Ponty's philosophy of situation does 
44Wittgenstein, L. , Philosophical Investigations , section 217. 
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not want to suggest that passional conduct can simply be constructed from nothing by a 
self-actualised individual, as Foucault ' s later philosophy inadvertently implies45 • The 
word invented, which seems to imply an individual inventing something, is the 
problematic term here. Both passional conduct and words, however, are invented, but by 
a community and hence subtend any individual existence. 
For some commentators, Merleau-Ponty' s notion of the body-subject, and his 
emphasis upon the intentional arc that inclines one towards an equilibrium and tacitly 
suggests the derivative nature of thought and interpretation, induces a picture of humanity 
that is too easy and not reflective enough. There is, after all, a tendency to interpret his 
position as being an advocation of simple, spontaneous relations, and a nostalgic desire 
for some primordial inherence in Being. Mary Barra!, among other more recent critics, 
has contended that his phenomenology does not give the required amount of attention to 
reflection, as well as other factors that might complicate Merleau-Ponty's spontaneous, 
pre-reflective state. She suggests that "if one equates the lack of reflection in a 
phenomenological milieu with a lack of understanding in an intellectualistic-critical 
philosophy, the results would be equivalent"46 • 
However, Barral's remarks do not incriminate Merleau-Ponty, or at least not in 
the way that she thinks they do. While her suggestions may be true of a certain 
phenomenology, the question arises as to what extent Merleau-Ponty's philosophy 
actually bridges this very divide of which she speaks, and hence 'deconstructs' her 
implied antinomy between reflection and non-reflection. It has been suggested that 
Merleau-Ponty's work is a synthesis of phenomenology and st1ucturalism47, and it is also 
clear that his phenomenology is not a simple effort to reject analytical thought, but 
merely to discipline it: anything from the analytic paradigm that claims or presupposes a 
metaphysical tluth must not ignore phenomenology. In other words, the milieu of 
Merleau-Ponty's philosophy of situation can accommodate rationality, but it also 
consigns it to its proper place. While his philosophy does affirm the primacy of 
45lt is generally agreed that Foucault's thought underwent some important changes towards the end of his 
life, and although opinions vaiy on the extent of this change, he clearly became increasingly receptive to 
the Greek and Nietzschean idea that we create our own lives as one might a work of art. See the later 
History of Sexuality volumes (in particular: Foucault, M. , Th e History of Sexuality: Vol. 2,· Th e Use of 
Pleasure, trans. Hurley, Penguin Books, 1992, p 251- 5), as well as some interesting comments that 
Foucault makes in interviews of around the same time-frame pertaining to an "arts of existence" . 
46Barral, M. , p 115. 
47Schmidt, J. , Maurice Merleau-Ponty: Between Phenomenology and Structuralism, New York: St. 
Martin ' s Press, 1985. 
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perception, broadly construed to incorporate the practical action that it cannot be 
distinguished from, this does not simply come at the cost of sacrificing the validity of 
rational processes. Rather, it grounds them in our situation and reinforces that reflection 
should not feign ignorance of its origins in perceptual experience48 • His point is simply 
that the "I can" precedes and conditions the possibility of the "I know" (PP 13 7). As 
Merleau-Ponty states, there is "a privilege of reason, but precisely in order to understand 
it properly, we must begin by replacing thought amongst the phenomena of perception" 
(PrP 222). 
Analytic thought and philosophy per se can and should be used to render pre-
reflective experience intelligible, for as he points out: 
It is a question not of putting the perceptual faith in place of reflection, but on the 
contrary of taking into account the total situation, which involves reference from 
the one to the other. What is given is not a massive and opaque world, or a 
universe of adequate thought; it is a reflection which turns back over the density 
of the world in order to clarify it, but which, coming second, reflects back to it 
only its own light (VI 35). 
Despite the nostalgic yearning that Merleau-Ponty occasionally seems to have for a 
primordial union with the world, he nevertheless makes it clear that one never returns to 
immediate experience. It is only a question of whether we are to try to understand it, and 
he believes that to attempt to express immediate experience is not to betray reason but, on 
the contrary, to work towards its aggrandisement. Philosophy is hence a means to 
improve our way of living, and reason has a role in this, providing that it is based in the 
phenomenological exigencies of the subject and their life-world. While Merleau-Ponty's 
philosophy is poised on the margins of philosophy and non-philosophy as Hugh 
Silve1man and others have suggested49, it is not anti-philosophical in any respect. 
However, Barral goes on to proffer the rhetorical question that "one cannot think 
perceptive consciousness without suppressing it as an originary mode of being: likewise, 
can one maintain a signification without referring it to intellectual consciousness?"50 • In 
other words, she is attempting to suggest that signification and meaning reside in an 
48Herbernick, R. , "Merleau-Ponty and the Primacy of Reflection" in The Horizons of the Flesh: Critical 
Persp ectives on the Thought of Merleau-Ponty, ed. Gillian, Urbana: Southern Illinois University Press, 
1973, p 92. As is evident from the title alone, Herbernick argues against the interpretation of Merleau-
Ponty as a philosopher who exalts the pre-reflective at the expense of the reflective. 
49Silverman, H. , Inscriptions , p 126--7. 
50Barral, M. , p 117. 
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intellectual consciousness (rather than in perceptive consciousness) to which Merleau-
Ponty does not pay enough attention. Again, I think that Merleau-Ponty would suggest 
that this question is a false one and is perpetuating traditional philosophical dichotomies. 
As has been illustrated in the numerous examples of what we have ref erred to as an 
"embodied intelligence", perceptive consciousness is not diametrically opposed to certain 
forms of thought (cf. PP 213, VI 29). Moreover, signification and meaning is always, in 
some form or another, involved in perceptive consciousness. Merleau-Ponty's suggestion 
is that when the idea of an objective rationality and an objective perception of the world 
'out there' are finally dispensed with, what we might see is an intertwining, if not of 
something that could be termed rational perception, then certainly of thoughtful 
perception. 
Moreover, Merleau-Ponty does not intend to suggest that the complicity of body 
and mind that we see in habitual behaviour implies an absolute awareness of one's own 
'subjectivity' 51 . According to him, "there is the absolute certitude of the world in general, 
but not of anything in particular" (PP 344). Knowing an individual person in a particular 
manifestation may presuppose an understanding of humanity in its totality, but certainly 
not any singular motivation for a particular act52 • This is because lived relations can never 
be grasped perfectly by consciousness, since the body-subject is not intimately united 
with consciousness, or entirely present-to-itself. Meaningful behaviour is lived through, 
rather than thematised and reflected upon, and this ensures that the actions of particular 
individuals "may be meaningful without them being fully or reflectively aware of the 
meaning that their action creates or embodies. In this sense, the behaving actor is not a 
fully-fledged subject in the Cartesian sense. She is not fully transparent to herself'53 • 
There is ambiguity then, precisely because we are not capable of disembodied reflection 
upon our activities, but are involved in an "intentional arc" that absorbs both our body 
and our mind (PP 136). For Merleau-Ponty, both intellectualism and empiricism 
presuppose "a universe perfectly explicit in itself' (PP 41 ), but residing between these 
51Perhaps on realising the interdependent complicity of mind and body, we might no longer conspire to 
make our own lives more difficult by sustaining illusory goals based upon an absolute subject-object 
distinction and the egoism that this seems to entail. The Western tendency towards individualism and 
finding oneself by escaping dominant influences is the most obvious example of this. 
52 As a brief aside, is not the ambiguity of the acting person also something that great literature manages to 
convince us of? Proust has famously stated that all significant art inclines us to the revelation - which for 
Merleau-Ponty, might typify the human predicament- that what we have just experienced is the same and 
yet different. 
'3 
:i Crossley, N. , p 12. 
two positions, his body-subject actually requires ambiguity and, in a sense, 
indeterminacy. 
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According to Merleau-Ponty, ambiguity prevails both in my perception of things 
and in the knowledge I have of myself, for a temporal situation cannot but be ambiguous. 
Indeed, it is because of this temporal alterity that Merleau-Ponty asserts that we can never 
say 'I' absolutely (PP 208). Rather, he suggests that "I know myself only insofar as I am 
inherent in time and in the world, that is, I know myself only in my ambiguity" (PP 345). 
Elsewhere in Phenomenology of Perception, he implies that the subject is time and time 
is the subject (PP 431-2), and these sentiments do not appear to be overly dissimilar to 
Derrida's suggestion that "the movement of diflerance is not something that happens to a 
transcendental subject; it produces a subject" (SP 82). Admittedly, in Derrida's version of 
events the subject at least seems to be something of a secondary product54, whereas for 
Merleau-Ponty, time and the subject are interdependent, but these two philosophers are 
not obviously antithetical in regard to temporal matters and this will become more 
apparent in chapter five. 
Moreover, as Gary Madison has argued, Merleau-Ponty's attempt to take 
seriously the notion of ambiguity would, or at least should, also involve the 
deconstruction of what is termed the 'metaphysics of presence'. This will be explicated in 
detail in chapter five, but Merleau-Ponty's emphasis upon ambiguity- which is the 
"mark of a thought which is resolutely attempting to overcome oppositional thinking 
itself '55 - means that it is not easy to establish that his work is a philosophy of self-
certainty, as Foucault and Derrida both claim that phenomenology tends to be56 • On the 
contrary, and BaiTal puts Merleau-Ponty's point well, "since we cannot remain in the 
alternative of either not understanding the subject, or of knowing nothing about the 
object, we must seek the object at the very heart of our experience ... to understand the 
paradox that there is a "for-us" of the "in-itself'57 (cf. PP 71). In other words, we must 
attain an understanding of what Merleau-Ponty describes elsewhere as "the paradox of 
transcendence in immanence" (PrP 16) - that is, to understand that objects are given over 
54The following chapter will argue that something closer to an interdependence ensues. 
55Madison, G. , "Did Merleau-Ponty Have a Theory of Perception?", p 120. 
56Foucault, M., The Order of Things, p xiv. For a more detailed discussion regarding how Merleau-Ponty 
might be envisaged to avoid Foucault's criticism that he propounds a philosophy of self-certainty, see 
Crossley, The Politics of Subjectivity, p 2-5. The extent to which Merleau-Ponty's philosophy can avoid 
being denigrated as yet another version of the metaphysics of presence is also examined in chapter five. 
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to us, influenced by us, just as we are influenced by the objects that surround us. For 
Merleau-Ponty, this interdependence and mutual encroachment is evident in all aspects of 
perception and subjectivity. As he makes clear, "whenever I try to understand myself, the 
whole fabric of the perceptible world comes too, and with it come the others who are 
caught -in -it" (S 15). To conclude the Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty 
cites de Saint-Exupery: "man is a network of relations" (PP 456), or "man is a knot of 
relations", depending upon the translation. The strong implication ofMerleau-Ponty's 
philosophy is that this is not a knot ( or network) of the Gordian variety, and that these 
relations are not something that we can or should want to unravel. The 
interdependence of the knot is what gives humanity its very qualities, and by dissecting 
it w~Ji-~~ _losing the very thing that establishes us as human. 
This point is best explored by Merleau-Ponty when he describes how in writing 
his philosophical texts he might not necessarily have a precise idea of exactly where his 
discussion is leading, but "as if by magic" the words flow from him and slowly become a 
cogent whole (PP 177). This is not to be dismissed as being symptomatic of a supposed 
'continental' 58 lack of philosophical rigour. All papers are not entirely worked out in the 
head before they are laid down. The process of laying them down inevitably effects 
alterations. Merleau-Ponty embraces this aspect of writing, and he does not consider it 
merely the derivative attempt to transcribe some self-present thought. With a view to the 
following chapter, he hence seems to avoid the phonocentric preoccupation with the 
spoken word that Derrida pervasively associates with the metaphysics of presence and 
logocentrism (OG 11)59 • However, there is also the further point that where exactly the 
written creation derives from (the particular word, as much as the whole book) is a 
fundamentally ambiguous point for Merleau-Ponty, since it is neither the self-present 
subject, nor the cultural world, which determines the product, but the knot; the sum 
relation of all networks. 
Again, this necessitates an ambiguity at the heart of our embodied experience 
58According to Lester Embree, the term ' continental ' was first used by himself in 1978. However, rather 
than being a simple geographical notion, Embree takes the term to designate philosophers who have paid 
Husserl's work significant attention, even if they disagree with him ( there hence cannot be a 19th century 
' continental' thinker, and this includes Nietzsche and Kierkegaard), and who continue to engage with other 
philosophers who have also interacted with Husserl. See Embree, L., "Husserl as Trunk of the American 
Continental Tree", in International Journal of Philosophical Studies (forthcoming 2002). 
59To some extent, Derrida also endorses this rather positive interpretation of Merleau-Ponty. In his essay 
"Force and Signification", Derrida cites two quotes from Merleau-Ponty as evidence that meaning must 
await being either written or spoken in order to inhabit itself (WD 11). 
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which has some important ethical implications. Trying to discern what is a legitimate 
authentic project of the self that is not induced by the demands of one 's society is 
infinitely difficult. Indeed, it is not a possibility for Merleau-Ponty, and because of its 
overtones of an unattainable individualism he refused to use the existential concept of 
authenticity for his entire career. But he would not want to say that something like, but 
slightly different from authenticity (ie. a body-subject coming to terms with their own 
situation in an empowering way) is an impossibility. In many ways, this is a primary 
ethical demand of his. Finally, however, this ambiguity at the heart of our experience will 
always be there and an authentic path is not one that we consciously choose by ensuring 
that we are the only origin of our projects, somehow attempting what he contends is 
impossible; that is, the transcending of our environment. Rather, Merleau-Ponty's 
suggestion is that circumstances point us to, and in fact, allow us to find a way (PP 456). 
The human situation is a product of the 'mind' and our socio-historical situation, and 
moral achievement is a tenuous embrace of both of these facts. 
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3. The Deconstruction of Oppositions: Speech-Writing, Mind-Body 
Given the vast amounts of literature devoted to the subject, it should not surprise us that 
Derrida is also preoccupied with undermining the dichotomous tendencies of the 
philosophical tradition. Almost by definition, dualisms are the staple diet of 
deconstruction, for without these hierarchies and orders of subordination it would be left 
with nowhere to intervene. Deconstruction is parasitic in this minimal sense that rather 
than espousing yet another grand narrative60 , it restricts itself to twisting and distorting 
already existing narratives, and to revealing the dualistic hierarchies they conceal. Like 
the philosophy of Merleau-Ponty, which almost ubiquitously discerns manifestations of 
subject-object dichotomies, Derrida is hence occasionally a little reductive when he talks 
about the Western philosophical tradition of metaphysics. His entire enterprise is 
predicated upon the conviction that being logocentric, dualisms are irrevocably present in 
the various philosophers and artisans that he considers. Unlike Merleau-Ponty, however, 
Derrida does not have quite the same hope for freeing philosophy, or for that matter 
thought, from the "empirico-transcendental" tendencies of metaphysics. On several 
occasions Derrida informs us that we cannot completely overcome logocentrism (WD 
280), and this is a significant difference between these two theorists regarding what they 
seek to achieve in their treatments of dichotomy, dualism, and aporia. However, before 
becoming embroiled in the details of explicating why the combined resources of 
Merleau-Ponty and Derrida are so valuable for considering the relationship between 
embodiment and alterity, it is first necessary to ascertain how the notion of embodiment 
can be thought by deconstruction. This will require considering Derrida in something 
approaching isolation, although the background that is this thesis' comparative 
juxtaposition with the philosophy of Merleau-Ponty will always be there. 
It has, of course, been widely recognised that there are some considerable 
difficulties involved in contemplating Derrida in terms of embodiment, and the most 
obvious of these difficulties derives from the simple fact that it is not the type of terrain 
that he ever explicitly considers in detail. Moreover, the strategic aspects of his work and 
his consistent use of terms under erasure, or crossed out ( as Heidegger so famously did 
with Being), also complicate any simplistic attribution of a thesis on embodiment to him. 
60Lyotard famously characterises the postmodern condition as "incredulity towards grand narratives". See 
Lyotard, J. , The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, trans. Bennington & Massumi, 
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If background is still necessary for a thinker whose work has been proliferated so widely 
( and such an exegesis is also more necessary exactly because of this exposure), Derrida 
has always tried to avoid becoming a traditional philosopher to whom we can attribute a 
specific claim about the nature of the world in which we partake. While his claims to 
being someone who speaks solely in the margins of philosophy can undoubtedly be 
contested, it is nevertheless important to take these claims into account. Deconstruction 
is, somewhat infamously, the philosophy that says nothing. To the extent that it can be 
tentatively suggested that Derrida's concerns are philosophical (and this is a strategic 
choice, designed to avoid another debate on the intersections of philosophy and literature, 
philosophy and non-philosophy)61, they are clearly not phenomenological (he assures us 
that his early work is to be read specifically against Sartre and Merleau-Ponty) and nor 
are they ontological. 
In comparing him to Merleau-Ponty then, who is variously both 
phenomenological and ontological, albeit in challenging and new ways, support 
structures for this thesis are relatively minimal. It is largely for this reason that a 
systematic analysis of Derrida's relationship with Merleau-Ponty has been deferred until 
the later stages of this work. Of course, the same type of difficulties also befall any 
consideration of Derrida in terms of embodiment. Embodiment is a notion that is full of 
what some would claim are antiquated phenomenological connotations, and it should be 
clear that in pursuing such lines of thought, this chapter is not reading Derrida in the most 
obvious way and is doing a certain violence to his texts (as Derrida's own deconstructive 
readings do). Indeed, contemplating how a notion like embodiment might apply to 
deconstruction also involves something inherently risky - an attempt to demarcate what 
deconstruction is. At times, this exegesis will run the risk of ignoring the multifarious and 
dispersed meanings of Derridean deconstruction, and the widely acknowledged 
difference between Derrida's early and late work is merely the most obvious example of 
the difficulties involved in suggesting "deconstruction says this", or "deconstruction 
Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1984, p xxiii. 
61 Rodolphe Gasche in The Tain of the Mirror: Derrida and the Philosophy of Reflection (Massachusetts : 
Harvard University Press, 1986) and Christopher Norris in Derrida (Massachusetts: Harvard University 
Press, 1987), were the earliest and most vocal critics of the suggestion that deconstruction was 
predominantly of relevance to literary theory. Geoffrey Bennington's recent criticisms of Gasche in 
Interrupting Derrida are, however, worth taking on board, as no attempt to philosophise Derrida should 
avoid taking into account his emphasis upon the messianic and the "perhaps" (PF 3 8), both of which insist 
upon retaining an openness towards other possibilities. See Bennington, G. , Interrupting Derrida, Warwick 
Studies in European Philosophy, London: Routledge, 2000. 
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prohibits that". Moreover, nothing would be more antithetical to deconstruction's stated 
intent than this attempt at defining it through the decidedly metaphysical question "what 
is deconstruction?". There is an inherent paradoxicality involved in trying to restrict 
deconstruction to one particular and overarching purpose (OG 19) when it is predicated 
upon the desire to expose us to that which is wholly other (tout autre) and to open us up 
to alternative possibilities, even if these possibilities are themselves 'impossible ' 62 . 
Such thematics are also the subject of one of Derrida's recent texts, which he co-
authored with Geoffrey Bennington. In Jacques Derrida, Bennington attempts to pin 
down the logic of deconstruction, to encapsulate "deconstruction in a nutshell" to borrow 
the title of one of John Caputo's books63 . Bennington's text aims at anticipating and 
accounting for the various different themes that have preoccupied Derrida and 
deconstruction over the years. Meanwhile, Derrida writes underneath this narrative, and 
literally attempts to undercut and elude Bennington's efforts at categorising and defining 
deconstruction. The particular spanner that Circumfessions throws in Bennington's works 
is Denida's revelation of a secret: that is, his own unholy alliance with Judaism and his 
,treligion without religion" more generally (Circ 154). Derrida's relationship to religion 
will be examined in chapter nine, but for the moment it is wo1ih acknowledging that this 
essential elusiveness of deconstruction also means that legitimising the question of 
embodiment can never be absolute. 
That said, it is worth recognising that in his recent work, Derrida is prone to 
propounding enigmatic suggestions like "go there where you cannot go, to the 
impossible, it is indeed the only way of coming or going" (ON 75). It seems that it is only 
the thinking that negotiates with the impossible, and which attempts to transgress given 
boundaries, that involves any real movement. If there is a sense in which the question of 
an embodied deconstruction is an impossible transgression of the deconstructive code, it 
can be pointed out that this has never deterred Derrida, whose own ultimate philosophical 
aim is "to reopen the power and adventure of the question itself '64, and it will not deter 
this thesis. 
Moreover, the question of the status of embodiment in Derrida's work will be 
62Such apparent incongruities of expression will be considered in depth when this thesis examines 
Derrida ' s later writings and his preoccupation with what is termed "possible-impossible" aporias (see 
chapters five, nine and ten). 
63Caputo, J. , Deconstruction in a 1Vutshell, New York: Fordham University Press, 1997. 
64Derrida, J. , as cited in Patrick, M. , Derrida, Responsibility, and Politics, p 5. 
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raised via an indirect methodology that is not quite so complicit with the metaphysical 
heritage that his philosophy has always sought to minimise. After examining 
deconstruction's parasitic relationship with oppositions in detail, particularly via 
reference to Derrida' s famous treatment of the speech-writing opposition, it will be 
established that his strategies for dealing with dualisms are actually surprisingly 
consistent. Basically, deconstruction reverses an existing opposition ( eg. speech-writing), 
before then attempting to reveal how that opposition, even with a new privileged term, is 
already corrupted from within. After having explicated these dual deconstructive 
strategies, this chapter will briefly examine the extent to which a similar methodology 
might also apply to the mind-body dualism ( and hence, tacitly, to the problem of 
embodiment). 
Introductory remarks aside, it is worth noting that in arguably his most famous 
work, Of Grammatology, Derrida suggests that there is an important correlation between 
the mind-body problem and the speech-writing hierarchy that is such a major concern of 
his earlier philosophy (OG 35). Moreover, he also contends that the distinction between 
the sensible and the intelligible controls metaphysics in its totality (OG 13). Apart from 
general and allusive comments such as these, however, he accords the mind-body 
problem that so preoccupies Merleau-Ponty with only relatively cursory attention, and 
this raises several important questions. Is the body something that is simply antithetical to 
deconstruction, or has Derrida just never pursued the question? And if not, why not? Our 
answer to these questions is a complicated one, and it will not even be entirely resolved 
in this chapter alone, but it will be argued that there is no necessary reason for 
deconstruction to ignore embodied concerns, at least conceived of in a certain manner. It 
will also be argued that it is to Derrida's detriment when his work cannot accommodate 
embodied concerns and the reason( s) that he has so steadfastly avoided writing about 
such matters (embodiment, existentialia, etc.) will become significant. For the moment, 
however, it is necessary to consider the consequences that the deconstruction of 
oppositions might have for a notion like embodiment, and the mind-body problematic. 
In this respect, the first task of this chapter will be to ascertain what early 
deconstruction, and Of Grammatology in particular, is trying to achieve through its own 
persistent relationship with oppositions. While it is unlikely that any stable and positive 
thesis on embodiment can be inferred from deconstruction, it will be illustrated that the 
workings of Derrida' s deconstructive methodology are certainly of relevance to the mind-
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body problematic, as much as to any other hierarchy or dualism. 
In regard to deconstruction's treatment of, and interest in oppositions, in his essay 
"Signature, Event, Context", Derrida has described them thus: 
An opposition of metaphysical concepts (speech/writing, presence/absence, etc.) 
is never the face-to-face of two terms, but a hierarchy and an order of 
subordination. Deconstruction cannot limit itself or proceed immediately to 
neutralisation: it must, by means of a double gesture, a double science, a double 
writing, practise an overturning of the classical opposition, and a general 
displacement of the system. It is on that condition alone that deconstruction will 
provide the means of intervening in the field of oppositions it criticises (M 195). 
To understand this dual 'methodology' - that is also, as Rodolphe Gasche has recognised, 
the deconstruction of the notion of a methodology because it no longer believes in the 
possibility of an observer being absolutely exterior to the object/text that is being 
examined65 - it is helpful to consider an example of this deconstruction at work. As has 
already been mentioned, the most prominent opposition with which Derrida's earlier 
work is concerned is that between speech and writing. According to Derrida, thinkers as 
different as Plato, Rousseau, Saussure, and Levi-Strauss, have all diminished the 
significance of the written word and valorised speech, by contrast, as some type of pure 
conduit of meaning. Their argument is basically that spoken words are the symbols of 
mental experience, whereas written words are the symbols of that already existing 
symbol, and as representations of speech they are doubly derivative and doubly far from a 
sacred unity with one's own thought. Without going into detail regarding the specific 
ways in which all of these thinkers have set about justifying this type of hierarchical 
opposition (this chapter will soon consider Saussure and Rousseau in some depth), it is 
important to note that the first strategy of deconstruction is to reverse existing 
oppositions. In Of Grammatology, Derrida hence attempts to illustrate that the structure 
of writing and grammatology are more important and even 'older' than the supposedly 
pure structure of presence-to-self that is characterised as typical of speech. 
For example, in an entire chapter of his Course in General Linguistics, Ferdinand 
de Saussure purports to restrict the science of linguistics to the phonetic and audible word 
only66 . In the course of his inquiry, Saussure even goes as far as to argue that "language 
65Gasche, R. , The Tain of the Mirror: Derrida and the Philosophy of Reflection, p 123 . 
66Saussure, F. , Course in General Linguistics, eds. Bally & Sechehaye, trans. Baskin, New York: McGraw-
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and writing are two distinct systems of signs: the second exists for the sole purpose of 
representing the first"67 • Language, he insists, has an oral tradition that is independent of 
writing, and it is this independence that makes a pure science of speech possible. Derrida 
vehemently disagrees with this type of hierarchy and instead argues that all that can be 
claimed of writing - eg. that it is derivative and merely refers to other signs - is equally 
true of speech. But as well as criticising such a position for certain unjustifiable 
presuppositions, including the idea that we are self-identical with ourselves in 'hearing ' 
ourselves think, Derrida also makes explicit the manner in which such a hierarchy is 
rendered untenable from within Saussure' s own text. 
Most famously, Saussure is the proponent of the thesis that is commonly referred 
to as "the arbitrariness of the sign", and this asserts, to simplify matters considerably, that 
the signifier bears no necessary or intrinsic relationship to that which is signified. 
Saussure derives numerous consequences from this position, most of which are not 
overly relevant to our purposes, but as Derrida points out, this notion of arbitrariness and 
of "unmotivated institutions" of signs would seem to deny the possibility of any natural 
attachment (OG 44). After all, if the sign is arbitrary and hence eschews any foundational 
reference to reality, it would seem that a certain type of sign (ie. the spoken) could not be 
more natural than another (ie. the written). However, it is precisely this idea of a natural 
attachment that Saussure relies upon to argue for our "natural bond" with sound68 , and his 
suggestion that sounds are more intimately related to our thoughts than the written word 
hence runs counter to his fundamental principle regarding the arbitrariness of the sign. 
Saussure' s work is considered in greater depth in the following chapter, but it is worth 
explicating a few other key points from Derrida ' s early work that reaffirm that 
deconstruction' s first strategic move is one of reversal. 
In Of Grammatology, Derrida also suggests that signification, broadly conceived, 
always refers to other signs, and that one can never reach a sign that refers only to itself. 
He argues that "writing is not a sign of a sign, except if one says it of all signs, which 
would be more profoundly true" (OG 43), and this process of infinite referral, of never 
arriving at meaning itself, is the notion of 'writing ' that he wants to emphasise. This is 
not writing narrowly conceived, as in a literal inscription upon a page, but what he terms 
' arche-writing ' . Arche-writing refers to a more generalised notion of writing that insists 
Hill, 1966, p 24. 
67Saussure, F. , p 23. 
that the breach that the written introduces between what is intended to be conveyed and 
what is actually conveyed, is typical of an originary breach that afflicts everything one 
might wish to keep sacrosanct, including the notion of self-presence. 
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This originary breach that arche-writing refers to can be artificially separated out 
to reveal two claims regarding spatial differing and temporal deferring. To explicate the 
first of these related claims, Derrida's emphasis upon how writing differs from itself is 
simply to suggest that writing, and by extension all repetition, is split ( differed) by the 
absence that makes it necessary, and one example of this might be that we write 
something down because we may soon forget it, or to communicate something to 
someone who is not with us. According to Derrida, all writing, in order to be what it is, 
must be able to function in the absence of every empirically determined addressee (M 
375). 
Derrida also considers deferral to be typical of the written and this is to reinforce 
that the meaning of a certain text is never present, never entirely captured by a critic's 
attempt to pin it down, and this applies as much to Bennington's efforts as it does to this 
thesis. The meaning of a text is constantly subject to the whims of the future, but when 
that so-called future is itself 'present' (if we are to try and circumscribe the future by 
reference to a specific date or event) its meaning is equally not realised, but subject to yet 
another future that can never be present. The key to a text is never even present to the 
author themselves, for the written always defers its meaning, and as a consequence we 
cannot simply ask Derrida to explain exactly what he meant by propounding that 
enigmatic sentiment that has been controversially translated as "there is nothing outside 
of the text" (OG 158)69 • Any explanatory words that he may deign to offer would 
themselves require further explication, for of necessity, in this temporal space, myriad 
interpretations will always be possible. So, Derrida' s more generalised notion of writing, 
arche-writing, refers to the way in which the written is possible only on account of this 
'originary' deferral of meaning that ensures that meaning can never actually be 
definitively present. In conjunction with the differing aspect that we have already seen 
68Saussure, F. , p 25. 
69There are those who argue, with good reason, that the French il n 'y a pas de hors-texte is more accurately 
translated as "there is no outside of the text". Since he first coined this aphorism, Derrida has also spent a 
lot of time reformulating its meaning, and he has suggested that it is more accurately translated as "there is 
no outside of context" ( cf. 'Afterword' , LI 136- 7). Of course, engendering controversy may have been 
Derrida's strategic intent in initially endorsing the "there is nothing outside of the text" translation, and if 
that was the case then he definitely succeeded. 
him associate with, and then extend beyond the traditional confines of writing, he will 
come to describe these two overlapping processes via that most famous of neologisms: 
diff erance. 
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Differance is an attempt to conjoin the differing and deferring aspects involved in 
arche-writing in a term that itself plays upon the distinction between the audible and the 
written. After all, what differentiates differance and difference is inaudible, and this 
means that distinguishing between them actually requires the written. This problematises 
efforts like Saussure's, which as well as attempting to keep speech and writing apart, also 
suggest that writing is a secondary and almost unnecessary addition to speech. In 
response to such a claim, Derrida can simply point out that there is often, and perhaps 
even always, this type of ambiguity in the spoken word - difference as compared to 
differance - that demands recourse to the written. Rather than speech being primordial, it 
necessarily requires the written to function properly. The spoken is hence always at a 
distance from any supposed clarity of a monological consciousness, and it is this 
originary breach that Derrida associates with the terms arche-writing and differance. 
Of course, differance cannot be exhaustively defined in any satisfactory manner 
and this is largely because of Derrida's insistence that it is "neither a word, nor a 
concept", as well as the fact that the meaning of the term changes depending upon the 
particular context in which it is being employed. For the moment, however, it suffices to 
suggest that according to Derrida, differance is typical of what is involved in arche-
writing and this generalised notion of writing that breaks down the entire logic of the sign 
(OG 7). The widespread conviction that the sign literally represents something, which 
even if not actually present, could be potentially present, is rendered impossible by arche-
writing, which insists that signs always refer to yet more signs ad infinitum, and that there 
is no ultimate referent or foundation. One could even extend the applicability of arche-
writing and differance to that most unpopular of terms in the modem philosophical 
vernacular - experience. Derrida dislikes the term ' experience ' because it is "unwieldy 
and metaphysical", but ifwe think of "experience as arche-writing" (OG 60-1), he 
assures us that this is a different matter, and it too is subject to the same differance, or 
dehiscence, for which writing, narrowly conceived, has often been disparaged. 
Such sentiments will be analysed in greater detail throughout this chapter, but this 
reversal of the subordinated term (writing) accomplishes the first of deconstruction' s dual 
strategic intents. Rather than being derivative, writing, or at least the processes that 
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characterise writing (ie. differance and arche-writing), are ubiquitous. Just as a piece of 
writing has no self-present subject to explain what every particular word means (and this 
ensures that what is written must partly elude any individual's attempt to control it), this 
is equally typical of the spoken. Utilising the same structure of repetition, nothing 
guarantees that the other will endow the words I use with the particular meaning that I 
attribute to them. Even the conception of an internal monologue and the idea that we can 
intimately 'hear' our own thoughts in a non-contingent way is misguided, as it ignores 
the way that arche-writing privileges difference and a non-coincidence with oneself. 
Without digressing in this regard, in his book Speech and Phenomena, Derrida 
discusses the Husserlian emphasis upon intuition and argues that the presentation of 
meaning, even to oneself, is always haunted by its possible repetition or reproduction (SP 
68). This implies, as one commentator has recognised, that "the now could never be 
recognised as such, if each experience of the now exhausted itself in the experience and 
left no trace"70 • A trace is hence necessary, and this residue of a previous experience 
precludes us ever being present to ourselves in a self-contained 'now' moment. The 
'identity of the now is dependent upon a non-identity: it can only repeat itself by differing 
from itself, and this means that arche-writing and the deferred temporality that is 
involved in it are not just an exception to the rule, but in fact, are the rule. 
Derrida's criticisms of the Husserlian 'now' moment will be considered in more 
detail in chapter five, but for the moment it is important to highlight that this reversing 
aspect of the deconstructive strategy is clearly also applicable to the mind-body dualism. 
After all, it can be cogently argued that everything that the body can be denigrated for, 
such as a reliance upon the transience of the senses, is equally applicable to the workings 
of any ephemeral realm of the 'mental'. To pose the problem in terms more closely 
aligned with Merleau-Ponty's project, there is no obvious reason why a hypothetical 
deconstruction should not highlight that everything that one might attempt to privilege as 
the 'mental' always implies the body, and is inconceivable without it. A deconstructive 
reversal of the mind-body hierarchy might even emphasise something tantamount to 
Merleau-Ponty's notion of the body-subject, where the previously subordinated term of 
the opposition - eg. the body - is restored, albeit in a modified form (the body-subject), 
as the privileged te1m. Indeed, such a reversal would seem to be structurally isomorphic 
70Dillon, M., Semiological Reductionism: A Critique of the Deconstructionist Movement in Postmodern 
Thought, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995, p 47. 
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with the transition that Derrida's notion of writing makes when instead of being merely a 
derivative addition to speech, it is actually revealed as partaking in arche-writing. At the 
very least, a mind-body dualism is clearly susceptible to the first strategy of 
deconstruction ( eg. reversal) and why Derrida rarely sought to reverse this particular 
hierarchy hence remains an issue that is worth examining. 
In this respect, however, it needs to be pointed out that all of deconstruction' s 
reversals (arche-writing included) are partly captured by the edifice that they seek to 
overthrow. For Derrida, "one always inhabits, and all the more when one does not 
suspect it" (OG 24), and it is hence important to recognise that the mere reversal of an 
existing metaphysical opposition might not also challenge the governing framework and 
presuppositions that are attempting to be reversed (WD 280). Deconstruction hence 
cannot rest content with merely prioritising writing over speech ( or body over mind), but 
must also accomplish the second major aspect of deconstruction' s dual strategies, that 
being to corrupt and contaminate the opposition itself. Without yet considering the 
significant differences between Den·ida's and Merleau-Ponty' s philosophical projects -
ie. stylistically, methodologically, etc. - it is worth pre-emptively suggesting that 
Merleau-Ponty's final chiasmic ontology can also be envisaged as highlighting that 
dualisms are always already corrupted. Indeed, forthcoming chapters will argue this in 
detail. 
However, before explicating how deconstruction reveals that existing oppositions 
are necessarily corrupted, it is worth mentioning that despite Derrida's use of scare 
quotes and consistent warnings against interpreting his reversals in a transcendental 
manner, his philosophy frequently verges on propounding transcendental and 
metaphysical arguments. Even if one agrees with him that it is necessary to go through 
transcendental arguments rather than merely bypassing them (OG 50) as Wittgenstein 
arguably does in his own 'deconstruction' of the philosophical tradition 71, in scrupulously 
written texts Derrida speaks of "original dispersion" (OG 232). More famously, he has 
also suggested that differance is "older" than Heidegger' s ontological difference (SP 
154 ), and as Richard Rorty has pointed out, it is difficult to know what to make of 
concepts such as ' older' that are precariously poised next to affirmations of primordiality 
71In his book, Wittgenstein and Derrida, Herny Staten details Wittgenstein and Derrida 's decidedly 
different deconstructions of the tradition. While Derrida proposes a more thorough and respectful relation 
to the metaphysical tradition, according to Staten, Wittgenstein hopes to do away with this necessity 
altogether. See Staten, H., Wittgenstein and Derrida, Oxford : Blackwell, 1984. 
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and other such transcendental arguments 72 • David Wood also criticises this aspect of 
Derrida' s work and cites several quotes where differance is described as constituting and 
as an origin 7 3. The point of this foray into a rather large body of literature regarding just 
how transcendental Derrida's work is, is to highlight that although Derrida regularly 
reverses many of the different oppositions that have plagued the Western philosophical 
tradition, this does not automatically ensure that he succeeds in corrupting these 
oppositions from within. If his various reversals are not undermined sufficiently by the 
second deconstructive strategy of corrupting the entire opposition, then he risks being yet 
another transcendental philosopher who simply swaps everything that metaphysics has 
valorised for its opposite. 
The tension between these dual aspects of a deconstructive intervention will 
become more important when alterity is considered in the second half of this thesis, but it 
should be apparent that Derrida must highlight that the categories that sustain and 
safeguard any dualism are always already disrupted and displaced. To effect this second 
aspect of deconstruction's strategic intents, Derrida usually coins a new term, or reworks 
· an old one, to permanently disrupt the structure into which he has intervened - examples 
of this include his discussion of the pharmakon in Plato ( drug or tincture, salutary or 
maleficent), and the supplement in Rousseau, which will be considered towards the end 
of this chapter. Moreover, according to Derrida, the basis for this disruption is to be 
found within the system that he is criticising itself. Deconstruction contends that in any 
text, there are inevitably points of equivocation and 'undecidability' that betray any 
stable meaning or thesis that an author might seek to impose upon his or her text. The 
process of writing always reveals that which has been suppressed, covers over that which 
has been disclosed, and more generally breaches the very oppositions that are thought to 
sustain it. This is why Derrida's 'philosophy' is so textually based and it is also why his 
key terms are always changing, because depending upon who or what he is seeking to 
deconstruct, that point of equivocation and 'undecidability ' - which he sometimes refers 
to as the neglected and yet pivotal cornerstone of the house (MDM 75, 79) - will always 
be located in a different place. 
To phrase the problem in slightly different terms, Derrida ' s argument is that in 
examining a binary opposition, deconstruction manages to reveal a trace. This is not a 
72Rorty, R. , "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in Critical Inquiry 11 , September 1984, p 17. 
73Wood, D., Th e Deconstruction of Tim e, Contemporary Studies in Philosophy and the Human Sciences, 
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trace of the oppositions that have since been deconstructed - on the contrary, the trace is 
a rupture within metaphysics, a pattern of incongruities where the metaphysical rubs up 
against the non-metaphysical, that it is deconstruction ' s job to juxtapose as best as it 
can74 . The trace does not appear as such (OG 65), but somehow the logic of its path in a 
text can be mimed by a deconstructive intervention and hence brought to the fore. The 
problem for translating this into a notion of embodiment is that the trace withdraws from 
sight, and to consider it according to the phenomenological dictum of describing that 
which appears to consciousness would be to ignore many of the trace ' s more prescient 
and defining features. 
Nevertheless, one impo1iant aim of this thesis will be to analyse the extent to 
which when we deconstruct the speech-writing opposition, and by implication, when we 
deconstruct the mind-body problem that Derrida says is largely correlative (OG 35), the 
trace that is revealed can be considered as having ramifications for a conception of 
embodiment that also wants to avoid the dualistic bifurcations of presence and absence. 
Of course, discerning exactly what type of ramifications this might have for embodiment 
will be no easy task, and Derrida has consistently warned us against attempting this type 
of project, most obviously in Speech and Phenomena (SP 75, 104, 154), but invariably in 
vitiually all of his texts. David Wood has also insisted that there can be no 
phenomenology of the trace 75, and this thesis will not simply ignore Derrida' s anti-
phenomenological bent. 
However, it is partly the frequency of, and intensity with which Derrida declares 
himself absolved of phenomenology, that makes us (and Levinas76) all the more 
suspicious. In Of Grammatology, he intriguingly states that "a thought of the trace can no 
more break with a transcendental phenomenology than be reduced to it" (OG 62, cf. SP 
154). To provide some context, this comment is Derrida's attempt to acknowledge that 
Husserl ' s philosophical schema accords non-presentation with as equally originary a role 
as he accords presentation. Derrida hence admits that what does not present itself, or that 
Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1989, p 274. 
74Harvey, I. , Derrida and the Economy of Differance, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986. 
75Wood, D., The Deconstruction of Time, p 271. It seems to me, however, that such a position rel ies upon 
an overly literal definition of phenomenology, and as Wood is himself well aware, Merleau-Ponty's 
phenomenology no longer adheres in any simple way to the Husserlian reduction. 
76Simon Critchley cites an interesting comment by Levinas suggesting that Derrida's treatment of 
phenomenology has been schematic, and that phenomenology has consequently always threatened to 
return and haunt Derrida. For an understanding of Levinas' arguments in this respect, see Critchley, S. , Th e 
Ethics of Deconstruction: Levinas and Derrida, Oxford: Blackwell, 1992, p 160. 
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which eludes the grasp of presence ( eg. diflerance, although it is worth pointing out that 
diflerance equally eludes the non-grasp of absence77) , is not rendered secondary. In that 
sense at least, Husserl is not considered to be committing the metaphysical mistake par 
excellence of subordinating one term of a dualism to the other78 • The implication of this is 
that there is a way, or at least might be a way, in which phenomenology can avoid the 
metaphysics of presence. However, Derrida insists that to pose the problem in terms of a 
choice between the trace/supplement/diflerance as aligned with a certain phenomenology, 
or as a rupture within phenomenology, is "to confuse very different levels, paths and 
styles" (OG 62). What is interesting is that he wants to keep phenomenology somehow 
external to the considerations of his text, even where he acknowledges something 
tantamount to complicity. Everything else in Of Grammatology is about breaching the 
purity of such 'outsides', contaminating Saussure's distinction between phone and 
gramme with this notion of arche-writing. It is curious then, that 'writing ' itself, the germ 
of contamination, might preclude yet another contamination - eg. the phenomenological 
contamination, and the contamination of the body more generally. 
This chapter intends to breach this purity, but the obvious question then becomes 
why, and for what reasons must Derrida's work be considered in terms of the body at all? 
One important reason is because his treatment of embodiment and what we must 
elsewhere infer a deconstructive treatment to be, will also have correlative repercussions 
on the way that Derrida can thematise the question of alterity. The way that we conceive 
of our embodied situation almost invariably influences how we think about alterity. This 
is not to suggest that the other is reducible to the self, but that the divergence and yet 
simultaneous dependence of mind and body is similar to - and even chiasmically 
intertwined with - the divergence and yet surreptitious betrothal of self and other. 
Establishing that, however, is very much a longitudinal concern, and the connections 
between these two guiding themes of this thesis - embodiment and the other - will 
become clearer as we progress. 
More immediately, this chapter will attempt to establish Derrida' s significance for 
77Rodolphe Gasche has consistently emphasised that differance cannot be simply taken as emblematic of 
absence, or certainly not as an absence that is susceptible of determination. It is rather, an "infrastructure" 
that is anterior to such oppositional notions, and that cannot be recuperated dialectically. See Gasche, R. , 
The Tain of the Mirror, p 103. 
78Of course, Derrida has expressed many reservations regarding Husserl throughout his career, and most 
famously in his discontent with Husserlian temporality and its reliance upon the notion of intuition ( cf. 
SP). 
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questions pertaining to embodiment because of an abiding belief that it is a thematic that 
he could and should have pursued further, and it need not necessarily be along the lines 
of the existentialism that he has so despised. There are several reasons why I think that he 
should have pursued it further, the most obvious of these being that although the 
denigration of writing is widespread in the philosophical tradition, it does not seem to be 
quite as endemic as the servility to which the body has been consigned. A deconstruction 
of the metaphysical tradition, which must also inhabit that metaphysical tradition (OG 
24), must surely accord more attention to this problematic than it has thus far. 
Moreover, much remains to be considered in issues regarding embodiment and 
Derrida has himself admitted this 79 • In The Gift of Death's evocative contemplation of the 
supreme Abrahamic sacrifice, Derrida ponders the tremble, the quiver, and the strange 
association that they bear to an unknown that nevertheless becomes palpable in these 
very agitations. According to him, the tremble is completely irrepressible and exhibits a 
symptomatology that is as "enigmatic as tears" (GD 55). This reference to tears would 
seem to preclude us daring to suggest that this symptomatology might be a 
phenomenology, for tears divest the eyes of their traditional phenomenological import -
seeing80 • However, Derrida does suggest that in order to begin to understand our quiver 
(and surely this is not the only symptom deserving of such attention) much about our 
bodies remains to be considered. In one rather long sentence, he contends that: 
We would need to make new inroads into thinking concerning the body, without 
disassociating the registers of discourse (thought, philosophy, the bio-genetic -
psychoanalytic sciences, phylo and onto genesis), in order to one day come closer 
to what makes us tremble or what makes us cry, to that cause which is not the 
final cause that can be called God or Death (God is the cause of the mysterium 
tremendum, and the death that is given is always what makes us tremble, or what 
1nakes us weep as well) but to a closer cause; not the immediate cause, that is, the 
79ln his essay, "Le Toucher: Touch/to touch him", Derrida also mentions the importance of embodied 
issues. His analysis of the thematic of touching, as it appears in the work of Jean-Luc Nancy, accords a 
certain priority to the sense of touch, but it also reveals a necessary breaching, or synaesthesia of the 
senses, in that the problem that Derrida poses at the beginning of this essay is: "when our eyes touch, is it 
day or is it night? (my italics)". See Derrida, J. , "Le Toucher: Touch/to touch him" in Paragraph , 16:2, 
1993, p 122-57. 
80In chapter five, it will be illustrated that Derrida thinks that the eyes are importantly blind, and the tears 
that he also associates with the eyes can only exacerbate this paradoxical blindness. This reaffirms John 
Caputo 's interpretation of Derrida, in which he suggests that the eyes are more for imploring than 
exploring, doing ' truth' rather than observing, "not seeing but sighing, not perception but prayer" (see 
Caputo, J. , The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997, p 
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accident or circumstance, but the cause closest to our body, that which means that 
one trembles or weeps rather than doing something else (GD 55). 
This stated intent to think of the body without succumbing to a final cause, or an 
immediate cause, seems closely related to Merleau-Ponty ' s attempts to avoid the twin 
metaphysical tendencies of intellectualism and empiricism. Moreover, part of achieving 
this rethinking of the body without "disassociating registers of discourse", that is, without 
thinking of the body merely empirically, will be to establish the extent to which Derrida' s 
work, like Merleau-Ponty' s, can also be relevant to such a project. 
Even in The Gift of Death itself, Derrida insightfully, if also rather aphoristically, 
suggests that we tremble because of the disproportion between death as affirming our 
own singularity, and death as also making us responsible for an infinite gift. We tremble 
in the face of the aporia that exists between these two competing demands: the first of 
these demands is communal and ethical, in that death opens us to something that is 
wholly other (an alterity that subtends our own individual existence); and yet given that 
our death can never actually be undergone by another for us, there is also a demand of 
· radical singularity (GD 56). We tremble in the recognition that neither of these demands 
can ever be entirely assuaged and also because of a tacit recognition that whichever 
direction we may incline towards, that 'undecidable' decision can never be wholly 
justified (GD 70)81• Returning to the problem at hand, it should be clear from these type 
of comments that considering Derrida in terms pertaining to the body is a coherent and 
worthwhile project that need not be diametrically opposed to his own philosophical 
intents. 
Moreover, it is worth reaffirming that the ethico-religious ideal of the body as 
subordinated to the mind, or the body as a mere 'handmaiden' of consciousness, parallels 
the speech-writing hierarchy and even almost inevitably accompanies it. Derrida hints at 
this type of correlation when he equates Saussure ' s repudiation of the written with the 
denial of embodied passion and sensibility that he suggests typifies the theologians of sin 
(OG 37-8). According to Derrida, Saussure' s argument hinges on interpreting the 
written, the body, and also the passions, as immoral and a deviation from nature ( eg. the 
"natural" bond of sound). When Saussure decries the "tyranny" of writing that distorts 
and contorts the pronunciation of words, he is, according to Derrida at least, expressing 
327 & 334). 
81 The notion of undecidability is examined in detail in chapter six. 
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his discontent with the body for usurping the rightful privilege of the soul (OG 38). 
Now, given this discussion of deconstruction ' s strategies in regard to opposition, 
and some ways in which they could be satisfactorily applied to the mind-body problem, 
one important question still remains to be answered - exactly what type of consequences 
might the deconstruction of the mind-body problem have for a notion like embodiment? 
To briefly sketch an answer, although this answer is predictably negative in its 
formulation, then clearly the body cannot be considered in any way that makes the 
linguistic extrinsic to it. Derrida has insisted that everything is subject to differance and 
'arche-writing' in the broad sense. From this it can be discerned, somewhat 
axiomatically, that there is no pure self-presence, or locus of self-certainty to be found in 
the body for Derrida (although nor does Merleau-Ponty's analysis of the body require 
this). Derrida objects to the metaphysical opposition between presence and absence above 
all else, and a body, conceived of in deconstructive terms, is clearly not something that 
can be simplistically characterised as in the domain of presence. 
Of course, in considering the relationship that obtains between deconstruction and 
embodiment it should not be ignored that the most pervasive interpretation of Derrida is 
still the one that relies upon famous and readily circulable statements such as "there is 
nothing outside of the text". The following chapter contains an extended analysis of this 
famous provocation, but for the moment it suffices to observe that critics propounding 
this type of interpretation are generally linguistically focused, and trace the debt that 
deconstruction owes to Saussurean linguistics and its emphasis upon the arbitrariness of 
the sign. While Gasche and Bennington, among others, have attempted to redress this 
treatment, it is still common, and those proposing this less sympathetic reading of Derrida 
envisage a textualising of the notion of the body that precludes it being considered in any 
manner other than linguistic. 
For the particular purposes of this thesis, it is worth reaffirming that this is the 
type of interpretation of Derrida propounded by many of those theorists writing at the 
intersection of his thought with Merleau-Ponty. I am referring to the collections entitled 
Ecart and Differance: Merleau-Ponty and Derrida on Seeing and Writing82 , and 
Merleau-Ponty, Hermeneutics and Postmodernism83 , and the most obvious problem with 
these essays is a fairly united reading of Derrida as a semiological reductionist who 
82Dillon, M., ed . .£cart and Differance: Merleau-Ponty and Derrida on Seeing and Writing . 
83Busch, T ., & Gallagher, S. , eds. Merleau-Ponty, Hermeneutics and Postmodernism. 
deliberately reduces embodied meaning to the linguistic84• Many of these essays are 
written by avowed "Merleau-Pontyians" (not that this is a bad thing! ) who intend to 
affirm a disparity and discordance between Merleau-Ponty and Derrida, and more often 
than not, precisely in order to discredit Derrida by comparison to Merleau-Ponty's 
phenomenology. 
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Martin Dillon is one contributor who rehearses such an argument in his 
introductory essay for Ecart and Differance 85, and in his book Merleau-Ponty 's 
Ontology86 • He also writes another book perpetuating such a line of thought, bluntly titled 
Semiological Reductionism: A Critique of the Deconstructionist Movement in 
Postmodern Thought. Dillon's fundamental contention is that Derrida in fact coins a new 
dualism, one side of which (the body and sensation) is rendered inaccessible87• Dillon's 
charge of semiological reductionism is not a new or particularly innovative interpretation 
of Derrida. Indeed, it is clear that Dillon's arguments cannot simply be dismissed, even if 
at certain points they fail in their reading of Derrida, because they are grounded in 
something of a scholarly consensus. Derrida himself has been bemused by the frequency 
of derisive accusations of linguistic idealism. Reflecting on one such interpretation, he 
asserts that: 
It is totally false to suggest that deconstruction is a suspension of reference. 
Deconstruction is always deeply concerned with the 'other' of language. I never 
cease to be surprised by critics who see my work as a declaration that there is 
nothing beyond language, that we are imprisoned in language; it is, in fact, saying 
the exact opposite. The critique of logocentrism is above all the search for the 
'other' and the 'other' of language88 • 
84This chapter will take issue with Martin Dillon's interpretation of Derrida as a semiological reductionist, 
but he is far from being alone in making such accusations. Among others, articles by Gary Madison, 
Patrick Burke and Leonard Lawlor also seem culpable in this regard. In his essay, "Merleau-Ponty and 
Derrida: La DifferEnce", Madison argues that, for Derrida, "the world is nothing more than a semiological 
construct, a purely intralinguistic affair" (Ecart and Differance, p 95). Burke and Lawlor maintain that 
Derrida introduces a new binary opposition (Ecart and Differance, p 63), and a dualism that severs the 
linguistic from the perceptual (Ecart and Differance, p 72). Fortunately, however, there are exceptions to 
this tendency, and most particularly in relation to Hugh Silverman's essay, "Between Merleau-Ponty and 
Postmodernism", which can be found in Merleau-Ponty, Hermeneutics and Postmodernism, eds. Busch & 
Gallagher, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992. 
85Dillon, M., "Introduction" in Ecart and Differance, Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: Humanities Press, 
1997, p 1-18. 
86Dillon, M., Merleau-Ponty's Ontology, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988, p 175-6. 
87Dillon, M. , Semiological Reductionism, p 3. 
88Derrida, J. , in an interview with Kearney, R., "Deconstruction and the Other: Dialogue with Derrida" in 
Dialogue with Contemporary Continental Thinkers: The Phenomenological Heritage, Manchester: 
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Coming from Derrida, this is quite an affirmative statement. He does not merely suggest 
that the criticism posed by Dillon, among other theorists, is incorrect and ignores the fact 
that he is usually quite careful to disassociate himself from such a position. Derrida 
makes the stronger claim that his philosophy propounds the exact opposite position. 
Exactly what this could mean will become clearer as this thesis progresses, but it 
certainly should not be suggested that Derrida's philosophy allows unmediated access to 
this other of language through reflection, intuition, or any other medium via which 
metaphysics has generally enabled the approximation to 'truth'. Attempting to grasp the 
other of language in language, can and should be a paradoxical activity. This is why 
Derrida has long been fascinated by negative theology (and also the Levinasian 
distinction between the Saying and the Said) and its strange attempt to bear witness to 
God without language and without the name, since such tools risk divesting the religious 
experience of exactly what it is that the notion of God would be attempting to 
communicate89 • There is no easy answer to Dillon's discontent with the deconstructive 
suggestion that the other of language is consistently being effaced by language, but it can 
be pointed out that the mere existence of this paradox does not necessarily deny us access 
to this other of language, and it certainly does not show that Derrida ignores the other of 
language. On the contrary, his later philosophy calls for nothing but the wholly other 
(tout autre) that breaches the imperialism of the same, language included90 • 
However, the main mistake of those accusing Derrida of semiological 
reductionism is to presume that the other of language must be an embodied immediacy 
that does without signification. For Derrida, the other of language is not the body. On the 
contrary, De1rida suggests that the problem of writing as subordinated by speech, and the 
problem of the body as subordinated by the mind, are a similar problem (cf. OG 35). The 
body is hence not simply the 'outside' which hides a secret, interior truth of subjectivity 
within, and the consequences of this idea will be examined in the following chapter's 
Manchester University Press, 1984, p 123. 
89To simplify, the Levinasian distinction between the Saying and the Said is an attempt to distinguish 
between a sensible and corporeal exposure to the other (the Saying), and the attempt to put that exposure 
into words (the Said). This problem of how the Said might be able to best convey the Saying would seem 
to share some similaiities with a constitutive problem of negative theology in regard to how one might go 
about testifying to a mystical exposure to God within a language that can never adequately capture that 
experience itself. For a more detailed account of Derrida's interactions with negative theology, see Caputo, 
J. , The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida, p 146, Hart, K., The Trespass of the Sign: Deconstruction, 
Theology and Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989, and Critchley, S. , The Ethics of 
Deconstruction. 
90This notion of the wholly other (tout autre) is examined in chapters nine and ten. 
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discussion of the work of Vicki Kirby. Moreover, by claiming that Derrida bases his 
entire analysis upon reducing the so-called 'externalities' (including the perceptual) to the 
linguistic, Dillon also ignores Derrida's fundamental claim to restructuring the entire 
concept of the sign and, by implication, language. Dillon must hence argue that the 
notion of the trace and arche-writing are an ineffectual play on words - a subterfuge 
designed to obscure Derrida's more traditional philosophical project, which he contends 
is a linguistic idealism. Of course, in its stated ambitions exactly what deconstruction 
does not want to do, is to try and effect this type of reduction. On the contrary, it is 
designed to open questions up to a multiplicity of perspectives, not to recreate the 
phenomenological reduction in linguistic guise. As Merleau-Ponty has informed us, the 
only thing that the phenomenological reduction has taught us is the impossibility of just 
such a reduction (PP xiv)91 , and even though Derrida has repeatedly acknowledged 
Husserl as a major influence, he would clearly agree. He is not, as Dillon provocatively 
suggests, "employing a methodology of reduction and idealism, like his primary mentor, 
Husserl"92 • 
While Dillon has no major problem with Derrida's analysis of language, at least 
insofar as it applies only to language, he points out that when Derrida extends his 
discussion of such matters onto the body and more phenomenological concerns in Speech 
and Phenomena, Derrida nevertheless begins his argument with the statement "when I 
use words" (SP 50). According to Dillon, this does not get at visual and embodied 
responses to a situation that do not require words93 , and can involve an original 
presentation rather than a mere representation. Dillon contends that presence to meaning 
need not require signs at all, as if the whole edifice of Derridean deconstruction falls 
apart on this suggestion. 
Without entertaining this claim that, for Derrida, meaning exists only in language, 
it seems to me that this difference between meaning and apprehension, and many of the 
related aporias that Derrida discerns in representation, need not be restricted to language 
alone. Does not the same divergence (ecart) exist within a situation conceived more 
91 Of course, this is a complicated statement that does not automatically entail a rejection of 
phenomenology. According to Jeffrey Bell (and I think he is correct), "the failure of the phenomenological 
reduction is not, for Merleau-Ponty, a sign of phenomenology 's inadequacy, but the recognition of a 
fundamental experience that is the condition for the natural attitude" (see Bell, J. , The Problem of 
Difference: Phenomenology and Poststructuralism, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998, p 119). 
92Dillon, M., Semiological Reductionism, p 50. 
93Dillon, M., Semiological Reductionism, p 42. 
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phenomenologically? This possibility will be examined in greater detail throughout this 
thesis and through reference to the divergence that Merleau-Ponty discerns between the 
sentient and the sensible, but there seems to be no compelling reason why this would not 
be the case. Iterability alters (LI 200), but the point is that the various structures of 
iterability are not the sole domain of language. It is precisely this absolute opposition that 
Derrida wants to place in question. Why then, does Dillon refuse to consider that 
Derrida's attempted complication of the notion of the sign might well have interesting 
consequences for the notion of the body? It would prohibit any transparent presence-to-
self, but it might also involve a productive redefinition of what it is to be embodied that 
would reinstall us in the ambiguity of our situation. At the very least, there seems to be 
no convincing reason to presume that it would, necessarily, be opposed to that 
paradoxical and internally divergent situatedness that Dillon's inspiration, Merleau-
Ponty, thematises. 
Preoccupied with proving that Derrida installs an absolute bar between the 
significance of the seen and its referent, the indefinitely deferred transcendental signified, 
Dillon contends that deconstruction "has the consequence of denying to perceptual 
objects any meaning beyond that conferred by signifiers" and he rhetorically asks of 
Denida, "why can't we smell, touch, etc?"94 • This claim that Derrida somehow forbids all 
reference to touching, smelling, etc. , seems to me to be a significant falsification of his 
deconstructive intent. Admittedly, early deconstruction does accord some priority to the 
vaiious formal structures of language over the language user. The written word, the 
grammatological, and even linguistics generally, are all emphasised, and Derrida also 
insists that signs, or at least his reworked definition of what a sign might be, are a 
prerequisite for meaning of all kinds. Much of the terrain traditionally considered 
phenomenological has also been consigned to the dustbin, but it needs to be pointed out 
that this decision to pursue other lines of questioning is not the same thing as attempting 
a sustained philosophical reduction and the collapsing of one term into its other. 
Given Derrida 's challenging of the traditional notion of the sign, we may be more 
inclined to agree with Bennington's suggestion that Derrida' s insistence that the sign is at 
the beginning, "will imply very rapidly that there is no beginning, thing or sign"95 . It 
opens all of these notions up to alternative formulations, rather than making the 
94Dillon, M., Semiological Reductionism, p 77-8 . 
95Bennington, G. , Jacques Derrida, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993, p 24. 
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phenomenal thing somehow inert before the all-encompassing power of the sign. If text, 
for Derrida, includes everything (OG 158, LI 136), then it seems permissible to suggest 
that repetition and all of the aporias that govern it are also 'perceptual' and 'experiential ' , 
although in a manner that transgresses our sense of what encloses and identifies these 
terms96 • On this type of interpretation, his emphasis upon "signification" is designed to 
suggest that a certain spatio-temporal movement that he terms differance makes 
(im)possible signification and sensibility in any of its myriad forms. 
Instead of considering such possibilities, the semiological reductionist argument 
reinstalls the very binary oppositions that Derrida is trying to displace, by refusing to 
consider the ways in which differance is not merely sign dependent, but is an 
"infrastructure" underneath the entire signifier/signified relationship97, that in turn also 
reveals the fragility of this very opposition. It must be remembered that deconstruction is 
not merely the simple reversal of the privileging of speech over writing, and of the 
signifier over what is signified. It wants to reveal how such oppositions are always 
already corrupted, and critics who argue that Derrida cannot be considered in terms of 
embodiment ignore this second major aspect of the deconstructive strategy. Admittedly, 
it has been suggested that Derrida himself occasionally forgets the importance of this 
second aspect of the deconstructive intervention, and that his reversals hence sometimes 
verge on legitimising transcendental claims. Elsewhere some concerns will be expressed 
about this tendency ( see chapter nine), but the point remains that the accusation that 
Derrida privileges the linguistic signifier almost entirely ignores the notions of differance 
and arche-writing that this chapter has begun to elucidate. 
Moreover, such an accusation also ignores the logic of the supplement that is an 
important aspect of Of Grammatology. This text's vastly different discussions of 
Saussure and Rousseau, of arche-writing and the supplement, are united by the fact that 
both of them explicitly preclude their significance being confined solely to the realm of 
the linguistic. In attempting to illustrate this, it is worth recognising that the supplement 
is something which, allegedly secondarily, comes to serve as an aid to something 
'original' or 'natural ' . Writing is itself an example of this structure, for as Derrida points 
96In this respect, it is worth recalling Gary Madison's insistence that Merleau-Ponty 's analysis of 
perception also transgresses our traditional sense of what identifies this term (see Madison, G., "Did 
Merleau-Ponty Have a Theory of Perception?", p 83) . For Merleau-Ponty, perception is always 
interconnected with action and habitual motility. 
97Gasche, R. , The Tain of the Mirror, p 103. 
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out, "if supplementarity is a necessarily indefinite process, writing is the supplement par 
excellence since it proposes itself as the supplement of the supplement, sign of a sign, 
taking the place of a speech already significant" (OG 281). Another example of the 
supplement might be masturbation, as Derrida suggests (OG 153), or even the use of birth 
control precautions. What is notable about both of these examples, is a certain ambiguity 
that ensures that which is supplementary can always be interpreted in two ways. For 
example, our society's use of birth control precautions might be interpreted as tacitly 
suggesting that our natural way is lacking and that the contraceptive pill, or condom, etc. , 
hence replaces a fault in nature. On the other hand, it might also be argued that such 
precautions merely add on to, and enrich our natural way. It is always ambiguous, or 
more accurately 'undecidable', whether the supplement adds itself and "is a plenitude 
enriching another plenitude, the fullest measure of presence", or whether "the supplement 
supplements ... adds only to replace ... represents and makes an image ... its place is 
assigned in the structure by the mark of an emptiness" (OG 144). Ultimately, Derrida 
suggests that the supplement is both of these things, accretion and substitution (OG 200), 
which means that the supplement is "not a signified more than a signifier, a representer 
than a presence, a writing than a speech" (OG 315). It comes before all such modalities, 
and for Derrida, there can hence be no simple reduction to one term ( eg. the image, or the 
linguistic). 
It should also be highlighted that this is not just some rhetorical suggestion that 
has no concrete significance in deconstruction, as Dillon claims98 • Indeed, while 
Rousseau consistently laments the frequency of his masturbation in his book, The 
Confessions, Derrida argues that "it has never been possible to desire the presence 'in 
person', before this play of substitution and the symbolic experience of auto-affection" 
(OG 154). By this, Derrida means that this supplementary masturbation that 'plays' 
between presence and absence ( eg. the image of the absent Therese that is evoked by 
Rousseau) is that which allows us to conceive of being present and fulfilled in sexual 
relations with another at all. In a sense, masturbation is 'originary' , and according to 
Derrida, this situation applies to all sexual relations. Hetero-eroticism has its own 
supplementary protection in which we are never present to some ephemeral 'meaning' of 
sexual relations, but always involved in some form of representation. Even if this does 
98Dillon does not accord the notion of the supplement much exegetical space, but he does argue that 
Derrida ' s references to the other of language play no concrete role in his work. See Dillon, M. , 
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not literally take the form of imagining another in the place of, or supplementing the 
'presence ' that is currently with us, and even if we are not always acting out a certain 
role, or faking certain pleasures, for Derrida, such representations and images are the very 
conditions of desire and of enjoyment. But he is in no way simplistically exalting the 
image, the represented and simulated version of sexual relations as exemplified by auto-
affection. Derrida' s point is that all sexual relations, and all subjectivity, are typified by 
this type of supplementarity that cannot be adequately characterised in terms of presence 
or absence, signifier or signified (OG 156). 
This digression into the logic of the supplement has aimed to provide further 
reasons for doubting the veracity of the semiological reductionist interpretation. Like his 
notion of arche-writing, Derrida's exploration of the problem of the supplement explicitly 
precludes its significance being confined solely to the linguistic, the image, or any other 
equivalent side of a dichotomy. Instead, these two pivotal notions from Of 
Grammatology emphasise an interdependence and also a breaching of categories like 
inner and outer, accretion and substitution, and this is characteristic of deconstruction ' s 
strategies in regard to dualisms generally. As yet, we have also seen no convincing reason 
to presume that this simultaneous interdependence and breaching of categories could not 
be relevantly applied to an analysis of embodiment. After all, Merleau-Ponty has 
emphasised the paradoxical status of the body-subject, which is simultaneously both 
subject and object, and forthcoming chapters will accord more significance to the way in 
which the world (outer) actually encroaches upon ' subjectivity' (inner) , as well as vice 
versa (PP 407). This possibility cannot be pursued in depth as yet, but this chapter intends 
to have redeemed Derrida from the caricature that suggests, without sufficient thought, 
that deconstruction rejects outright the possibility of an embodied 'meaning ' . Such an 
understanding seems possible within deconstruction, although it remains to be understood 
why Derrida never really pursued this question. 
As a chapter intent on opening up a plethora of questions, rather than closing 
them off, much remains to be considered. In this respect, it is worth turning to the 
writings of Vicki Kirby. Not only does she envisage Derrida 's work as functioning 
without a linguistic reduction, but she also sees an applicability, based in Derrida ' s own 
comments, to a notion of embodiment, and one that appears remarkably similar to the 
position that I will ascribe to the later philosophy of Merleau-Ponty. The following 
Semiological Reductionism, p 43. 
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chapter will examine the cogence of this claim, because if Kirby's position is correct ( or 
even close to correct) the commonly assumed antinomy between Merleau-Ponty and 
Derrida is also concordantly deconstructed. 
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4. Kirby, 'Corporeography', and the Question of an Embodied Deconstruction 
In Telling Flesh: The Substance of the Corporeal, Vicki Kirby argues that it is not in the 
interests of feminism to propound what she describes as an 'inessentialist' position in 
regard to embodiment. While she objects to undifferentiating biological givens that 
might, for example, construe women as confined to a nurturing role, she does not want to 
insist simplistically that embodiment has nothing to do with subjectivity. To pose the 
problem in terms more closely aligned with her own, Kirby is wary of the tendency 
simply to reverse binary oppositions, to swap nature for culture, reality for representation, 
and originary cause for interpretive effect. According to her, themes like 'textuality' and 
linguistic ideality have all but replaced the notion of 'reality'. As arguably the pre-
eminent European philosopher of our generation, the work of Derrida is invariably 
associated with this reversal of binary oppositions that seems to prohibit recourse to 
questions concerning embodiment. However, Kirby's book, via an extended meditation 
upon Derrida's claim that "there is nothing outside of the text"99 , constitutes an important 
challenge to such an interpretation. Rather than eschewing any and every reference to the 
body, she insists that deconstruction cannot be contained within such a framework, and 
that it makes sense within the logic of Of Grammatology (and she also pays cursory 
attention to Derrida's essay, "'Eating Well' or the Calculation of the Subject") to 
conceive of embodiment in deconstructive terms. Examining the coherence of this claim 
will be the main focus of this chapter, although in order to facilitate this task, I will also 
compare the notion of embodiment that Kirby espouses to a curiously similar conception 
of embodiment that Merleau-Ponty theorises in his unfinished text, The Visible and the 
Invisible. 
While Kirby's references to Derrida are often quite subtle, he is an important 
background figure in her work because many of the feminists that she criticises use 
Derridean deconstruction as an intellectual support. According to Kirby, recent feminist 
articulations of the body rely heavily upon the linguistic emphasis of early Derridean 
texts, and she finds theorists like Drucilla Cornell and Judith Butler to be complicit in 
something akin to the semiological reductionist interpretation. That is, they take Derrida 
as something of a linguistic idealist (TF 83-128), even if they generally endorse this 
99Kirby employs this particular translation of ii n '.Ya pas de hors-texte, and although we have previously 
seen reasons for preferring alternative translations, this chapter will abide by her protocol. 
position rather than reject it as the more unsympathetic critics of deconstruction have 
done. Kirby contends that Derrida actually resists any such reading of his work, and has 
an implied conception of the body that avoids this mere reversal of binary oppositions. 
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Dissatisfied with what she takes to be the postmodern refusal to consider the 
question of the body, Kirby seeks to transplant, with slight variations, certain post-
structuralist insights regarding language onto the contours of the body. She hence asks, 
"Is it absurd to assume, that if there is no outside of textuality, then the differential of 
language is articulate in/as blood, cells, breathing and so on?" and suggests that "the 
complexity of the sign is inseparable from the riddle of the copula" (TF 4). From the 
beginning then, it is obvious that her philosophical project is vastly different to that 
which has been exemplified by theorists like Martin Dillon 100 • Rather than interpreting 
Derrida' s use of terms like 'textuality' and 'writing ' narrowly, and hence envisaging his 
significance as being confined solely to the realm of the linguistic, Kirby endows these 
terms with their widest possible significance. According to Kirby and Derrida alike, 
terms like writing and textuality bear an applicability beyond the literal conception of the 
written word or text, and hence have a relevance that extends beyond their traditional 
domains. However, Kirby quickly adds an important proviso to this proposed 
generalisation of writing and textuality. She suggests that: 
I am not content to pose such an inquiry in a way that leaves the categories of 
nature and culture intact, as if the charge in my question only acknowledges the 
permeability of the body of nature to the inscriptive penetrations of the writing 
machine we call culture. I want to suggest instead that something a little more 
perverse and interesting might be going on (TF 4). 
Admittedly, Kirby' s book leaves the nature of this perversity somewhat unexplored, and 
this issue will be returned to towards the end of this chapter. For the moment, however, it 
suffices to point out that Kirby's explicit interactions with Derrida begin by way of 
disassociating him from Saussurean linguistics. According to her, Derrida' s use of the 
Saussurean thesis regarding the "arbitrary nature of the sign" is intended simply to blur 
the difference between arbitrariness and systematicity, rather than suggesting a priori that 
all signs have no reference point whatsoever (TF 45). Her point is that rather than merely 
exalting the "free play of the sign" and hence coming close to reinstalling a version of 
linguistic idealism, Derrida is more intent to reveal that the arbitrariness that we associate 
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with the sign is also always involved in the most apparently systematic of activities. In 
this respect, it is worth acknowledging that rather than merely adopting or reinventing 
Saussure's thesis regarding the arbitrary nature of the sign, Derrida claims that he 
chooses to focus on what he takes to be this thesis' indispensable correlate, that being a 
more general argument regarding difference as the source of linguistic value (OG 52). 
Kirby's version of events goes one step further and makes an even more general point. 
She suggests that the paradox of the sign's identity (ie. that it is dependent upon 
difference) is symptomatic of the paradox of identity generally (TF 45). In other words, 
Derrida's point is not so much that everything is semiotic (and this is something that he 
explicitly denies), but that the processes of differing and deferring found within linguistic 
representation are symptomatic of a more general situation (hence the neologism 
diff erance) that afflicts everything that one might wish to keep sacrosanct, including the 
body and the perceptual. 
Kirby reaffirms this distance between Derrida and Saussure by suggesting that 
"although it may be allowed that the precise break between nature and culture, or reality 
and representation, is now undecidable, we are left with a sense that [for Saussure, and 
for much of postmodern thought since] these realities are in fact discrete" (my italics, TF 
52). For Kirby at least, Derrida's work avoids these discrete realities, that is, the 
maintaining of antinomies like nature and culture, and it also avoids dualistically 
separating language and all that we take to be its other (TF 53). However, Kirby is not 
content merely to refute the claim that Derrida is a semiological reductionist. She also 
offers some further ruminations on what her proposed intertwining of the ideal and the 
material might mean for notions like materiality and objects. According to her: 
If the critique of the sign is to be taken seriously, if materiality is a type of writing 
wherein difference is its defining force, then we would have to concede that 
objects are entirely permeable to what we describe as culture, and that the 
transformational plasticity that identifies the latter must also inhabit the former 
(TF 56). 
This dialectical insistence that just as objects are influenced by what we describe as 
culture, so is culture influenced by materiality, appears to be closely related to Merleau-
Ponty' s lifetime efforts to avoid the dualisms of the Western tradition. Whether that be in 
his affirmation of an embodied intelligence, or in the transformational possibilities that 
100Dillon, M. , Semiological Reductionism. 
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perception has for him, Merleau-Ponty has consistently embarked upon the type of 
project that Kirby is now delineating in only slightly different terms. Rather than being 
able to separate perception from culture, Merleau-Ponty argues that perception "already 
stylises" (S 54), and in The Visible and the Invisible he also suggests that what we have 
termed the object always encroaches upon us, just as we encroach upon it (VI 123). These 
two claims ensure that rather than being conceived of as merely brute facts of the world, 
objects are capable of similar transformations to those that we commonly associate with 
culture. The cuiious proximity that Merleau-Ponty's sentiments bear to Kirby's above 
encapsulation of her project, indebted as it is to Demda, is important. It again suggests 
that the traditional phenomenologist versus post-structuralist schematic might not be an 
adequate theoretical framework for understanding the more valuable contiibutions of 
both Merleau-Ponty and Demda. 
At a later stage in her text, Kirby is also moved to ask, "if the nature of matter is 
generative - if it conceives and construes itself through an involved representation, or 
differentiation of itself - then why must we presume that thought/language is alien to its 
identity or to this process?" (TF 115). This blumng of the boundaiies between ideality 
and matter is again related to Merleau-Ponty's philosophy, although Kirby's rather 
consistent invocation of the Aiistotelian/Newtonian term 'matter' is not overly helpful in 
problematising dualistic thinking. Nevertheless, her desciiptions of 'matter' being 
generative through differentiation with itself, would seem to be precisely how our 
embodiment works according to Merleau-Ponty. Particularly in The Visible and the 
Invisible, it becomes apparent that as Thomas Busch has suggested, "in the body's 
touching of itself is found a differentiation and an encroachment which is neither sheer 
identity nor non-identity" 101 , and it is this very differentiation that is generative and 
makes subjectivity possible at all. 
To substantiate this claim in adequate detail would take us too far afield of this 
chapter's main concerns, but it is important to recognise that according to an example 
that Merleau-Ponty uses regularly, it is through the differentiation (or divergence) 
between our left hand touching our light hand that we gain an apprehension of ourselves. 
Merleau-Ponty's initial (and, I think, permissible) presumption is that we can never 
simultaneously touch our right hand while it is also touching an object of the world. He 
101Busch, T. , "Introduction: ... Being .. . which is Staggered out in Depth" in Merleau-Ponty, Hermeneutics 
and Postmodernism, eds. Busch & Gallagher, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992, p 110. 
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suggests that "either my right hand really passes over into the rank of the touched, but 
then its hold on the world is interrupted, or it retains its hold on the world, but then I do 
not really touch it" (VI 148). There is then a gap ( or ecart) between ourselves as touching 
and ourselves as touched, a divergence between the sentient and sensible aspects of our 
existence, but this gap is importantly distinct from merely reinstating yet another 
dualism. The experiences of touching and being touched are not simply separate orders of 
being in the world, as Sartre, for example, has claimed in Being and Nothingness. Sartre 
contends that: 
To touch and to be touched, to feel that one is touching and to feel that one is 
touched - these are two species of phenomena which it is useless to try and 
reconcile by the term 'double sensation' . In fact, they are radically distinct and 
exist on two incommunicable levels 102 • 
While Merleau-Ponty agrees with Sartre that these two experiences cannot be united by 
the term 'double sensation' (PP 93), he nevertheless insists upon the thoroughly 
communicative and interdependent relationship that obtains between the sentient and the 
sensible. According to him, the experience of our left hand touching our right hand does 
more than merely highlight the body's capacity to be both perceiving object and subject 
of perception in a constant oscillation ( eg. the Saiirean 'looked at' , ' looked upon' 
dichotomy). As Merleau-Ponty points out: 
I can identify the hand touched in the same one which will in a moment be 
touching ... In this bundle of bones and muscles which my right hand presents to 
my left, I can anticipate for an instant the incarnation of that other right hand, 
alive and mobile, which I thrust towards things in order to explore them. The 
body tries ... to touch itself while being touched and initiates a kind of reversible 
reflection (PP 93). 
This suggests that the hand that we touch while it is touching an inanimate object, is 
hence not merely another such ' object', but another fleshy substance that is capable of 
reversing the present situation and being mobile and even aggressive. Given that we 
cannot touch ourselves, or even somebody else without this recognition, the awareness of 
what it feels like to be touched encroaches upon the experience of touching. Any absolute 
distinction between being in the world as touching, and being in the world as touched 
102Sartre, J.P., Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology, trans. Barnes, London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1958, p 304. 
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(such as Sartre's), deprives the existential phenomena of their true complexity. Our 
embodied subjectivity is never located purely in either our tangibility or in our touching, 
but in the intertwining of these two aspects, and in an awareness that is predicated upon 
our body's reversible differentiation with itself. Kirby, we may remember, has also just 
suggested that a deconstructive notion of embodiment might involve 'matter' being 
generative through differentiation with itself, and this seems to precisely summarise the 
ecart, or divergence, that Merleau-Ponty discerns. At the very least, Kirby's suggestion 
bears some important similarities, admittedly in an undeveloped way, with some major 
aspects of Merleau-Ponty' s later philosophy. 
Significantly, however, this is also a position that Kirby is now characterising as 
indebted to Derrida. And while she admits that "evidence of this extraordinary 'weave' is 
not spectacularly present" and that "the business of proving its existence, when it is 
existence itself that must be rethought, underlines the question's labyrinthine 
dimensions" (TF 56), she nevertheless endorses this idea of matter being generative 
through differentiation with itself as being grounded in Derridean deconstruction. This is 
a difficult claim to substantiate, but even if we cannot definitively prove that what Kirby 
is trying to accomplish is deconstructive, it is apparent that deconstruction can be of some 
benefit in revealing how the logic that sustains and safeguards the mind-body dualism is 
always already breached. 
Now, Kirby is certainly aware of the competing tendency towards interpreting 
Derridean deconstruction as a latter-day re-invention of idealism, and one that 
deliberately precludes any possibility of thinking about the body. She suggests that the 
claim that there is nothing outside of the text is "most commonly" interpreted in such a 
manner 103 , and like Rodolphe Gasche before her, she concludes that the literary use of 
terms such as "writing, trace, and text" is largely responsible for this, as it often 
appropriates these te1ms for purposes not analogous to Derrida's own, and more often 
than not, divests them of their radical purchase (TF 60)104 • It is also undeniable that 
Derrida has painstakingly insisted that his comment that "there is nothing outside of the 
text" has been interpreted incorrectly, and that he never intended it to indicate a complete 
103In an interesting passage in her interaction with Drucilla Cornell (TF 93), Kirby suggests that this type of 
interpretation of Derrida tends to induce the conclusion that deconstructive politics will involve either a 
utopian gesture or a prophetic cry. Kirby thinks that deconstruction is actually much more promising than 
this politically. 
104Gasche, R. , The Tain of the Jvfirror, p 252. 
lack of constraining referents (LI 148). He reaffirms this in Positions, when he suggests 
that: 
This work cannot be purely theoretical or conceptual or discursive. I mean it 
cannot be the work of a discourse entirely regulated by essence, meaning, truth, 
consciousness, ideality, etc. What I call a 'text' is also that which 'practically' 
inscribes and overflows the limits of such a discourse (PO 59-60). 
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As should be apparent, Derrida does not consider his project to be a mere formalist 
quibble. While writing is privileged in many of his texts and used to overcome the 
tendency of Western metaphysics to exalt speech and phonetics, this is primarily for 
strategic reasons and to reveal its root in what he calls 'arche-writing' - that is, the way in 
which all that might be claimed to be typical of writing (for example, a discrepancy 
between the authorial intention and what is actually conveyed by a particular piece of 
writing) is inevitably also involved in all aspects of our existence. 
However, it is not only the narrow interpretation of Derrida's main terms that 
Kirby objects to in the idealist reading. It is the consequent refusal to entertain any 
thoughts regarding the applicability of his work to embodied matters that most concerns 
her. She suggests the claim that there is nothing outside of the text: 
Is most commonly taken to mean that we are caught in an endless slide of referral 
that leads from one signifier to another signifier, one meaning to yet another 
meaning, in a vertiginous spiral of implication that never quite arrives at its 
destination. As a consequence, we can never retreat or advance to some natural, 
pre-discursive, or extra-textual space in order to test the truth or adequacy of our 
representations because, as we have seen, intelligibility is reckoned through such 
systems (TF 60-1 ). 
Now, the preservation of that natural and pre-discursive space - traditionally the domain 
of phenomenology and the pre-reflective cogito - is very much what certain anti-
Derrideans are concerned about. Theorists like Dillon, among others, want to retain a 
conception of the embodied self that feels and touches free from the aporias that Derrida 
associates with the repetition of writing and language 1°5. In this respect, however, it is 
worth digressing to recognise that one of the major factors behind Merleau-Ponty setting 
out upon his final philosophy was the conviction that the tacit, or pre-reflective cogito of 
105Dillon, M. , Semiological Reductionism, p 77-8. 
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his earlier philosophy was problematic 1°6. Presuming the possibility of a natural, 
primordial consciousness without language and anterior to thought, The Visible and the 
Invisible calls into question the coherence of this pre-reflective cogito, predicated as it is 
upon the idea of non-linguistic signification. As Merleau-Ponty suggests: 
What I call the tacit cogito is impossible. To have the idea of thinking (in the 
sense of thought of seeing and thought of feeling), to make the phenomenological 
reduction to the things themselves, to return to immanence and to consciousness, 
it is necessary to have words. It is by the combination of words that I form the 
transcendental attitude (VI 1 71). 
This abandoning of the notion of the pre-reflective cogito also entails a giving-up on a 
certain conception of phenomenology. After all, Merleau-Ponty' s problematising of the 
distinction between language and the perceptual ensures that the outside world can never 
be effectively bracketed away and excluded from consideration. Language is always 
implied, and Husserl's famous phenomenological reduction to the things themselves - or 
more accurately, to the things as they present themselves to consciousness prior to the 
'natural attitude' - which wants to bracket away the outside world, can no longer be 
envisaged as a real possibility (PP xiv). 
Merleau-Ponty even goes on to speak of the "mythology of self-consciousness to 
which the word consciousness refers", and contends that "there are only differences 
between significations" and language (VI _171 ). If there is no consciousness that is ever 
entirely present-to-itself, and there are only differences between significations, then it 
seems that the notion that there is "nothing outside of the text" is not as antithetical to the 
philosophy of Merleau-Ponty as many presume. This is particularly so if we, like Kirby, 
interpret Derrida's famous provocation as having an embodied relevance (ie. there is no 
outside of our embodied context) rather than enclosing all of us in some prison house of 
language. 
While Kirby does not attempt a sustained critique of the desire to find an original 
presentation in the body that is not subject to the difference and instability that Derrida 
powerfully discerns in representation ( and phenomenology's pre-reflective cogito is one 
such attempt), she does offer a powerful counter-example and one that is aligned with the 
position of Geoffrey Bennington. In Jacques Derrida, Bennington paradoxically suggests 
106Merleau-Ponty suggests that while the concept of the pre-reflective cogito can make understood how 
language is not impossible, it nevertheless cannot make understood how it is possible (VI 176). 
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that "we have to cast doubt on everything that can apparently limit deconstruction to 
language ( and this is our only chance of understanding that there is nothing outside of the 
text)" 107• Kirby agrees, and her own approach, which exceeds any conventional limits of 
language, involves acknowledging: 
An inseparability between representation and substance that rewrites causality ... a 
writing that both circumscribes and exceeds the conventional divisions of nature 
and culture (mind and body). If we translate this into what is normally regarded as 
the matter of the body, then, following Derrida, "the most elementary processes 
within the living cell" are also a "writing" and one whose "system" is never 
closed. This would mean that the body is unstable - a shifting scene of inscription 
that both writes and is written (TF 61 ). 
Such a project compromises the common understanding of materiality as a "rock-solid" 
something (TF 61 ), but the important question for us is what might this body that both 
writes and is written be? Kirby never makes this entirely explicit, and this will concern us 
towards the end of this chapter, but her presupposed position seems to be closely related 
to the Merleau-Pontyian conception of the body that is not so essentialist that it 
constitutes the world, and yet nor does it allow of an absolute, Sartrean freedom in regard 
to the world. Between the pillars of freedom and determinism, Merleau-Ponty's notion of 
embodiment is very much one that writes and is written, one that moulds the world in 
which we seek to live but is also constrained and defined by those others - 'objects' as 
much as people - who invariably also write us. 
In regard to whether such an understanding of the body is indebted to 
deconstruction, one important passage from Of Grammatology helps Kirby out, and is 
worth repeating in its entirety. Derrida suggests that: 
Writing, sensible matter and artificial exteriority: a "clothing" ... One already 
suspects that if writing is "image" and exterior ' figuration' , this "representation" 
is not innocent. The outside bears with the inside a relationship that is, as usual, 
anything but simple exteriority. The meaning of the outside was always present 
within the inside, imprisoned outside the outside, and vice versa (my italics, OG 
35). 
In this passage, Derrida clearly recognises that the debate between writing and speech is 
one that poses significant ramifications for that between body and mind, despite the fact 
107Bennington, G. Jacques Derrida, p 84. 
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that he does not elaborate upon this at any length. He even draws an analogy between 
writing and sensible matter, and implies that just as writing is not the ' clothing ' of 
speech, sensible matter and the body are not the clothing that prevent us from seeing an 
inaccessible mind. In both cases, Derrida argues that inner and outer are irrevocably 
intertwined, and like Merleau-Ponty, he is hence dissatisfied with the conception of a 
monological consciousness that resides beneath our embodied exteriority and that might 
somehow be disclosed, but for an unfortunate lack. 
It is also important to ascertain that in his above remark, Derrida strongly 
emphasises the mutual implication of speech and writing, the inner and the outer, that 
Saussure wanted to keep separate. The idea of speech conceived of as a discrete field -
not even considering that it is also the privileged term of that opposition - partakes in the 
dichotomous vision of human existence that Derrida aims to deconstruct. Such passages 
go some way towards justifying Kirby's assessment that were Derrida to state his 
position in terms of ontological import, it would involve acknowledging that the written 
is not beyond speech, so to speak, even if "arche-writing" is, but that the example of 
writing serves to elucidate a type of breaching that is in existence in speech and all other 
'phenomena' . In other words, Kirby implies that Derrida ' s primary goal is to reveal the 
mutual inextricability of the inner and the outer, or as she puts it, to establish that "the 
matter of difference is also the difference of matter" (TF 54). In this respect, it is worth 
recalling that one of Derrida's chapters in Of Grammatology is titled "The Written 
Being/The Being Written", and for this more generalised writing, evoked as it is by 
Derrida's references to "the scene of writing", Kirby invents the term "corporeography". 
Corporeography is intended to describe the mutual implication of the writing of the body, 
and the body of the written (TF 83) 108 . 
Later in Of Grammatology, Derrida reaffirms this kind of interpretation when he 
suggests that: 
Writing, the letter, the sensible inscription, has always been considered by the 
Western tradition as the body and matter external to the spirit, to breathe, to 
speech, and to logos. And the problem of soul and body is no doubt derived from 
the problem of writing from which it seems - conversely - to borrow its 
metaphors (OG 35). 
108Some brief illustrations of what Kirby believes are feminist misinterpretations of Derrida would prove 
efficacious in exploring further what her ' corporeographic' reading of Derrida entails ( and the significance 
79 
Derrida again points towards a correlation between these two problems (that is, the 
denigration of the written in relation to the spoken, the disparaging of the body in relation 
to thought/soul), and he also implies a specific affinity between writing and the body. If 
the problematic of the body is tacitly related to that of writing, then the efficacy of 
Derridean deconstruction should clearly depend on a complex understanding of 'writing' 
and the body, and a greater appreciation of what the materiality of the written consists in. 
Whether Derrida's work provides the resources to attain an understanding of the 
materiality of the written is another question, but such an appreciation would depend 
upon emphasising that both the notion of writing, and our thinking regarding 
embodiment, need to pay attention to their dependence upon difference, or in the terms of 
Merleau-Ponty, the divergence (ecart) and dehiscence that typify our situation in the 
world. It is the difference between what we mean to write and the way the other interprets 
it, or between touching and being touched, that allows any form of writing and equally 
embodiment (of which we could not conceive were we completely self-present) to be 
possible at all. 
These are valuable suggestions, but it is worth emphasising that Derrida does not 
actually offer much by way of a complex and detailed understanding of embodiment, 
notwithstanding some enigmatic references he has made to the tympanum, which is the 
membrane of the ear that is simultaneously both inside and outside ( cf. M xxiii). In his 
recently published book, The Purest of Bastards: Works of Art, Affirmation and 
Mourning in the Thought of Jacques Derrida, David Farrell Krell makes a similar point, 
although he does not pursue it at length. Krell rhetorically asks: "if the scene of writing 
proves to be in and of the world, as Derrida insists it is, must not deconstruction run 
headlong into a phenomenology that is at the world and a thinking that is interlaced with 
the world?" 109 • It is difficult to be sure if Krell has any particular phenomenologist in 
mind here, although he does devote some exegetical space to the work of Merleau-Ponty 
soon after this quotation. Regardless, Krell's observation points out that certain embodied 
and phenomenological aspects of existence - ie. the way in which touching, sight, etc., 
actually open us beyond merely our own bodies and our own consciousness 110 - are 
of her feminist revisions) , but space constraints preclude this taking place. 
109Krell, D. , The Purest of Bastards: Works of Art, Affirmation and Mourning in the Thought of Jacques 
Derrida, p 8 7. 
1100f course, precisely what can be identified as embodied also becomes less clear once the dualism 
between mind and body is deconstructed. This reveals the difficulty of simply leaving formulations like 
mind and body behind, and in his "Working Notes" for The Visible and the Invisible, Merleau-Ponty has 
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largely ignored by Derridean deconstruction (although see chapter five), despite the 
obvious relevance they bear to deconstruction. This ensures that there must be something 
of a confrontation between an embodied phenomenology and deconstruction. It might 
even be suggested that as yet neither phenomenology nor deconstruction has managed to 
avoid this situation and to speak to each other in less antagonistic terms. Kirby's book 
constitutes an important attempt to avoid this impasse, and to buttress an account of 
embodiment with a deconstructive insistence upon the writing that is in and of the world, 
although this chapter will eventually express some reservations about her ultimate 
success. 
Before we get ahead of ourselves, however, it is worth considering a passage of 
Kirby's in which she tries to reconcile Derrida's emphasis upon temporal deferring with a 
notion of the body, that 'thing' which at least appears to be most 'present' to us of all. 
Her discussion also bears an applicability to Derrida's later emphasis upon the "to come" 
that has never yet been present1 11 , but let us remain within the logic of Kirby's text, and 
hence Of Grammatology, for the time being. In describing what an embodied, Derridean 
temporality might be, she suggests that: 
If we think temporality as textuality in the Derridean sense, we are reminded that 
the grammatological textile does not wait in anticipation of time's coming (a 
coming into presence) through the promise of the punctum, a lineal unfolding 
through an evolutionary march of different, separate, self-present moments. Time 
is not so much a thing - divisible into moments ... rather, we must think of a 
moment as the body of time, the marking of an anterior future, which we will 
have been in the already not yet of the present. Opening itself to the differential 
pulse of otherness within itself, the fold of temporality differentiates itself by 
touching itself (TF 94). 
Kirby's fundamental point in this paragraph is that rather than attesting to some type of 
primordial and undivided presence, our embodiment actually inaugurates the famous 
priority of the future anterior and Derrida's "always-already" motif (M 24) 112, or as she 
puts it, "the already not yet of the present". But what exactly does she mean by this 
hence argued that it is more important to recognise that "there is a body of the mind, and a mind of the 
body, and a chiasm between them" (VI 259). 
'' 'Derrida's notion of the "to come", and his related insistence upon the messianic aspects of alterity, will 
be analysed in chapter nine. 
112The notion of the "always-already" also dominates Heidegger's Being and Time ( cf. Section 128). 
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strange use of apparently incompatible tenses, the "already, not yet of the present"? Kirby 
seems to be suggesting that the temporality of an embodied moment involves nothing 
that could be construed as self-presence, but it is also important to note that she does not 
restrict herself to merely valorising the 'not yet' of the present, the Godot-like wait that 
ultimately becomes, in Derridean deconstruction, an insistence upon the priority of the 
"to come". Time, for Kirby, is also already there, even if in an internally divided way, 
and our embodied experience is hence not only about waiting and deferral. 
Kirby's position is undoubtedly suggestive in linking itself to Derridean 
deconstruction. However, despite the insistence with which she attributes this type of 
embodied temporality to Derrida, her interpretation is one that makes quite a lot from 
relatively scarce resources. This is not necessarily to suggest that her reading is a 
falsification. It is arguably faithful to the spirit of deconstruction, in that it traces that 
which the author is largely unaware of, and in engendering a more embodied focus her 
interpretation moves in a direction with which this thesis must be sympathetic. 
In the spirit of such a deconstructive retrieve, Kirby also makes use of a cryptic 
comment of Derrida's in Of Grammatology, where he suggests that it is "the game of the 
world that must be first thought; before attempting to understand all the forms of play in 
the world" (OG 50). She cites this comment primarily as evidence that the play of 
semiosis is not all that he is concerned with, but it is worth elaborating upon this quote to 
make more interesting use of it. To place this comment about the game of the world in 
context, Derrida is attempting to argue that to think play radically ( and this is his 
overarching intent), and hence without being empirical or metaphysical, "the ontological 
and transcendental problematics must first be seriously exhausted" (OG 50). For Derrida 
then, transcendental philosophy as exemplified by thinkers like Husserl and Heidegger is 
part of the game of the world that must be thought through before we can even begin to 
contemplate the play ( cf. WD 292). Such a precondition should also include the 
philosophy of Merleau-Ponty, as the question of the body would seem equally necessary 
for us to understand the game of the world, before we can begin to contemplate the play 
of the world in the precise way that Derrida demands ofus. 
Kirby also points out that, for Derrida, it is within "regional limits" that this play 
takes place. What these regional limits might be is left ambiguous by him, and notably 
so, but Kirby proposes that embodiment must be, at the very least, one important factor. 
According to her, the body can and should be conceived of as "the spacing of this game, 
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the ma(r)king of an uncanny interlude" (TF 63). For Kirby then, the body is envisaged as 
being both the spacing of the game, and also as marking an interlude, with all of the 
references to temporality that this term implies. Spatiality and temporality are necessarily 
intertwined by such a statement, just as Derrida has declared that the spatial differing and 
temporal deferring of differance escape the dualistic structure of an opposition. There is 
hence a sense in which our embodied situation can be viewed as further exemplifying 
Derridean notions like diff erance and the trace, and in a way that Derrida himself never 
attempted. By emphasising the possible applicability of Derridean thought to the body -
as tentatively indicated by Derrida himself- Kirby tacitly reconciles Merleau-Ponty's 
phenomenological focus on embodiment with Derrida's own reluctance to confront the 
problematic. 
While it should not be suggested that there is a latent return to phenomenology 
within Derrida's work, it is interesting to speculate upon exactly what regional limits 
might be involved in the play of the world. Or, more accurately, it is difficult to see how 
embodiment, albeit in an immensely complicated fashion, would not affect the structure 
of this world. This is not to affirm that our body has any determinate empirical limits, but 
- and axiomatically - that the very possibility of communication is predicated upon our 
being embodied, and more importantly, being embodied in a manner that is itself 
predicated upon a divergence, upon an alterity 'within' that makes possible the 
experience of an alterity 'without' (and vice versa). 
Such themes will be expanded upon in later chapters, but it seems that we have 
returned to the problem with which this chapter began. Word and flesh, sign and matter, 
language and perception, are all utterly implicated for Kirby, as they are for both 
Merleau-Ponty and Derrida, albeit in somewhat different ways. But despite her attempt to 
deconstruct traditional antinomies such as mind-body, nature-culture, Kirby does not 
want to commit to a monism and suggest that they are exactly the same thing. The body 
is not mere signification, or certainly not signification traditionally conceived. Her 
recognition of the possible applicability of Derridean ideas to the problematic of the body 
still leaves some questions unanswered, and certainly questions that Derrida himself 
hesitates to explore. As she suggests: 
This (generalisable mutability) does not mean, however, that we can simply add 
what we conventionally regard as the stuff of matter and substance to the soup of 
textual dissolution. The difficulty here is that we are bound to work at the 
interfacings of these binary borders in order to question the very notions of 
identity and separability that they maintain. Nevertheless, the displacement of 
matter from its oppositional stance over and against form, opens the question of 
matter, as indeed it must also open the question of ideality (TF 96). 
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Ultimately, this paragraph implies that as something of a pioneering work, the inter-
relations of form and matter can be taken up again by others, and without doubt Telling 
Flesh does open up some valuable questions regarding form and matter that might 
otherwise be ignored. That said, it is significant that both Kirby's and Derrida's work 
reveal a similar aphoristic tendency that ensures that some important questions regarding 
embodiment are never quite followed through. Indeed, Kirby evocatively argues for the 
simultaneous breaching and interdependence of categories like inner and outer, 
particularly in relation to the language-embodiment problematic, but it is nevertheless 
difficult to attain an understanding about precisely how this transpires. While it might be 
agreed that some mutual implication is necessary between language and embodiment, 
how we are to concretely conceive of their inter-relation is far from obvious in Kirby's 
work. 
For example, at one stage Kirby asks: "and how is the body itself a scene of 
writing, subject to a sentence that is never quite legible, because to read it is to write it, 
again, yet differently?" (TF 56). Unfortunately, the answer to this question is deferred. 
Exactly what type of relationship obtains between language and embodiment, if a 
difference is maintained between the two as Kirby suggests immediately above, and yet is 
nevertheless united by a governing dictum such as "there is nothing outside of the text", 
is a question that is unanswered. This is admittedly a difficult question, but one way of 
approaching the problem might be to posit language as supplementary to embodiment, in 
the Derridean sense of the supplement. In other words, it might be argued that it cannot 
be discerned whether the linguistic supplement makes up for an embodied lack, or simply 
adds on to and enriches our embodied presence. According to Derrida ' s theorising of the 
supplement, if language is posited as supplementary it is not actually secondary, but is 
paradoxically a constitutive aspect of the system that serves to reveal the myth of an 
embodied self-presence (cf. OG 144). In forthcoming chapters it will also become 
apparent that, for Merleau-Ponty, the figure of the chiasm functions as an ontological 
motif to describe how language and embodiment might be related to each other, but 
without simply being reducible to one another (cf. VI 87-93). Unfortunately, however, 
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Kirby does not pursue these type of possibilities in any depth. 
Moreover, in her analysis of the behaviour of hysterics at a nineteenth-century 
Parisian hospital (TF 56-9), Kirby rather convincingly argues that mind and body, 
subject and object, far from being autonomous, separable entities, actually intertwine 
with each other in a complexity that is only just beginning to be appreciated. 
Interestingly, this is not unlike what Merleau-Ponty achieved in his own analysis of the 
sexual dysfunctions of Schneider in Phenomenology of Perception (PP 155), even if the 
saliency of his project is partly obscured by his presumptions about the universal 
applicability of a sexuality that looks suspiciously like male heterosexuality. However, 
returning to Kirby, whatever relationship does obtain between mind and body is also 
somewhat unclear in her work, and while we should not discount Merleau-Ponty's claim 
that "one cannot make a direct ontology" (VI 179), this is something of a problem. It can 
be speculated that this intertwining of the ideal and the material, language and 
embodiment, the mind and the body, could never completely efface the difference 
between thought and its object, for that would be to advocate either a relativism capable 
of no discrimination, or some ecstatic union with Being, both of which deconstruction 
could clearly never contemplate. An enmeshment of the ideal and the material might, 
however, conceivably problematise without ever quite transcendentally annulling the 
difference between thought and its object. The difference between thought and its object 
might hence become undecidable. 
Kirby, however, is elusive about the nature of this enmeshment, and it seems that 
we need to subtlely alter her claim regarding the viability of an embodied deconstruction, 
at least to the extent to which she ties such a project to Derrida's work. This is not to 
suggest that Derridean deconstruction is irrelevant to questions concerning embodiment -
on the contrary, it has been illustrated just how provocative and helpful it can be. 
However, both Deni.da and Kirby exhibit a similar aphoristic tendency regarding how we 
are actually to conceive of a relationship between mind and body that breaches the 
dualism without simply becoming a monism, and this is the case despite Kirby' s 
considerable efforts. To put the problem rather non-academically, Kirby pushes Derrida 
about as far as he can be pushed in the direction of an embodied deconstruction, and 
despite offering some important insights along the way, the result is an emaciated 
reinvention of Merleau-Ponty' s philosophy that induces more questions than answers. 
That is, Kirby's attempted deconstructive notion of embodiment leaves us with a 
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phenomenology without the depth that one would associate with a phenomenology, and it 
seems to me that there are other resources and other theoretical frameworks that might 
have helped Kirby in moving beyond the aphorisms of early deconstruction, and in 
hesitantly posing an answer to many of the important questions that she raises. 
The work of Merleau-Ponty himself would be one obvious resource, given that a 
new and positive conception of what it is to be embodied is something that his 
philosophy clearly does want to achieve (VI 130-55)113 • This will be illustrated 
throughout the remainder of this thesis, and it has already been shown that The Visible 
and the Invisible is capable of shedding some substantial light on Kirby's interesting but 
unfulfilled suggestion that matter is generative through differentiation with itself. 
Although Kirby has taught Merleau-Ponty for years, and although his project is relevant 
to her intents in Telling Flesh, he does not even merit a passing mention. This is not only 
perplexing, but an oversight that ignores a valuable conceptual tool, for as will become 
apparent, Merleau-Ponty can elucidate the embodied interdependence and breaching of 
form and matter more clearly than early deconstruction114• While Kirby realised that the 
negotiation of deconstruction with questions concerning embodiment is potentially a 
productive line of thought, her indebtedness to the particularities of Derridean 
deconstruction is not quite as emancipatory a resource as she believes. 
113Rather than positing a traditional dualism in which mind and body, subject and object, sentient and 
sensible, are discrete entities, Merleau-Ponty maintains that they are associated chiasmically. This is to 
suggest that perception . is born where the subject seeing and the object that is visible cross, 
and the chiasm is an image to describe how this overlapping and encroachment takes place. The body is 
neither sentient nor sensible, but exists in their intersection, where the two lines of the chiasm cross. 
114S uch a synthesis of structuralism ( as preoccupied with form) and phenomenology ( as preoccupied with 
the content, or the 'matter' of consciousness) remains to be attempted. It seems to me, however, that both 
Derrida's and Merleau-Ponty 's work troubles this form/content distinction, albeit in very different ways. 
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5. The Later Philosophy of Merleau-Ponty and the Metaphysics of Presence 
Having problematised, but not entirely invalidated the contention that deconstruction can 
be of little help in adumbrating embodied concerns, this chapter will more explicitly 
consider the nature of the relationship between Merleau-Ponty and Derrida. This thesis 
has already illustrated the curious convergence between the notion of embodiment that 
Kirby rather generously attributes to Derrida and the more developed notion of 
embodiment that we have ascribed to Merleau-Ponty, but in several other important 
respects it will be shown that the philosophical positions of Merleau-Ponty and Derrida 
are more closely aligned than many critics, including Derrida himself, presume. Indeed, it 
will be argued that this is paiiicularly so in regard to three main themes: dialectics; 
temporality; and visibility/invisibility. By examining Merleau-Ponty ' s and Derrida 's 
surprising and counter-intuitive proximity on such themes, this chapter will also begin to 
sketch out the manner in which Merleau-Ponty's work can avoid being denigrated as yet 
another version of the all-encompassing metaphysics of presence 115 . 
However, before becoming immersed in a comparison of their respective 
contributions to dialectics, temporality, and visibility, it is necessary to consider 
Derrida' s relationship to phenomenology generally, since this is partly what is being 
called into question by a comparison with Merleau-Ponty's thought. Derrida has had a 
long and infinitely complicated association with phenomenology for his entire career, 
including ambiguous relationships with Husserl and Heidegger, and something closer to a 
sustained allegiance with Levinas ( although chapter nine will analyse the many criticisms 
that Derrida has also made in regard to Levinas). Despite this complexity, two main 
aspects of Derrida's thinking regarding phenomenology remain clear. Firstly, he thinks 
that the exaltation of the immediacy of experience is the new transcendental illusion, and 
secondly, he argues that despite its best intents, phenomenology cannot be anything other 
than a metaphysics (SP 75 , 104) 116 • Moreover, Derrida also defines metaphysics as the 
science of presence, as for him, all metaphysics privileges presence, or that which is . 
While they are presented somewhat schematically here, these inter-related claims 
115Such thematics will also be indirectly pursued in the second half of this thesis, where it will be argued 
that Merleau-Ponty 's treatment of alterity does not propound an "imperialism of the same". 
116However, as should be apparent, this chapter will agree with Damien Byers who gave a paper entitled 
"Must Phenomenology be a Metaphysics?", that contested the Derridean-inspired suggestion that 
phenomenology must be a metaphysics (Australian National University, Philosophy Staff Seminar Series, 
October 1999). 
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constitute Derrida's major arguments against phenomenology. 
According to him, phenomenology is a metaphysics of presence because it 
unwittingly relies upon the notion of an indivisible self-presence, or in the case of 
Husserl, the possibility of an exact internal adequation with oneself (SP 66-8). In various 
texts, Derrida contests this valorisation of an undivided subjectivity, as well as the 
resultant primacy that such a position accords to the 'now' . For instance, in Speech and 
Phenomena, Derrida argues that if a 'now' moment is conceived of as exhausting itself in 
that experience, it could not actually be experienced, for there would be nothing to 
juxtapose itself against in order to illuminate that very 'now'. Instead, Derrida wants to 
reveal that every so-called 'present', or 'now' point, is always already compromised by a 
trace, or a residue of a previous experience, that precludes us ever being in a self-
contained 'now' moment (SP 68). Phenomenology is hence envisaged as nostalgically 
seeking the impossible: that is, coinciding with oneself in an immediate and pre-reflective 
spontaneity. Admittedly, this nostalgia can be discerned in some passages of Merleau-
Ponty' s Phenomenology of Perception, but it is not so clear that this also applies to The 
Visible and the Invisible. Before contemplating this latter text in greater detail, however, 
it is worth returning to Derrida's more general characterisation of metaphysical thought 
in order to interrogate what his dismissal of the metaphysics of presence might entail, and 
whether it does, in fact, apply to the later phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty. In the 
'Afterword' to Limited Inc., Derrida suggests that metaphysics can be defined as: 
The enterprise of returning 'strategically', 'ideally', to an origin or to a priority 
thought to be simple, intact, normal, pure, standard, self-identical, in order then to 
think in terms of derivation, complication, deterioration, accident, etc. All 
metaphysicians, from Plato to Rousseau, Descartes to Husserl, have proceeded in 
this way, conceiving good to be before evil, the positive before the negative, the 
pure before the impure, the simple before the complex, the essential before the 
accidental, the imitated before the imitation, etc. And this is not just one 
metaphysical gesture among others, it is the metaphysical exigency, that which 
has been the most constant, most profound and most potent (LI 236, cf. M 195). 
In this passage, it becomes apparent that metaphysics is not only the science of presence, 
and of valorising that which appears. According to Derrida, metaphysics also involves 
installing hierarchies and orders of subordination in the various dualisms that it 
encounters and/or engenders (M 195). Metaphysical thought is envisaged as prioritising 
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presence and purity at the expense of the contingent and the complicated, which are 
considered to be merely aberrations that are not important for philosophical analysis. This 
chapter will contest the extent to which Merleau-Ponty's philosophy conforms to both 
aspects of this metaphysical paradigm (ie. an insistence upon an immediate presence-to-
self, and an insistence upon hierarchical dualisms) and by implication will also contest 
the claim that such a position is inevitable for phenomenology more generally. 
In his later philosophy, Merleau-Ponty does not appear to convey any sort of 
hierarchy that privileges presence and purity. On the contrary, in The Visible and the 
Invisible, he specifically claims that: 
What we propose here, and oppose to the search for the essence, is not the return 
to the immediate, the coincidence, the effective fusion with the existent, the 
search for an original integrity, for a secret lost and to be rediscovered, which 
would nullify our questions and even reprehend language. If coincidence is lost, 
this is no accident; if Being is hidden, this is itself a characteristic of Being and no 
disclosure will make us comprehend it (my italics, VI 121-2). 
While it is sometimes claimed that Merleau-Ponty~s later philosophy is only precariously 
poised within phenomenology, in that it disputes both the pre-reflective cogito and the 
phenomenological reduction itself (at least as Husserl conceives of it) , the above 
quotation clearly suggests that his work is a long way from betraying a nostalgia for some 
pure immediacy that might yet be rediscovered. On the contrary, according to Merleau-
Ponty, we can never recuperate the pre-reflective faith (VI 35, 99). Moreover, it is worth 
noting that Derrida describes a metaphysics of presence as involving an attempt to first 
think the purity of an origin, before then proceeding to consider the deviations and the 
"accidents" which fall outside the terrain of this origin, but always, or so logocentric 
thinkers tell us, inconsequentially117• For Merleau-Ponty, however, the impossibility of 
any absolute presence-to-self is not a derivative accident, or a fall from grace, but is 
symptomatic of a constitutive divergence (ecart) that can never be assuaged. 
This thesis has previously contemplated the fundamental role that the notion of 
ecart has played in Merleau-Ponty' s later philosophy. It names a divergence that is 
neve1iheless not adequately characterised as a dualism, because the differences between 
an apparent dualism ( eg. mind-body and even self-other) are revealed as chiasmically 
117Probably the most obvious illustration of this metaphysical tendency is in Derrida 's various discussions 
of the texts of John Searle. At least according to Derrida, Searle repeatedly acknowledges exceptions to his 
89 
intertwined. For the moment, it suffices to recapitulate that any absolute self-presence is 
prohibited by this perennial difference between the sentient and the sensible. Moreover, 
an understanding of both mind and body - to persist with a dualism that does not 
accurately represent the phenomena, as "there is a body of a mind and a mind of a body, 
and a chiasm between them" (VI 259) - depends upon this very dehiscence, and is 
inconceivable without it. In other words, subjectivity is predicated upon a gap, or a 
difference that is not a dualism, and in such sentiments Merleau-Ponty does not appear to 
conform to the standard deconstructive definition of the metaphysics of presence. 
This becomes even more apparent if we remember that the embodiment of which 
he speaks is always typified by ambiguity. Derek Taylor is one commentator who has 
emphasised this quality of his work, and he suggests that "Merleau-Ponty's greatness lies 
in his ability to demonstrate how that thing which has always frustrated thinkers from the 
beginning, namely contingency ( or 'ambiguity'), is not accidental to thought but rather is 
constitutive of it" 118 • Rather than being subordinated, contingency and ambiguity are 
accorded their due import in Merleau-Ponty's philosophy. Of course, it is not 
immediately apparent that a philosophy of ambiguity must, of necessity, avoid being 
consigned to the metaphysics of presence. Nor, for that matter, does Merleau-Ponty's 
insistence that Being is not disclosable ensure that he is not a metaphysician of presence. 
Negative theology has traditionally held similar positions, although it tends to presume 
that somebody suitably qualified, and who manages to evade naming and circumscribing 
the experience of God, can still somehow access the secret. But, for Merleau-Ponty, like 
Derrida, the secret is that there is no secret (ON 29-30, 67-8). Now, for this statement to 
be envisaged to characterise De1Tida' s work accurately, this chapter would require 
numerous addendums and supplements - supplements that would reveal his position on 
the lack of a secret ( other than there being no secret) to be importantly different from the 
way in which such an aphorism could be said to accurately represent the philosophy of 
Merleau-Ponty. That acknowledged, Merleau-Ponty's notion of ambiguity entails at least 
a related position, and more importantly for this chapter's purposes, a philosophy that 
does not prioritise presence and purity119 • 
speech act theory, but nevertheless insists that they are unimportant and derivative occurrences (LI 118). 
118Taylor, D. , "Phantasmic Genealogy" in Merleau-Ponty, Hermeneutics and Postmodernism, eds. Busch & 
Gallagher, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992, p 156. 
119It is, however, worth recognising that in Of Grammatology, Derrida rejects the notion of ambiguity (OG 
71 ), and his reasons for doing so will be examined in chapter six. 
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Even in Phenomenology of Perception, where ambiguity comes to occupy such an 
important role in his philosophy, it is not envisaged to be a shortcoming, or a fall from 
some better, aggrandised state. We were never the fortunate occupiers of some absolute 
presence-to-self. On the contrary, ambiguity is defined as the inevitable condition of our 
finite temporality, and at least for the atheist that was Merleau-Ponty120, there is no God 
that makes this possible and who might avoid the many and varied conundrums that 
befall a temporal existence (samsara, or the cycle of suffering and rebirth for the 
Buddhists). Of course, Heidegger has made it clear that a philosopher can be onto-
theological (which is basically metaphysical) without admitting to a belief in God, at 
least in the way that one generally conceives of a deity. However, to the minimal extent 
that Merleau-Ponty's earlier philosophy occasionally exhibits a nostalgia for a pure, pre-
reflective cogito that might be spontaneously at one with its surroundings - a remnant of 
the metaphysical desire for absolute 'presence' - this last vestige of presence seems to 
have been exorcised from his later philosophy ( cf. VI 17 5-6). 
Is it possible that despite analysing embodiment, Merleau-Ponty did so without 
succumbing to 'presence' as his example par excellence? Vicki Kirby certainly thinks 
that such a project is viable, and if it is not already apparent, this thesis will contend that 
Merleau-Ponty did manage such a feat, although the longer answer to that question 
depends upon this chapter's forthcoming consideration of the invisible that he considers 
to be constitutively involved in embodiment. For the moment, however, it is worth 
considering a quote of Merleau-Ponty's from The Visible and the Invisible, which 
suggests that while his later philosophy maintains an embodied focus, it also seems to 
have done so without partaking in something that might be retrospectively characterised 
as a metaphysics of presence. Of the possibility of an embodied certitude, he suggests 
that as: 
Entirely irresistible as it may be [this prospect], it remains absolutely obscure; we 
can live it, we can neither think it, nor formulate it, nor set it up in theses. Every 
attempt at elucidation brings us back to the dilemmas ... And it is this unjustifiable 
certitude of a sensible world common to us that is the seat of truth within us (my 
italics, VI 11 ). 
According to Merleau-Ponty then, despite the sensible world being unjustifiable, there is 
120While Merleau-Ponty became an atheist, he was a practising Christian in his youth and early adulthood. 
For further biographical information, see Moran, D., An Introduction to Phenomenology, London: 
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nevertheless a lived certitude to it, and it is from this certitude that truth emerges. Derrida 
would probably not endorse such a passage, but it must be remarked that the truth of 
which Merleau-Ponty speaks is certainly not a truth in the sense that Husserl thought 
could be extracted from phenomenology. Rather, for Merleau-Ponty, it is an obscure 
certitude that we live with, although we can neither think it, nor formulate it, and it 
emerges from unjustifiability. 
At a later stage in The Visible and the Invisible, Merleau-Ponty even suggests that 
in the philosopher's descriptions of this sensible world, "there is no longer identity 
between the lived experience and the principle of non-contradiction" (VI 87). This 
apparent disavowal of the law of non-contradiction obviously requires some substantial 
consideration. Indeed, it appears to challenge one of the most fundamental principles of 
Western philosophy since Aristotle, even if some recent philosophers like Graham Priest 
would endorse this move (although perhaps not the rationale behind it) 12 1• For the 
purposes of this thesis, however, it is more important to note Merleau-Ponty's didactic 
intent. In explaining this disavowal, he suggests that: 
The situation of the philosopher who speaks as distinct from what he speaks of, 
insofar as that situation affects what he says with a certain latent content which is 
not its manifest content. .. implies a divergence between the essences he fixes and 
the lived experience to which they are applied, between the operation of living the 
world and the entities and negentities in which he expresses it (VI 87). 
For Merleau-Ponty then, lived experience may partake in contradiction on account of a 
residue of this difference between the act of speaking and what is spoken of (something 
like a performative contradiction), and a correlative divergence between a latent and a 
manifest content. This divergence hints at a predicament that is closely related to what 
Derrida has later insisted upon in his strategy of deconstruction, in that both philosophers 
point towards the inevitability of a philosophical expression containing a contradictory 
element within it. Indeed, Derrida has also implicitly entertained the possibility that the 
law of non-contradiction might be false, in suggesting that there may instead be a law of 
impurity, or "a principle of contamination" ( cf. LI 204). It is important to appreciate that 
there are some surprising similarities between Merleau-Ponty's and Derrida' s 
descriptions of the necessarily double nature of a philosophy that can never recapture the 
Routledge, 2000, p 392. 
121Priest, G., In Contradiction , Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1987. 
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pre-reflective faith, or coincide with itself in a moment of self-presence. This proximity 
between deconstruction and Merleau-Ponty' s own methodology, which he labels as a 
"hyper-reflection" (VI 3 8), will continue to be examined throughout this chapter, but for 
the moment it suffices to point out that these similarities reaffi1m that there are some 
considerable difficulties involved in characterising Merleau-Ponty' s philosophy as a 
metaphysics of presence. 
However, secondary proponents of deconstruction routinely assume that Derrida 's 
critique of the notion of presence is relevant to Merleau-Ponty, even though Derrida has 
never addressed any text towards establishing this (this is an interesting omission 
considering the vast array of thinkers that he has deconstructed). Derrida has made only a 
few isolated comments about Merleau-Ponty throughout his entire body of work122 , at 
least until his relatively recent text, Memoirs of the Blind, which while paying Merleau-
Ponty some considerable attention is actually predominantly flattering, and as the second 
section of this chapter will illustrate, is even partly indebted to his predecessor on the 
French scene I23• While the criticisms that Derrida directs at the metaphysics of presence 
seem to apply to occasional passages in Phenomenology of Perception, it is certainly no 
clear matter. When one considers Merleau-Ponty's unfinished work, The Visible and the 
Invisible, it becomes even more apparent that Derrida's dismissal of the 
phenomenological tradition has had the effect of "dismissing Merleau-Ponty on the basis 
of arguments primarily directed against Husserl and secondarily against Heidegger and 
Sartre" I24• What I am suggesting here is not particularly original. Martin Dillon, Gary 
Madison, and Hugh Silverman have all suggested similar things 125 , although we have 
1221n his doctoral thesis, Edmund Husserl 's 'Origin of Geometry ': An Introduction , Derrida suggests that 
while his work is indebted to phenomenology, it is to be read specifically in opposition to Merleau-Ponty 
and Sartre. In his essay, "Violence and Metaphysics", he observes that the movement of temporality in 
Merleau-Ponty 's work is his alterity (WD 104, footnote 36), and this comment seems complimentary. In 
"Force and Signification", Derrida implies that Merleau-Ponty 's conception of meaning need not be 
considered to be phonocentric (cf. WD 11). However, his only sustained treatment of Merleau-Ponty has 
been Memoirs of the Blind, which will be examined in the following section of this chapter. Derrida has 
also recently completed another book that briefly considers Merleau-Ponty, entitled Le Toucher: Jean-Luc 
Nancy . Some parts of this book have been translated into English by Peggy Kamuf (see Derrida, J. , "Le 
Toucher: Touch/to touch him", Paragraph , 16:2, 1993, p 122- 57). 
123For more information on the debt that Derrida's Memoirs of the Blind owes to Merleau-Ponty, see the 
following section of this chapter, and also Vallier, R., "Blindness and Invisibility: The Ruins of Self-
Portraiture" in .£cart and Differance, ed. Dillon, Humanities Press, 1997, p 191-207. 
124Dillon, M. , "Merleau-Ponty and Postmodernism" in Merleau-Ponty, Hermeneutics and Postmodernism, 
eds. Busch & Gallagher, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992, p 129. 
125Dillon, M. , & Madison, G. , & Silverman, H. , in lvlerleau-Ponty, Hermeneutics and Postmodernism, eds. 
Busch & Gallagher, p 129 & 143. Also see Haas, M. , & Haas, L. , "Merleau-Ponty and the Origin of 
Geometry" in Chiasms: Merleau-Ponty 's Notion of Flesh, eds. Evans & Lawlor, Albany: State University 
previously discussed reasons for being wary of the sentiments propounded by the first 
two of these thinkers, at least when it comes to comparing the work of Merleau-Ponty 
and Derrida. 
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Moreover, in emphasising this 'blind spot' that is involved in Derrida's thought 
and also in the post-structuralist repudiation of phenomenology generally126, this chapter 
should not efface the fact that Derrida and many other French writers of the 1960s and 
70s were wrestling with the possibility of a difference not reducible to dialectic (OG 
314), or to opposition. The phenomenological scene that preceded them, with its alleged 
failure to cope with and thematise genuine alterity, was certainly something that they 
were trying to avoid and, in an important sense, move beyond. However, traditional 
conceptions of opposition, as well as dialectics, are radically altered by Merleau-Ponty's 
work (in particular by The Visible and the Invisible) and it is more than curious that these 
philosophers did not accord him more attention 127 • 
This point is rendered even more salient by the similarities that aspects of 
Merleau-Ponty's proposed hyper-reflection (which he synonymously exchanges with the 
term "hyper-dialectic") bear to deconstructive themes. This has already been paiiially 
illustrated, but Rodolphe Gasche is one important thinker to have recognised the manner 
in which Merleau-Ponty's hyper-reflection pre-empted certain aspects of 
deconstruction 128 , and yet these aspects of Merleau-Ponty's thought are often ignored and 
of New York Press, 2000, p 177-88. Their essay argues that Denida's critique of Husserl has very little 
bearing on the philosophy ofMerleau-Ponty, and there are many other examples of commentators 
unwilling to extend the applicability of Derrida's denunciation of Husserl to the work of Merleau-Ponty. 
126Michel Foucault is also rather dismissive of the phenomenological tradition in his book The Order of 
Things, and his criticisms of phenomenology are actually more schematic than Derrida 's own sometimes 
extensive treatment (see Foucault, M. , The Order of Things, p xiv). In The Politics of Subjectivity, Nick 
Crossley criticises Foucault's rejection of phenomenology for ignoring the complexity of the tradition, and 
he also argues that Foucault fails to provide any substantial reasons for rejecting the specific 
phenomenology ofMerleau-Ponty (see Crossley, N., The Politics of Subjectivity, p 136-69). 
127Merleau-Ponty never entirely gave up on the dialectic, but Diana Coole has convincingly argued that his 
conception of a hyper-dialectic actually avoids many of the problems that 'postmodern' thinkers have 
raised in regard to Hegelian dialectics, for example. See Coole, D. , Negativity and Politics: Dionysus and 
Dialectics from Kant to Poststructuralism, London: Routledge, 2000, p 122-155. 
128Gasche, R. , Inventions of Difference: On Jacques Derrida, p 29-30. According to Gasche, Merleau-
Ponty only anticipates deconstruction (rather than is deconstructive) because "the deferral of coincidence 
in Merleau-Ponty's critique of reflection is judged to be merely temporal". This is an interesting 
observation, because it is often suggested that while Heidegger achieved this temporal victory, Merleau-
Ponty is to be commended more for his contributions to spatiality, particularly in Phenomenology of 
Perception. In fact, Gasche 's comment is surprising and I agree with Thomas Busch that Merleau-Ponty's 
ecart involves both a spatial and a temporal non-coincidence. See Busch, T., "Merleau-Ponty and Derrida 
on the Phenomenon" in Ecart and Differance, ed. Dillon, Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: Humanities 
Press, 1997, p 23-4. 
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he is somewhat spuriously characterised as a foundationalist thinker 129 . Of course, unlike 
Derrida, Merleau-Ponty's critique of reflection and his subsequent call for a hyper-
reflection ( or hyper-dialectic) does quite obviously locate itself primarily in an analysis of 
the body, where he discerns a necessary and constitutive divergence within the embodied 
situation. As we have seen, this ecart is variously described as the difference between the 
sentient and the sensible, the touching and the touched, and for Merleau-Ponty, it also 
applies to several other divergences, including one between the perceptual faith and its 
articulation (VI 87). 
However, this concept is most easily demonstrated through an example that we 
have previously contemplated - that is, an individual's left hand touching their right 
hand, while their right hand is also simultaneously touching another object. Of this 
situation, Merleau-Ponty suggests that this difference between touching and being 
touched reveals a fundamental divergence within the body, although it is not such that it 
prohibits an overall grasp of the body (VI 9, cf. PP 108). Just as this gap, or dehiscence, 
ensures the impossibility of any thorough and all-encompassing self-perception, it is also 
that which allows perception and indeed subjectivity to be possible at all. This is why 
Merleau-Ponty suggests that ecart is "not a radical discontinuity, but a distance which is 
not the contrary of proximity" (VI 135) and that it "both disjoins and conjoins at the same 
time" 130 • Now, this should allude to some similarities with the "possible-impossible" 
aporias that typify Derrida's more recent work and which will be examined in 
fo1ihcoming chapters131 , but it is more important to ascertain that if our embodied 
divergence inaugurates our capacity for perception ( as well as language and reflection), 
this same divergence also ensures that there are certain limits upon this capacity. Just as 
we cannot reflexively attain to a coincidence or self-identity with the hand that we are 
touching, for Merleau-Ponty the philosophy of reflection cannot entirely overcome a 
similar divergence (VI 3 8). 
In his critique of Hegel, Sartre, and others, Merleau-Ponty insists that "reflection 
recuperates everything except itself as an effort of recuperation, it clarifies everything 
except its own role" (VI 33). There is a temporal divergence that precludes the attempted 
129Lechte, J. , Fifty Key Contemporary Thinkers, London: Routled~e, 1994. 
IJ0Madison, G. , "Merleau-Ponty and Derrida: La DifferEnce" in Ecart and Differance, ed. Dillon, Atlantic 
Highlands: Humanities Press, 1997, p 102. 
131 Interestingly, Merleau-Ponty refers to reflection and also his notion of the flesh - which will be briefly 
explicated in chapter eight- as involving an "impossible-possible" (VI 34). 
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recovery of meaning via reflection from coinciding with that which it wants to demarcate. 
The task of hyper-reflection then, is to ensure that reflection is always aware of its own 
finitude. It is hence somewhat removed from philosophical reflection itself, and resides in 
what several theorists have referred to as the non-space of philosophy132 . The proximity 
of such sentiments to deconstruction has been widely recognised, and also occasionally 
contested, but at the very least, Merleau-Ponty 's phenomenology criticises the naivety of 
traditional dialectics in much the same way as Derrida's work does, even if it might be 
suggested that Merleau-Ponty also recuperates the dialectic on other terms (ie. as a hyper-
dialectic ). It will soon be argued that their respective accounts of dialectics are actually a 
little closer to each other than such a formulation implies, but what is irrefutable is that 
like Derrida, Merleau-Ponty is concerned with the tendency of the metaphysical tradition 
to exalt self-presence and the rationalism that this usually entails. The idea of philosophy 
being able to mirror or transcend nature is disparaged (VI 99), and yet for Merleau-Ponty, 
traditional reflective thought is inevitable and indeed indispensable, just as it also is for 
Derrida. In regard to their critique of the philosophy of reflection ( and also in their 
recognition of our simultaneous dependence upon it) there is at least some affinity. 
Of course, it cannot be disputed that there are some important differences between 
their respective methodologies, including the obvious fact that Merleau-Ponty propounds 
his own ontological arguments, whereas deconstruction primarily focuses upon other 
philosopher's or artisan's arguments. To the minimal extent that we can refer to Derrida's 
'own' arguments, they are always inextricably intertwined with the arguments of 
whomever he seeks to deconstruct. For example, De1Tida claims that his critique of the 
Husserlian 'now' moment is actually based upon resources that he discerns within 
Husserl ' s own text (ie. the retentional and protentional aspects of consciousness) which 
elide the self-presence that Husserl was attempting to secure (SP 64-66). If Derrida's 
point is simply that Husserl ' s phenomenology holds within itself conclusions that Husserl 
failed to recognise, Derrida can, ostensibly at least, disavow any transcendental or 
ontological position. One consequence of this difference is that Derrida ' s work often 
appears less convinced in its rhetoric than Merleau-Ponty' s phenomenology does. 
For this reason, it is necessary to consider more precisely what it is that Merleau-
Ponty wants his philosophy to achieve. This will help to clarify why his particular version 
of the dialectic can elude being denigrated as yet another version of the metaphysics of 
132Silverman, H ., Inscrip tions, p 102, & Gasche, R. , Inventions of Difference, p 33 . 
presence, and it will also establish some of the ways in which this apparently stark 
methodological disparity between phenomenology and deconstruction begins to be 
hroken down. According to Merleau-Ponty: 
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What we call hyper-dialectic is a thought that, on the contrary, is capable of 
reaching truth because it envisages without restriction the plurality of the 
relationships and what has been called ambiguity. The bad dialectic is that which 
thinks it recomposes being by a thetic thought, by an assemblage of statements, 
by thesis, antithesis, and synthesis; the good dialectic is that which is conscious of 
the fact that every thesis is an idealisation, that Being is not made up of 
idealisations or of things said ... but of bound wholes where signification never is 
except in tendency (my italics, VI 94). 
While this passage reaffirms the enduring role of ambiguity in his philosophy, the last 
sentence of this quotation is also closely related to themes that are more commonly 
associated with the work of Derrida. Merleau-Ponty's describes his hyper-dialectic as 
acknowledging that not only is every thesis an idealisation, but also that being cannot be 
ascertained through such idealisations. Moreover: Merleau-Ponty also goes on to suggest 
that such a dialectical thought: 
Abounds in the sensible world, but on condition that the sensible world has been 
divested of all that the ontologies have added to it. One of the tasks of the 
dialectic, as a situational thought, a thought in contact with being, is to shake off 
the false evidences, to denounce the significations cut off from the experience of 
being, emptied - and to criticise itself in the measure that it itself becomes one of 
them (VI 92). 
Other than the recourse to terms like being, this passage reads very much like Derrida's 
deconstructive prescriptions, or at least an embodied version of them. Merleau-Ponty's 
hyper-dialectic is envisaged as being a situational thought that, like deconstruction, must 
criticise all thinking that ignores the conditional nature of idealisations, and it must also 
maintain a vigilance to ensure that it does not itself become one of them. This is why 
Merleau-Ponty describes his philosophical project as one of propounding an "indirect" 
rather than a direct ontology (VI 179). These themes are deserving of more prolonged 
attention, but there seems to be a significant and underestimated connection between 
what Merleau-Ponty's hyper-reflection seeks to achieve and what Derrida's 
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deconstructive methodology has more recently attempted 133 • 
Of course, a comprehensive understanding of the relationship between Merleau-
Ponty and Derrida also requires further consideration of temporality, and the role that 
both of these theorists accord it in their respective philosophies. As has been mentioned, 
Derrida has consistently rejected phenomenology for its tacit dependence on a 'now' 
moment, or temporal immediacy, and following his refutation of Husserlian temporality, 
he remarks that "in the last analysis, what is at stake is ... the privilege of the actual 
present, the now" (SP 62-3). This chapter has already highlighted the importance of 
temporal matters in inducing Merleau-Ponty's conception of a hyper-reflection, and in 
Phenomenology of Perception he argues that "if we rediscover time beneath the subject, 
and if we relate to the paradox of time those of the body, the world, the thing, and others, 
we shall understand that beyond these there is nothing to understand" (PP 365). Derrida 
and Merleau-Ponty hence have a shared recognition of just how important temporality is 
to all of the problems that confront both philosophy and everyday subjectivity, although 
their two statements are not equivalent. Again, Merleau-Ponty's position is the more 
emphatic and convinced, and this is symptomatic of an important difference in their 
respective projects. 
More substantively, however, deconstruction also argues that all speculation 
about time is metaphysical 134, and it hence tries to restrict itself to deconstructing other 
naiTatives about time (such as Husserl's). One consequence of this is, to put it crudely, 
that Merleau-Ponty can be envisaged as having a philosophy of time (which will soon be 
briefly explicated), whereas Derrida might claim to simply deconstruct other philosophies 
of time. Of course, it can be argued that Derrida has an implied conception of time that he 
will not always admit to 135 • Without such a presupposition, it is difficult to understand the 
basis from which he could claim that the 'immediacy of experience' is a transcendental 
illusion. For the moment, however, we are better served by delineating the antinomy that 
is often presumed to exist between Merleau-Ponty and Derrida on this issue. 
1331n this respect, however, it needs to be emphasised that I am not attempting to establish any absolute 
unity between Merleau-Ponty and Derrida. On the contrary, the argument is a relatively modest one that 
seeks to destabilise the antinomy that is often presumed to exist between them and which ensures that 
Merleau-Ponty's embodied philosophy is not considered as seriously as it should be. 
134Derrida, J. , "Ousia and Gramme: A Note to a Footnote in Being and Time" in Phenomenology in 
Perspective, ed. Smith, trans. Casey, The Hague: Nijhoff, 1970, p 88-9. 
135Shaun Gallagher and David Wood undertake a more sustained examination of the extent to which a 
metaphysical claim about time can be tacitly attributed to Derrida. See Gallagher, S. , "On the Pre-Noetic 
Reality of Time" in £cart and Differance, ed. Dillon, Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1997, p 134, 
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As has been affirmed by numerous commentators, Derrida strategically utilises a 
conception of time that emphasises deferral and this is assumed to be vastly different to 
the 'immediacy' found within Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology. While this chapter has 
partly extricated Merleau-Ponty ' s later philosophy from associations with the much-
derided phenomenological exaltation of immediacy, Derrida certainly does not appear to 
affirm any type of certitude to our embodied existence, even if it is a certitude that 
Merleau-Ponty suggests is "obscure" (VI 11). To summarise a few themes that have 
occupied a major place in Derrida's work, the temporal hesitation involved in his notion 
of differance, the 'undecidability' of decision-making (which will be explicated in 
chapter six), the priority allocated to the "to come", and his later philosophy's attempt to 
set a place at the table for something wholly other (tout autre ), are all united by his 
abiding emphasis upon the thematic of deferral, as well as by the preparation for a future 
that is radically other to the now. 
While such themes will be considered in detail in later chapters, it is worth 
observing that even if Derrida does not think that we can ever entirely overcome 
metaphysics (WD 280), for him, there is a persistent hope for what the future might 
contain and this is also what makes deconstruction a form of prophesy13 6• There is not 
much content to these prophecies of, and calls to the future, but to invoke a distinction 
that will be examined in chapter nine, this is the difference between a messianic structure 
of existence which is open to the coming of an entirely ungraspable and unknown other, 
and the concrete, historical messianisms (ie. the Islamic, Jewish and Christian religions) 
that are open to the coming of a specific other of known characteristics. A deconstruction 
that ente1iained any type of grand prophetic narrative, like a Marxist story about the 
gradual movement of history toward a pre-determined future which, once attained, would 
make notions like history and progress obsolete, would be yet another vestige of 
'logocentrism' and susceptible to deconstruction. Precisely in order to avoid the problems 
that such messianisms engender - eg. killing in the name of progress, mutilating on 
account of knowing the will of God better than others, etc. - Derrida suggests that: 
I am careful to say 'let it come' because if the other is precisely what is not 
& Wood, D., The Deconstruction of Time, p 336. 
136For Derrida 's own reflections on the link between deconstruction and prophecy, see his interview with 
Richard Kearney in "Deconstruction and the Other: Dialogue with Derrida" in Dialogue with 
Contemporary Continental Thinkers: The Phenomenological Heritage , Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 1984, p 119. 
invented, the initiative or deconstructive inventiveness can consist only in 
opening, in uncloseting, in destabilising foreclusionary structures, so as to allow 
for the passage toward the other (RDR 60). 
99 
Much remains to be explicated about these aspects of his later philosophy, but 
deconstruction is clearly motivated by a desire to open up myriad possibilities for the 
future, and a future that is of a fundamentally different order to the 'now'. But 
deconstruction is not merely prophetic and hopeful about the future; on the contrary, it is 
both quasi-transcendental and philosophical when it emphasises the future. Despite 
Derrida's claims about deconstruction being merely strategic, and hence not involving 
transcendental assertions about the nature of the world, it inevitably breaches these 
conditions 137 • While philosophers like Richard Rorty and David Wood have paid this 
topic considerable attention, Derrida does assert the priority of a temporal deferral, and 
later the alterity of the future, in a philosophical way - or at least in a way that is not 
merely strategic, for it confuses and compromises the entire distinction between 
philosophical and strategic interests. 
John Caputo expresses this point succinctly when he claims that Derrida' s 
criticisms of Husserlian temporality in Speech and Phenomena involve an attempt to 
convey that: 
What is really going on in things, what is really happening, is always "to come". 
Every time you try to stabilise the meaning of a thing, try to fix it in its 
missionary position, the thing itself, if there is anything at all to it, slips away ( cf. 
SP 104) 138 • 
To put Derrida's point simplistically, it might be suggested that the meaning of a 
particular object, or a particular word, is never stable, but always in the process of change 
(eg. the dissemination of meaning for which deconstruction has become notorious). 
Moreover, the significance of that past change can only be appreciated from the future 
and, of course, that 'future' is itself implicated in a similar process of transformation were 
it ever to be capable of becoming 'present'. The future that Derrida is referring to is 
hence not just a future that will become present, but the future that makes all 'presence' 
possible and also impossible. 
137It is worth repeating that Derrida insists that the dissemination of meaning is more "originary" than 
gathering (OG 232), and also that differance is "older" than Heidegger's ontic-ontological distinction (SP 
154 ). This transcendental tendency has been analysed in more depth in chapter three. 
138Caputo, J. , Deconstntction in a Nutshell, p 31. 
Derrida's work offers many important temporal contributions of this quasi-
transcendental variety, but it is worth pointing out that even in Phenomenology of 
Perception, Merleau-Ponty has also insisted that: 
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My hold on the past and the future is precarious and my possession of my own 
time is always postponed until a stage when I may fully understand it, yet this 
stage can never be reached, since it would be one more moment bounded by the 
horizon of its future, and requiring in its tum, further developments in order to be 
understood (PP 346). 
This remark is fairly self-explanatory, and in his chapter on temporality from this same 
text, Merleau-Ponty goes on to argue that "it is the essence of time to be not only actual 
time, or time which flows, but also time which is aware of itself, for the explosion or 
dehiscence of the present towards the future is the archetype of the relation of self to self' 
(PP 426). In such sentiments, Merleau-Ponty is suggesting that the relationship that we 
have to ourselves is one that is always typified by a divergence, or alterity, on account of 
a temporal explosion towards the future that precludes us ever being self-present. For 
Merleau-Ponty then, as for Derrida, there can be.no self-enclosed 'now' moment, because 
time always has this reflexive aspect that is aware of itself, and that opens us to 
experiences beyond our particular horizons of significance. 
As yet then, there seems to be no reason to presume that Merleau-Ponty and 
Derrida have wildly different understandings of temporality, although it may be 
coherently argued that the relative emphasis that they accord to this deferring aspect of 
our temporal existence is importantly distinct. Indeed, in relation to deconstruction's 
consistent attempts to open us up to an unknown future that cannot be grasped, it is worth 
recalling De1Tida' s reply to a question posed to him during the Villanova Roundtable 
Conference. As captured in Caputo's Deconstruction in a Nutshell, Derrida insists that 
"as soon as you have a temporal experience of waiting for the future, of waiting for 
someone to come: that is the opening of experience" 139 • The meaning of this Beckettian-
inclined comment is not as axiomatic as it appears, but it reaffirms that for Derrida, there 
can be no presence-to-self, or self-contained identity, because the 'nature ' of our temporal 
existence is for this type of experience to elude us. Our predominant mode of being is 
what he will eventually term the messianic, in that we wait for an absolutely 
undetermined Godot whose presence is forever forestalled and deferred. The opening of 
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experience is about the wait, or more aptly, experience is only when it is deferred. 
This Derridean conception of experience and its implied understanding of 
temporality is commonly assumed to be in opposition with a phenomenological 
description of equivalent phenomena. While it is valid to suggest that deconstruction has 
altered the phenomenological paradigm in significant and worthwhile ways, such an 
oppositional framework regarding the issues of experience and temporality is also 
considered to be applicable to the specific phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty. Indeed, the 
following quotation from The Visible and the Invisible has been cited as evidence of 
Merleau-Ponty' s tacit dependence upon a temporality of presence: 
With the first vision, the first contact, the first pleasure, there is initiation, that is, 
not the positing of a content, but the opening of a dimension that can never again 
be closed, the establishment of a level in terms of which every other experience 
will henceforth be situated (VI 151 ). 
This suggestion that different dimensions of existence are opened with the first actual 
vision, contact, or pleasurable experience, has been taken to infer that these two 
philosophers conceive of the opening of experience in radically different terms, and also 
as evidence of a fundamental difference between them in their relation to temporality140• 
Considering Derrida's insistence that experience is only when it is deferred, and that what 
is really happening is always "to come", it seems that for him, the opening of the 
dimension of pleasurable experience, to contemplate a concrete example, consists not in 
the first actual pleasurable experience, but in the anticipation of this pleasurable 
experience. Pleasure, paradoxically, is to be found in the waiting for it, as no pleasure can 
ever be completely self-contained, or exhausted by the resources of any singular 
experience. Like the sign, it is persistently referring to other things and cannot ever be 
entirely satiated or controlled, and such themes have already been demonstrated in 
chapter three (cf. OG 150). For Merleau-Ponty, however, or so the story goes, it is 
inferred that the opposite position is the case: pleasure is awakened on being 'present' to 
pleasure. If this were Merleau-Ponty and Derrida's respective positions, then this 
problematic could not be easily resolved, except to suggest that Merleau-Ponty' s work 
139Derrida, J., as cited in Caputo, J. , Deconstruction in a Nutshell, p 22. 
140This is the position espoused by Martin Dillon, who asserts that Merleau-Ponty's and Derrida 's different 
conceptions of temporality result in manifestly different treatments of embodiment, and even preclude 
Derrida being considered in terms of embodiment at all. See Dillon, M., "Temporality: Merleau-Ponty and 
Derrida" in Merleau-Ponty, Hermeneutics and Postmodernism, eds. Busch & Gallagher, Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1992, p 189-212. 
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might actually be confined within a metaphysics of presence. 
However, this apparent antinomy can also be dissected, even if we restrict this 
analysis to the particular passage in question. After all, Merleau-Ponty speaks of an 
initiation, which is a rite of passage and an entering into a habitual relation that revolves 
around our embodied situation in a world. More significantly, being initiated also 
involves waiting for somebody to bestow relevance upon the act in which we have 
situated ourselves, and the initiation is hence not an actual self-contained event. The lack 
of identity and the instability of an initiation, with its wait for some type of meaning to be 
conferred, is typical of all experiences, for even once the initiation is over, it is never 
really over, as it still requires recognition from others to have any meaning attributed to 
it. 
Moreover, in the passage in question, Merleau-Ponty does not literally mean that 
such a situation applies only to the ve1y first vision and the very first pleasure. All of our 
visions are, in a sense, a first vision, and there are infinitely varied pleasures; that is, 
pleasures of such and such a kind, and pleasures of another kind. More importantly, 
however, it is worth paying attention to Merleau-Ponty' s contention that it is not the 
actual positing of a particular content that initiates and opens up aspects of existence for 
us. If it is not the concrete content of the pleasurable experience that is initiating, then 
there seems to be little alternative but to conclude that Merleau-Ponty is also referring to 
a temporality of waiting for that pleasure, which in tum also opens us towards other 
possible experiences. While the traditional phenomenological reduction almost 
exclusively emphasises the content of our perceptions/experiences, if vision itself is but 
an initiation without content as Merleau-Ponty suggests in the above quotation (that is, a 
relation to both the past and the future), clearly this does not involve an actual presence-
to-self in the ' subjectivity ' or the 'now' of which he speaks. Moreover, this also suggests 
that Derrida' s and Merleau-Ponty's respective positions, even on issues like the 
temporality of experience, are not as divergent as many theorists presume. 
Against this interpretation, it may be argued that Merleau-Ponty never explicitly 
suggests that what is really happening is always "to come", as Derrida consistently 
affirms, and this is certainly true, just as it is true that a certain deconstructive pressure 
has been applied to the remark of Merleau-Ponty 's with which we have been concerned. 
There are some significant differences between their respective philosophical positions 
and this chapter would be loathe to efface these, particularly given that some of these 
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differences will also be the site of this thesis' dissatisfaction with aspects of Derridean 
deconstruction. What should be apparent, however, is that the differences between these 
two theorists cannot be adequately accounted for by simple postulations like 
phenomenologist versus post-structuralist, and this is largely because there are some 
important ways in which Merleau-Ponty's notion of a hyper-reflection actually pre-
empted deconstruction. This chapter intends to have begun to destabilise the antinomy 
that characterises much of the literature concerning the relationship between these two 
thinkers, and in particular the idea that the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty remains 
betrothed to the metaphysics of presence. In order to further these dual ambitions, it is 
time that invisibility and blindness, themes common to both Merleau-Ponty and Derrida, 
were accorded the attention they deserve. 
Sb. The Punctum Caecum: The Visible and the Invisible and the Memoirs of the Blind 
In exploring the problematic of drawing, Derrida's 1991 text, Memoirs of the Blind, 
considers issues that are more closely aligned with perception and sight than his 
philosophy has hitherto considered, and this provides the opportunity to consider his 
position in regard to some obviously phenomenological themes. After all, 
phenomenology has been widely recognised, and sometimes even criticised, for being the 
philosophy of sight par excellence 141 • Memoirs of the Blind brings Derrida into closer 
proximity with such themes, but he also imbues his descriptions of the perspective of the 
artist with an impo1iant twist, in that he insists upon the artist's necessary blindness. 
While such an assertion is undoubtedly both counter-intuitive and something of a 
challenge to the traditional phenomenological paradigm of sight, it is not so obviously a 
position that is in opposition to the philosophy of Merleau-Ponty. After all, invisibility 
has been a theme of some interest to Merleau-Ponty's work and he eventually decided 
upon the title The Visible and the Invisible, for what was intended to be his major 
philosophical text 142• In this respect, it is unsurprising that Memoirs of the Blind is a text 
in which Derrida belatedly begins to appreciate the significance and import of Merleau-
14 1This argument is a common one, but it is particularly obvious in Yeo, M. , "Perceiving/Reading the 
Other: Ethical Dimensions" in Merleau-Ponty, Hermeneutics and Postmodernism, eds. Busch & Gallagher, 
Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992, p 44. Yeo argues that an emphasis upon vision is an 
inadequate and "remarkably bizarre way to stage the scene of our encounter with the other". A similar 
discontent is also apparent in Vasseleu, C. , Textures of Light: Vis ion and Touch in Irigaray, Levinas and 
Merleau-Ponty, Warwick Studies in European Philosophy, London: Routledge, 1998, p 64- 9. 
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Ponty' s philosophy, and this section of this chapter will consider Derrida 's argument that 
blindness is constitutively involved in drawing, before elaborating on the relationship that 
this bears to Merleau-Ponty's later philosophy. 
Memoirs of the Blind is orientated around an exhibition of drawings that Derrida 
curated at the Louvre, and he intends to reveal a blindness at the centre of the point of 
view, as evidenced through drawing and the self-portrait, and this blindness will be what 
calls into question 'perception', at least as it is usually conceived. Derrida' s attempt to 
reveal an aporia involving the perspective in an irremediable blindness revolves around 
the positing of two different hypotheses about the act of drawing, then showing that both 
of these hypotheses fail on their own terms, and yet when taken together a spread of 
invisibility is still involved in the act of drawing, as well as the perspective more 
generally. 
Derrida's first hypothesis is termed the abocular hypothesis and it conceives of 
the drawing of an object as being accomplished predominantly without the eyes - that is, 
with the eyes not focusing on the inscriptions upon the canvas, but upon the thing being 
traced itself. In this model of drawing, the hand 'rushes ahead without seeing, leaping 
without looking, and is hence on the verge of disaster (MB 4). It feels blindly through the 
darkness, somehow precipitated by the vision upon which one is staring. However, it is 
infinitely difficult to draw entirely from observing only the object, rather than one's 
inscriptions on the canvas. If any of you have ever tested this, you will agree that it could 
only be the most avant-garde of art forms! The body is not so well-trained that it can 
replicate the object without persistent references to and from. 
The second hypothesis that explores this problematic revolves around a model of 
drawing in which one looks from the object to the canvas and then begins to draw. In this 
paradigm, one is relying on memory, but according to Derrida, references to memory 
cannot resolve this problem either - the memory is not the same as the thing being traced, 
but is, on the contrary, a representation and hence subject to the processes of differance. 
At the very least, it is apparent that an alterity insinuates itself precisely where the artist is 
trying to do away with anything that might appear arbitrary. Memory, or recalling 
something, does not merely capture the perception anew. 
According to this second alternative, which Derrida refers to as the double 
genitive hypothesis, we draw according to a logic of anticipation. In other words, we 
142Merleau-Ponty 's final work was at one stage entitled "The Origin of Truth" (VI 165). 
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draw while looking at the canvas (rather than the object being traced), and move our 
hands, anticipating their movements to conform to the model of the object that we 
possess in our memory (MB 4). In anticipating, we take the initiative, move out in front 
of, and as Robert Vallier suggests, this type of embodied anticipation "guards against the 
precipitous, vertiginous terror of the invisible" 143 • So in drawing we can attempt to escape 
from the nuances of invisibility by immersing ourselves in embodiment and in the 
anticipating leap of the hand. This type of drawer may try and get that elusive vision 
down quickly before it fades from memory, or they may be so painstakingly preoccupied 
with what they are drawing that the object itself ceases to be a reference factor. There is 
hence a type of faith evident, and a certain fidelity to either the memory of the thing, or to 
the drawing itself, and they are not as apprehensive about space as Derrida's imagined 
protagonists of the first hypothesis are. However, it quickly becomes obvious that one 
cannot adequately trace an object in this manner and while these practical considerations 
are not the main focus of Derrida's analysis, they do reveal the paradoxicality involved in 
abandoning the perception and drawing entirely due to memory, "as if one drew on the 
condition of not seeing" (MB 49). 
This dual position can be summarised as follows: when the draftsperson looks at 
the object being painted and moves the pencil, they draw precipitively; when they look at 
the canvas and not the object being drawn (and hence rely upon memory), the artist draws 
anticipatively. Derrida's point is that either way there is always a blindness involved, and 
his question is that if blindness is a condition of the possibility of drawing ( and 
concurrently also reflects its impossibility), then how is drawing possible? In responding 
to this paradoxical situation, Derrida argues that these two different hypotheses (the 
abocular and the double genitive, or roughly, eye before hand, or hand before eye) are 
intertwined, and "between the two, in their fold, the one repeating the other without being 
reduced to it, there is the event" (MB 41 ). The act of drawing, and the perspective itself, 
hence involves the interdependency of both of these hypotheses. 
Without analysing Merleau-Ponty's own writings on aesthetics in his essays 
"Cezanne's Doubt" and "Eye and Mind" respectively144, it is clear that his ontology also 
143Vallier, R. , p 194. It needs to be acknowledged that I am indebted to Vallier for pointing out this 
connection between Merleau-Ponty and Derrida on the theme of the punctum caecum, although I will 
disagree with some aspects of his interpretation. 
144lt is worth recognising that in "Eye and Mind", Merleau-Ponty argues that "vision is not a certain mode 
of thought or presence to self; it is the means given me for being absent from myself. .. Painters always 
knew this" (PrP 184). 
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argues that it is only in the fold between the sentient and the sensible, in their chiasmic 
intertwining, that experience (including the artistic event) is possible at all. As we have 
seen, for Merleau-Ponty neither the experience of touching or the experience of being 
touched are conceivable on their own, but can be recognised only if the awareness of 
what it feels like to be touched encroaches upon the experience of touching (VI 148, cf. 
PP 93). It is only between these two abstractions, "in the fold" between touching and 
being touched, that either of these things can actually occur. It seems that both Merleau-
Ponty and Derrida discern a necessary divergence within our everyday embodiment and 
the situation of the aiiist respectively. Moreover, subjectivity for Merleau-Ponty, and the 
perspective for Derrida, are both made (im)possible by this very difference ( ecart) that 
cannot simply be characterised as yet another dualism. In this respect, it is interesting to 
note that both of these philosophers make persistent references to the fold, the hinge, and 
the chiasm; all images that seek to retain a difference between two terms, but it is a 
difference that cannot be adequately characterised in the form of a dualistic opposition 145 . 
In regard to Memoirs of the Blind, however, the question arises as to what occurs 
in this interim, the between of looking at the ob]ect and then 'tracing' it to paper? As 
Vallier points out, in this hiatus (which is not a literal self-enclosed moment), in the fold 
of these two directed gazes, is a spread of invisibility that makes drawing both possible 
and impossible146 • There is a feeling of powerlessness, according to Derrida, at these 
moments when we realise that the experience of the gaze is given over to blindness, and 
it is a blindness that can only be resolved through leaping. Now, Derrida acknowledges 
the common-sense argument against him. He says: 
If one can recall no blind draftsperson, that is, one deprived of sight and eyes in 
the literal sense, isn't it going against common sense ... to claim exactly the 
opposite, ie. that every draftsperson is blind? No one will dispute that the 
draftsperson is prey to a devouring proliferation of the invisible, but is that 
enough to make him into a blind man? (MB 44) 
Perhaps it is going against common sense to claim a blindness at the heart of vision, but 
145This apparent proximity between Merleau-Ponty and Derrida, in te1ms of the extent to which both 
theorists emphasise a chiasmic intertwining of two disparate hypotheses, will be further examined in 
chapter ten. It will be argued that Derrida is more reluctant to thematise this intertwining than Merleau-
Ponty, and this fits in with Martin Dillon' s argument that Merleau-Ponty and Derrida actually use the 
figure of the chiasm in importantly different ways (see Dillon, M., "Introduction" in Ecart and Differance, 
p 6-7). 
146Vallier, R. , p 194-5. 
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that has rarely stopped philosophers previously and in this regard at least, Derrida is no 
exception. Nevertheless, it is clear that the blindness he is referring to is not a 
problematic retina, but the necessary redirection of the gaze for drawing to occur. It is, 
however, tempting to insist that a 'mastery of technique' type explanation would suffice, 
and is in opposition to Derrida's portrait of the inherent paradoxicalities of drawing. In 
other words, it may be claimed that we successfully draw because we have previously 
been trained to do so. In this respect, it is worth noting that both of Derrida' s hypotheses 
are heavily reliant upon the hands and the body, and it is no surprise that the hands and 
the body would orient drawings of the blind - this is something that Derrida accepts and 
it might seem to prioritise the practical and habitual exigencies of Merleau-Ponty's 
notion of the body-subject and its "I can" relationship to the things surrounding it (PP 
137). After all, it is the body that inaugurates these provisional sketches, that leaps across 
the chasm of blindness and seeks to restore something approaching an equilibrium - in 
this case, the approximation of the seen object to that drawn on paper. Derrida is not 
going to deny this, but he does want to suggest that no matter how well-trained an 
individual may be in the art of sketching, there is nevertheless a moment between when 
they are looking at the thing they are trying to trace and when their hand actually begins 
to 'trace' the object, where blindness ensues. 
Regarding this blindness, or space of difference between the object and its traced 
representation, Derrida suggests that: 
The night of the abyss can be interpreted in two ways, either as the eve or 
memory of the day, in other words as a reserve of visibility (the draftsman does 
not presently see but he has seen and will see again: the aperspective is the 
anticipating perspective or the anamestic retrospective) or as radically and 
definitively foreign to the phenomenality of the day (MB 45). 
Derrida rejects the first memory model and its reserve of visibility that would render the 
night as nothing but the absence of the day. Such a position seems to re-inscribe an 
unwanted dualism, and Derrida 's claim is more than merely that there are occasions when 
our _ perspective is compromised by blindness; he wants to suggest that this 
blindness is always there and is actually an integral factor in the possibility of sight at all. 
Derrida hence chooses the latter option, but this idea of the invisible being radically and 
definitively foreign to the phenomenality of the day is not to suggest that it has no 
interaction with that phenomenality, or that it resides in some dualistic, ephemeral, 
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external outside (although it admittedly sounds that way). Rather, it means, as Vallier 
suggests, that "the draftsperson is always in danger of ruination at the ' origin ' of drawing 
because the 'heterogeneity of the invisible to the visible, can haunt the visible as its very 
possibility"' 147 . Rather than assuming phenomenality to be transparent, Derrida implies 
that it is on account of the difference between the invisible and the visible, that vision is 
itself possible. 
This is a thought that is remarkably similar to Merleau-Ponty's own account of 
perception, and Hugh Silverman puts his fundamental point well: "Merleau-Ponty took 
the model of the ruin of a castle left in shambles on the top of a hill. The ruin is visible. 
What is invisible is the whole castle, as it was, as it could be in the future. Its visibility is 
the intertwining of the visible and the invisible" 148• It is the last sentence of this quotation 
that is important, for while only the ruin is literally visible, the visibility that we perceive 
is not merely the visible (eg. the ruins), but also the invisible (eg. a proud 13th-century 
castle manned with guards at every comer). Moreover, like Derrida, Merleau-Ponty 
insists that the fact that we perceive at all is indebted to this difference between the 
visible and the invisible. 
If it is the difference between visibility and invisibility that makes vision itself 
possible, then as Derrida suggests, this has the consequence of necessitating that: 
Invisibility would still inhabit the visible, or rather, would haunt it to the point of 
being confused with it. .. The visible as such would be invisible, not as visibility, 
the phenomenality or essence of the visible, but as the singular body of the visible 
itself, right on the visible (MB 51 ). 
This idea of the invisible being right on the visible is also intimately related to Merleau-
Ponty, as Vallier has argued in his essay comparing Memoirs of the Blind to The Visible 
and the Invisible. Moreover, in the above statement, Derrida seems to discard completely 
the notion of the phenomenality of the day, and replace it with a conception of 
' experience ' that incorporates the invisible and the visible together, and is paradoxically 
also predicated upon their divergence. As he explains, "to be the other of the visible, 
absolute invisibility must neither take place elsewhere nor constitute another visible" 
(MB 52) - rather, it must be right on the visible, and it is this aporia that the artist must 
confront, and as we have already seen, it is usually accompanied by a feeling of 
147Vallier, R. , p 197. , 
148Silverrnan, H. , "Reading Postmodernism as Interruption" in Ecart and Differance, ed. Dillon, New 
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powerlessness. 
Significantly, however, Derrida makes it clear that this moment of "powerlessness 
is not an impotence or a failure" (MB 44). In fact, it is all pervasive and makes possible 
the artistic experience, because the invisible "is at once that which sustains and 
ailments ... the visible, the conditions of its possibility, and that which threatens the 
visible with wreck and ruination, the conditions of its impossibility"149 . In this suggestion 
that the aporia of invisibility is not only negative but also creative and instantiating, 
Derrida once more moves closer towards the philosophy of Merleau-Ponty. For Merleau-
Ponty, a similar divergence is envisaged to preclude self-presence (ecart), but it is 
nevertheless also considered to be a "fruitful contradiction" in that it allows some form of 
subjectivity to be possible at all ( cf. PrP 134 ). Rather than acting as transcendental 
conditions that are sufficient and enabling, Merleau-Ponty's and Derrida's respective 
concepts (ecart and aporia) are hence more accurately described as quasi-transcendental 
conditions, in that they ensure that the effect that is made possible is also made 
unstable 150 • Before such a claim can be legitimised in more detail, however, Merleau-
Ponty' s own conception of this invisibility needs to be examined. 
In The Visible and the Invisible, Merleau-Ponty explicitly suggests that his 
governing principle is "not to consider the invisible as another visible possible" (VI 229), 
just as Derrida was careful to avoid consigning his own invisible ( the night of the abyss) 
as being merely the eve or memory of the day. Merleau-Ponty' s suggestion that the 
invisible is not of the order of visibility also seems to problematise - although not 
entirely refute - one of the claims of Leonard Lawlor in his essay, "Eliminating Some 
Confusion: The Relation of Being and Writing in Merleau-Ponty and Derrida". Lawlor's 
essay characterises Merleau-Ponty as almost exclusively concerned with the conditions of 
possibility, whereas Derrida is envisaged as being concerned only with impossibility151 • 
Now, it cannot be denied that Derrida examines impossibility to a more significant and 
sustained extent than Merleau-Ponty, and Lawlor is hence pointing towards an important 
difference between these two thinkers that will concern us in chapters nine and ten. 
However, it also needs to be pointed out that, according to Merleau-Ponty, the invisible is 
Jersey: Humanities Press, 1997, p 216. 
149Vallier, R., p 198. 
150This distinction between the transcendental and the quasi-transcendental is indebted to Caputo, J. , The 
Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida, p 12. 
151Lawlor, L., "Eliminating Some Confusion: The Relation of Being and Writing in Merleau-Ponty and 
Derrida" inEcart and Differance, ed. Dillon, New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1997, p 84. 
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not merely another possible visibility (VI 229), but it is "there without being an object, it 
is pure transcendence, without an ontic mask. And the 'visibles' themselves, in the last 
analysis ... are only centered on a nucleus of absence" (VI 229). It seems then, at least 
from the evidence of his "Working Notes", that Merleau-Ponty explores the relationship 
of the impossible to the possible, rather than simply affirming the one paradigm at the 
expense of the other as Lawlor implies. There is a radicality to Merleau-Ponty's position 
that ensures that he is not exclusively preoccupied with possibility, and that he is hence 
also not obviously a metaphysician of presence. For example, in the "Working Notes", he 
suggests that: 
When I say that every visible is invisible, that perception is imperception, that 
consciousness has a ''punctum caecum", that to see is always to see more than one 
sees - this must not be understood in the sense of a contradiction - it must not be 
imagined that I add to the visible, perfectly defined in-itself, a non-visible ... one 
has to understand that it is the visibility itself, that involves a non-visibility (VI 
247). 
This mutual inextricability of visibility from invisibility, imperception from perception, is 
also what Derrida has been exploring through his insistence that the invisible is right on 
the visible (without being reduced to it). On realising this curious coming together, 
Derrida proposes an "entire re-reading of the later Merleau-Ponty" (MB 52). As should 
be obvious, this re-reading is one that is closely aligned with his own purposes and it 
again reveals a proximity between the thoughts of Merleau-Ponty and Derrida, although a 
question or two remain to be asked about their respective conceptions of this invisibility. 
Indeed, Merleau-Ponty makes clear, at least in the main textual body of The 
Visible and the Invisible, that what he is not propounding is "an absolute invisible which 
would have nothing to do with the visible" (VI 151 ). This, however, is a position that 
Derrida does incline towards in Memoirs of the Blind. While Robert Vallier has sought to 
brush off the significance of this discrepancy by claiming, with some validity, that much 
ofMerleau-Ponty's "Working Notes" are closer to the Derridean conception of an 
absolute invisibility than his more finished text is152, I do not think that this actually 
accounts for the full extent of their differences. In fact, I would argue the reverse: where 
Deni.da begins to be preoccupied with an absolute invisibility ( and this is only 
occasionally the case) he abandons Merleau-Ponty's chiasmic conception of visibility and 
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invisibility that actually precludes the one ever being considered in isolation from the 
other. This is an important difference, for although Derrida only infrequently thematises 
this absolute invisibility that might have nothing whatsoever to do with visibility, the 
second half of this thesis will reveal an analogous problem in his conception of alterity. It 
will be argued that while Merleau-Ponty retains a chiasmic conception of alterity in 
which the other is always partially intertwined with the self, Derrida's ultimately 
emphasises the way in which the other eludes the grasp of any self-other dialectic. 
Such themes will be returned to, but for the moment Merleau-Ponty's conception 
of invisibility needs be interrogated in more depth. In this respect, it is interesting to 
recognise that Merleau-Ponty makes persistent references to the "punctum caecum" (VI 
24 7), which refers to a physiological blind spot on the retina that does not see itself but in 
fact makes seeing possible (although always also ambiguous and problematic). As he 
explains: 
What it [the punctum caecum] does not see, it does not see for reasons of a 
principle, it is because it is consciousness that it does not see. What it does not see 
is what in it prepares the vision of the next. .. What it does not see is what makes it 
see, is its tie to Being, is its corporeity, are the existentials by which the world 
becomes visible (my italics, VI 248). 
According to Merleau-Ponty, there is hence a constituting blindness that makes vision 
possible and this is what traditional dialectics fails to recognise. These radical elements of 
his work are not always appreciated by commentators 153 , but other than using terms like 
consciousness and Being, his position again appears to be closely related to Derrida's, 
notwithstanding the one important difference between them that has just been 
adumbrated - ie. that Derrida occasionally flirts with a more absolute and asymmetrical 
conception of invisibility. Merleau-Ponty' s suggestion that what consciousness "does not 
see, is that in it which prepares the vision of the next" is particularly enigmatic, and while 
his untimely death means that it is difficult to know in exactly what direction Merleau-
Ponty would have pursued this thought, it is worth recognising that this comment still 
maintains an embodied resonance. After all, he argues that "what it [consciousness] does 
not see, is its tie to Being, its corporeity", so what prepares for the vision of the next is 
152Vallier, R., p 201. 
153Martin Dillon pays the "Working Notes" less attention than many other commentators on Merleau-
Ponty 's work, and this is largely because they conflict with the somewhat less radical interpretation of 
Merleau-Ponty that he propounds. 
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our own corporeity. Moreover, we have already quoted Derrida suggesting that "the 
invisible is the body of the visible itself' (M 51 ), and such sentiments owe a lot to 
Merleau-Ponty and his more literal notion of the body which can only very ambiguously 
discern its relation to the world. Because the body is that which allows for any form of 
perspective at all, there can be no Archimedean vantage point from which one can 
overcome the constitutive blindness of our own irremediable subjectivity. As a point of 
view (the only point of view), the body is blind to itself to an important extent. 
For Merleau-Ponty, we cannot even see ourselves properly when confronting a 
mirror (PP 92), and this seems to be phenomenologically accurate. Gaining an 
apprehension of our own appearance is infinitely more difficult than apprehending 
another, and in this respect one can understand the philosophical efficacy of Antoine 
Roquentin's prolonged struggle to look at himself in Sartre's novel, Nausea. We can 
never really see ourselves, because the self is only by dehiscence, and in this respect it is 
worth acknowledging that Memoirs of the Blind is subtitled The Self-Portrait and Other 
Ruins. As the title suggests, to a large extent Derrida's text is focused on exhibiting the 
impossibility of a self-portrait that would adequately grasp its subject, as well as in 
revealing the difficulties inherent in any and every self-perception. 
Moreover, this ''punctum caecum", this constituting blindness, is also that which 
encourages Merleau-Ponty to "raise the question of the invisible life, the invisible 
community, the invisible other, the invisible culture ... ( and to) elaborate a 
phenomenology of the other world" (VI 229). As an encapsulation of his project for the 
uncompleted remainder of The Visible and the Invisible, this also seems to be an apt 
summary of Derrida 's own project. If this is not immediately apparent, it is worth 
recalling that what is proper to a culture, according to Derrida in "Signature, Event, 
Context", is "not to be identical to itself' (M 195). In other words, a culture must ensure 
that its identity is questionable, flexible, and recognise what else it might be and could 
yet be (ie. the invisible of that culture). 
Interrogating this type of invisibility was to be a major aspect ofMerleau-Ponty's 
unfinished project, and he argues that it is an important one: 
Precisely in order to know how it opens us to what is not ourselves. This does not 
even exclude the possibility that we may find in our experience a movement 
towards what could not, in any event, be present to us in the original, and whose 
irremediable absence would thus count among our originating experiences (VI 
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159). 
This movement he describes towards "what could not, in any event, be present to us in 
the original" is, as has been widely recognised, a thought that pre-empts some major 
aspects of Derrida's own thought, most obvious among these being the notion of the trace 
which, as David Wood suggests, is about a past that can never be fully reactivated and 
that was never entirely present154 • As with the Derridean notion of the trace, Merleau-
Ponty' s emphasis upon the possibility of this irremediable absence seems to be a 
deliberate attempt to circumvent the insistence upon presence that has dominated much of 
the philosophical tradition. More importantly for the purposes of this chapter, however, 
Merleau-Ponty also defines his later phenomenology as being focused upon the other of 
experience in order to open us to what is not ourselves. This stretches the boundaries of 
what can be conceived of as phenomenology. After all, what Merleau-Ponty seeks now is 
not merely to return to the phenomenon, but to return to the phenomenon in a way open 
to that which makes the phenomena itself possible and yet also problematic; the invisible 
and the ecart ( although these are not synonymous) that allows phenomenality to be 
possible at all. While debate on Merleau-Ponty's eventual relationship to phenomenology 
continues - according to the man himself, his later project was still within the purview of 
a broadly interpreted phenomenology- it suffices to establish that this is not 
diametrically opposed to Derrida's own tempestuous relationship with phenomenology. 
Indeed, Merleau-Ponty suggests that his later philosophy is based upon showing how 
communication with others goes beyond perception (EW 367-8) and deconstruction 
might be aptly described as a summons to the other that has abandoned the vocabulary of 
perception. Much remains to be considered in regard to their significantly different 
treatments of alterity, but it is worth pointing out that while deconstruction in some ways 
transcends phenomenology, in other respects it is also surreptitiously betrothed to it. 
Notwithstanding Derrida's repeated efforts to distance himself from this tradition, there 
are some important ways in which his thought is precariously poised at the margins of 
phenomenology, and more obviously philosophy, in a manner not entirely unlike the later 
writings of Merleau-Ponty. 
154Wood, D. , The Deconstruction of Time, p 271. 
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6. Habituality and Undecidability: A Comparison of Merleau-Ponty and Derrida on 
the Decision. 
While Merleau-Ponty and Derrida have both engaged in a critique of the dualistic and 
hierarchical tendencies of what has come to be called the philosophy of reflection, they 
have employed vastly different concepts, methodologies, and styles in criticising this 
relatively similar target 155 • This chapter will compare and contrast two of their most 
apparently disparate motifs: the embodied habituality that typifies Merleau-Ponty' s 
Phenomenology of Perception, and the 'undecidability' that is a major concern of 
Denida's later writings. To schematically introduce the problem, Merleau-Ponty 
emphasises the body-subject's tendency to seek an equilibrium with the world (by 
acquiring skills) and towards deciding in an embodied and habitual manner that 
minimises any confrontation with a decision-making aporia. On the other hand, Derrida 
frequently points towards a constitutive undecidability that is involved in all decision-
making. He insists that a decision, if it is to genuinely be a decision, must involve a leap 
beyond all prior preparations for it. One must ·always decide without any equilibrium or 
stability, and yet these are precisely the things that Merleau-Ponty claims that our body 
inclines us towards. The majority of this chapter will explore the significance of this 
dissension, and while it is not an either/or situation in which one philosopher is obviously 
right and the other wrong, it will be argued that many of Merleau-Ponty's insights do 
challenge aspects of Derrida's characterisation of the undecidability involved in decision-
making. Before entertaining any such conclusion, however, this skeletal outline needs to 
be filled in. 
The notion of undecidability is not explicitly thematised in Of Grammatology but 
it is a concept that depends upon the analysis contained therein. Undecidability, in its first 
and probably most famous instantiation, is one of Derrida's most important attempts to 
trouble dualisms, or more accurately, to reveal how they are always already troubled. An 
undecidable, and there are many of them in deconstruction ( eg. ghost, pharmakon, 
hymen, etc.) , is something that cannot conform to either polarity of a dichotomy (eg. 
present/ absent, cure/poison, and inside/ outside in the above examples). 
155Given Derrida's fascination with the ' philosophical ' significance of the ' stylistic' aspects of Nietzsche 's 
writing (and the way in which philosophical and stylistic concerns can never actually be neatly separated 
out as I have just attempted to do), this difference between Merleau-Ponty and Derrida can hardly be 
dismissed. 
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However, Derrida has a recurring tendency to resuscitate terms in new and 
different contexts (a kind of self-referential paleonymy), and the term undecidability also 
returns from the dead in later deconstruction. Indeed, to complicate matters, 
undecidability returns in two discernible forms. In his more recent work, Derrida often 
insists that the condition of the possibility of mourning, giving, forgiving, and hospitality, 
to cite some of his most famous examples, is at once also the condition of their 
impossibility. In his explorations of these "possible-impossible" aporias (which are 
examined at length in chapter ten) it becomes undecidable whether genuine giving, for 
example, is either a possible or an impossible ideal. 
More importantly for the purposes of this chapter, however, the various 
ruminations of Derrida's later philosophy are also united by his analysis of a similar type 
of undecidability that is involved in the concept of the decision itself, and it is this 
particular undecidable problematic that will be the focus of this comparison with 
Merleau-Ponty. In this respect, Derrida regularly suggests that a decision cannot be wise, 
or posed even more provocatively, that the instant of the decision must actually be mad 
(DP J 26, GD 65). Drawing on Kierkegaard, Derrida tells us that a decision requires an 
undecidable leap beyond all prior preparations for that decision (GD 77), and according 
to him, this applies to all decisions and not just those regarding the conversion to 
religious faith that preoccupies Kierkegaard. To pose the problem in inverse fashion, it 
might be suggested that for Derrida, all decisions are a faith and a tenuous faith at that, 
since were faith and the decision not tenuous, they would cease to be a faith or a decision 
at all ( cf. GD 80). This description of the decision as a moment of madness that must 
somehow move beyond rationality and calculative reasoning may seem paradoxical, but 
it might nevertheless be agreed that a decision requires a 'leap of faith ' beyond the sum 
total of the facts. Many of us are undoubtedly stifled by the inherent difficulty of 
decision-making, and this psychological fact aids and, for his detractors, also abets 
Derrida's discussion of the decision as it appears in otherwise distantly related texts, 
including The Gift of Death, Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice, Adieu to 
Emmanuel Levinas, and Politics of Friendship. 
In Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas, Derrida argues that a decision must always come 
back to the other, even if it is the other ' inside ' the subject, and he disputes that an 
initiative which remained purely and simply "mine" would still be a decision (AEL 23-
4 ). A theory of the subject is incapable of accounting for the slightest decision (PF 68-9), 
116 
because, as he rhetorically asks, "would we not be justified in seeing here the unfolding 
of an ego logical immanence, the autonomic and automatic deployment of predicates or 
possibilities proper to a subject, without the tearing rupture that should occur in every 
decision we call free?" (AEL 24). In other words, if a decision is envisaged as simply 
following from certain character attributes, then it would not genuinely be a decision, and 
Derrida is hence once more insisting upon the necessity of a leap beyond calculative 
reasoning, and beyond the resources of some self-contained subject reflecting upon the 
matter at hand. A decision must invoke alterity- that which is outside of the subject's 
control - and these Levinasian-inspired sentiments will be considered in greater detail as 
this chapter progresses. 
For the moment, however, it is worth pointing out that if a decision is yet another 
example of a concept that is simultaneously impossible within its own internal logic and 
yet nevertheless necessary, then not only is our reticence to decide rendered 
philosophically cogent, but it is even privileged. Indeed, Derrida's work has been 
described as a "philosophy of hesitation" 156 , and his most famous neologism, differance, 
explicitly emphasises deferring, with all of the procrastination that this term implies 157 • In 
his early essay "Violence and Metaphysics", Derrida also suggests that a successful 
deconstructive reading is conditional upon the suspension of choice; on hesitating - in a 
manner not dissimilar to the "agonised serenity" that Albert Camus describes in The 
Rebe/158 - between the ethical opening and the logocentric totality (WD 84). Even though 
Derrida has suggested that he is reluctant to use the term 'ethics' because of logocentric 
associations 159 , one is hence led to conclude that 'ethical' behaviour (for want of a better 
word) is a product of deferring, and of being forever open to possibilities rather than 
taking a definitive position. 
156Critchley, S. , The Ethics of Deconstruction, p 42. 
157As has been frequently discussed, differance is an attempt to conjoin differing and defening, and to 
make these temporal and spatial aspects inextricably intertwined. 
158Camus, A. , The Rebel, trans . Bower, Penguin Books, 1951 , p 266. In some important respects, Camus 
can be understood as exhibiting a certain post-structuralist relevance in this text, and arguably as also 
providing a more satisfactory position than many of his successors. In particular, Camus' advocation of 
rebellion rather than revolution, and of the state of mind that accompanies rebellion - an "agonised 
serenity" that is both an urgent, agonised demand for the moment, and simultaneously serene in such a way 
as to preclude this demand becoming a self-enclosed moment in which the revolution is enacted - seems to 
be closely related to the distinction that Derrida draws between the messianic and messianism. Like 
Derrida's conception of the messianic, Camus ' rebellion proceeds without a grand telos or intent that the 
messiah should arrive (which would be a messianism), but involves a perpetual openness towards the 
future , a rebellion that is not quite a revolution (which inevitably installs a concrete messiah and kills in 
'his' name). More needs to be said about this connection, but this will have to suffice for the present work. 
159Critchley, S. , p 12. 
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The problem of undecidability is hence apparent even before Derrida had 
explicitly thematised the term, and it is also evident in more recent texts including The 
Gift of Death. In this text, Derrida seems to support the sacrificing of a certain notion of 
ethics and universality for a conception of radical singularity not unlike that evinced by 
the "hyper-ethical" sacrifice that Abraham makes of his son upon Mt Moriah, according 
to both the Judaic and Christian religions alike (GD 71). To represent Derrida's position a 
little more precisely, true responsibility consists in vacillating between the demands of 
that which is wholly other (in Abraham's case, God, but also any particular other) and the 
more general demands of a community. Responsibility is enduring this trial of the 
undecidable decision, where attending to the call of a particular other will inevitably 
demand an estrangement from the "other others" and their communal needs. Whatever 
decision one may take, according to Derrida, it can never be wholly justified (GD 70), 
and it is hence not surprising that in The Gift of Death he reveals a certain kind of 
admiration for Abraham's persistent refusal to attempt to justify his pact with the wholly 
other, the tout autre. 
Of course, Derrida's emphasis upon the undecidability inherent in all decision-
making does not want to convey inactivity or a quietism of despair, and he has insisted 
that the madness of the decision also demands urgency and precipitation (DPJ 25-8). 
Nevertheless, what is undergone is described as the "trial of undecidability" (LI 210) and 
what is involved in enduring this trial would seem to be a relatively anguished being. In 
an interview with Richard Beardsworth, Derrida characterises the problem of 
undecidability as follows: 
However careful one is in the theoretical preparation of a decision, the instant of 
the decision, if there is to be a decision, must be heterogeneous to the 
accumulation of knowledge. Otherwise, there is no responsibility. In this sense 
not only must the person taking the decision not know everything ... the decision, 
if there is to be one, must advance towards a future which is not known, which 
cannot be anticipated 160 • 
This suggestion that the decision cannot anticipate the future is undoubtedly somewhat 
counter-intuitive. The capacity to decide at least appears to depend upon anticipation 
(through our embodied situation and previous experiences), even if it is true that the 
160Beardsworth, R. , "Nietzsche and the Machine: Interview with Jacques Derrida" in Journal of Nietzsche 
Studies , Issue 7, Spring 1994, p 37-8. 
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results that are anticipated are unlikely to be forthcoming. While such sentiments will be 
pursued in greater depth as this chapter progresses, Derrida' s rejection of anticipation is 
not only a rejection of the traditional idea of deciding on the basis of weighing-up and 
internally representing certain options. By suggesting that anticipation is not possible, he 
means to make the more general point that no matter how we may anticipate, any 
decision must always rupture those anticipatory frameworks , even if those frameworks 
are simply the habitual structures that inform our corporeal comportment towards the 
world. 
Derrida's main intention is hence to insist once more that a decision must be 
fundamentally different from any prior preparations for it. He would also argue that this 
need not entail asserting that the relationship between a decision, and the experience or 
knowledge that has situated that decision, can separate into precisely delineated realms in 
which ' facticity' has no conversation with our transcendent capacity to freely decide. 
Deconstruction is not a revised version of Sartre's governing duality in which Being-for-
itself asserts authority over Being-in-itself. On the contrary, no ontological distinction 
between a decision and what is actually external to that decision could ever legitimately 
be made by deconstruction, much less the according of one term of the duality a priority 
over the other. Does existence precede essence? "How can one tell?" would be Derrida's 
first and most important response to such a question, although a further question will be 
whether his analysis nevertheless presupposes a neat and discrete distinction between 
what prepares for a decision and the decision itself, even if exactly what this distinction is 
can never be specified. 
Defe1Ting such a question, Derrida's conception of the decision is fundamentally 
different from that of Sartre in at least one important respect. His enigmatic assertion that 
the decision must invoke alterity has already been cited, but in Politics of Friendship , he 
again suggests that the decision must "surprise the very subjectivity of the subject" (PF 
68). In expanding upon this suggestion, he argues that far from returning us to any 
sovereign conception of free-will , what needs to be considered is the fundamentally 
"passive" aspect of a decision that is always made for the other (PF 69). He eventually 
concludes: "in sum, the decision is unconscious - insane as that may seem, it involves the 
unconscious but is nevertheless responsible" (PF 69). Derrida is hence clearly not 
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returning us to a Sartrean paradigm of the activity and projects of the for-itsel f 61• On the 
contrary, the reason that the decision cannot be anticipated is because it is always 
partially unconscious (a formulation Sartre would not accept), and this suggests that our 
conscious reflections must always be abandoned for the realm of madness in deciding. 
Moreover, it is in making this leap away from calculative reasoning that Derrida argues 
that responsibility consists (PF 69). However, despite this emphasis, he does not want to 
accept an account of decision-making that can be influenced by our habitual and pre-
reflexive comportment towards the world (which would seem to be closely related to the 
unconscious life), and this undecidability that he discerns is envisaged as permeating 
basically all aspects of our existence (GD 24). 
At a certain level, it is difficult to argue with this emphasis upon the aporia that 
necessarily surrounds all decision-making. Like his focus upon the iterability of language 
in texts like Limited Inc., Derrida's analysis of the decision focuses upon the way in 
which no one particular decision can be envisaged as necessary, and it also implies that 
every situation that can be encountered is different and even unique. A decision cannot 
rely upon previous explorations, or any form of knowledge, and this ensures that every 
action must endure this later version of undecidability, particularly that which seeks to be 
just or morally approbatious. 
Now, the philosophy of Merleau-Ponty might not seem to be overly relevant to 
such philosophical terrain. It is sometimes even claimed that he ignores the decision, and 
hence ignores the aporias that it may introduce 162 • Elsewhere such a position has been 
refuted (see chapter two), but it cannot be denied that decision-making is rarely his 
explicit focus. In his favour, it can be pointed out that he has repeatedly expressed 
discontent with the conceptions of authenticity evident in philosophers like Heidegger 
and Sartre. According to Merleau-Ponty, they over-emphasise an individualistic decision-
making paradigm in which authentic projects can be freely chosen. Such considerations 
will not be the main focus of this chapter, however, which will instead examine several 
important implications that his account of embodiment has for decision-making, and for 
the aporia that Derrida associates with it. 
Merleau-Ponty's fundamental suggestion in this regard, is that "whether a system 
161At least in this minimal respect, I hence disagree with Christina Howells who argues that Sartre 's and 
Denida 's respective conceptions of subjectivity are much closer than is commonly presumed. See Howells, 
C., Derrida: From Phenomenology to Ethics, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999, p 135. 
162Barral, M., Merleau-Ponty: The Role of the Body-Subject in Interpersonal Relations, p 115. 
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of motor or perceptual powers, our body is not an object for an ' I think ', it is a group of 
lived-through meanings which moves towards its equilibrium" (PP 153). This somewhat 
innocuous looking statement might not appear to challenge Derrida's conception of the 
undecidability that is inherent in all decision-making, but I think that when imbued with 
further details this is precisely what it can accomplish. Merleau-Ponty describes the 
body-subject as perpetually seeking to cultivate certain behavioural structures in order to 
minimise confrontations, aporias, and the like. More specifically, he argues that we 
develop habitual modes of interacting, and of deciding, in an attempt to attain this 
equilibrium and stability. 
This search for an equilibrium cannot simply be conflated with the sedimentation 
of meaning, or with a nostalgic desire for immanence. According to Merleau-Ponty, our 
embodied need to attain an equilibrium within our environment often means that 
decisions are made on the basis of what he calls an "intentional arc", which subtends the 
life of an individual consciousness and "projects round about us our past, our future, our 
human setting, our physical, ideological and moral situation" (PP 136). He hence 
acknowledges a necessary rupture of sedimented meanings ( and to some extent, the 
decision correlatively involves a leap beyond immanent subjectivity), but this does not 
also necessitate a rupture of our embodied and habitual comportment towards the world, 
which he describes in far more positive terms than as a simple sedimentation. 
Indeed, Merleau-Ponty often synonymously exchanges the term 'habit' for skilful 
action ( cf. PP 143). He also tells us that in habitual activity the body "understands" (PP 
144 ), and the intentional arc that he describes is supposed to embody the interconnection 
of skilful action (ie. habit) and perception (PP 136). This will become clearer as this 
chapter progresses, but this embodied habituality that he depicts is certainly not a mere 
mechanistic propensity to decide in a certain way. Rather, it is an insistence that, to a 
large extent, we decide through our bodies, and that our bodies inevitably move towards 
an equilibrium with the world in which they partake. 
Before exploring Merleau-Ponty's conception of this embodied habituality any 
further, however, it is worth observing that something not entirely unrelated to Derridean 
undecidability does ensue in his philosophy. It has repeatedly been suggested that his 
philosophy, like Simone de Beauvoir' s, is one typified by ambiguity. Merleau-Ponty tells 
us that ambiguity must pervade our embodied situation because reflection can neither 
recuperate everything, nor return us to pre-reflective experience and the perceptual faith 
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(VI 35, 99 cf. PP 208, 345). Ambiguity is a condition of being a perspective on the world 
and yet being blind to that perspective, and this problem is compounded by the 
paradoxical status of the body-subject, which being an amalgam of both subject and 
object ensures that it is always ambiguous whether a decision, or a perception, can be 
traced back to the subject or to the world. 
Generally, however, this notion of ambiguity is taken to be importantly distinct 
from what Derrida conveys through his concept of undecidability. According to one 
critic, "Merleau-Ponty's ambiguity supposes relative continuity, whereas undecidability 
supposes the relative discontinuity" 163 • Similarly, when speaking of the way the trace is 
simultaneously both present and absent ( or equally accurately, is neither present nor 
absent) in Of Grammatology, Derrida argues that "one should not call this ambiguity, but 
rather its play (for the word ambiguity requires the logic of presence even where it begins 
to disobey that logic)" (OG 71). While this opposition between the concepts of ambiguity 
and undecidability seems somewhat exaggerated, Merleau-Ponty's philosophy does 
downplay the significance of something like the deconstructive emphasis upon the 
undecidability involved in the decision. 
If undecidability is well described as a compulsion to act, as both John Caputo 
and Derrida at times imply164, it is a compulsion to act precisely without any equilibrium 
or stability and yet these are the very things that Merleau-Ponty argues that our body 
moves us towards, even, and most importantly, in inaugurating a decision. To 
recapitulate, Merleau-Ponty argues that on mastering a certain technique and on acquiring 
embodied skills, ce1iain scenarios begin to solicit our responses in a way that inclines us 
towards an equilibrium and to a situation that appears to involve decision-making 
processes without the type of aporia that Derrida associates with them. Much remains to 
be considered in this respect, but it should be apparent that this chapter will ask Derrida 
certain questions that are not commonly directed at him, and these will be about 
embodiment, habituality, and the effects they may have on the aporia that he discerns. 
It is worth repeating that Merleau-Ponty' s descriptions of habitual activity are not 
intended to be construed in an essentialist manner which deprives experience of its 
openness and fundamental ambiguity by insisting that humanity is behaviouristically 
determined. Rather, they are an attempt to affirm that it is our embodied situation that 
163Lawlor, L. , "Eliminating Some Confusion", p 82. 
1641 have previously cited a quote from Derrida, and also see Caputo, J. , The Prayers and Tears of Jacques 
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predisposes us towards a certain course of action, and that it is in relation to our previous 
bodily experiences that we anticipate the best possible mode of action in a flexible and 
constantly evolving way. The significant point to extract from this is that the body-
subject inevitably seeks to minimise aporias, confrontations, and anything that might 
disrupt its "intentional arc" towards the world (PP 136, 153, 250). Of course, this can 
never be accomplished completely, and there is no possible union between the body-
subject and the world (VI 147-8), but there is a connection, and it is such that it allows us 
to slowly approximate towards what Wittgenstein refers to as a mastery of a technique165 • 
This applies both in regard to the world at large, and more obviously in relation to those 
activities that we are most consistently immersed in. 
While Derrida has been critical of the phenomenological emphasis upon 
immediacy since his first published book on Husserl, it is not obvious that his criticisms 
of phenomenology generally, and of Husserl and Heidegger in particular, should 
unequivocally also involve a denunciation of the type of divided immediacy (based in 
repetition) about which Merleau-Ponty speaks. For Merleau-Ponty, the habitual action is 
not based merely in a temporality of the present, and yet nor is it restricted only to the 
past. The 'presence' of habituality is built upon our past-learned skill that is still in play, 
and which, nevertheless, must also open us to slightly different and unanticipated 
scenarios. So even the mode of existence in which we unthinkingly react partakes in a 
previous existence that has engendered certain results. This is what allows us to anticipate 
eventual outcomes, and yet it also necessitates precipitation and the hastening of a 
coming event, and these two aspects mutually encroach such that we condition and alter 
the world, just as the world also conditions and produces us (PP 403). 
The apparent 'presence' involved in behaving habitually is hence always 
internally divergent, requiring both anticipative and precipitative elements which never 
resolve themselves into any absolute stability that might be denigrated as conforming to 
the metaphysics of presence. Merleau-Ponty suggests that what "enables us to center our 
existence is also what prevents us from centering it completely" (PP 85), and in habitual 
activity the identity of the body is therefore both achieved and deferred. Were habitual 
action entirely present-to-itself and without this divergence (ecart) that Merleau-Ponty 
Derrida, p 225 & 334. 
165Wittgenstein, L. , Philosophical Investigations, Sections 150, 208-9. 
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theorises 166 , then the body- somewhat like a robot incapable of deviating from its 
originary programming- would not have the capacity to adjust to different 
circumstances, to learn167, or even to conceive of alterity at all, let alone to reabsorb it into 
an embodied equilibrium. Merleau-Ponty's conception of habituality is hence not 
opposed to change. In fact, to maintain an equilibrium within an environment that is 
changing, the body must change - to stay the same would be to induce instability in a 
rapidly multiplying world. So there is a strange, although somewhat Taoist logic here, in 
which something apparently unstable (change) is in fact the only original and stable 
'nature' of which we can speak168 • 
On a simple level, any one of us can bear witness to a multitude of habitual 
imperatives that have become ingrained in the background of our consciousness and very 
rarely considered. This must be partly why the notion of the unconscious and its power of 
explanation has so much allure. Without intending to subsume the unconscious under the 
umbrella of what Merleau-Ponty has referred to as 'habituality', it is important to 
recognise that, as Martin Dillon has put it, one of "the great truths of transcendental 
thought is that habitual forms are deeply sedimented in both cultures and individuals, that 
the a priori nature of these habits increases with degree of latency (ie. their potency to 
structure our lives is proportional to their taken-for-grantedness)"169 • This would seem 
difficult to deny, but the point is not so much to simplistically denigrate these habitual 
modes of interaction, but to affirm that the tendency to form habits is an important aspect 
of human existence that enables us to deal with our world in a manner which need not be 
considered ignorant or non-reflective, but nevertheless does not involve the deliberate, 
calculative reflection that is commonly associated with thought. While Hegel exalted 
166While I am referring to the ontology of The Visible and the Invisible, which explicitly thematises the 
notion of an ecart, or divergence, such a characterisation is also valid when applied to Phenomenology of 
Perception, where a similar ontology is often implied and presupposed. In this respect, I am sympathetic 
with Martin Dillon's characterisation of the differences between the early and late Merleau-Ponty, even if 
Dillon occasionally forces material into his account and ignores the more radical aspects of The Visible and 
the Invisible 's "Working Notes" (see Dillon, M. , Merleau-Ponty 's Ontology, Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1988). This account can be contrasted with that of Gary Madison, who posits a greater 
disparity between Merleau-Ponty's early and late work. See Madison, G. , The Phenomenology of Merleau-
Ponty: A Search for the Limits of Consciousness, Athens: Ohio University Press, 1981. 
1670ne of the major thematic concerns of Phenomenology of Perception, is an attempt to redress what 
Merleau-Ponty considers to be the philosophical tradition's inability to account for learning (PP 28). 
168This alludes to the fallacy of metaphysical calls to 'the natural', when 'the natural' is taken to be 
synonymous with the original. Nature, were such a thing capable of existing, would be precisely that 
transience and flexibility which induces change, and which is inevitably opposed to the politically 
insidious suggestion that there is one original and unchanging way of being in the world that might be 
characterised as 'the natural'. 
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habit for reducing one 's sense of corporeity 170, Merleau-Ponty does so for diametrically 
opposed reasons. For him, the phenomenon of habituality reveals an intelligence to the 
body (PP 144 ), and his fundamental suggestion would seem to be that the body that 
learns and can be trained, is a body that bears thought and the mind within it, and hence 
defies the dualism. 
The body-subject's capacity to acclimatise to its environment even enables it to 
physically change size, shape, colour, etc. , in order to deal better with the conditions it 
confronts. Without considering the implications of this adapting 'physiology' at any 
length, it is worth briefly recognising that while the new movements involved in the first 
few times we swing a golf club, lift weights, etc., may initially prove to be difficult and 
will undoubtedly cause us some pain in the ensuing days afterwards, our body and 
muscles do gradually adjust. After a few months of regular gym activity, not only is the 
process of actually lifting the weights usually relatively easy (and always different from 
that initial voyage into the world of lactic acid!), but any pain the following day is also 
minimal and sometimes even non-existent. Perhaps this expertise of our bodies in 
accommodating us to the peculiarities of our environment also pertains to something not 
so strictly physiological, in that our decision-making processes also have this habitual 
component. To present the disparity between these two thinkers somewhat schematically, 
for Derrida the difference between preparing for a decision and actually deciding can 
never be effaced, but according to Merleau-Ponty' s account, even the undecidability of 
decision-making can be gradually reabsorbed by the body so as to engender a minimum 
of fuss. 
The suggestion being proposed is that the mode of being associated with a trained 
individual - and being trained is a state that the body-subject inevitably tends towards, 
for Merleau-Ponty - is such that it renders the undecidability involved in decision-
making an increasingly rare state, or at least compels us to treat the aporia in an 
importantly different way. In order to justify this claim, it is worth considering Hubert 
and Stuart Dreyfus ' empirical studies regarding the way the body learns. In an essay 
entitled "The Challenge of Merleau-Ponty' s Phenomenology of Embodiment for 
Cognitive Science", they explore this phenomenology of skill acquisition and agree that 
169Dillon, M. , "Introduction" in Ecart and Differance, p 11. 
170Hegel, G. , Enzykclopadie der philosophiscen Wissenschaften, Part III, Werke In Zwanzig Banden, Vol. 
10, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1970, p 186-9, as cited in Gasche, R. , Inventions of Difference, p 172. 
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the fundamental concern of the body-subject is to attain this equilibrium in the world 171 • 
More importantly, however, their analysis also demarcates and considers the various 
states of our trained body, from beginner, to competent, to proficient, to master. What 
they make clear is that the master chess player, or expert car driver, through both talent 
and prolonged practice in an embodied context, becomes able to respond to situations 
without the intervention of thought, at least as it is traditionally conceived. 
In one study, Dreyfus and Dreyfus establish that a master chess player can easily 
beat an exceptionally good chess player, even if they respond to their opponent's every 
move in less than five seconds and while they are also simultaneously counting or doing 
something else which preoccupies their cognitive capacity172 • The degree to which the 
master player's ability is lessened is scarcely discernible, suggesting that their various 
moves are predominantly habitual reactions to certain configurations on the chess board, 
with conscious reflection and detailed cognitive preparations not necessarily a major 
aspect of what is involved in deciding, even in those types of activities which seem to 
require the most extensive and sustained 'thinking'. In Merleau-Ponty's vocabulary, the 
master chess player accords a priority to the "I can" rather than the "I think" (PP 13 7), 
and they need not rigorously attempt to ascertain the consequences of what a certain 
move might be, or be absorbed by thoughts like "should I place my knight here or there, 
use my knight or my bishop for this particular move?". While this type of thought is 
undoubtedly sometimes also involved, according to Hubert and Stuart Dreyfus it is a far 
more common experience for the beginner, and even more so for the competent, who are 
both confounded by the enormity of possibilities 173 • 
It would seem that both the beginner and the competent chess player experience 
something like an existential awareness of Derridean undecidability. They are tacitly 
aware that the rules they have been taught regarding chess are too numerous and 
necessarily ambiguous to help them decide on a move, and yet they try to restrict their 
decisions to these guidelines and to the prescriptions of the latest guide for chess players. 
Derrida is undoubtedly correct in pointing out that this type of preparation is never 
enough to ensure that one particular decision must eventuate, and that a decision must 
hence always move beyond any calculative reasoning that precedes it (GD 77). However, 
171Dreyfus, H. , & Dreyfus, S. , "The Challenge of Merleau-Ponty 's Phenomenology of Embodiment for 
Cognitive Science", p 103-4. 
172Dreyfus, H. , & Dreyfus, S. , p 109- 10. 
173Dreyfus, H. , & Dreyfus, S. , p 105-8. 
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in Dreyfus ' example, the continuing high standard of play that is attained to by the master 
chess player, despite the fact that they can no longer prepare for the numerous decisions 
that they will make, suggests that there are situations where the distinction between 
preparing for a decision and actually deciding might not be applicable. The body inclines 
us towards an expertise of those environments in which we consistently partake, and if 
this habitual comportment towards the world is suitably refined it seems to be capable of 
effacing ( or at least altering) the aporetic cliff erence between that which prepares for a 
decision and the instantiation of the decision itself. In Phenomenology of Perception, 
Merleau-Ponty suggests that: 
It is the body which 'understands ' in the acquisition of habit. This way of putting 
it will appear absurd, if understanding is subsuming a sense datum under an idea, 
and if the body is an object. But the phenomenon of habit is just what prompts us 
to revise our notion of 'understand' and our notion of the body. To understand is 
to experience harmony between what we aim at and what is given, between the 
intention and the performance - and the body is our anchorage in the world (PP 
144). 
If the phenomenon of habit is to truly revise our notion of understanding and our notion 
of the body, as Merleau-Ponty argues it should, to a large extent that revision would 
involve acknowledging that habit is a flexible skill, a power of action and reaction174 that 
cannot be considered to be irrelevant to decision-making, which is never accomplished 
by some ephemeral mind, but always in an embodied situation. Even if one wants to 
avoid Merleau-Ponty's suggestion that habituality can allow of a harmony between 
intention and performance in decision-making, the expert would seem to be closer to 
attaining this harmony than the beginner. While Derrida would undoubtedly love to 
problematise this distinction between expertise and its lack, the claim being proposed is 
that the aporia on which undecidability relies is alleviated by an increased inherence in 
our embodied context - ie. by mastering a technique. Sooner rather than later, the vast 
a1ray of possibilities (in chess, as in life) becomes absorbed into our embodied motility, 
and even if our route is blocked, or a physical change forces us to re-evaluate ( the tool is 
broken for Heidegger), adjustment is generally possible. According to Hubert and Stuart 
Dreyfus' studies regarding the way the body learns, it would also seem that for somebody 
well-trained in their particular area of expertise this adjustment becomes easier all the 
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time, and literally alters the breadth of the aporia between the preparation for a decision 
and the undecidable decision which must leap beyond this calculation. Can an aporia 
constrict? For the moment, it can only be repeated that it does appear that what is 
involved in the decision-making processes of the highly skilled, as compared to the 
beginner, is importantly different. 
It is also not simply endeavours like chess that involve this difference between the 
ways in which an expert of a particular activity might decide, as compared to the efforts 
of somebody who is not quite so skilful. This gradual refinement of our capacity to make 
choices applies to all skilful coping with our environment, including the lecturer who has 
plied their particular trade for years. Even if the previous year's material is not literally 
regurgitated, the full spectrum of possible contingencies is approached in an importantly 
different way by an individual with an increased association in the language-game of 
being an academic. While this example may seem to have somewhat negative 
connotations, suggesting that habituality is a stagnation, this is not necessarily the case. 
Soon our lives form patterns, but this does not have to be in a way that ossifies or 
precludes adaptability. Indeed, it seems coherent to argue that as the lecturer increases in 
skill, the need to intellectually and consciously reflect upon what might be the best way 
to teach a particular course, or the most productive way to advise a particular PhD student 
on how to proceed, is inversely lessened. On mastering a technique, an individual can 
become accustomed to a situation in such a way that they 'understand ' how best to 
decide, and without the need for this understanding to be accompanied by any prior 
mental representation, or consciously determined goal 
Moreover, these type of phenomena, which blur the boundaries between action 
and decision-making, also trouble the logic of Derridean undecidability which depends 
upon a difference, albeit an unthematisable one, between what precedes a decision and 
the decision itself. As an individual gets better at a particular endeavour, and as their 
corporeal comportment towards the world becomes more sophisticated, these embodied 
"solicitations to act" 175 become more and more extensive, and also seem to play an 
increasingly important role in skilled decision-making (cf. PP 440). For example, both 
174Crossley, N. , Th e Politics of Subjectivity, p 12 . 
175This is Hubert and Stuart Dreyfus ' expression for the way in which people with expertise in a particular 
field of endeavour often find themselves solicited towards action in increasingly spec ific ways, and this 
embodied adjustment to their environment is something that the beginner simply does not have access to . 
See Dreyfus, H ., & Dreyfus, S. , p 104. 
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the expert chess player and the lecturer have become acquainted with their situation in 
such a way that their decisions can be made without any obvious preparations and yet 
these often remain best described as skilful and intelligent decisions. What does it mean 
for the notion of undecidability if a trained body develops these increasingly specific 
solicitations to act, which have the capacity to reduce the difference between a decision 
and what precedes that decision? It would seem that the structure of undecidability is 
slightly altered, and while something like what Derrida characterises as undecidability is 
certainly sometimes involved, it may be more akin to a beheading than a "trial" if we are 
to take Derrida's criminal justice system motif seriously (LI 210). In other words, for 
Merleau-Ponty, our embodied context inclines us to leap through the aporia of 
undecidability immediately, and equally significantly, this decision, in its very 
instantiation, also refines our capacity to so decide given future occurrences of a similar 
environment. 
At least on the most obvious level, Derrida might not deny this. Deconstruction is 
"not merely an invitation to wild and private lucubrations" 176 and it does not rule out the 
possibility of a certain marching order. Indeed, iterability refers to this very repetition and 
is a fundamental cornerstone of Deni.da' s philosophy. However, for Derrida, iterability is 
premised upon alterity and he has famously illustrated that every sign is necessarily 
altered in being used. According to him, it is difference that allows for the possibility of 
repetition, and it can hence be speculated that Derrida would seek to deconstruct this idea 
of habitual decision-making by revealing that the repetition of a certain way of deciding 
is only possible if there is something to distinguish it from that past decision that it seeks 
to repeat. Moreover, Derrida would also argue that we can never repeat a mode of 
behaviour self-identically, because the environment in which we are seeking to enact it in 
( either linguistically or existentially) is always different. Perhaps Derrida's discussion of 
undecidability could be used to deconstruct the idea that the body seeks its own 
equilibrium, and to suggest that talk of an embodied equilibrium is merely an essentialist 
remnant of the metaphysics of presence. In regard to this possible deconstruction of 
Merleau-Ponty, it seems to me, for the reasons that have been addressed earlier in this 
chapter (habituality requires an internal divergence between anticipative and precipitive 
elements), that his conception of an embodied habituality does not succumb to the 
metaphysics of presence in any obvious way. For the moment, however, let us restrict our 
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analysis to Derrida on the issue of habituality, and to one intriguing paragraph from Of 
Grammatology. In it, he argues that: 
Auto-affection, - subjectivity- gains in power and its mastery of the other to the 
extent that its power of repetition idealises itself. Here idealisation is the 
movement by which sensory exteriority, that which affects me or serves me as a 
signifier, submits itself to my power of repetition, to what thenceforward appears 
to me as my spontaneity and escapes me less and less (my italics, OG 165-66). 
Auto-affection is hence seen as inducing what appears to us as spontaneous and habitual 
responses to a situation, and Derrida implies that rather than there being any pure 
spontaneity before the simulacrum is introduced ( or the masturbatory experience for 
Rousseau), spontaneity is essentially an illusion. After all, as Derrida has suggested in Of 
Grammatology, auto-affection "constitutes the same (auto) as it divides the same" (OG 
166), so that as soon as one presumes that the object or the signifier is escaping them less 
and less - for example, mastering the decision-making involved in a game of chess - it is, 
with equal insistence, also always moving away. Habit then, and the breaking down of 
the difference between the preparation for the decision and the decision itself, would be 
seen as engendering a difference precisely at the same time as it purported to be rid of it. 
However, it is worth pointing out that habit, at least for Merleau-Ponty and Dreyfus, is 
not only about the world submitting to our "idealisations" and "powers of repetition", as 
Derrida characterises spontaneity in the above paragraph. Rather than being auto-
affective and an -idealistic projection of one's self upon these externalities, habituality 
would also seem to be the reverse - a strange type of complicity with the "outside" being 
internalised. 
This is difficult territory, but it should be acknowledged that there is little doubt 
that Derrida is partly correct in suggesting that alterity must always be betrothed to any 
habitual understanding. If it were not, the whole project of attempting to understand 
another would be a meaningless one. This also applies to our habitual interactions with 
the objects of our world, since they too have their particular significance largely on 
account of our relations with the other and the society that we inhabit. The experience of 
undecidability is hence an important component of our humanity. We need to be 
confronted by the enormity of possible scenarios, and by the impossibility of laying claim 
to any mode of conduct having its own irrefutable logic. However, by ignoring some 
176Gasche, R., Inventions of Difference, p 123 . 
130 
important aspects of what seems to be involved in decision-making, Derrida ensures that 
the 'presence' of this undecidability is rather overwhelming, and it is my contention that 
the paradoxes of undecidability should be characterised in a slightly different manner 
from how he usually describes them. More specifically, his descriptions of undecidability 
should acknowledge some form of interdependence with the way that our bodies tend 
towards an equilibrium with their environment (through skilful habit), and also towards 
recuperating the aporetic difference between a decision and what prepares for that 
decision. Derrida would certainly object to such a suggestion, but as well as having the 
advantage of being able to accommodate the important differences that exist between the 
decision-making processes of an expert and those not so fortunate, such a recognition 
also promises to avoid the alleged inability of deconstruction to thematise the political. 
The claim is sometimes made that deconstruction's unrelenting emphasis upon 
undecidability ensures that a discussion of the decision itself ( and hence politics) is 
rendered impossible 177 • Without being able to digress unduly in this regard, these claims 
have some credibility. Deconstruction is not apolitical, and it cannot but intervene in 
contexts as Derrida has suggested (PO 93),'but if we are to take his emphasis upon the 
undecidability of decision-making seriously, it almost becomes a transcendental 
condition for the possibility of decision-making, rather than a discussion of how various 
decisions can and do take place. An understanding of the importance of our embodied 
and habitual comportment towards the world would provide the tools for moving beyond 
a mere recognition of such an aporia, and towards acknowledging that because lea1ning 
takes place through our bodies, it can affect the very constitution of the decision-making 
aporia (that is, how large the gap between preparing for a decision and actually deciding 
might be). Our capacity to thereby make decisions can also be equally constrained or 
enhanced depending upon the political situation in which one exists, and how it facilitates 
this embodied acquisition of skills, and hence alters our apprehension (whether that be 
tacit or otherwise) of the decision-making aporia178 • 
It seems clear that the overall emphasis accorded to this experience of 
177Critchley, S., p 199-200, 236. For an interpretation that disagrees with Critchley's account and argues 
for the political relevance of Derrida's use of undecidability, see Patrick, M. , Derrida, Responsibility and 
Politics, p 140-8. 
178In this respect, Merleau-Ponty is not diametrically opposed to the work of Foucault, who also discusses 
how the body learns and retains the various meanings of the culture in which it partakes. For an 
understanding of some of the similarities between these theorists, see Crossley, N. , The Politics of 
Subjectivity. 
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undecidability is in a considerable opposition, and that there is a significant disagreement 
between these two philosophers regarding human experience. Is Merleau-Ponty 
advocating a philosophy of the visceral, whereas Derrida's position inclines towards a 
philosophy of the cerebral? Derrida's various discussions of undecidability are 
completely against some rationalistic, decision-making paradigm that emphasises the 
accumulation of knowledge (block upon block). That said, and without entertaining the 
semiological reductionist interpretation, Derrida's characterisations of the decision do 
allow only minimal recourse to the way in which both understanding and deciding 
inevitably have an embodied context. Postulating that there will always be a leap beyond 
our bodies in deciding, Derrida never considers the possibility that our embodied 
predisposition towards acquiring skills can cause the aporia that he discerns - between 
the preparation for a decision and its instantiation - to at least partly coalesce. Not least 
for reasons of political efficacy179 , it seems to me that deconstruction should be careful to 
consider the body, that most familiar and yet problematically discussed terrain of all. 
179Moreover, chapter ten will argue that Derrida's reticence to consider the embodied significance of 
decision-making also ensures that his later philosophy harbour_s a nostalgia for s_omethin~ tanta~oun~ to a 
self-other dualism. In opposition to this, Merleau-Ponty's detailed account of this embodied hab1tuahty 
endows the other with more than merely a messianic promise, and helps us to understand the complicated 
ways in which the other that eludes us, is nevertheless already there, intertwined in our shared experience 
of the world. 
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PART 2: THE OTHER 
7. Solipsism and the Master-Slave Dialectic: An Onto-Ethical Dissonance Between 
Sartre and Merleau-Ponty 
Somewhat notoriously, the phenomenological tradition has been accused of being unable 
to deal with the problem of the other. This will be partially demonstrated in this chapter's 
consideration of Sartre's prolonged struggles with the issue, but for the moment it 
suffices to present the general problem. Phenomenology speaks of horizons and 
immanence, and consistently suggests that the perceived object cannot be foreign to those 
who perceive. On account of this, there is also a related tendency to assimilate objects to 
the terms of reference of the perceiver, and the phenomenological treatment of the other 
hence inclines, at least potentially, towards solipsistic positions and the denial of the 
alterity or the transcendence of the other. At the very least, the question of the other 
seems to be a difficult one for phenomenology. 
For Husserl, the question was posed thus: "How can my ego, within his peculiar 
ownness, constitute under the name 'experience of something other', precisely something 
other?" 180• 
Merleau-Ponty recognises the problem in a similar fashion: "The spectacle begins 
to furnish itself a spectator who is not I, but who is reproduced from me. How is it 
possible? How can I see something that begins to see?" (PW 135). 
Unsurp1isingly, however, Merleau-Ponty envisages his notion of the body-
subj ect, as it is expressed in Phenomenology of Perception, as contributing towards the 
dissolution of this problem. As has been previously suggested, he argues that the 
experience of the body is opposed to the intellectual reflection that disengages the object 
from the subject, thus giving us merely the thought of the body, or the body in idea, 
rather than in its experiential reality. This conception of the body-subject also has some 
significant consequences for the problem of the other, the apparent insolubility of which 
has long been an outrage for our rationalist tradition. Indeed, it will be argued that not 
only does Merleau-Ponty's dissolution of the mind/body problem avoid the solipsistic 
tendencies that have befallen much of the Western philosophical tradition (and arguably 
phenomenology in particular), but it also provides the foundation for a conception of 
180Husserl, E., Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology, trans. Cairns, The Hague: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1960, p 94. 
other people that refutes the ontology involved in the master-slave dialectic, and more 
particularly, in Sartre's famous adaptation of it. 
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Merleau-Ponty's emphasis upon our pre-reflective and embodied subjectivity 
becomes significant because of the embodied intersubjectivity that it entails. For him, 
"transcendental subjectivity is a revealed subjectivity, revealed to itself and to others, and 
is for that reason an intersubjectivity" (PP 361). This should not surprise us unduly, since 
he maintains, along with Sartre, that ontology can never be divorced from ethical 
considerations. While this ethical aspect of Merleau-Ponty' s thought is not always 
immediately obvious (indeed, he is sometimes accused of lacking it), this chapter, as well 
as the following one, will help to clarify his enduring ethical relevance. To present this 
correlation between the ontological and the ethical schematically, Merleau-Ponty's 
fundamental suggestion that "I am my body" means that just as I must be the exterior that 
I present to others, so too must the body of the other be the other themselves in a 
meaningful sense (PP xii). While we have already seen that relationships with the other 
are phenomenologically given because intersubjectivity is involved in, and presupposed 
by our every perception, Merleau-Ponty makes the further point that precisely because I 
can see and be seen by the other, "this instrument of expression which is called 
physiognomy can be bearer of existence" (PP 404). The identification of subjectivity with 
our embodied engagement in the world allows us to find the other in their visible 
behaviour. 
These simple suggestions may, at first sight, seem more reductive than 
clarificatory in explaining the nuances of human behaviour, but Merleau-Ponty manages 
to make such a position eminently persuasive. If we are spontaneously at one with the 
movements of our bodies, then so too is the other. According to one of Merleau-Ponty' s 
examples, my friend's consent or refusal of a request for them to move nearer is 
immediately understood through bodily interaction. Moreover, as Merleau-Ponty goes on 
to suggest, this does not involve a perception, followed by an interpretation, and then a 
behavioural response. Rather: 
Both form a system which varies as a whole. If, for example, realising that I am 
not going to be obeyed, I vary my gesture, we have here, not two acts of 
consciousness. What happens is that I see my partner' s unwillingness, and my 
gesture of impatience emerges from this situation without any intervening thought 
(PP 111). 
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Just as I am my body, so too is the other his or her body, and there is no need for access 
to some abstract realm of private, mental intention. In his "Preface" to Phenomenology of 
Perception, Merleau-Ponty makes explicit that "there is nothing hidden behind these 
faces and gestures, no domain to which I have no access, merely a little shadow which 
owes its very existence to the light" (PP xii). There are several important consequences of 
this suggestion that bodies are primordially expressive, including the fact that while it 
makes the existence of the other self-evident, it also means that a certain gesture does not 
make me think of anger, or read anger behind the expression, but that it is anger in-itself 
(PP 184). Rather than hide the 'mind', the body must be able to entirely disclose it, or 
more exactly be it. Without considering Merleau-Ponty's more general claim that it often 
makes little sense to distinguish between mind and body, there can be little doubt that the 
majority of associations with others carry with them the kind of spontaneous trust and 
immediate receptivity to the other of which he speaks. When we hear a scream of pain, 
generally we do not take the time to infer that this is probably indicative of some inner 
mental pain, nor are we likely to doubt the rationale behind such a scream. We take the 
scream as a direct and primary expression ·of pain. 
Moreover, when a close friend is suffering we tend to empathise immediately, to 
the degree that we almost are their pain. When a baby opens its mouth on having its 
finger bitten, it directly acknowledges the intention of the other and it is in this 
phenomenological sense that the existence of the other is proven. For the baby, however, 
actions have more than merely an intersubjective significance (PP 352), or to be more 
precise, according to Merleau-Ponty, a baby is essentially at one with not just the mother, 
but the entire external world. Or equally aptly, there is no external world before what he, 
following Lacan, te1ms the mirror-stage. As we shall see, this is a very different position 
to the account of the other provided by Sartre, in that for Merleau-Ponty, the boundaries 
between self and other are not considered primordial, but rather induced by language and 
experience 181 • 
Of course, it is worth briefly recognising that for an adult ( or even a post mirror-
stage infant) a passion is not for the one who directly experiences it, equivalent with the 
181The considerable attention that Merleau-Ponty pays to psychology (he was Chair of Child Psychology at 
Sorbonne in 1947) alludes to his and Sartre 's vastly different treatments of the other. While Sartre was to 
coin existential psychoanalysis, he did not, like Merleau-Ponty, pay much attention to the findings of 
psychology in the general framing of his dialectic . On the contrary, Merleau-Ponty consistently refers to 
psychological studies in order to elucidate his own points (Gestalt in particular), and not only those of 
empirical significance, but also those of ontological import. 
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experience of those who perceive it from a distance. The pleasure of the voyeur is 
significantly different from the pleasure of the participant, even if there is a sense in 
which all parties, the voyeur included, are participating. Merleau-Ponty is not attempting 
to conflate the entire self-other distinction here. Communication is never entirely 
complete and we never fuse with the other, or entirely efface them in his phenomenology. 
Just because we see the other immediately on the surface does not entail that we are them. 
In pre-reflective existence, while the ego and the other are mutually related, the 
distinction and transcendence of the two is nevertheless also preserved. 
However, in relation to his suggestion that relations with the other are 
predominantly conducted without some type of interpretive gap, Merleau-Ponty has 
another important point to make. According to him, this immediate apprehension of the 
other is confirmed when we discover within ourselves what he describes as "a kind of 
internal weakness standing in the way of my being totally individualised: a weakness 
which exposes me to the gaze of others as a man among men" (PP xii). His use of the 
word "weakness" here is somewhat misleading. It is the awareness of this internal lack 
(that we are never sufficient to ourselves) that allows us to avoid the avarices of what he 
terms "objective thought" (ie. scientific thought), which seems to have no place for other 
people. Indeed, in The Primacy of Perception, he appreciates that "the recognition, at the 
very heart of our most individual experience, of a fruitful contradiction which submits 
this individual experience to the consideration of others - is the remedy to both 
scepticism and pessimism" (PrP 134). The ambiguity and contradiction that typify 
Merleau-Ponty's philosophy of subjectivity are envisaged as that which allows the other 
to exist at all. While the other is presupposed by, and encroaches upon our every project 
and perception in the world, there is an important implication here that the other comes 
into being and is made possible by the fact that an individual subject cannot be present, or 
sufficient to themselves. Rather than the other being domesticated by the horizonal 
projections of the subject, as traditional phenomenology might have it, it is the 
fundamental alterity of the other that makes presence-to-self impossible. 
Now, there seems to be an increasing consensus in regard to the impossibility of 
an unequivocal self-presence in contemporary European philosophy. We have already 
considered the Derridean denunciation of the Husserlian 'now' moment (see chapters 
three and five) and Sartre's philosophy also admits an essential contradiction. In many 
ways Sartre's ontology is actually premised upon a contradiction: the for-itself which 
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creates meaning ( and would seem to imply a presence-to-self) is nevertheless not what it 
is and is what it is not182 • This internal contradiction is due in no small part to the other, 
just as it also is for Merleau-Ponty. More specifically, this is because for Sartre, the other 
can accomplish something which the for-itself alone cannot: they can see us as we are. It 
is because the other holds the key to an apprehension of our existence that they are so 
important to us, although this chapter will eventually question the tacit Sartrean 
presumption that it is only an affirmation of ourselves that is sought in dealing with the 
other. 
Before we become involved in such details, however, it is worth making one 
simple but often overlooked point in favour of Merleau-Ponty' s paradoxical ontology. As 
we shall see, for Merleau-Ponty, it is the ontology of the body-subject - which he 
describes as a "fruitful contradiction" of transcendence in immanence (PrP 18) - that 
makes the recognition of the other, as well as communication with the other, possible at 
all. As Nick Crossley suggests, if we were either a transcending mind ( a self that is 
sufficient for-itself) or entirely empirically immanent, the demand for communication 
would be non-existent I83 • The other would appear to have no hold upon us whatsoever, or 
they might be something that only impedes our access to the world. As Merleau-Ponty 
suggests, this paradigm involves the other either "receding into absence, or insofar as he 
remains present to me, is felt as a threat" (PP 355). 
We will examine the other conceived of as a threat throughout this chapter, but 
for the moment it is important to recognise the possibility of a philosophy rendering the 
other absent. While it is undoubtedly a counter-intuitive position, it is certainly far from 
an unheard of position in the history of philosophy. After all, from a certain rationalist 
paradigm that reduces subjectivity to the mind, it seems that there is consciousness and 
diametrically opposed to this there are the objects of the world, the body included. This 
means that if I constitute the world, then the Other presumably constitutes the world 
also 184 . However, this possibility is inconceivable because I see the Other external to me 
and within the realm of objects. I cannot directly access his or her consciousness, so the 
existence of the Other, in this type of thought, remains unconfirmable and subject only to 
182Sartre, J.P. , Being and Nothingness, p 268 (hereafter referred to in this chapter as BN). 
183Crossley, N., The Politics of Subjectivity, chapter two. 
184I use capitals for the Other here, and at other relevant times, not just because it is Sartrean protocol, but 
also because it reflects a distinct way of conceiving of the problem: ie. as a problem to be solved by the 
reflecting, rational mind. 
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the problematic speculation of arguments by analogy which presuppose what they are 
called upon to explain (PP 352). Solipsism is inordinately difficult to refute from within a 
rationalist/idealist framework that conceives of the mind as capable of, and indeed 
requiring the transcending of the body. 
However, even if one manages to avoid the "reef of solipsism", this equation of 
subjectivity with purely 'mental' attributes often encourages another equally problematic 
manifestation. Typified best by Hegel's master-slave dialectic, and made famous via 
Sartre's contestable interpretation of it in Being and Nothingness, it is a portrait of human 
relationships that remains entangled in a subject-object dialectic not unlike that which 
encourages solipsism. Now, while Sartre's ambitious attempt to synthesise Hegelian and 
Cartesian positions sought to break away from the failures of phenomenology to 
adequately treat the problem of the Other, according to Merleau-Ponty, his efforts were 
ultimately betrayed by a flawed ontology. In tracing the divergences between these two 
compatriots, Merleau-Ponty's account of the other not only becomes significantly clearer, 
but he raises some objections to Sartre's position that it will be argued are also applicable 
to the philosophy of Derrida. 
In this respect, the obvious meta-discursive question is why would this thesis' 
intention to examine De1Tida in terms of responsibility to alterity be best accomplished 
via a consideration of Merleau-Ponty' s critique of Sartre, particularly given that such a 
connection has rarely, if ever, been pursued? There are several reasons for this apparent 
digression, but the most important of these is that a significant question for forthcoming 
chapters will be to what extent Derrida's philosophy of alterity might also be referred to 
as "agnostic" and as being symptomatic of a "disguised solipsism", as Merleau-Ponty 
accuses Sartre's position of. While there are many differences between Sartre's and 
Derrida's respective accounts of alterity, it will eventually be argued that both theorists 
can be envisaged as denying the importance of the ways in which self and other are 
intertwined together - at least, chapters nine and ten will argue that this applies to 
Derrida's later philosophy more so than to his earlier work. 
Moreover, what is significant about Merleau-Ponty's criticisms of Sartre's 
account of alterity, is that he explicitly argues that Sartre's mistakes are intimately tied to 
his ontology, and to a dualistic split between mind and body. While Derrida will not be 
accused of partaking in a simple dualism ( deconstruction is predicated upon revealing 
dualisms as always already breached), it has been established that Derrida is reluctant to 
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talk_ about embodiment and it will be argued that this has some important consequences 
for his conception of responsibility towards alterity. Defeni.ng any further contemplation 
of the politics of these suggestions until a later stage, it is towards a brief exegesis of 
Sartre's position that this chapter must turn. 
For Sartre, because it is only the Other who can grasp that aspect of me which on 
principle must continually escape me, "being-seen constitutes me as a defenceless being 
for a freedom which is not my freedom" (BN 267). As they can "accomplish for us a 
function of which we are incapable: to see us as we are", the Other therefore has the 
potential, in Sartre's terminology, to transcend one ' s transcendence. As a consequence, 
this necessitates that an individual has their foundation outside of themselves. When an 
individual is looked at by another transcendent consciousness, Sartre claims that a 
metaphorical drain-hole effect ensues and around the Other's perspective flow all of the 
objects that were once of my world. This is most famously demonstrated in his example 
of the person caught peering through the key-hole, and Sartre argues that the Look of the 
Other instigates not only a transformation of oneself, but also a complete and total 
metamorphosis of the world. The Look denies physical distances from objects and 
unfolds its own distances, and even through the self-deception involved in what Sartre 
terms Bad Faith, one still cannot avoid this dramatic and uneasy recognition of the 
Other's freedom. 
However, Sartre's notion of Being-for-others has more serious consequences for 
human interaction than merely emphasising our own innate vulnerability. Seeing the 
other automatically involves the realisation that I too can be seen and hence rendered an 
object by their free subjectivity (after all, one cannot be made an object by an object). 
The for-itself ( or subjectivity) - which according to Saiire, "is what it is not and is not 
what it is" (BN 268) - seeks naturally to be the foundation of itself by reducing the 
impact of the other' s look. However, this goal could only be attained if one could control 
their Being-for-others and since this dimension is obviously dependent upon others, it 
necessitates that any attempt to control it entails an attempt to control Others. 
This problem is reinforced by the fact that Sartre ' s notion of the Look precludes 
two people simultaneously "looking" at each other. By "looking" Sartre does not mean 
eyes simply following one another, but the rendering of a subject as an object. This 
internal haemorrhage obviously requires a subject to induce it, who must be either 
imagined or real. Given his contention that one cannot perceive or imagine 
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simultaneously (BN 258), this means that Beings-in-the-world are necessarily separated 
into two general dichotomies; one is either the looker, or the looked upon 185• According to 
Sartre, this represents the only possible structure of experiencing the Other, and 
depending on which mode the self has manifested itself in (ie. looking), the other must on 
principle be the opposite (ie. being looked at). As Sartre persuasively shows, any 
systematic elaboration from this position fundamentally entails conflict. 
Because the experiences of the social self (shame, fear and alienation) are so 
disorientating, Sartre explains that people adopt variations on either sadism or masochism 
in an attempt to control them. Again, he leaves us with two main options. One can 
constantly objectify others and thereby seek to prevent the emergence of one's social self, 
or one can induce the Other to see one exactly as one wishes to be seen and thereby 
control their subjectivity. There is no possibility of mutual recognition between 
individuals in this picture of human relations. If one is inevitably a subject or an object, 
transcendent or immanent, then human relationships can only oscillate between these two 
polarities without ever approaching a complementary intersubjectivity. Moreover, Sartre 
also argues that the positions of master and slave are untenable, since they both divest the 
Other of their true relation to us, and yet both positions are also envisaged as inevitable. 
There is hence a weight of philosophical significance behind Sartre's dramatic 
declaration that "hell is other people" 186 • 
Now, Merleau-Ponty admits of a similar phenomenon to the drain-hole inducing 
exigencies of Sartre's Look. Speaking of the appearance of another in our immediate 
surroundings, he says "round about the perceived body a vortex forms, towards which my 
world is drawn and so to speak, sucked in: to this extent, it is no longer merely mine" (PP 
353). Someone is appropriating my world and this description would seem to demand a 
philosophical position similar to Sartre's - the Other can transform me into an object, as I 
can transform the Other, by a process of continual looking. 
However, Merleau-Ponty makes a pe1iinent point that does not make such a 
185 According to Sartre, a similar dichotomy also applies to touch, as was highlighted in chapter four. Sartre 
suggests that "to touch and to be touched ... these are two species of phenomena which it is useless to try 
and reconcile by the term 'double sensation'. In fact, they are radically distinct and exist on two 
incommunicable levels" (BN 304). This notion that the body as subject is ontologically disjunct from the 
body as object, reaffllTils the dualistic thinking that ultimately precludes Sartre from theorising anything 
but the master-slave dialectic. While Merleau-Ponty agrees that these two experiences cannot be united by 
the term 'double sensation' (PP 93), he nevertheless insists upon their thoroughly communicative and 
interdependent relationship. 
186Sartre, J.P., 'No Exit ' and Three Other Plays, trans. Abel, New York: n.d. 
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position and the correlative suggestion that "hell is other people" the necessary outcome 
of all human relations. He argues that the other's gaze can only induce this tumultuous 
ontological change from subject to object (or object to subject) if we withdraw into an 
abstract thinking disposition that he characterises as an "inhuman gaze" in which we 
merely observe. A related criticism will be levelled at Derrida in chapter nine 187, but for 
Merleau-Ponty, this objectification by the other's gaze may indeed be unbearable, but the 
situation persists only while the improbability of communication is conceded. 
However, for Merleau-Ponty, "the body of others, insofar as it is a bearer of 
symbolic behaviour ... breaks away from the condition of one of my phenomena, presents 
to me the task of true communication and bestows on my objects the new dimension of 
intersubjective being" (PrP 125). The body of another person is hence not just an object 
that has the capacity to constrain my freedom, but an object (for want of a better word) 
that compels us to attempt what is admittedly the ongoing task of "true communication". 
By true, I take Merleau-Ponty to be referring to a form of meaningful communication that 
acknowledges both the other's alterity and their capacity to be understood, and it is 
important to note that the above quotation also emphasises how difficult it is to envisage 
a refusal to communicate. This ,:vill be explained more precisely in the following chapter, 
but for the moment, a simple example might illustrate the point. Imagine what a 
devastating trick a group of students could play on a new teacher by simply uttering 
nothing at all, and giving away no meaning in their facial expressions. If the students 
could sustain this impassive blankness in the face of repeated questions, for the teacher 
nothing but madness could ensue. But the point is that, in fact, this is not a possible 
scenario - the demand of the other will always exact some form of a response; solitude 
and communication are not two alternatives, but two moments of a unique phenomenon 
demanded by the existence of the other (PP 359). 
Even if relations with the other are often conflictual in the manner that Sartre 
suggests (and who could deny that?), for Merleau-Ponty, the situation can be redeemed 
simply "by establishing relations with him, by bringing about his clear recognition of 
187To present my argument schematically, Derrida will be accused of cultivating something tantamount to 
this abstract thinking disposition. In chapter nine, it will be argued that Derrida 's later philosophy verges 
on becoming an "agnosticism" in regard to the other, and William James has famously described 
agnosticism as a position of "pure intellectualism". Derrida's agnosticism in regard to the other is manifest 
on two different levels: he textually privileges a vacillation (ie. it cannot be decided whether Abraham is 
the most moral or the most immoral); and he also privileges something wholly other (tout autre) that 
cannot be imbued with any determinate characteristics, and whose coming might or might not ever actually 
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me" (PP 357). Embroiled in a Sartrean perspective, this recognition may seem difficult to 
attain, but as we have just seen, it is something that the very presence of another compels 
us to seek (if not in every other, at least in an other). Moreover, for Merleau-Ponty, it is 
certainly not as difficult as Sartre suggests - "let him utter a word, or even make a gesture 
of impatience, and already he ceases to transcend me" (PP 361). His implication seems to 
be that by immersing ourselves in embodied action, the subject can at least minimise the 
anxiety and anguish of Sartrean human relations. Perhaps even the experience of joy can 
be accommodated in this conception of the acting body-subject. At the very least, it 
seems that individual existences are far more likely to be construed as transcending each 
other when we remain, in an important sense, disembodied. 
Indeed, even if Sartre is analysing what appears, almost incontrovertibly, to be 
embodied aspects of existence (such as desire, sadism, masochism, etc.), according to 
Merleau-Ponty, this is ultimately not the case. The Sartrean analysis of embodiment 
construes the other as a being who cannot be reached, and interaction hence consists in 
limiting and controlling their effect on the for-itself. But the other's for-itself cannot be 
known, and there is no possibility of engaging with the other immediately and through 
their embodiment. Bodies can nullify each other's progress, but there is not really any 
embodied engagement with the other that merits the name. This shall become clearer as 
we progress, but the sense in which Sartrean subjectivity is actually embodied is, at the 
very least, subject to some doubt. 
For Merleau-Ponty, when reintegrated into the primordial nature of everyday 
existence, the body cannot be conceived of as simply an objectified in-itself or a 
subjectivised for-itself188 • Although it is in some sense an object for others and a lived 
reality for the subject, it is never simply an object or a subject. The body-subject must 
reside between such dualities, and for Merleau-Ponty, the physiological and the 
psychological interact almost seamlessly. As he makes explicit, this means that "if 
another's body is not an object for me, nor mine an object for him, if both are 
eventuate (the messianic). 
188Given that consciousness is considered to be irremediably embodied, and hence not a pure for-itself, 
Merleau-Ponty's philosophy manages to avoid the problems that many philosophers have had with Sartre's 
notion of an absolute freedom in regard to a given situation. Oppression, or at least a freedom devoid of 
projects, is possible within Merleau-Ponty's framework, while such a position cannot so easily be 
accommodated within Sartre's philosophy. Perhaps this is why many feminist theorists - including 
Elizabeth Grosz, Judith Butler, Sonia Kruks, Rosalyn Diprose, Cathryn Vasseleu, Vicki Kirby, Dorothea 
Olkowski, and even De Beauvoir - have had quite a lot of time for Merleau-Ponty 's work, notwithstanding 
the criticisms that many of them have made in relation to his presuppositions regarding 'normal' sexuality. 
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manifestations of behaviour, the positing of the Other does not reduce me to the status of 
an object" (PP 352). Despite the slightly crude simplicity of this suggestion (these ideas 
are expanded upon in The Visible and the Invisible), this acknowledgment of the 
possibility of reciprocal recognition between individuals seems almost self-evidently to 
be an improvement on Sartre's position. 
Of course, Merleau-Ponty is not suggesting that Sartrean conflict is an impossible 
mode of human interaction, even outside of the difficulties inherent in objective thought 
(PP 356). There is a lived experience of solipsism which is insurmountable (PP 357-8) 
and conflict with the other does not dissipate entirely in the irreflexive. Relationships 
with the other can sometimes calcify into competing entities and reading another's face 
can be problematic. But by paying attention to the aspects of our embodied situation that 
Merleau-Ponty delineates, and not falsely imposing subject-object relations ubiquitously, 
these type of phenomena are certainly lessened and take on a less damaging form. 
Moreover, his analysis serves to deny Sartre's conclusion that such relationships are 
phenomenologically primitive. The other can look at me, penetrate me to the very fibre of 
my being, "only because we belong to the same system of being-for-itself and being-for-
another; we are moments of the same syntax, we count in the same world, we belong to 
the same being" (VI 83). In other words, for him, the conflict of Sartre's Being-for-others 
is dependent upon the more fundamental experience of communication, or the fact that in 
Merleau-Ponty's words, "we are collaborators for each other in consummate reciprocity" 
(PP 354). 
Whereas Sartre asserts that the alienating experience of Being-for-others (induced 
by being victim to the Look of the Other) precedes and founds our experience of Being-
with-others - that is, any possibility of a collective 'we', or mitsein (BN 413) - Merleau-
Ponty disagrees on precisely this point: Being-with-others, not Being-for-others, is the 
more primordial mode of being. 
This chapter has spent some time exploring this divergence between these two 
philosophers, and Merleau-Ponty's position seems the more compelling for many 
reasons, not least his ability to entertain two fundamental notions that Sartre cannot: love 
and oppression, both of which are rather important factors of any relationship with a 
human other. But do we also want to take on board Merleau-Ponty' s insistence that the 
other and I are of the same syntax, belong to the same being, and are ultimately 
interdependent with each other and the world? Do we want to accept his suggestion that 
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"the world and I are within one another"? (VI 123). Such ontological questions will be 
pursued in detail in the following chapter, but for the moment some questions of a more 
empirical kind also plague Merleau-Ponty' s account of relations with others. 
Most obviously, the act of lying seems to be difficult to thematise from within 
such a framework, as issues regarding how one might differentiate between a body-
subject with genuine goodwill, love, hatred, etc. , and one feigning these emotions come 
to the fore. If we are our body in the sense that Merleau-Ponty intends, then it seems that 
the lie must be necessarily embedded in an aspect of the false gesture that differs slightly 
from the genuine version. One may feel inclined to doubt whether expressions are 
necessarily always a pure reflection of our attitudes and dispositions as Merleau-Ponty 
seems to believe. In this respect, Merleau-Ponty could and would undoubtedly insist, as 
Wittgenstein also has, that within the meaning conferred upon our world by mores and 
convention, lying cannot predominate or else communication would cease 189 • While 
Den·ida would probably contest this claim ( cf. LI), it seems to me that in regard to his 
dependence upon the pre-reflective purity of expression (which is importantly distinct 
from advocating a simple expressivism), Merleau-Ponty' s earlier philosophy is not 
defending a position that is beyond redemption. 
However, even if one does not want to concede that our relationships with the 
other are as unmanipulative as Merleau-Ponty inadvertently implies, in every one of our 
expe1iences, presumably, there are occasions which attest to the possibility of interaction 
beyond the subject-object dichotomy and its perennial role-playing. If so, this is a 
position that Sartre must struggle to accommodate and this is largely because of his 
dichotomistic conception of existence. Indeed, Sartre's conflictual po1irait of human 
relationships issues forth from his own notion of embodiment (and ontology), which 
despite his protestations to the contrary, remains dualistic. 
While there has been an immense amount of literature on this subject190, this 
chapter cannot become too deeply immersed in this debate. Such a digression would 
obscure the major purpose of this thesis, which is to use Merleau-Ponty' s work to place 
some critical pressure upon Denida' s conception of alterity. However, I think that it is 
relatively clear that Sartre ' s ontology does require reflective consciousness (or Being-for-
itself) to assert a prio1ity over the things of the world, which are Being-in-itself and 
189Wittgenstein, L., Zettel, eds. Anscombe & Von Wright, trans. Anscombe, Oxford: Blackwell, 1981, 
section 571 . 
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which it can transcend. Granting primacy to consciousness and hence betraying his 
Cartesian heritage, Sartre seems to think that the activities of the body can be understood 
by disassociating oneself from them and reflecting upon them. It is for this reason, 
according to Merleau-Ponty at least, that Sartre is unable to truly grasp the lived 
experience of the body. 
Even though Sartre wants to repudiate the thesis that mind and body are distinct 
substances 191, and does so at length in the later stages of Being and Nothingness (cf. BN 
400-445), Sartrean relations with the other are typified not by a negotiation between 
body-subjects, but between minds seeking to control that freedom which possesses the 
capacity to judge. From such a standpoint, it is somewhat inevitable that Sartre would 
also end up treating the body as a Being-in-itself, rather than as something that is 
necessarily at the juncture of these polarities. For him, "the Other' s body is ... the tool 
which I am not and which I utilise ( or which resists me which amounts to the same 
thing)" (BN 445-7). It seems that Sartre's flawed ontology seduces us into an ethical 
blind alley. Without the hinge or mediating function of Merleau-Ponty ' s emphasis upon 
the body-subject, the problem of other people was inevitably going to be a substantial one 
for Sartre, and it seems that having so deliberately attempted to avoid solipsism, he 
veered towards what philosophically speaking he must have considered the lesser evil: 
the master-slave dialectic. 
In The Visible and the Invisible, Merleau-Ponty provides a more detailed analysis 
of Sartre's dualistic ontology and again devotes particular attention to Sartre's treatment 
of the other. According to Merleau-Ponty, Sartre's philosophy is a version of what he 
terms "high-altitude thinking" (VI 69), since the concepts he employs (Being and 
Nothingness) are not primordial, but are established via dialectical argument, which come 
after our primary inherence in Being (VI 76). The pertinent question, as Bernard Flynn 
points out, is hence whether "it is possible to think the appearance of the world, the 
apparition of being, in terms of the concepts of being and nothingness - in terms of a 
negation which decomposes the identity of being and opens a space in which being 
comes to appearance" 192 • In regard to this question, Merleau-Ponty answers with a 
190Wamock, M. , Th e Philosophy of Sartre, London: Hutchinson University Library, 1965. 
191Priest, S., Merleau-Ponty, p 54. 
192Flynn, B., "The Question of Ontology: Sartre and Merleau-Ponty" in The Horizons of the Flesh: Critical 
Perspectives on the Thought of Merleau-Ponty, ed. Gillian, Urbana: Southern Illinois University Press, 
1973, p 117. 
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resounding 'no'. By basing his entire ontology on the concepts pure being and pure 
nothingness, which for Merleau-Ponty come after all possible experience (VI 89), Sartre 
does not describe, but constructs an openness of being. Phenomenology, we must 
remember, is supposed to be about description (PP xi) , and yet all of Sartre 's analyses are 
guided by this rather abstract distinction between Being and Nothingness, the for-itself 
and the in-itself, regardless of how concrete the situation being analysed may actually 
appear ( eg. smoking cigarettes). 
To Sartre's philosophy of negativity (the for-itself that is nothingness is 
responsible for meaning, and we are hence not just our past, nor our circumstances, etc.), 
Merleau-Ponty opposes a philosophy of inherence. In Phenomenology of Perception , this 
idea is contained in all of the ramifications of the body-subject, but in The Visible and the 
Invisible, he clarifies the ontology of this inherence - being is possible only through 
reversibility and the intertwining. Both of these related notions will be examined in detail 
in the following chapter, but for the moment it suffices to point out Merleau-Ponty's 
claim that: 
Because my eyes which see, my hands which touch, can also be seen and touched, 
because, therefore in this sense they see and touch the visible, the tangible, from 
within, because our flesh lines and even envelops all the visible and tangible 
things which neve1iheless it is surrounded, the world and I are within one another, 
and there is no anteriority of the percipere to the percipi, there is simultaneity or 
even retardation (VI 123). 
In other words, and Flynn puts the point well, Being does not reveal itself across an 
interval of nothingness, but from a profound intimacy of the body and the world 193 . 
However, it is not an intimacy in the sense of a fusion, but rather a chiasmic overlapping. 
This ontology ensures that, for Merleau-Ponty, aspects of the perceived world are not 
either present or absent, but rather "they are present in levels and gradations and their 
absence trails off gradually from the field of presence" 194 • Perception is fundamentally 
ambiguous in a way that Sartre's philosophy cannot seem to accommodate (although his 
literature, and Nausea in particular, seems able to). For Merleau-Ponty, it is Sartre's 
emphasis on defining the mind as the pure negative which creates meaning that renders 
impossible the openness upon being which is the perceptual faith (VI 88). 
193Flynn, B., "The Question of Ontology: Sartre and Merleau-Ponty", p 122. 
194Flynn, B. , "The Question of Ontology: Sartre and Merleau-Ponty", p 121. 
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Now, this manner in which Sartre annuls our inherence in being, for Merleau-
Ponty, also has analogous consequences for our relations with the other. This has already 
been partially illustrated in this chapter's descriptions of Sartre ' s master-slave dialectic, 
but his philosophy also has some other undesirable consequences. Most important among 
these is the suggestion that I cannot discover another person, or ascertain some 'truth' (in 
a loose sense) about them, but only realise a "dimension of myself that comes to be fixed 
through the other's look" 195 . As Flynn points out, this implies that the other's presence 
adds nothing and only freezes me into what I have made of myself196 • Michele Le Doeuff 
has also argued that this amounts to a "defacto solipsism" 197, and the following remark of 
Merleau-Ponty's sums up his similarly inclined interpretation of the ethical consequences 
of Sartre's position. He says, "power over me is exactly measured by the consent which I 
have given to my body, to my situation; he has alienating force only because I alienate 
myself. Philosophically speaking, there is no experience of the other" (VI 71). Sartrean 
philosophy hence ignores what, for Merleau-Ponty, is an essential fact of our inherence in 
being - that we are always involved in a human world with other people, and if we 
confront the other, this background is nevertheless already there. 
Again, these are significantly different conceptions of the other that are being 
employed. In many ways, the concept of sharing is foreign to the Sartrean description of 
the other. For Merleau-Ponty, on the other hand, the other is fundamentally those that we 
do share a world with. Politically speaking, Merleau-Ponty's account would seem to have 
more to offer us, at least in regard to the innumerable institutions that we undoubtedly do 
share. Nick Crossley's book, The Politics of Subjectivity, highlights Merleau-Ponty's 
applicability to such issues 198 , as does Kerry Whiteside' s work, Merleau-Ponty and the 
Foundation of an Existential Politics 199 • It is also worth recalling that it was a political 
quarrel with Sartre that precipitated his and Merleau-Ponty's acrimonious parting of the 
ways, with Sartrean Marxism appearing lacking in some important respects200 . Such 
195Flynn, B., "The Question of Ontology: Sartre and Merleau-Ponty", p 124. 
196Flynn, B., "The Question of Ontology: Sartre and Merleau-Ponty", p 124. 
197Le Doeuff, M., Hipparchia 's Choice: An Essay Concerning Women, Philosophy etc, trans. Selous, 
Oxford: Blackwell, 1991, p 62-3. 
198Crossley, N., The Politics of Subjectivity, p 1-7, 136-69. 
199Whiteside, K., Merleau-Ponty and the Foundation of an Existential Politics , Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1988. 
20
°For a more detailed account of their political differences, see Merleau-Ponty, M., Adventures of the 
Dialectic, trans. Bien, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973. Also of interest in this respect, is 
the problems that Sartre had with Albert Camus after the publication of his politically motivated The Rebel, 
which in my opinion at least, is actually the most successful of Camus' book-length philosophical essays. 
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issues lie beyond the scope of this thesis, however, and it can certainly be argued that a 
philosophy intent on emphasising our differences, rather than what we share, can provide 
the foundation for effective political thought. Indeed, this is something that Derrida 
attempts to do201 • 
Without digressing any further into such questions, it is worth emphasising that in 
The Visible and the Invisible, Merleau-Ponty reaffirms the subtle proximity between 
solipsism and the master-slave dialectic that this chapter has been trying to establish. In 
describing Sartrean relations with the other, he suggests that: 
If the other is really the other, that is, a for-itself in the strong sense that I am for 
myself, he must never be so before my eyes ... it is necessary that there be no 
perception of an other. .. and that the other be my negation or my destruction. 
Every other interpretation, under the pretext of placing us, him and myself, in the 
same universe of thought, ruins the alterity of the other and hence marks the 
triumph of an undisguised solipsism. Conversely, it is in making the other not 
only inaccessible but invisible for me that I guarantee his alterity and quit 
solipsism (VI 79). 
If the moral equivalent to solipsism, which Sartre was clearly trying to avoid ( cf. BN 
223-33), is a blindness to the other as other, then it is not surprising that he would 
approach the moral opposite to solipsism; that being the master-slave dialectic, and a 
rather absolute conception of an alterity that is "inaccessible" and "invisible". However, 
given the faceless and anonymous conception of alterity that is induced by this master-
slave dialectic, these two extremes paradoxically result in some rather similar 
consequences. 
Merleau-Ponty goes on to raise (and answer) the obvious question regarding 
whether the Sartrean "solution" really does justice to the alterity of the other - he 
suggests that "this agnosticism in regard to the other' s being for himself, which appeared 
to guarantee his alterity, suddenly appears as the worst of infringements upon it" (VI 79). 
This is an important idea that will be returned to in the later stages of this thesis and in 
See Sartre, J, P ., Situations, trans . Eisler, London: H. Hamilton, 1965, p 71-112. 
201 The political consequences of deconstruction are accorded more attention in chapters six, nine and ten. 
The political writings of Jean-Luc Nancy are also of relevance here, as while indebted to the Derridean 
analysis of difference, Nancy also emphasises sharing to a greater extent. See Nancy, J. , Inoperative 
Community, ed. Connor, trans. Connor, Garbus, Holland & Sawhney, Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1991. 
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relation to Derrida's exaltation of the 'otherness of the other' 202 . It is hence worth pausing 
to explicate exactly what Merleau-Ponty means. Sartre is accused of an agnosticism in 
regard to the other because he ignores our inherence in being, and because he ignores the 
way in which alterity is always intertwined with subjectivity. Sartre posits a radical 
singularity, a void of nothingness that can have no content, and he argues that given this 
situation, the other should not be theorised except in relation to their effects on the self. In 
his own way then, Sartre very much wants to preserve the alterity of the other, despite 
what theorists like Levinas have suggested203 • But Merleau-Ponty insists that speaking 
only of oneself, just like speaking for everybody, also misses an aspect of our experience. 
In regard to this paradox - the proximity between no other (solipsism) and an absolute 
other (master-slave dialectic)- Merleau-Ponty makes an interesting and pertinent point. 
He argues that: 
A negativist thought is identical to a positivist thought, and in this reversal 
remains the same in that, whether considering the void of nothingness or the 
absolute fullness of being, it in every case ignores density, depth, the plurality of 
planes, the background worlds (VI 68). 
In other words, when attempting to speak of nobody, in the end we do speak of 
everybody, and vice versa. Intending to preserve the other's alterity, Sartre cannot avoid 
effacing it, and his suggestion that the other cannot be accessed extends beyond France 
and into many different languages, and has, or so Sartre seems to presume, universal 
validity2°4. For Merleau-Ponty, "this singular that he permits himself- the for-itself, the 
for-others - indicates that he means to speak in the name of all, and that in his description 
he implies the power to speak for all, whereas his description contests this power" (VI 
79). Merleau-Ponty's methodology hence reveals some of the aporias of Sartre's text that 
elude the author's intention, but more importantly, Merleau-Ponty also illustrates that the 
respect shown for the other's alterity is only apparent. In the end, Sartre "makes of the 
202This cannot be justified as yet, but it is worth pointing out that Derrida also seeks to preserve the alterity 
of the other by prioritising the aspects of the other that resist appropriation, and by emphasising that it is 
towards such aspects of the other that responsibility should be directed. The extent to which Derrida 
consequently engenders an "agnosticism in regard to the other" is examined in chapters nine and ten. 
203Levinas, E. , "Philosophy and the Idea of Infinity" in Collected Philosophical Papers, The Hague: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1977, p 55. 
204Herbert Marcuse also denigrates the way in which Sartre's existentialism, which is supposed to be about 
concrete human existence, actually makes a universal ontology of conflict. According to Marcuse, Sartre 's 
master-slave dialectic simply describes a capitalist conception of relations with the other. See Marcuse, H. , 
"Existentialism: Remarks on Jean-Paul Sartre 's L 'Etre et Le Neant" in Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research, vol. VIII, 1948, p 317-30. 
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other an anonymous, faceless obsession, an other in general" (VI 72). And Sartre does 
seem to have no notion of a specific Other, but only this faceless , untouchable Other, who 
is absolutely transcendent. Indeed, the Other for Sartre is almost a God, which might 
explain his consistent capitalising of the term. 
With this emphasis on an absolute Other, it is unsurprising that Sartre seems 
unable to admit of degrees. As he famously suggests, in deciding and acting for 
ourselves, we are also responsible for all humanity (BN 553-6). In-itself this is not 
necessarily a ludicrous suggestion, and it arguably has some rather generous 
humanitarian consequences. However, responsibility for a singular other, or even a local 
community, is rarely considered in Sartre ' s major works, and while he has published 
articles on anti-semitism and 'negritude ' , they are also of debatable salience. An ethics 
which would further consider such matters was promised but did not eventuate, most 
probably because Sartre's ontology precluded that very possibility. His enduring subject-
object opposition allows little room for the ethical, which is well-conceived of as a 
relation between terms, and if Merleau-Ponty's philosophy accomplishes anything of 
note, it is in providing an ontology of relations and one that can accommodate difference 
without reifying it. 
However, with a view to this thesis' forthcoming consideration of Derrida' s 
notion of the wholly other (tout autre), it is important to reaffirm that, for Merleau-Ponty, 
this positing of a faceless, anonymous other, is far from the best way to preserve the 
alterity of the other2°5. In attempting to keep the other entirely sacrosanct, the other's 
existence is actually threatened. None of this, however, is necessary. Merleau-Ponty 
argues that: 
For the other to be truly the other [and he is referring to an other who retains 
their alterity and yet nevertheless impacts upon and interacts with us] , it does not 
suffice and it is not necessary that he be a scourge, the continued threat of an 
absolute reversal of pro and con, a judge himself elevated above all contestation, 
without place, without relativities , faceless like an obsession and capable of 
crushing me with a glance into the dust of my world. It is necessary and it suffices 
that he have the power to decenter me, to oppose his centering to my own, and he 
205As will become apparent in chapter nine, in a certain sense Derrida 's notion of the wholly other (tout 
autre) also posits a rather faceless and absolute conception of alterity. After all, the wholly other is 
precisely that which cannot be imbued with any determinate characteristics, and which cannot be named, 
as it forever exceeds our horizons of significance (MO 71). 
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can do so only because we are not two nihilations installed in two universes of the 
in-itself, incomparable, but two entries to the same Being, each accessible to but 
one of us (my italics, VI 82). 
Intuitively at least, there is much to recommend Merleau-Ponty 's suggestions. Certainly 
it is difficult to argue with the suggestion that it is "only by backing down on the alleged 
ubiquity of the vision, by forgoing the idea of being everything, that is, of being nothing, 
by learning to know, within the vision itself, a sort of palpitation of the things ... an 
inherence" (VI 83), that we will truly relate to the other. Clearly Merleau-Ponty and 
Sartre have vastly different conceptions regarding what a genuine "other" is, and they 
also use the category of the other to explain and elucidate different phenomenac.Sartre ' s 
other is conceived of in te1ms of what influence they have upon the for-itself, the subject. 
Merleau-Ponty's other revolves around a recognition of our mutual interdependence, and 
the way in which the other is always encroaching upon us. Relativism cannot save Sartre 
here, however, as more often than not, it is not just a faceless other who impacts upon us; 
rather it is usually an other known to us ( and often intimately so), with a shared history, 
whose being in places overlaps and encroaches upon our own. 
This intimacy and these experiences that we share with the other (which Merleau-
Ponty's philosophy accommodates to a far greater extent than Sartre ' s) must necessarily 
have consequences for our phenomenological and existential experiences of the other 
which Satire sought to describe. Certainly, we often experience shame and guilt as Sartre 
shows us. Nevertheless, are these and the other vast array of emotions which we 
experience treated with justice and in their full complexity when analysed via their 
relation to this anonymous other that permeates Sartre ' s dialectic? The emotions that 
Satire describes seem somewhat exaggerated by the necessary inaccessibility of his Other 
( cf. to the shame described in his famous keyhole incident), although the rejoinder may 
certainly be put that at least Sartre considers the emotions, which is something that 
Merleau-Ponty rarely does. And this is true, although Merleau-Ponty ' s conception of the 
other as sharing an inherence in being does promise the possibility of an analysis of 
emotions, as well as ethical relations more generally, of a more sophisticated kind. 
In the terms of Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty's demand for a 
recognition of our ' inherence ' is to advocate nothing more than an understanding of the 
dimensions and ambiguous state of the body-subject. As the condition and context 
through which one can have any relations to objects, the body is both immanent and 
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transcendent, if such a vocabulary is needed, and this knowledge of the body cannot be 
attained by abstractly reflecting upon it as Cartesianism and ultimately Sartre have done. 
Perhaps it is largely on account of the philosophical tradition's emphasis upon abstract, 
retrospective, and rational reflection, that we binarise and dichotomise. Of course, there is 
a sense in which reflection cannot be anything other than retrospective. Even Merleau-
Ponty' s philosophy of embodiment cannot recapture the exigencies of lived experience 
and this is not something that he wants to claim. Nevertheless, certain philosophies 
manage to evoke this lived experience better than others and Merleau-Ponty' s 
suggestions in this regard are insightful. The practicalities of embodied action do seem to 
disavow the dualistic oscillations between subject and object that Sartre's philosophy 
imbues with such pessimistic connotations. Moreover, in lucidly describing the 
rationalistic emphasis upon the mind which has made the problematic of both solipsism 
and the master-slave dialectic such deeply tempting philosophical positions, Merleau-
Ponty' s work constitutes an achievement of the highest estimation, since in 
understanding the reasons for their allure, we can perhaps finally put them to rest. 
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8. Merleau-Ponty, Levinas, and the Alterity of the Other 
In providing the foundation for a conception of other people that does not fall into the 
related traps of either solipsism or the master-slave dialectic, it nevertheless cannot be 
claimed that Merleau-Ponty thereby avoids all problematic conceptions of alterity. 
Another set of questions for him are proffered by Levinas, Foucault and Derrida, all of 
whom have suggested that the exclusion of the ethical other tends to be a major problem 
for phenomenology2°6. To simplify, their shared suggestion is that in affirming context, 
phenomenology only allows the other to disclose that which the subject has prepared for. 
Phenomenology is hence envisaged as paying only minimal attention to the other 
conceived of as irremediably different, and similar claims have also been propounded 
regarding the specific phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty, most notably by Levinas -
whose arguments will soon be addressed - and more recently by Claude Lefort. 
At the meeting of the Merleau-Ponty Circle that was held at the University of 
Rhode Island in 1987, Lefort accuses his former teacher of being unable to thematise the 
more asymmetrical aspects of alterity experienced by the infant in their absolute 
dependence upon mother, father, and somewhat synonymously - for Lacan at least - the 
symbolic order. Lefort argues that this is because of the ontological priority that Merleau-
Ponty accords to the reversibility thesis which, according to his interpretation, 
presupposes a reciprocity between self and other that does not adequately account for our 
relationship with alterity in all situations207 • This claim has occasioned much debate, with 
many theorists leaping to Merleau-Ponty's defence by arguing that Lefort misconstrues 
Merleau-Ponty' s notion of reversibility2°8 . Now, Lefort' s arguments have a largely 
psychoanalytic register that cannot be directly engaged with in this chapter, but the 
general outline of the debate that he initiated makes explicit an enduring concern of what 
206We have previously contemplated Derrida's criticisms of phenomenology at some length (see chapters 
three and five), and this chapter will begin by considering Levinas' criticisms of phenomenology as they 
are expressed in his essays "Meaning and Sense" and "Philosophy and the Idea of Infinity", in Collected 
Philosophical Papers, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977. 
207Lefort, C. , "Flesh and Otherness" in Ontology and Alterity in Merleau-Ponty, eds. Johnson & Smith, 
Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1990, p 9. 
208Both Gary Madison and Martin Dillon argue that Merleau-Ponty's notion of reversibility is not simply 
about the immanent projection of the touching-touched divergence upon the rest of the world (as they 
rightly suggest Lefort is committed to arguing). Thi~ will be explicated later in this chapter, but see 
Madison, G., "Flesh as Otherness", & Dillon, M. , "Ecart: A Reply to Lefort 's 'Flesh and Otherness "' in 
Ontology and Alterity in Merleau-Ponty, eds. Johnson & Smith, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 
1990, p 28 & 21. For a sustained discussion of the differences between Dillon's and Lefort's positions, see 
Bell, J., The Problem of Difference: Phenomenology and Poststructuralism, p 164-180. 
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might be loosely termed 'postmodern' thought. Lefort's suggestion that Merleau-Ponty 
cannot thematise radical alterity is rather intimately related to the position of Levinas, and 
also to the arguments that Derrida and Foucault have raised about phenomenology more 
generally. All of these theorists imbue an asymmetrical priority to a conception of alterity 
that exceeds all of our resources for attempting to describe it, and while it cannot be 
argued that Merleau-Ponty valorises the other in their absolute difference as Levinas and 
to a lesser extent Derrida do, this chapter will examine how his work relates to this type 
of paradigm. 
Moreover, it will be the spectre of Derrida, indebted as he is to the Levinasian 
treatment of the other2°9, which will motivate much of this discussion, even if he is rarely 
mentioned by name. The significance of this comparison will become clearer as this 
thesis progresses, but oddly enough, to compare Derrida and Merleau-Ponty on alterity is 
actually to start to think about the ways in which Merleau-Ponty's analysis opens the 
deconstructive treatment of the other up to alternative and possibly more promising 
formulations, although establishing that is very much a longitudinal concern. 
It is first necessary to establish that Merleau-Ponty can be envisaged as according 
due recognition to alterity. In this respect, The Visible and the Invisible will be 
considered in the light of some fundamental criticisms that Levinas has made in regard to 
Merleau-Ponty' s conception of alterity. Levinas' various arguments against Merleau-
Ponty can be schematised to reveal two main claims, and the first of these pertains to 
Levinas' more general assertion that phenomenology invariably amounts to what he calls 
an "imperialism of the same"2 10• In his seminal essay "Philosophy and the Idea of 
Infinity", Levinas contends that by insisting upon the importance of horizons and 
contexts, phenomenology either precludes the possibility of something being absolutely 
other, or if it considers the other, it does so only in terms of a more derivative otherness 
that the subject has already been prepared for. According to him, phenomenology hence 
ensures that the other can be considered only on the condition of surrendering their 
difference. "Philosophy and the Idea of Infinity" does not explicitly relate this assertion 
that phenomenology engenders an "imperialism of the same" to the philosophy of 
Merleau-Ponty, but Levinas ' frequent criticisms of Merleau-Ponty's treatment of alterity 
209The degree to which Derrida either partakes in, or criticises the Levinasian conception of alterity, is the 
main problem of the following chapter. It will be argued that Derrida ultimately privileges a rather similar 
account of alterity, despite his rather frequent criticisms of Levinas. 
210Levinas, E. , "Philosophy and the Idea of Infinity" in Collected Philosophical Papers, p 55. 
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leave us in little doubt that he thinks that Merleau-Ponty can also be adequately 
encapsulated by such a description. Indeed, as will soon be apparent, two of Levinas' 
more recently translated texts propound a similar argument in relation to Merleau-Ponty' s 
reversibility thesis. 
Levinas' second and related problem with Merleau-Ponty's conception of alterity, 
is basically that it is overly positive. Along similar lines to a criticism made by Emile 
Brehier some years earlier (although perhaps with a little more sophistication)2 11 , Levinas 
argues that Merleau-Ponty's discussion of the genesis of the represented other 
presupposes the non-indifferent constitution of intersubjectivity. Cathryn Vasseleu is 
among those to have examined these suggestions in detail212 , but for the purposes of this 
chapter it needs only to be pointed out that Levinas' criticisms do not revolve simply 
around the fact that Merleau-Ponty highlights the non-indifferent aspects of our 
existence, and it is difficult to see how anybody could suggest that we encounter others 
with genuine indifference, least of all Levinas. Indeed, Levinas argues that Merleau-
Ponty' s philosophy actually goes one step further than this, and his discontent with 
Merleau-Ponty's conception of intersubjectivity revolves around the claim that it is 
sustained by what he terms "an unaccountable affection"213 • In other words, Levinas 
thinks that Merleau-Ponty' s descriptions of alterity are overly optimistic, in that they 
unjustifiably presuppose a social unity between self and other. 
In the process of exploring Merleau-Ponty's conception of intersubjectivity, this 
chapter will address these two related claims. Before turning to consider The Visible and 
the Invisible, however, it is worth recognising that his philosophy does occasionally 
appear to efface the difference between self and other. He attempts to legitimise this in 
various different ways, including through a quasi-psychological analysis of the behaviour 
of babies. In his essay "The Child's Relations with Others", Merleau-Ponty argues, 
fallowing Lac an, that the child does not distinguish between self and external world in 
any meaningful way prior to the mirror stage. According to Merleau-Ponty, the infant's 
relations with others are typified by what he terms "transitivism", in that the infant cries 
not because another discrete individual is crying, but as if they actually are that other 
2 tt1n The Primacy of Perception, Merleau-Ponty discusses Brehier's criticism that his phenomenology can 
speak only of the other in terms of their relations with us (that is ethically) and not as "this person who 
suffices to himself'. Without digressing unduly, Merleau-Ponty's response is basically that we never 
encounter this other who suffices to himself, but always an ethical other (PrP 28). 
2t2vasseleu, C., Textures of Light, p 64. 
213Vasseleu, C., p 64. 
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child (PrP 119). In other words, they identify with the other as if they are the same, and 
for Merleau-Ponty, this type of identification resounds throughout adult life in such a 
way that self and other have a tendency to encroach upon one another (PrP 147). 
We cannot justify or cast aspersions upon the psychological aspects of this idea 
here, but in this tendency to collapse the other into the self it does appear that Merleau-
Ponty' s emphasis upon ambiguity is somewhat diluted in regard to his descriptions of 
relations with the other. Parts of Phenomenology of Perception also have an inherently 
positive emphasis and it cannot be denied that Levinas' claim that Merleau-Ponty's work 
is sustained by an unaccountable affection is an understandable interpretation of some 
major aspects of this work. It seems to me, however, that this feeling of affection that can 
be discerned in Merleau-Ponty's early work is more a flaw of exposition, and of his 
preoccupation with refuting Sartre and the conflict inherent in the master-slave dialectic, 
than of the ontology that is presupposed by and indirectly involved in this earlier text. 
After all, even in his earlier philosophy, Merleau-Ponty regularly speaks of the 
paradox of immanence and transcendence (PrP 18), and he insists that far from being 
mutually exclusive, the two concepts actually require each other. In elaborating upon the 
paradox that transcendence is always betrothed to immanence, and vice versa, he makes it 
clear that the "transcendence always contains something more than what is actually 
given" (PrP 16) and it is this something more that escapes or resists assimilation. The 
other can hence never be completely divested of their othe1ness, because in immanence there is 
always also some form of transcendence, although there is nevertheless a moral problem 
regarding nullifying that alterity. According to Merleau-Ponty, however, this is a problem 
posed by life itself, rather than a dilemma that is specific to, or exacerbated by the 
phenomenological milieu (PrP 30). And of course, we all do frequently encounter this 
type of aporia in our relations with other people. If we care about somebody enough to 
want to get to know them fully, we find that there is always something enigmatic about 
them that eludes us. This phenomenon of our lived experience is certainly not something 
that Merleau-Ponty wishes to deny. 
On the contrary, even in Phenomenology of Perception, he continually 
emphasises the ability of the other to surprise us and to reveal aspects of themselves that 
we had hitherto not been aware of. As Michael Yeo suggests, Merleau-Ponty emphasises 
our capacity to "win from the speech of the other something more and perhaps different 
than one puts into it"2 14, and this provides for the possibility of the new (including the 
disconcerting) to emerge from our experience. 
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As something of a subject-based philosophy (although I disagree with Merleau-
Ponty about precisely how subject-based Phenomenology of Perception is215), many of 
his discussions regarding the other are expressed in terms of their effect upon the body-
subject. This type of philosophy of consciousness is phenomenology's most commonly 
acknowledged domain, and while Merleau-Ponty widens phenomenology's resources by 
affirming a body-subject, he is nevertheless intent on emphasising that not only can 
interactions with the other involve us in a renewed appreciation of their alterity (ie. the 
ways in which they elude us), the other is equally importantly also that which allows us 
to surprise ourselves, and to move beyond the various horizons and expectations that 
govern our daily lives. Dialogue with the other, for example, enables us to not only 
develop more sophisticated ways of thinking, but even to "discover" and be astounded by 
our own thoughts (PP 177). This phenomenon of surprise only begins to highlight the 
ways in which Merleau-Ponty attempts to avoid the conception of the other as 
domesticated by the subject's horizons of significance. Surprise and disorientation disrupt 
these already acquired meanings, and revolve around the ineluctable fact that interaction 
with the other often differs significantly from one's expectations and from the contexts 
that are brought to bear upon a situation. In this respect at least, there is in no sense an 
effacement of the otherness of the other, precisely because it is the other's alterity that 
induces change in the subject. Merleau-Ponty considers this overlapping and 
transformative interaction between self and other to be vitally important, to the extent that 
one could cogently claim that any absolute dichotomy between self and other is rendered 
untenable. The other encroaches upon the self because identification and community is 
already presupposed ( eg. in childhood), but also because alterity is that which literally 
alters for Merleau-Ponty. 
214Yeo, M., "Perceiving/Reading the Other: Ethical Dimensions", p 45. 
215In The Visible and the Invisible, Merleau-Ponty rejects his earlier philosophy for presupposing a 
philosophy of consciousness (VI 183), but it is also worth bearing in mind his argument in Phenomenology 
of Perception, that "if the perceiving I is genuinely an I, it cannot perceive a different one; if the perceiving 
I is anonymous, the other which it perceives is equally so" (PP 356). While phrased in a negative manner, 
Merleau-Ponty is suggesting that the ambiguity of human perception requires a subject that cannot be 
identical with itself (self-present) , so it is a philosophy whose 'subjective orientation' is already in the 
process of being problematised. Merleau-Ponty is often overly harsh in his retrospective accounts of his 
earlier work, and Jacques Taminiaux makes a similar argument in his essay "Phenomenology in Merleau-
Ponty's Late Work" (see Life-World and Consciousness: Essays for Aron Gurwitsch, ed. Embree, trans. 
Lingis, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1972, p 307-8). 
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In attempting to explain this conception of alterity as that which literally alters, 
Merleau-Ponty has enigmatically suggested that "I borrow myself from others; I create 
others from my own thoughts" (S 159). This formulation might seem somewhat 
misleading, in that it almost reads like a reinvention of an antiquated idealism - which is 
exactly what phenomenology is sometimes claimed to be. However, this statement also 
pertains in inverse fashion and this ensures that the other must borrow themselves from 
me, create me with their thoughts, and it is this interactive and transfo1mative element of 
alterity that remains an enduring focus of his philosophy. More detail will soon be 
accorded to the explication of this position, but these aspects of Merleau-Ponty' s earlier 
philosophy, which already seem capable of refuting Levinas' implied suggestion that he 
makes the other nothing but the projection of the subject's own aims and ambitions, are 
expanded upon in his later philosophy, and in particular by The Visible and the Invisible. 
In this respect, it is worth recalling that in an essay that was unpublished in his 
own lifetime, Merleau-Ponty describes his philosophical career as falling into two 
distinct phases: he tells us that the first phase of his work - up to and including 
Phenomenology of Perception - involved an attempt to restore the world of perception 
and to affirm the primacy of the pre-reflective cogito. In other words, in this period he 
was intent on emphasising an inherence in the world that is more fundamental than our 
thinking/reflective capacities. The second distinct phase of his work, which refers 
predominantly to The Visible and the Invisible, as well as to the abandoned The Prose of 
the World, is characterised as an attempt "to show how communication with others, and 
thought, take up and go beyond the realm of perception"216 • This is important for several 
reasons, not least that it suggests a fairly major change in direction. The idea that 
communication with others goes beyond the realm of perception, is sufficiently radical to 
put him at odds with at least a certain definition of phenomenology. 
Ostensibly in opposition to this type of characterisation, Martin Dillon has 
emphasised that these two major periods of Merleau-Ponty's career are actually 
intimately connected. Dillon downplays the significance of quotes from Merleau-Ponty 
like that which has just been cited and instead insists that The Visible and the Invisible is 
primarily concerned with bringing the results of the earlier work, which are often 
216This particular quotation, as well as Merleau-Ponty's more general claim regarding these two distinct 
periods of his work, can be found in an essay that was unpublished in his own lifetime and which has been 
subsequently titled "An Unpublished Text by Merleau-Ponty", and is included in Fisher's collection. See 
Fisher, A., ed. The Essential Writings of Merleau-Ponty, New York: Harcourt, 1969, p 367-8. 
primarily psychological, to their ontological explication. Merleau-Ponty has also 
suggested similar things at times (VI 17 6), and according to this type of account, the 
ontology of his later philosophy was already implied in his earlier works21 7 • 
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Despite agreeing with the broad outlines of Dillon's position, there are 
nevertheless some problems with such a characterisation that suggest that the truth of this 
dispute might lie somewhere between these respective accounts. In comparing Merleau-
Ponty' s discussion of the Sartrean other in his two major philosophical texts (PP & VI), 
one detects a significant difference in focus and this partially validates the conclusion that 
his career is typified by two reasonably different periods. In Phenomenology of 
Perception, Merleau-Ponty continually stresses that the conflict of Sartre's master-slave 
dialectic must always presuppose something shared, and this largely explains the 
"unaccountable affection" that Levinas discerns in his work. In The Visible and the 
Invisible, however, it is no longer the conflict with the other that so bothers him about 
Sartre's depiction, but it is actually what he takes to be Sartre's paradoxical refusal to 
respect alterity that most concerns him. According to Merleau-Ponty, Sartre's 
"agnosticism in regard to the other's being for himself, which appeared to guarantee his 
alterity, suddenly appears as the worst of infringements upon it" (VI 79). The suggestion 
being propounded is that far from safeguarding the other's alterity, the description of the 
other as forever inaccessible and incomprehensible ( as nothing more than a "freedom 
which transcends my freedom"218) actually trivialises it, and one consequence of this is 
that it also artificially renders the other as nothing but a threat. Far from merely being a 
negative thing, the alterity of the other is too complicated and multifarious to be simply 
posited as that which will forever elude us, and such a description also ignores the 
impo1iant ways in which an individual must borrow themselves from the other and yet 
also be created by the other - that is, the way in which self and other are partially 
intertwined. 
In The Visible and the Invisible then, there is a tacit claim regarding what a 
responsible treatment of the alterity of the other consists in, even if Merleau-Ponty rarely 
considers notions like responsibility in any explicit fashion219 • His final ontology wants to 
21 7Dillon, M. , Merleau-Ponty 's Ontology, p 154-6. 
218Sartre, J.P. , Being and Nothingness, p 363, 377. 
219Of course, Merleau-Ponty 's Humanism and Terror and Adventures of the Dialectic contain some 
important implications regarding political responsibility in their negotiations with Marxism and Sartre 
respectively. Diana Coole's book, Negativity and Politics, is a helpful resource in delineating the politics 
implied by Merleau-Ponty 's hyper-dialectics. However, while Merleau-Ponty does have this significance 
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insist that the other should not be conceived of only in terms of their inaccessibility and 
how they resist understanding. Rather, alterity is something that can only be appreciated 
in being encountered and in a recognition of the fact that there can be no absolute alterity. 
If absolute alterity is but a synonym of death and inconceivable to humanity, then what 
needs to be considered, according to Merleau-Ponty, is the paradoxical way in which self 
and other are intertwined, and yet also, and at the same time, divergent. 
Indeed, in The Visible and the Invisible, Merleau-Ponty is also careful not to fall 
prey to what has been termed, sometimes disparagingly, the horizonality of 
phenomenology. He devotes an entire chapter entitled "Interrogation and Intuition" to 
distancing himself from this tendency of phenomenology - which he variously traces to 
Hegel, Husserl and Bergson - to subsume all else under the concept of context and 
background. Engendering a coincidence between self and world ( or self and other) is just 
as antithetical to his philosophical purposes as advocating a vast abyssal difference, and 
Merleau-Ponty asserts that when we are overly sure of the other, just as when we are 
overly unsure of the other, an inadequate apprehension of human relations beckons. For 
him, alterity is that which cannot be reduced to the logic of an either/or, as he does not 
intend to espouse a Sartrean version of human relations where the other is so transcendent 
that they can never really be understood, and yet nor does his philosophy reductively 
ignore this alterity. He suggests that "this infinite distance, this absolute proximity 
express in two ways - as a soaring over or as fusion - the same relationship with the 
thing itself. They are two positivisms ... " (VI 127), indeed, neither of which he wants to 
associate with his new ontology. 
In an effort to avoid this dualistic tendency to conceive of the other as either 
forever beyond the comprehension of a subject, or as entirely domesticated by the subject 
and their horizons of significance, the final chapter of The Visible and the Invisible 
proposes an ontology that emphasises the chiasmic intertwining of various different 
notions. Most importantly for this chapter's purposes, it also suggests that a chiasmic 
relationship obtains between self and other. However, before considering how the figure 
of the chiasm might be envisaged to characterise the relationship between self and other, 
it is necessary to briefly re-examine Merleau-Ponty's more general use of this term and 
his associated theory of reversibility. 
Rather than maintaining a traditional dualism in which mind and body, subject 
in regard to issues of responsibility, he does not always make it explicit himself. 
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and object, self and other, etc., are discrete and separate entities, Merleau-Ponty argues 
that there is an important sense in which such pairs are also associated. For example, he 
does not dispute that there is a divergence or dehiscence in our embodied situation that is 
evident in the difference that exists between touching and being touched, between 
looking and being looked at, or between the sentient and the sensible. On the contrary, 
this divergence (ecart) is considered to be a necessary and constitutive factor in allowing 
subjectivity to be possible at all. However, he argues that rather than involving a simple 
dualism, this divergence between the sentient and the sensible also allows for the 
possibility of overlapping and encroachment between these two terms. For example, 
Merleau-Ponty has famously suggested that the experience of touching cannot be 
understood without reference to the tacit potential for this situation to be reversed. This 
reversibility thesis has been explicated in depth in chapter four, but it suffices to point out 
that according to him, the experience of being touched actually supervenes upon the 
experience of touching, and vice versa, in such a way that we can never unambiguously 
contend that we are simply touching, or are simply being touched, because there is 
always an embodied awareness of this "imminent reversibility" (VI 147). In other words, 
we can experience ourselves as touching only if we also have a recognition of our own 
tangibility and our capacity to be touched by others, and this means that our embodied 
subjectivity is never purely located in either our tangibility or in our touching, but at their 
intersection and where the two lines of a chiasm intertwine and cross. The chiasm then, is 
simply an image to describe how this overlapping and encroachment can take place 
between a pair that nevertheless retains a divergence, in that touching and touched are 
obviously never exactly the same thing. 
According to Merleau-Ponty, however, these observations retain an applicability 
that extends well beyond the relationship that obtains between touching and being 
touched. He also contends that mind and body (VI 247, 259), the perceptual faith and its 
articulation (VI 87-93), subject and object, self and world (VI 123), as well as many 
other related dualisms, are all associated chiasmically, and he terms the interdependence 
of these various different notions the flesh (VI 248-51). The rather radical consequences 
of this intertwining become most obvious when Merleau-Ponty sets about describing the 
interactions of this embodied flesh. At one stage in The Visible and the Invisible, he 
argues that the realisation that the world is not simply an object: 
Does not mean that there was a fusion or coinciding of me with it: on the 
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contrary, this occurs because a sort of dehiscence opens my body in two, and 
because between my body looked at and my body looking, my body touched and 
my body touching, there is overlapping or encroachment, so that we may say that 
the things pass into us, as well as we into the things (VI 123). 
According to Merleau-Ponty then, this non-dualistic divergence between touching and 
being touched, which necessitates some form of encroachment between the two terms, 
also means that the world is capable of encroaching upon and altering us, just as we are 
capable of altering it. Such an ontology rejects any absolute antinomy between self and 
world, as well as any notion of subjectivity that prioritises a rational, autonomous 
individual who is capable of imposing their choice upon a situation that is entirely 
external to them (although this is not to rule out the possibility of responsibility). To put 
the problem in Sartrean terms, while it may sometimes prove efficacious to distinguish 
between transcendence and facticity, or Being-for-itself and Being-in-itself, Merleau-
Ponty argues that such notions also overlap in such a way as to undermine any absolute 
difference between these two terms. As a consequence, Sartre's conception of an absolute 
freedom in regard to a situation is also rendered untenable by the recognition of the ways 
in which self and world are chiasmically intertwined220 , although this is not to suggest 
that the world can be reduced to us. Indeed, Merleau-Ponty explicitly asserts that 
precisely what is rarely considered is this paradoxical fact that although we are of the 
world, we are nevertheless not the world (VI 127), and in affirming the interdependence 
of humanity and the 'things' of the world in a way that permits neither fusion nor 
absolute distance, he advocates an embodied inherence of a different type. More 
significantly for the purposes of this chapter, his descriptions also pertain directly to the 
problem of the alterity of the other. 
After all, this chiasmic relationship ensures that in some sense the other is always 
intertwined within the subject, and Merleau-Ponty explicitly suggests that self and non-
self are but the obverse and reverse of each other (VI 83, 160). In short, his later 
philosophy reinforces that self and other are relationally constituted via their potential 
reversibility. One example of this might be the way in which looking at another person -
or even a painter looking at trees, according to Merleau-Ponty' s controversial example in 
"Eye and Mind" (PrP 167) - always also involves the tacit recognition that we too can be 
220These differences between Merleau-Ponty and Sartre have been analysed in greater depth in the previous 
chapter, and have also been argued for by John Compton. See Compton, J. , "Sartre, Merleau-Ponty and 
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looked at. However, rather than simply oscillating between these two modes of being, 
looker and looked upon, as Sartrean philosophy would have it, for Merleau-Ponty each 
experience is betrothed to the other in such a way that we are never simply a disembodied 
looker or a transcendental consciousness. The alterity of the other's look is always 
already involved in us, and rather than unduly exalting alterity by positing it as forever 
elusive, or as recognisable only as freedom that transcends my freedom, he instead 
affirms an interdependence of self and other that involves these categories overlapping 
and intertwining with one another, but without ever being reduced to each other. 
However, it is precisely this emphasis upon a self-other reversibility with which 
Levinas disagrees, and it is worth considering two of Levinas' more recent essays on 
Merleau-Ponty. In both "Intersubjectivity: Notes on Merleau-Ponty" and "Sensibility", 
Levinas reaffirms the criticisms of Merleau-Ponty that have already been ascribed to him 
- ie. an imperialism of the same, and an unaccountable affection - but he also imbues 
them with more concrete content, particularly in relation to Merleau-Ponty's emphasis 
upon reversibility. While Levinas accepts Merleau-Ponty's descriptions of reversibility as 
they pertain to an individual touching themselves while touching another object - he 
describes it as a "remarkable analysis"221 - he is not so sure about extending this type of 
reversibility to the alterity of another person, as Merleau-Ponty does. 
For example, as Lefort has also been quick to point out222 , at one stage Merleau-
Ponty asks: 
Why would this generality [the sentient-sensible divergence] which constitutes 
the unity of my body, not open it to other bodies? The handshake too is 
reversible ... Why would not the synergy exist among different organisms, if it is 
possible within each? Their landscapes interweave, their actions and their 
passions fit together exactly (my italics, VI 142). 
In "Intersubjectivity: Notes on Merleau-Ponty", Levinas explicitly considers this 
suggestion that the handshake is reversible. However, he asks: "one may especially 
wonder, then, whether such a relation, the ethical relation, is not imposed across a radical 
separation between the two hands"223 • Levinas hence argues that even if the touching-
Human Freedom" in The Journal of Philosophy, 1982, p 577-588. 
221Levinas, E., "Sensibility" in Ontology and Alterity in Merleau-Ponty, eds. Johnson & Smith, trans . 
Smith, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1990, p 63. 
222Lefort, C., "Flesh and Otherness", p 8. 
223Levinas, E., "Intersubjectivity: Notes on Merleau-Ponty" in Ontology and Alterity in Merleau-Ponty, 
eds. Johnson & Smith, trans. Smith, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1990, p 59. 
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touched relationship between one's own hands is as Merleau-Ponty describes it, to 
presume that this also applies between the hands of two people is to make something of a 
logical leap, and to tacitly reintroduce an imperialism of the same. After all, it seems that 
the apparent 'immanence' of the touching-touched relationship is superimposed upon that 
which is ostensibly transcendent - ie. alterity. This is also what Lefort' s critique of 
Merleau-Ponty amounts to when he argues that the body's internal divergence between 
the sentient and the sensible is projected upon the relation with the other224 • According to 
Levinas and Lefort alike, Merleau-Ponty superimposes the experience of the body upon 
the structure of our relations with the other, and without due consideration of the 
cliff erences between them. 
Now, these criticisms seem to miss their target. In the touching-touched dynamic 
that Merleau-Ponty so consistently describes, the world clearly encroaches upon the body 
as much as vice versa. To characterise this reversibility as immanent is simply incon·ect, 
as the world and others are conceived of as always already encroaching upon the body. In 
"Eye and Mind", Merleau-Ponty concludes with the words inscribed on Paul Klee's tomb 
- "I cannot be caught in immanence" (PrP 188) - and it is not the case that there is a self-
contained experience of the body that can afterwards be imposed upon the problem of 
others. On the contrary, the alterity of the other and our own alterity (ie. the touching-
touched divergence) are mutually encroaching, without ever being reducible to the other, 
and also without an ontological priority being accorded to either term, and this will be 
emphasised in chapter ten. 
Moreover, it is worth noting that Merleau-Ponty does not consider the various 
instances of reversibility that he delineates - ie. an individual touching their own hand, 
and shaking the hand of another person - to be exactly the same, as both Levinas and 
Lefort imply. The various reversible structures that he describes cannot simply be 
conflated, as that would be to propound something tantamount to a Hegelian dialectic, 
not a hyper-dialectic that seeks to avoid any final synthesis (VI 95). Indeed, Merleau-
Ponty explicitly argues that there is a difference between the reflexivity involved in 
hearing one ' s own voice and hearing the voice of another. As he says, "I am always on 
the side of my body" (VI 148), and this means that the reversibility involved in touching 
one's own hands is not exactly the same as that which obtains when I shake someone 
224Lefort, C., "Flesh and Otherness", p 8-9. 
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else's hands225 , but there is a nevertheless an isomorphism of function that allows me to 
encroach upon and perceptually interact with the other, when I shake his or her hand. 
Dillon and Madison also point out these type of problems with Lefort' s 
interpretation of the reversibility thesis, but there is another important aspect of Merleau-
Ponty' s account that resists such an interpretation, and which Dillon and Madison do not 
deal with at any length. Lefort' s and Levinas' criticisms of Merleau-Ponty are also 
misplaced because they ignore his tacit ethical import. In order to establish this, it is 
necessary to recall an important remark from Merleau-Ponty's essay, "The Philosopher 
and His Shadow". He contends that: "I borrow myself from others; I create others from 
my own thoughts. This is no failure to perceive others, it is the perception of others" (S 
159). In other words, Merleau-Ponty argues that the fact that I encroach upon the other in 
perception - eg. by tacitly putting myself in that place of that which is seen, or by lending 
the other something of my own tangibility when I touch them - is not necessarily a 
failure to perceive their genuine alterity. 
Now, Levinas explicitly considers this remark of Merleau-Ponty's, as well as the 
essay from which it derives. In "Intersubjectivity: Notes on Merleau-Ponty", Levinas 
suggests that "one must wonder whether this way of affirming a positivity in a 
phenomenon that, at first sight, and from a certain point of view, appears as privation 
does not require the indication of a new dimension that would accredit that positivity"226 • 
I will soon illustrate precisely why Merleau-Ponty considers this borrowing from others 
to be a positive phenomenon, but it is clear that Levinas cannot understand why the way 
that we borrow ourselves from others, and create others from our own thoughts, should 
not be understood as a failure of perception. For him, it indicates that perception cannot 
get us to the genuine alterity of the other, but on the contrary, remains ensnared in 
epistemological concerns. Indeed, in "Sensibility", Levinas again explicitly asks: "·how 
can a knowledge in which the perceived is neither grasped nor found in its object, but 
only lent to it [or borrowed from it], mean anything but the failure of perception's very 
intentions? (my italics )"227 . 
225 As well as problematising the claims of Lefort, this also challenges the position of James Phillips, who 
argues that Merleau-Ponty very rarely makes any distinction between the structure of our relations with 
others and the structure of our relations with the world. See Phillips, J. , "From the Unseen to the Invisible" 
in Merleau-Ponty, Inferiority and Exteriority, Psychic Life and the World, eds. Olkowski & Morley, 
Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999, p 80. 
226Levinas, E. , "Intersubjectivity: Notes on Merleau-Ponty", p 58 . 
227Levinas, E. , "Sensibility", p 64. 
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This reference to epistemology is important, and is a persistent theme of Levinas' 
writings on Merleau-Ponty. Levinas even argues that in Merleau-Ponty' s descriptions of 
the touching-touched relationship, "the order of consciousness is not broken by sociality 
any differently from the way it is by knowledge, which, joining the known, immediately 
coincides with what may have been foreign to it"228 . In response to this, it needs be 
reaffirmed that precisely what Merleau-Ponty' s touching-touched relationship cannot 
achieve is coincidence (VI 14 7), and nor, for that matter, can his epistemology (VI 121-
2). Moreover, Levinas also presumes that Merleau-Ponty's descriptions of the handshake 
remain on an epistemological level, but is this fair? After all, it is not simply an 
epistemological proof of the other that Merleau-Ponty's philosophy provides, but an 
onto-phenomenological one that also has an ethical relevance. Indeed, Merleau-Ponty 
considers this lending/borrowing situation where self and other encroach upon one 
another to be positive precisely because he is not making a purely epistemological point. 
Without the perceptual encroachment between self and other that he delineates, an 
absolute alterity is fetishised (the other is that which resists perception, as well as every 
attempt to thematise it) and the problem of solipsism seems to have returned through the 
back door. As Dorothea Olkowski has pertinently put it, "if there is to be room in the 
world for others as others, there must be some connection between self and other that 
exceeds purely psychic life"229 , and Merleau-Ponty envisages this as an ontological 
necessity, rather than as an attempt to propound a thesis that restores us to the primordial 
affection that we have for the other. 
That said, Levinas is right to be wary of Merleau-Ponty' s philosophy, at least 
insofar as it contests aspects of his own philosophy. Indeed, one consequence of Merleau-
Ponty' s position is that questions regarding the otherness of the other are rendered 
something of an abstraction, at least if they conceive of that alterity without reference to 
the subjectivity with which it is always chiasmically intertwined230 • For Merleau-Ponty, a 
responsible treatment of alterity consists in recognising that alterity is always intertwined 
228Levinas, E. , "Intersubjectivity: Notes on Merleau-Ponty", p 59. 
2290lkowski, D. , "The Continuum of Interiority and Exteriority in the Thought of Merleau-Ponty" in 
Merleau-Ponty, Interiority and Exteriority, Psychic Life and the World, eds. Olkowski & Morley, p 4. 
2300f course, Levinas' treatment of touching in Otherwise Than Being Or Beyond Essence is complicated. 
At times, he seems to imply that embodied relations involve an ' interpenetration' of self and other, and the 
extent to which the other maintains an absolute distance is hence riddled with more tension than is 
commonly presumed. While a sustained examination of Levinas' work may have been beneficial in this 
regard, forthcoming chapters will argue that many of the differences between Merleau-Ponty 's and 
Derrida' s conceptions of alterity also apply between Merleau-Ponty and Levinas (see chapter nine). 
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within subjectivity, rather than by obscuring this fact by projecting a self-present 
individual who is confronted by an alterity that is inaccessible and beyond 
comprehension. Exactly what kind of responsibility Merleau-Ponty's position entails will 
be explicated throughout the remainder of this thesis, but for the moment these 
observations suggest that his thought is misrepresented where it is categorised as 
indifferent to the alterity of the other, and also where it is criticised for unjustifiably 
presupposing an affectionate bond with that alterity. 
Of course, there is a minimal sense in which Merleau-Ponty's work does ensure 
that the other is a part of our system of reference. He emphasises that the other is always 
already encroaching upon us ( without being reducible to us), and in this respect cannot 
remain a pure other as Levinas seems to desire. But Merleau-Ponty's distaste for such 
absolute conceptions of alterity has already been illustrated in relation to Sartre, and for 
Merleau-Ponty, the risk of this overlapping with the other can and should always be there 
(VI 123). His philosophy consistently alludes to the manner in which this encroachment 
is not simply a bad thing and something to be avoided at all costs, like a shy teenager 
might ignore the overtures of those r·eaching out to them. For Merleau-Ponty, interacting 
with and influencing the other ( even contributing to permanently changing them) does 
not necessarily constitute a denial of their alterity. On the contrary, if done properly it in 
fact attests to it, because we are open to the possibility of being influenced and changed 
by the difference that they bring to bear upon our interaction with them. This ethic of 
mutual transformation is not an imperialism of the same, as the sanctity of the self must 
be breached in any meaningful interaction with alterity. 
We are now in a position to see why Merleau-Ponty's conception of alterity does 
not succumb to Levinas' fundamental criticism of it. An imperialism of the same would 
be any totalising system of judgement (whether it be personal, philosophical or political) 
that ensured that the other could gain entry into a particular world perspective only on the 
condition of surrendering their difference. What this chapter hopes to have begun to 
illustrate, however, is that for Merleau-Ponty the other is truly other, only if they gain 
entry into this world perspective by actually altering this totalising system precisely on 
account of their difference. This is the ethics that his ontology of the flesh tacitly 
presupposes, and it is a position that is importantly different from those of Sartre, Levinas 
and Derrida respectively. Difference is not encountered by preserving it untouched, like a 
specimen in a jar. Rather difference and alterity are truly experienced only by an 
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openness that recognises that despite all of the undoubted differences that we encounter, 
there is always something shared that allows difference to be conceivable at all. This is 
not an effort to reintegrate cliff erence into sameness, but an insistence upon the 
importance of transforming the notions of self and other in any attempt to behave 
responsibly towards the alterity of the other. 
8b. Successfully Reading a Text: A Responsible Treatment of the Alterity of the 
Book 
Thus far, this chapter has considered alterity in a somewhat restricted and even 
humanistic sense, in that the other being referred to has frequently focused upon our 
literal encounter with another person. It is this focus that was largely responsible for 
making the existentialism of the 1940s so seductive, but it is also partly why it is 
currently somewhat out of favour intellectually. Broadening this treatment of the other is 
a task that is certainly congruent with Derrida's deconstructive intent to disavow all such 
subject-based thinking23 1, and it is also something that Merleau-Ponty' s later philosophy 
would endorse. At least according to Merleau-Ponty himself, his final project involves an 
ontology that would be presented "without compromise with humanism, nor moreover 
with naturalism, nor finally with theology" (VI 274). Moreover, in The Prose of the 
World he explicitly considers issues like the alterity of the text, rather than merely 
remaining within the oscillations of the thing-consciousness distinction, and the 
remainder of this chapter will be devoted to exploring this text's less humanistic 
conception of what responsibility towards the alterity of the other might involve. 
Admittedly, there is a small methodological problem in focusing this analysis 
upon a text that Merleau-Ponty had abandoned in favour of other projects, but parts of 
The Prose of the World that we will be refeni.ng to were actually published by Merleau-
Ponty himself. Moreover, they were also considered deserving of inclusion, although 
perhaps in a substantially revised form, in what would have been a much larger version of 
The Visible and the Invisible than we currently have232 • The second and more important 
231 According to Derrida, "the discourse on the subject, even if it locates difference, inadequati on, the 
dehiscence within auto-affection, etc., continues to link subjectivity with man". See '"Eating Well' or The 
Calculation of the Subject: An Interview with Jacques Derrida", in Who Comes After the Subject? eds. 
Cadava, Connor, Nancy, New York: Routledge, 1991 , p 105. 
232For a detailed account ofMerleau-Ponty 's publishing intents, see Dillon, M., Merleau-Ponty's Ontology. 
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factor in legitimising this discussion of Merleau-Ponty via a partly abandoned text, is that 
the "indirect ontology" of The Visible and the Invisible has already been addressed, and 
some of the consequences that this text has for alterity have been explicated. This ensures 
that what follows in our discussion of The Prose of the World need not stand alone as an 
explanation of Merleau-Ponty's treatment of alterity, but will simply deepen the 
understanding that has been attained through our previous discussions. 
Of course, a consideration of the alterity of the text seems to involve a 
manipulation of the playing field in favour of Derrida. Even if it can be claimed that 
Derrida's work is primarily philosophical, it is nevertheless heavily textually based, and 
it is true that in pursuing such themes this chapter is pushing Merleau-Ponty into terrain 
with which he was less obviously interested. In his essay "Two Reversibilities: Merleau-
Ponty and Derrida", Mark Yount also emphasises this point, and he suggests that despite 
Merleau-Ponty and Derrida having a very similar conception of reversibility: 
Derrida writes the reflexivity of reading as writing and of a writing that refers to 
itself, while Merleau-Ponty sees a reflexivity of the body, a touching of touch that 
lends its "inspired exegesis" ·to the always unfinished birth of a world ( cf. VI 
133)233. 
According to Yount then, what separates these two philosophers is their different areas of 
concern, and he implies that Merleau-Ponty pays only minimal attention to the 
reflexivity/reversibility of reading as writing, and of a writing that refers to itself. Such a 
position is intuitively persuasive and it is ce1iainly evident in much of the literature 
regarding the intersection of these two French thinkers234 , but this chapter will challenge 
such a characterisation. In our earlier discussion of The Visible and the Invisible, it was 
beginning to become apparent that Merleau-Ponty's treatment of the other entails an 
ethical relation of mutual grappling and encroachment, where neither self nor other can 
be conceived of as discrete entities. Contrary to what Yount would have us believe, 
however, these notions are actually reaffirmed by Merleau-Ponty's discussion of the task 
of reading as it is presented in The Prose of the World. As will soon become apparent, 
this more textual focus also provides some additional means to further this thesis ' 
233Yount, M, "Two Reversibilities: Merleau-Ponty and Derrida", p 222. 
234As has been indicated elsewhere, I am predominantly referring to articles from the collection of essays 
entitled Ecart and Differance: Merleau-Ponty and Derrida on Seeing and Writing, and Merleau-Ponty, 
Hermeneutics and Postmodernism, which considers Merleau-Ponty's relation to postmodernism, and 
somewhat inevitably to deconstruction. 
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comparison of Merleau-Ponty and Derrida. 
In this respect, Michael Yeo's essay, "Perceiving/Reading the Other: Ethical 
Dimensions", is an invaluable resource. Arguing that perception is too narrowing a 
medium for analysing the experience of others, Yeo instead quotes extensively from The 
Prose of the World, and persuasively suggests that Merleau-Ponty's account of 
perceiving or phenomenologically encountering the other has its correlate in the reading 
of texts, and a type of hermeneutics that is often unrecognised in his thought. As Yeo 
points out, at one stage in The Prose of the World, Merleau-Ponty explicitly argues that 
"to perceive other people, is to decipher a language", and he adds that "one cannot help 
but notice how much the perception of other people becomes increasingly comparable to 
language"235 • In and of themselves, these sentiments are not overly helpful in confronting 
the problem at hand (what a responsible treatment of alterity might consist in) , but 
Merleau-Ponty expands upon these comments to suggest that: 
The same difficulty is involved in understanding how words arranged in 
propositions can signify anything to us except our own thought, and how the 
movements of a body patterned into gestures or action can present us with 
someone else other than ourselves ... how we are able to find in these spectacles 
anything other than what we have put into them (PW 139). 
This analogy that Merleau-Ponty draws between the manner in which the body of another 
can present us with something that is not merely our own projection, and how words, 
when presented in certain arrangements, always signify something more than merely our 
own thoughts, is an important one. While Merleau-Ponty is not original in suggesting this 
type of correlation, it is worth considering his treatment of language in a little more detail 
in order to ascertain how he thinks that certain types of language, but not all, allow us to 
move beyond the confines of our own thoughts and a merely solipsistic appraisal of the 
world. 
In attempting to reveal how language might allow for new meaning, Merleau-
Ponty begins by way of describing a sterile language that is "in danger of becoming 
stereotypic", which according to him, "can be distinguished from fertile language" (PW 
57). While Derrida might object to the ease of this distinction, it is in abundant evidence 
in the essays collected in The Primacy of Perception, and also in The Prose of the World. 
Employing several different vocabularies, all of which refer to this type of distinction, 
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Merleau-Ponty's point is basically that our speech (and our writing, for he does not 
privilege the audible over the written) is governed by both ready-made meanings, and a 
more fertile and ambiguous mode of expression that can adjust for changing 
circumstances. 
According to Merleau-Ponty, "sedimented language is the language the reader 
brings with him, the stock of accepted relations between signs and familiar significations, 
without which we could never have begun to read" (PW 13). In other words, sedimented 
language is the linguistic equivalent of the horizon that the subject inevitably projects 
upon the world in which they seek to interact, and into which they place and sometimes 
even subsume that which they read or encounter in that world. But if horizons were 
everything, "vibrating the listener's machinery of acquired signification" (PW 142) as 
Merleau-Ponty puts it, it would not be possible to learn anything. It is for the same reason 
that in Phenomenology of Perception, he insists that our embodied learning, via imitation 
and habituality, can never be merely a robotic response, but must be a flexible and 
constantly evolving way of adjusting to circumstances (see chapter six). Even if it is 
disingenuous to assert that one ever· learns something that could be characterised as 
absolutely new and that bears no relation to our horizons of significance, it seems 
undeniable that humanity has the capacity to learn, or as in Merleau-Ponty's most 
favoured example, to win from a particularly prescient novel "something more, and 
perhaps different, than one puts into it"236 • 
According to Merleau-Ponty, the emergence of new meaning, in a linguistic 
sense, occurs through the dialectical exchange between these two positions, the fertile 
and the sedimented. In this context, however, it is worth remembering that it is a "hyper-
dialectic" that Merleau-Ponty envisages as a productive philosophical resource, as 
opposed to a dialectic of the kind employed by Hegel and so frequently castigated by 
thinkers of 'postmodern' persuasion, for whom it often appears that Hegel is the arch-
enemy. Merleau-Ponty's conception of a hyper-dialectic seeks a dialectic, but it is one 
without aims for an ultimate synthesis (VI 95), and equally significantly, the "hyper-
dialectic is a thought that would take itself, and the changes it introduces into the 
spectacle, into account" (VI 38), at least insofar as that is possible. If this conception of 
how one attains to new meaning is to retain this hyper-dialectical element, it must 
235Yeo, M. , p 43. 
236Yeo, M. , p 45. 
acknowledge that this very description is itself finite , and Merleau-Ponty consistently 
brackets the terms of his distinctions, including that regarding the difference between 
sedimented and fertile language that has just been introduced. 
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Moreover, what he refers to as sedimented language is not the disparaged side of a 
dualistic hierarchy, as Derrida has insisted is typical of metaphysical thought. Rather than 
attempting to establish an origin, or to render the one aspect of language primary at the 
expense of the other, Merleau-Ponty insists that the sedimented and the fertile are 
interwoven. In a move that we may be becoming familiar with, particularly given 
Derrida's recent work in which the notions of possibility and impossibility are 
inextricably intertwined237, Merleau-Ponty suggests that: 
Everything which exists for me should be mine, and not qualify as a being for me, 
except on condition of being framed in my field, does not prevent the appearance 
of the other [read fertile language] - on the contrary it makes that appearance 
possible (my italics, PW 138). 
Just as immanence and transcendence are two complementary sides of the same 
perceptual phenomenon, so we are seeing a similar logic in regard to Merleau-Ponty' s 
language distinction. It is the blindness of sedimented language that makes meaning 
possible and which is the necessary condition for allowing change to come about. 
Without this background context, genuinely fertile language cannot develop. 
Merleau-Ponty's demarcation of these two types of language is worth briefly 
comparing with the positions espoused by Cora Diamond and Raimond Gaita, among 
others. These theorists are united by their shared rejection of traditional moral philosophy 
and their conviction that the vocabularies employed in these increasingly specific 
domains of moral thought (from Kant to Rawls, from the concept of maximising hedons 
to whatever else) does not allow these philosophers to get a grip on the lived experience 
that they are seeking to shed light upon238 • While their arguments for "linguistic 
disassociation" are more complicated than this summary might suggest, the essential 
point to extract is that the only language that can adequately approximate to lived 
experience - to the horror of the holocaust, for example - is a language that is not 
restricted to a discrete field of inquiry. Moreover, nor is it a language that has actually 
become cliched or sedimented, to use Merleau-Ponty's terminology. Rather, it is a 
23 7Derrida's possible-impossible aporias, and their relevance to the philosophy of Merleau-Ponty, will be 
further examined in chapter ten. 
language that is poised on the verge of death, that at least has the possibility to become 
cliche but has not quite fallen over that precipice, which can adequately cope with the 
complexities of moral issues. This type of juxtaposition between the cliched and the 
innovative, the sedimented and the fertile, accurately conveys the manner in which 
meaning occurs for Merleau-Ponty. 
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Merleau-Ponty, it should be remembered, is also convinced that the well-written 
book "makes use of everything I have contributed, in order to carry me beyond it" (PW 
11). It is not difficult to discern a paradox and a circularity here, in that the book uses the 
reader's own resources to carry them beyond themselves and towards that which is other, 
but for Merleau-Ponty, this aporetic situation is actually the evidence that "betrays the 
solipsistic illusion that consists in thinking that every going beyond is a surpassing 
accomplished by oneself' (VI 143). As in regard to the hermeneutic circle, the key seems 
to be not in getting out of this paradoxical situation, but as Heidegger has suggested, in 
coming into it in the right way239 • 
In The Prose of the World, Merleau-Ponty is equally committed to affirming this, 
and he begins one paragraph by speculating "if the book teaches me something ... ". As 
Yeo recognises, this insinuates that the book- or the text, if we agree with Derrida's 
insistence that the notion of the book falsely connotes a finished and complete totality -
may not teach me something and, by implication, we may not reach the other. We may be 
blind to the other and we may even assuage our surprise at something different by 
labelling it as "nonsense", "propaganda", or even "perverted" . There are any number of 
derogatory and condescending attitudes that are regularly employed to ensure that one's 
own particular way of doing things is not threatened. This is certainly a possible way of 
living and Merleau-Ponty is in no position to deny it, but it is also important to recognise 
that often books do teach us and interact with our consciousness in surprising ways. 
Merleau-Ponty argues that for us to truly encounter the alterity that a book makes 
possible for us (and once more this applies equally to the difference of another person), 
this must involve us appropriating the annuls of that text. According to him: 
My relation to a book begins with the easy familiarity of the words of our 
language, of ideas that are part of our make-up, in the same way that my 
perception of the other is at first sight perception of the gestures and behaviours 
238Gaita, R. , A Common Humanity, Melbourne: Text Publishing, 1999. 
239Heidegger, M., Being and Tim e, Sections 188- 192. 
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belonging to the 'human species ' . But [ and here is the important point] if the 
book really teaches me something, if the other person is really another, at a certain 
stage I must be surprised, disoriented. If we are to meet not just through what we 
have in common, but in what is different between us - which presupposes a 
transformation of myself and of the other as well - then our differences can no 
longer be opaque qualities. They must become meaning (my italics , PW 142). 
This is an intriguing comment and it will take a great deal of unpacking because it makes 
clear an important and enduring concern of Merleau-Ponty' s. He suggests that if we are 
to experience difference, and by implication alterity, then these differences must cease to 
be opaque and become meaning. The experience of difference as simply a deviation, or 
fetishised as something that cannot be addressed within the subject's frame of reference, 
is for Merleau-Ponty, not yet a genuine experience of the text/other. These differences 
must first become meaning and this, he tells us, "presupposes a transformation of myself 
and the other as well". The following quote from the same text makes clearer what he 
means by this. He suggests that: 
In the perception of the other, this happens [ie. the transformation of self and 
other that makes difference meaningful] when the other organism, instead of 
'behaving' like me, engages with the things in my world in a style that is at first 
mysterious to me, but which at least seems to me a coherent style because it 
responds to certain possibilities which fringed the things in my world. Similarly, 
when I am reading, there must be a moment when the author's intention escapes 
me, where he withdraws himself. Then I catch up from behind, fall into step, or 
else I tum over a few pages and, a bit later, a happy phrase brings me back and 
leads me to the core of the new signification, and I find access to it, through one 
of its ' aspects' , which was already part of my experience (my italics , PW 142-3 ). 
There is much of significance in this passage, and it reaffirms the suggestion from the 
previous quotation that "the book really teaches me something", and "the other person is 
really other", only when difference is reintegrated as meaningful difference. What is the 
distinction here, one might well ask, and how is difference to become meaning? It seems 
to describe the simultaneous apprehension of that which is mysterious as nevertheless a 
coherent and conceivable mode of existence, and more significantly, it is in the disruption 
of that very effort to comprehend that meaning resides. It seems that the meaning of the 
other ceases to be opaque in surprise and disorientation, and this rather paradoxical 
sentiment reinforces that Merleau-Ponty clearly wants to encourage that which resists 
preconceived expectations. 
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At the same time, however, he equally clearly also intends to avoid making the 
other forever inaccessible and it might hence be asked "in what sense is his other, really 
other?" . If we take the notion of the other to imply being entirely independent and 
separate, then Merleau-Ponty does not accord this absolute alterity the respect that it 
warrants. But is this the way that we really encounter otherness? Merleau-Ponty breaks 
down this idea of the independence of the other in favour of the idea of their 
interdependence, and the question that this thesis is beginning to pose is whether 
Merleau-Ponty' s definition of the other is closer to the mark than some more recent 
conceptions of alterity, including those of Levinas and Derrida respectively? For 
Merleau-Ponty, the other retains their difference, as well as their capacity to shock and 
break open the horizons of the same, and yet there is an enduring insistence that this 
difference can and should be encountered by, in a paradoxical sense, the actual 
transformation of this difference - that is, not the ceasing to be different, but the ceasing 
to be absolutely different, and the breaching of the conception of self and other as 
discrete and unrelated entities. Merleau-Ponty's persistent implication that responsibility 
towards the other consists in maximising these transformational opportunities is an 
insightful position, although that is not to negotiate with the more difficult question of 
whether his way of treating alterity is more or less productive than the deconstructive one 
exemplified in the work of Derrida. After all , to an even greater extent than is the case 
with Merleau-Ponty's later philosophy, deconstruction is premised upon respecting the 
alterity of the other. 
While the philosophical projects of these two French thinkers are importantly 
different, this discussion of what reading another text involves for Merleau-Ponty, 
provides the resources for beginning a comparison on the issue of responsibility towards 
the alterity of the text, as well as for pre-emptively exploring some important questions 
that will guide this thesis ' forthcoming discussions of Derridean alterity. After all, just as 
Merleau-Ponty emphasises the necessity of both sedimented and fertile languages, the 
various strategies that deconstruction implements in order to respect textual alterity are 
also premised upon two fundamental moves of what might be termed ' sameness ' and 
' difference ' at once. That is, deconstruction is committed to the rigorous analysis of the 
literal meaning of a text, and yet also to finding within that meaning (perhaps in the 
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neglected comers) aporias that point towards alternative meanings. Deconstruction must 
establish a methodology that pays close attention to these apparently contradictory 
imperatives and a reading of any Derridean text can only reaffirm this dual aspect. 
For example, in his discussion of the work of Levinas in "Violence and 
Metaphysics", Derrida speaks of the first aspect of this deconstructive strategy as being 
akin to a fidelity and a "desire to be faithful to the themes and audacities of a thinking" 
(WD 84). At the same time, however, deconstruction also famously borrows from 
Heidegger's conception of a destructive retrieve, and hence seeks to open a particular text 
up to alternative and usually repressed meanings that reside at least partly outside of the 
metaphysical tradition (although always also surreptitiously betrothed to it). Indeed, 
despite his avowed affinities with the philosophy of Levinas, which will be examined in 
the following chapter, "Violence and Metaphysics" also contains a powerful, although 
subtle critique of Levinas' early philosophy and its residual humanism (WD 127). 
Moreover, at least according to Simon Critchley, Derrida' s criticisms induced some 
substantial changes in Levinas' subsequent texts240 • This more violent and transgressive 
aspect of deconstruction is amply illustrated by Derrida's consistent and Nietzschean-
inspired exhortation, aimed at all of us engaged in philosophy, to "invent in your own 
language if you can or want to hear mine; invent if you can or want to give my language 
to be understood" (MO 57). In suggesting that a faithful reading of him is one that 
transgresses and goes beyond him, Derrida installs invention and reappropriation as 
vitally important aspects of any deconstructive reading. Ultimately, the merit of a 
deconstructive reading consists in this creative contact with another text that cannot be 
characterised as either mere fidelity or as an absolute transgression, but rather which 
oscillates between these dual demands. 
The intriguing thing about deconstruction, however, is that despite the fact that 
Derrida 's own interpretations of specific texts are generally quite radical, it is often 
difficult to pinpoint where the explanatory exegesis of a text ends and where the more 
violent and transgressive aspect of deconstruction begins. In the transformative 
interaction that ensues on account of deconstruction's dual commitments to both fidelity 
and transgression, Derrida is always reluctant to impose 'my text' , 'your text' 
designations too conspicuously in his texts. Returning to the problematic that has been 
associated with Merleau-Ponty, one might even suggest that self and other are extremely 
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difficult to discern in the work of deconstruction. It is even problematic to speak of a 
'work' of deconstruction, since deconstruction itself (were such a singularity ever 
attributable to it) only highlights what was already revealed in the text itself, and this all 
the more pointedly since Paul de Man' s insistence upon Rousseau ' s own 'deconstructive' 
capacity. All of the elements of a deconstructive intervention reside in the "neglected 
cornerstones" of an already existing system (MDM 72), and this equation is not altered in 
any significant way whether that 'system' be conceived of as metaphysics generally, 
which must contain its non-metaphysical track, or the writings of a specific thinker, 
which must also always testify to that which they are attempting to exclude. What then, is 
the 'work' of deconstruction, if there is "always already" (MDM 73) deconstruction 
taking place? These are, of course, themes reflected upon at length by Derrida ( and they 
will also be examined in the final two chapters), but another obvious and analogous 
question is: who or what is deconstructing, and where does the pressure exerted upon the 
deconstructive lever derive from, given that notions like self and other are so importantly 
undecidable? 
It is worth emphasising that these are not simply rhetorical questions designed to 
denigrate deconstruction, since such a position is rather closely related to that which 
Merleau-Ponty has just been commended for - ie. his insistence that categories like self 
and other must be transformed in order to do justice to, and act responsibly towards the 
alterity of the other. It might even be suggested that a 'proper' deconstructive reading 
(which is also always a writing) and by implication a responsible treatment of alterity, 
would consist in an interpretation that is open to the otherness of the text and yet which 
does not simply reify that otherness, but transforms it into something different, as 
Merleau-Ponty has also insisted in The Prose of the World. A reification of alterity-
which might involve: a) either ceaselessly quoting and/or seeking to present nothing but 
an exegesis; orb) refusing to interact with the text in any concrete ways but nevertheless 
idolatrously preserving it as an inspiration - is not something that could be associated 
with the deconstructive reading of a text ( cf. MDM 50). On the contrary, in responding to 
the alterity of another text, both Den-ida and Merleau-Ponty acknowledge the dual 
necessity of sterile and fertile language, of fidelity and transgression. Despite being 
preoccupied with such seemingly disparate themes, both of these French philosophers are 
intent on encouraging a transformational attitude towards alterity that complicates any 
24
°Critchley, S. , The Ethics of Deconstruction, p 11- 12. 
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dualistic conception of self and other. 
The realisation of these type of similarities on the question of alterity - which are 
only initial and peremptory formulations that await further examination - immediately 
provokes several important questions regarding the relationship between these two 
thinkers. In particular, the extent to which Derrida's conception of alterity remains intent 
on problematising self and other categories, and encouraging a recognition of their 
transformational aspects, will be an important issue. After all , in attempting to make 
room for the possibility of difference and heterogeneity, Derrida suggests that 
deconstruction aims specifically to accomplish two main things: that is, the reversal of 
the previously prioritised term of the opposition; and then to reveal how the logic that 
sustains and safeguards that opposition is always already disrupted (M 195). The extent 
to which these dual strategies are actually adhered to in practice will be a major concern, 
for the valorisation of only the reversal aspect of the deconstructive intervention would 
preclude the suggestion of Merleau-Ponty, and tacitly by Derrida himself, that otherness 
( whether that be a textual or humanistic other) is best encountered in the transformation 
of it. A mere reversal very rarely transforms the structure and imperatives involved in a 
given opposition, and it is with such thoughts in mind that we must tum to an analysis of 
Derrida's later texts, paying particular attention to his preoccupation with themes like the 
messianic, his call to the wholly other "to come", his consistent affirmation of a "radical 
singularity", as well as his "possible-impossible" aporias more generally. All of these 
themes appear inclined towards exalting a rather more absolute and asymmetrical 
conception of alterity than that endorsed by Merleau-Ponty's chiasmic conception of 
alterity, as well as towards promoting a disjunction between self and other that might, at 
least to some extent, prohibit their transformative interaction. 
9. The Other of Derridean Deconstruction: Levinas, Phenomenology, and the 
Problem of Responsibility 
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Deconstruction, and postmodernism more generally, have both associated their various 
criticisms of the philosophical tradition with a desire to emancipate a conception of 
alterity that they see as marginalised by metaphysics. This chapter does not intend either 
to validate or to cast aspersions upon postmodernity, but it does intend to form some 
qualitative judgements regarding this pivotal aspect of Derrida's deconstructive 
enterprise. In examining his treatment of alterity, it is necessary to explore an aporia that 
is discernible in many of Derrida's writings: that is, the tension his work often bears 
between emphasising an absolute and irrecuperable alterity that is always deferred and 
always "to come", and his simultaneous insistence that the other is always already within 
the self - a conception of alterity that can be summed up most presciently as always 
already encroaching. These two aspects of his treatment of alterity do not necessarily 
contradict one another, but they do exist in some tension with one another, and it will be 
argued that this problem is symptomatic of Derrida's vacillation between a Levinasian-
inspired conception of alterity and a more traditionally phenomenological conception of 
the other. In unpacking this important tension, this chapter will examine The Gift of 
Death's meandering ruminations on what responsibility to the alterity of the other might 
consist in, and it will also consider Derrida's persistent emphasis upon what he refers to 
as the messianic aspects of alterity. 
In order to disclose the full ramifications of the problem that is being addressed, it 
is wo1ih reaffirming that the phenomenological treatment of the other has been 
disparaged by a multitude of thinkers for subscribing to the "imperialism of the same"241 • 
The suggestion propounded by Levinas, among others, is that the phenomenological 
conception of the other- and this is intended to apply to Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, as 
much as to Husserl - actually deprives the other of exactly that which would constitute 
their alterity. According to this interpretation, phenomenology invariably describes the 
other along the lines of what subjectivity knows of it (or at least thinks it knows). While 
there are good reasons to retain a healthy scepticism in regard to this schematic dismissal 
of phenomenology (particularly in relation to the philosophy of Merleau-Ponty), it is not 
overly surprising, and nor is it simply wrong. At least in its stated methodological intent, 
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the phenomenological reduction is an attempt to bracket away the 'natural attitude ' that 
assumes that there is an outside world, and to instead restrict itself to a description of the 
contents of consciousness (PP viii, ix)242 • As a consequence of this theoretical starting 
point, it would seem that alterity can only be analysed according to how it appears to 
consciousness, and is hence defined only in terms of what it is for the self. For Levinas, 
on the contrary, the other is precisely the opposite to this, being primarily that which 
resists knowledge, as well as every attempt to thematise or capture that alterity. The other 
is that which does not and cannot appear. It will be argued that Derrida's conception of 
alterity vacillates between these two positions: ie. between a phenomenology that, while 
perhaps not an imperialism of the same, certainly emphasises the way in which the self 
always encroaches upon the other, and a more Levinasian-influenced conception of 
alterity which, to some extent, downplays this recognition. In this respect, Derrida's work 
stages a battle between phenomenology and something tantamount to a post-
phenomenology ( a conception of alterity that is irrecuperable and beyond the dialectic), 
and in addressing this problem this chapter promises to offer some important insights into 
the question of responsibility towards the other. 
A tension between these two aspects of alterity is evident in much of Derrida's 
work, but it is also apparent in his explicit interactions with the philosophy of Levinas. It 
has been widely recognised that Derrida owes Levinas a considerable philosophical debt, 
and at times De1Tida implies that his conception of alterity is similarly absolute and 
irrecuperable; the other is that which by definition must elude any attempt to grasp it. 
Like Levinas, Derrida claims that the other precedes philosophy and "necessarily invokes 
and provokes the subject before any genuine questioning can begin" (AL 299), and he 
also describes his work as "a positive response to an alterity which necessarily calls, 
summons, motivates it"243 . Without going into unnecessary detail at this formative stage 
of this chapter, Derrida clearly endorses some aspects of Levinas ' rather unsympathetic 
interpretation of traditional phenomenology, as well as his more general desire to accord 
alterity a less derivative role in his philosophy ( or non-philosophy244) . It might be 
241 Levinas, E., "Philosophy and the Idea of Infinity", p 50-5. 
242 Also see Husserl, E., Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology, trans. Cairns, The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960, chapter five. 
243Derrida, J. , "Deconstruction and the Other: Dialogue with Derrida", p 118. 
244In "Violence and Metaphysics", Derrida suggests that because of his renunciation of apriori 's and 
transcendental horizons of language, Levinas' work amounts to an empiricism. According to Derrida, it is 
"a pure thought of pure difference", that strictly speaking no longer partakes in philosophy (WD 151). 
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reasonably suggested that Derrida's enduring suspicions regarding phenomenology, in 
conjunction with his declared empathy with Levinas' philosophical project, provide 
enough circumstantial evidence to indicate that his account of alterity would be 
importantly different to the phenomenological paradigm that Levinas castigates 
(including the philosophy of Merleau-Ponty, whose work will be considered shortly). Nor 
is it that such a position is simply incorrect. 
Before sliding too quickly down this post-structuralist versus phenomenologist 
path, however, it is worth complicating such an account by pointing out that despite his 
avowed affinities with Levinas' way of thinking245 , in other places Derrida is suspicious 
of Levinas' position, and even of aspects of his own formulations that resemble Levinas ' 
work. It should not be ignored that Derrida has frequently returned to the writings of 
Levinas and intermingled his appreciation for him with multifarious criticisms. In no 
particular order, Levinas has been accused of humanism (WD 114, 127), of remaining 
within the tradition of Western metaphysics while claiming otherwise (WD 126), of 
betraying the feminine (AEL), of trying but failing to distinguish between the religious 
and the ethical (GD 84)246 , and ofinisguided and inaccurate readings of Heidegger (WD 
135-8, cf. GD 42) and Husserl (WD 120-21). Undoubtedly, there are also other issues 
with which Derrida's deconstructive interventions have been concerned, but for the 
moment it suffices to recognise that all of these apparently disparate criticisms relate to 
Levinas' fundamental conception of alterity. For this reason, it is worth momentarily 
returning to the vast and complicated text that is "Violence and Metaphysics", in which 
Derrida first sets about textually articulating some of his differences from Levinas. 
In that text, Derrida seeks to reveal that rather than the other being infinite and 
absolute, as Levinas demands, the other must also be recognisable as "other than myself'. 
The notion of alterity, Derrida argues, requires this relational aspect (being other than 
myself) to be conceivable at all (WD 126). Suggesting that dissymmetry would be 
245Denida describes the fundamental nature of his relationship with Levinas thus: "Faced with a thinking 
like that of Levinas, I never have an objection. I am ready to subscribe to everything that he says. That 
does not mean that I think the same thing in the same way, but in this respect the differences are very 
difficult to determine; in this case, what do differences of idiom, language or writing mean ... these are not 
philosophical differences" (as cited in Critchley, S. , p 9-10). Their relationship, however, is obviously 
more complicated than Derrida 's rather schematic account of it suggests. 
246In The Gift of Death, Denida comments that "in taking into account absolute singularity, that is the 
absolute alterity obtaining in relations between one human and another, Levinas is no longer able to 
distinguish between the infinite alterity of God and that of every human" (GD 84). In such sentiments, 
Denida appears to suggest that while Levinas intends to maintain a distinction between the religious and 
the ethical, his failure to do so is actually a good thing. For Denida, there can be no neat demarcation 
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impossible without some form of symmetry (WD 126), Derrida is wary of imbuing 
alterity with the absolute qualities that are involved in the singularity of Levinas' face-to-
face encounter. It is also worth acknowledging that, according to Derrida, Levinas' 
position partly betrays itself, because the wholly other is absolutely other only if it is 
human and hence partly the same (WD 127). While Derrida is convinced that his own 
work avoids this residual humanism, in insisting that alterity must be "other than the self' 
( and is hence conceivable only in relation to the self) he tacitly acknowledges a minimal 
truth to what Levinas has denigrated as the phenomenological "imperialism of the same" 
- ie. the notion that the other is always being conditioned by the horizons and contexts 
that the subject brings to bear upon that alterity. This is one example, among others, of 
the distance that Denida establishes between his own work and that of Levinas. It is also 
evidence that Derrida's debt to his deconstructive predecessor is not enough, on its own, 
to justify an oppositional logic when considering his relationship to the 
phenomenological conception of alterity, and to the work of Merleau-Ponty. 
More needs to be said about Derrida's relationship to Levinas, but this summary 
of one of the main arguments of "Violence and Metaphysics" is sufficient to show that 
although a conception of radical alterity might well be privileged by Derrida, at least 
according to his specific interactions with the work of Levinas, it is not valorised to the 
same extent. Of the two, Den·ida seems to be the more receptive to what might be called 
the traditional phenomenological perspective247, and if this is sustained in his later 
writings on alterity then this would also bring the Derridean position closer to Merleau-
Ponty' s conception of alterity. 
Of course, it is also possible that despite his protestations to the contrary, 
Derrida's conception of alterity in his later work nevertheless inclines towards the 
position that is best exemplified by Levinas ( and both John Caputo and Simon Critchley 
implicitly claim this in relation to the messianic248). If that is the case, then some of 
Derrida's early criticisms of Levinas would also appear to be self-criticisms. Without pre-
empting our ultimate verdict, it will be claimed that there is a tension in Derrida's later 
work between a Levinasian-inclined description of alterity and a more relational or 
between the religious and the ethical. 
2471n this respect, it is not surprising that in "Violence and Metaphysics", Derrida rescues Husserl 's notion 
of the alter-ego from some ofLevinas ' more severe criticisms of it (WD 120-1). 
248Caputo, J. , The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida, p 83-4. Simon Critchley also stresses the 
proximity ofLevinas and Derrida, even if he ultimately seems to prefer the Levinasian account (see 
Critchley, S., The Ethics of Deconstruction, p 199-200). 
traditionally phenomenological conception of alterity, although some of the details of 
both of these positions are still to be filled in. 
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Before delving into the paradoxes of Derrida's later philosophy, it is worth 
recognising that the questions that concern this chapter can be situated in terms of his 
own deconstructive methodology, and this is one reason why the early chapters of this 
thesis considered Of Grammatology at such length. Even if one wants to suggest, as 
Gasche has, that deconstruction is, in part, the deconstruction of the concept of method 
(cf. MDM 122-4)249 , it nevertheless has a distinguishable strategy that Derrida has made 
explicit (M 195). Particularly in his early texts, Derrida describes deconstruction as 
proceeding according to two main strategies: the first, the reversal or inversion of the 
prioritised term of a metaphysical opposition; and the second, the displacement or 
disruption of that opposition, by revealing that it is already corrupted from within. A 
genuinely deconstructive intervention requires both of these aspects in relatively equal 
measure. These dual ambitions have been explicated in detail in chapter three, but for the 
moment it suffices to recognise that Derrida's vacillation on the question of alterity can 
be cogently seen to derive from these dual methodological concerns and their importantly 
distinct, although not completely opposed, imperatives. A major issue for this chapter is 
the extent to which Derrida satisfies himself with simply reversing the alleged priority of 
the self in the phenomenological conception of alterity, for a philosophy that emphasises 
how the other does not and cannot appear. Theoretically, at least, deconstruction must 
also succeed in disrupting this self-other opposition, rather than merely reversing it, for it 
is this aspect of his methodology that Derrida acknowledges is the important one and this 
is because of an enduring suspicion about the mere reversal of binary oppositions. One 
inhabits such oppositions all the more when one does not suspect it (OG 24), and to 
attempt to reverse an opposition, or to just step outside of metaphysics, does not 
necessarily challenge the framework and governing presuppositions that are attempting to 
be reversed250 • In the example that concerns us, to merely reverse the conception of the 
self as determinative of the qualities of alterity (as phenomenology is accused of) for a 
249Gasche, R., The Tain of the Mirror, p 123. 
250According to Caputo, the way to negotiate the paradox of the gift (and it is a paradox analogous with that 
which ensures that one cannot just step outside of metaphysics) is to move within the cycles of giving and 
taking, but also to attempt to outmanoeuvre them by somehow loosening this type of exchange to allow for 
the possibility of something different (see Caputo, J. , The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida, p 170- 1). 
While this formulation poses as many questions as it answers, this type of problem will be more explicitly 
dealt with in the following chapter. 
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notion of alterity as absolutely indeterminable and capable of being accorded no tangible 
qualities, might be to leave in place a discrete separation between self and other that 
retains a propensity towards a type of individualism and a conception of subjectivity that 
has long since been disparaged251 . Having sketched such a framework for this chapter, it 
is time that this analysis became a little more specific. 
The most obvious aspect of Derrida's later philosophical conception of alterity is 
his advocation of the tout autre, the wholly other, and The Gift of Death will be our main 
focus in explicating what this exaltation of the wholly other might mean. Focusing upon 
S0ren Kierkegaard's discussion of the supreme Abrahamic sacrifice upon Mount Moriah, 
the latter half of this text promises to be of benefit in understanding Derrida's evocation 
of the wholly other, and also, albeit less directly, in beginning to comprehend his 
emphasis upon the messianic qualities of alterity252 . This text also looms as important for 
this thesis' more general purposes. As an essay on "the secrets of European 
responsibility" (GD 1) it will enable some tacit comparative allusions to the notion of 
responsibility as demanding a transformative interaction between self and other that the 
previous chapter attributed to Merleau-Ponty. 
Any attempt to sum up this short but ominously difficult text would have to 
involve the recognition of a certain incommensurability between the individual and the 
universal (or the singular and the multiple, although these are not quite synonymous), and 
consequently the dual demands placed upon anybody intending to behave responsibly. 
For Derrida, the paradox of responsible behaviour both installs a self-other opposition, in 
that there is always a question of being responsible before a singular other ( eg. a loved 
one, God, etc.), and yet it also breaks down the intimacy of this self-other opposition by 
referring us to our responsibility towards others generally and to what we share with 
them. Derrida insists that this type of aporia is too often ignored by the "knights of 
responsibility" who presume a rationalistic discourse of intention, conscience and good 
will (cf. MDM 247), such that accountability and responsibility in all aspects of life -
whether that be guilt before the human law, or even before the divine will of God - is 
251 Chiistina Howells argues that Derrida's conception of subjectivity, at least in his early work, remains 
stuck in what she calls "the reversing phase" rather than being radically deconstructed (see Howells, C., 
Derrida: Deconstruction from Phenomenology to Ethics, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999). In some respects, 
I will accuse his later work of this fault, although it will be admitted that Derrida's conception of alterity 
does not only remain within the 'reversing stage'. 
252 Although Derrida does not explicitly refer to this distinction between the messianic and messianisms in 
The Gift of Death (it is, however, a feature of Spectres of Marx), such a distinction is nevertheless 
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quite easily established (GD 85). These are the same people who insist that concrete 
ethical guidelines should be provided by any philosopher worth his or her 'salt' (GD 67) 
and who repeatedly ignore the difficulties inherent in a notion like responsibility, which 
demands something importantly different from merely behaving dutifully (GD 63). 
Derrida's exploration of Abraham's strange and paradoxical responsibility before 
the demands of God, which consists most obviously in sacrificing his only son Isaac, but 
also in betraying the ethical order through his silence about this act (GD 57-60), is 
designed to problematise this type of ethical concern that exclusively locates 
responsibility in the realm of generality. In places, Derrida even verges on suggesting that 
this more common notion of responsibility, which insists that one should behave 
according to a general principle that is capable of being rationally validated and justified 
in the public realm (GD 60), should be replaced with something closer to an Abrahamian 
individuality where the demands of a singular other ( eg. God) are importantly distinct 
from the ethical demands of our society (GD 61, 66). It should be noted that this 
emphasis upon responsibility as involving a radical singular confrontation with 
something or someone wholly other, seems to bear some similarities to the Levinasian 
conception of alterity and the radical singularity upon which his face-to-face encounter is 
predicated. This cannot be justified as yet, but it is also important to recognise that, 
ostensibly at least, Derrida equivocates regarding just how far he wants to endorse such a 
conception of responsibility and also on the entire issue of whether Abraham's 
willingness to murder is an act of faith, or simply an unforgivable transgression. 
Derrida's methodology here, this undecidable equivocation, might also be termed 
an 'agnosticism'. This is obviously a somewhat paradoxical thought given the quasi-
religious themes with which this chapter is concerned, but such an assertion does not 
necessarily contradict the arguments of philosophers like Caputo, as well as Kevin Hart, 
who have both highlighted the 'religious' significance of Derrida's thought253 • For 
Derrida, responsibility to the other is such that we cannot know whether we have, or have 
not, made a mistake by them. In deciding, we endure the trial of undecidability, which 
ensures that there is no right answer, since the decision is that which must leap into the 
presupposed in places as this chapter will illustrate. 
253Caputo, J., The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida, & Hart, K. , Trespass of the Sign. It will soon be 
argued that Derrida makes a religion of agnosticism (and that is what Caputo's "religion without religion" 
amounts to), but before elaborating on such ideas consideration of Derrida's notion of the messianic is 
required. 
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unknown and into madness, according to both Kierkegaard and Derrida alike (GD 65). 
But textually speaking, it is worth noting that Derrida does not actually descend into this 
madness very often. He refuses to say 'yes' or 'no' to the question of whether Abraham is 
the person of greatest faith. Abraham is "at the same time, the most moral and the most 
immoral, the most responsible and the most irresponsible" (GD 72). In this respect, it is 
worth momentarily invoking William James' famous definition of the agnostic. In his 
reliance upon such equivocations, Derrida appears to take the risk of being wrong more 
seriously than the risks of missing out on the spiritual benefits of belief (that is, of 
deciding)254 , and he leaves his options open. This, of course, is a defining trait of 
deconstruction, which has been variously pilloried and praised for this refusal to 
propound anything that the logocentric tradition could deem to be a thesis. In this respect, 
it is also not surprising that Simon Critchley has described Derrida's work as a 
"philosophy of hesitation"255 . 
Of course, to point out this type of agnosticism and equivocation is not 
necessarily to criticise Derrida. Who can blame him for not finding a formulaic response 
to the question of responsibility towards the other? This thesis will not be able to provide 
it, even though it will be suggested that an alternative and possibly more promising way 
to conceive of this responsibility is one that is more intimately acquainted with the 
position of Merleau-Ponty. But before entertaining any criticisms of Derrida, it must be 
recognised that this particular type of undecidability - which is sometimes expressed via 
an insistence upon the "perhaps" (PF 3 8)256 - is typical of deconstruction, and there is 
also an analogous problem in his recently published text, Of Hospitality. 
Towards the end of this text, Derrida returns to biblical themes and considers the 
famous story of Lot. The story revolves around some foreign men arriving at Lot's 
doorstep and asking to be taken in. Lot agrees, but when some other men from Sodom 
arrive at his house and violently demand those foreigners whom he has taken in under his 
protection, Lot refuses. After first offering them his daughter, Lot eventually decides to 
sacrifice his wife to the sexual whims of the men from Sodom rather than give up his 
254In his essay "The Will to Believe", William James suggests that the agnostic's position- a refusal to 
commit oneself to faith because of insufficient evidence - is untenable. He sees it as being a position of 
"pure intellectualism". See James, W., The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy, New 
York: Longmans, Green, 1896. 
255Critchley, S. , The Ethics of Deconstruction, p 41. 
256In the context of a discussion of Nietzsche in Politics of Friendship , Derrida asserts that "no 
responsibility will ever abolish the perhaps" (PF 38), and he even suggests, in his own ambiguous way, 
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duty to be hospitable to his recently arrived guests (OH 151-5). Derrida concludes this 
text, as well as this particular discussion of hospitality and what it might involve, by 
asking: "Are we the heirs to this tradition of hospitality? Up to what point? Where should 
we place the invariant, if it is one, across this logic and these narratives?" (OH 155). 
These are all pertinent questions, but they are also questions that are notoriously difficult 
to figure out in Derrida's texts, where there is never an obvious answer and where self 
and other designations ( eg. where the exegesis ends, and the deconstruction begins) are 
few and far between. 
Nevertheless, it is relatively clear that in The Gift of Death, Derrida intends to free 
us from the common assumption that responsibility is to be associated with behaviour 
that accords with general principles capable of justification in the public realm. In 
opposition to such an account, he emphasises the "radical singularity" of the demands 
placed upon Abraham by God (GD 60, 68, 79) and those that might be placed on us by 
our own loved ones. In the process, he also verges on reinstalling a self-other binarism. 
While such a suggestion runs against the grain of much of what Derrida says about 
alterity, particularly in his early work, it is worth recognising that the aporia that 
surrounds Abraham's decision presumes a rather discrete self and other. Abraham is 
estranged from God ( even if God is within, he is nevertheless importantly distinct), aware 
only that he is compelled to sacrifice his son, and he has no access to the rationale behind 
the necessity for such a sacrifice and no possibility of a conversation with God, or a plea 
bargain, that might lead to respite from this most horrible of commandments. Equally 
importantly, Abraham's family are also other radically disparate individuals, entirely 
estranged from Abraham and his predicament (GD 73). His wife Sarah is she to whom 
nothing is ever said (GD 76). This is not to suggest that Abraham has no feelings for 
them - he certainly does and this is what imbues the sacrifice with worth (GD 65). But 
the point is that Abraham is envisaged as making a decision in a vacuum from the rest of 
existence. How is that possible? Abraham does not come, or even exist without his 
family, and it is difficult to conceive of a radically singular conversation between the 
essence of Abraham, his interior reserve, and God. Admittedly, it is not always 
transparently clear that Derrida endorses this interior reserve of subjectivity that 
Kierkegaard's reading of Abraham reveals. However, both Kierkegaard and Derrida 
repeatedly insist upon the importance of this radical singularity in behaving responsibly 
that responsibility might consist precisely in framing all of our responses in terms of a 'perhaps '. 
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and in deciding upon a course of action (GD 60, 68, 79, 87). 
What exactly is this radical singularity that Derrida keeps referring to in this text, 
as well as in others from the same period257, including Politics of Friendship, where he 
also refers to an "absolutely and irreplaceably singular responsibility" (PF 37)? In what 
does this radical singularity of the other, and by implication ourselves, consist? In this 
respect, it is worth recalling Derrida's insistence that a decision, if it is genuinely to be a 
decision, must create a rupture with all prior preparations or anticipations for that 
decision (GD 77). A decision must leap beyond any mere calculative reasoning and 
anticipatory modes of figuring out what might be the best course of action. Now, if a 
decision cannot follow from any prior preparations, or from any particularly salient 
advice, or even simply from one's lifelong commitment to family or religion, then it 
would seem that one is importantly alone when deciding and we can hence understand 
Derrida's insistence upon a radical and absolute singularity. Indeed, Derrida suggests that 
this radical singularity is illustrated equally well in two main phenomena, those being 
death and the decision, as no-one can die or decide in place of me (GD 60). That said, 
Derrida also has some substantial reservations in regard to the Heideggerian conception 
of death as the ultimate individualising event258 , but further consideration of his treatment 
of death must wait until the next chapter. 
Derrida's emphasis upon this radical singularity seems to be referring to the 
solitude that responsibility brings with it, and in this respect it is worth noting that he has 
elsewhere made some revealing comments about the solitude that deconstruction 
presupposes. In a relatively recent interview, one speaker asked Derrida if differance is 
analogous to what in contemporary literature is called solitude and his response was 
highly intriguing. Derrida replied that: 
The notion of solitude obeys a highly disconcerting logic. Pure solitude is 
absolute non-solitude, whether it cuts off all relation to the other or whether it 
relates to all that is other, which is also not relating at all. Is not the relation to 
every other, which is the only opening to a possible solitude, also the interruption 
to solitude?259 
257In the interviews contained in Deconstruction in a Nutshell, Derrida also repeatedly refers to this radical 
singularity. See Caputo, J. , Deconstruction in a Nutshell, p 14. 
258This is examined in greater depth in Caputo, J. , The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida, p 83. 
259Derrida, J. , as cited in "The Original Discussion of Differance", Derrida and Differance, eds. Wood & 
Bernasconi, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1988, p 85. 
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Merleau-Ponty has suggested that solitude and communication are but two moments of 
the same phenomenon (PP 359, VI 79, 233), and at least in this moment, Derrida 
similarly insists that solitude is a relational concept. As a consequence, he is also a 
considerable distance from affirming only the pure and unconditional alterity of the other. 
Nevertheless, Derrida does go on to suggest that "I do not absolutely reject the 
proposition according to which differance would also be solitude"260 • This is an important 
admission, for even where Derrida recognises that it must be balanced by its counterpart, 
it is solitude and disruption that remains his focus. Of course, an emphasis upon solitude 
does not necessarily preclude a meaningful conception of alterity. It might be suggested 
that it is the change to the 'I', and one's own constant displacement that is alterity. 
Indeed, in Derrida's discussion of the decision in Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas, he 
repeatedly argues that if a person decides on a course of action based only on their own 
ego and what they are capable of, then it is not a decision (AEL 23). A decision must 
reach beyond what he describes as the "autonomic" and "egological" resources of a self-
contained individual (AEL 24), and towards an unknown future. What then becomes of 
this notion of a radical singularity, if a "theory of the subject is incapable of accounting 
for the slightest decision" (PF 68)? It clearly still refers to a being alone with the 
decision, but this does not mean that one can decide simply on the basis of one's own 
propensity for doing things in a certain way. That is not a decision either. The decision, 
which installs one as radically singular, should also come from something other and even 
something "unconscious", as has been discussed in chapter six (cf. PF 69). Radical 
singularity is, paradoxically, where one is best open to alterity. A typical Derridean 
formulation might be that the only possible decision, is this impossible decision by order 
of the other whose alterity must somehow be within me, and yet I am nevertheless 
responsible for this decision that exceeds my being ( eg. Abraham' s sacrifice of his son 
for, and by order of, God). The roles of self and other are inextricably intertwined in such 
ideas, and so it is not, in the end, a binarism of self and other that this chapter is accusing 
Derrida of, despite this radical singularity that obtains between God and Abraham, and 
that makes all other considerations superfluous. 
It is necessary to return to The Gift of Death in a little more detail to see what can 
be made of this equivocation that has been discerned. Although Derrida emphasises the 
Kierkegaardian and Abrahamian affirmation of an absolutely singular responsibility 
260Derrida, J. , as cited in "The Original Discussion of Differance", Derrida and Differance, p 86. 
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before the wholly other (tout autre), as yet it has not been made clear how this balances 
with his more general intent to expose that we all have competing claims upon us and to 
highlight that there is no easy way to address the question of responsibility. In exploring 
the paradoxical status of responsibility, Derrida observes that: 
As soon as I enter into a relation with the other, with the gaze, look, request, love, 
command, or call of the other, I know that I can respond only by sacrificing 
ethics, that is, by sacrificing whatever obliges me to also respond, in the same 
way, in the same instant, to all of the others (GD 68). 
Moreover, he suggests that in this "land of Moriah that is our habitat every second of 
every day" (GD 69), we betray and offer gifts of death to those most intimate to us, just 
as Abraham so dramatically did to his family and son. Ethics, with its dependence upon 
generality, must be continually sacrificed as an inevitable aspect of the human condition 
and its aporetic demand to decide (GD 70). As Derrida points out, in writing about one 
particular cause rather than another, in pursuing one profession over another, in spending 
time with one's family rather than at work, one inevitably ignores the "other others" (GD 
69), and this is a condition of any and every existence. He argues that "I cannot respond · 
to the call, the request, the obligation, or even the love of another, without sacrificing the 
other other, the other others" (GD 68). One can only presume that, for Derrida, the 
Buddhist desire to have attachment to nobody and equal compassion for everybody is an 
unattainable ideal. He does, in fact, suggest that a universal community that excludes no 
one is a contradiction in terms. According to him, this is because: 
I am responsible to anyone (that is to say, to any other) only by failing in my 
responsibility to all the others, to the ethical or political generality. And I can 
never justify this sacrifice; I must always hold my peace about it. .. What binds me 
to this one or that one, remains finally unjustifiable (GD 70). 
Derrida hence implies that responsibility to any particular individual is only possible by 
being irresponsible to the "other others", that is, to the other people and possibilities that 
haunt any and every existence. Moreover, no choice can be justified, because every other 
is wholly other (GD 71), as other to us as the next person. The meaning of this enigmatic 
formulation will be pursued shortly, but for the moment it is clear that responsibility 
towards the other involves both disclosure and secrecy, both an ethical demand for 
generality and a simultaneous compulsion towards radical singularity. Balancing these 
two competing claims is envisaged to be inordinately difficult. Derrida suggests only that 
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a responsible appreciation of aporia requires a respect both for the universal and the 
particular261 , and he hence implies that a responsible treatment of alterity should involve 
trying to keep the recognition of both of these ' truths ' together. 
However, presuming that we have appreciated the aporia that envelops 
responsibility and the decision, one enduring question still remains and that is "what is to 
be done?". In this respect, Derrida is not an ethicist and will not dictate any guidelines for 
the decision, except that enduring the trial of undecidability (LI 210) should not be 
avoided. Typically, he will also restate the aporia that surrounds responsibility in the 
form of an aphorism, and one that has intrigued and repelled commentators in perhaps 
equal measure. 
The aphorism that he coins to express this paradoxical confrontation between the 
general and the ethical in attempting to behave responsibly is tout autre est tout autre, 
which translates as the tautologous sentiment that every other is every other. Derrida 
alters this to decree that "every other (one) is every (bit) other", although he warns us 
against abusing this aphorism as the secret of all secrets and admits that it readily betrays 
his purpose (GD 82-3). It might be interjected that aphorisms, and neologisms that work 
aphoristically, are the staple diet of deconstruction in all of its various guises, but 
Derrida's assertion that every other is wholly other does manage to convey much of the 
import of The Gift of Death ' s discussions regarding the aporia of responsibility. It 
performatively introduces a tension between singularity and generality, in that every 
other is wholly other, inaccessible even, and yet this must apply to every single other in a 
general sense (GD 87). As Geoffrey Bennington has pertinently put it, Derrida's 
aphorism reveals that "the principle whereby the very (irreplaceable) singularity of the 
other (the p1inciple of its difference) is thinkable only in the context of that singularity ' s 
potential equalisation with every other singularity (the principle of its indifference)"262 • 
Of course, certain questions still abound, including exactly what Derrida is 
referring to through this recourse to conceptions of the "wholly other" . His point seems to 
be that the infinite alterity and transcendence exemplified by God (GD 27, 33) is typical 
of our relations with every other (GD 78), and that there is hence a sense that, like 
Abraham, we all have pacts with people that we can never really know, and we can never 
261 Speaking to Caputo at the Villanova Roundtable Conference, Derrida makes explicit that "I would not 
oppose, as you did, universality and singularity. I would try to keep the two together" (See Caputo, J. , 
Deconstn,ction in a 1Vutshell, p 22). 
262Bennington, G., Interrnpting Derrida, p 46. 
adequately justify why the pact is with them and not somebody else. Such a position 
certainly throws conceptions of responsible behaviour free of the moralising assertions 
that are commonly betrothed to any command to behave responsibly. While this 
encapsulation of Derrida's project should not be taken to mean only that every other is 
perpetually incapable of being comprehended - for he readjusts his formulation 
throughout - such an interpretation is a reasonable enough beginning. 
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However, one obvious response to such a position would be to argue that if every 
other were wholly other, then they would not be conceivable at all, as Derrida himself 
pointed out to Levinas all those years ago (WD 126). If we were not at least partially 
prepared for the other, then their coming would not cause a ripple and their alterity would 
not be appreciated. According to Caputo, the wholly other is hence wholly other only up 
to a point - "an absolute surprise relative to what we were expecting [ my italics ]"263 and 
anticipating. The alterity of the wholly other cannot be too great, or too small, but is a 
shock to the system in place that modifies the same and "alters it, instead of confirming it 
in its complacency"264 • This emphasis upon the relative and non-absolute aspect of 
alterity would seem to be closely related to the notion of surprise that some 
phenomenology can theorise well (the previous chapter associated Merleau-Ponty's work 
with the claim that alterity is that which "literally alters"). It will also become important 
when contrasted with other assertions that Derrida makes about our experience of the 
wholly other as being symptomatic of a "relationless relation". The question that 
concerns this chapter will become one regarding how to conceive of this relational aspect 
with an alterity that is wholly other, and radically singular. How can the wholly other be 
anticipated, as even Caputo accepts that it must be, and yet Derrida elsewhere insists that 
the wholly other, like the decision, is precisely that which cannot be anticipated and 
which must remain forever elusive? 
Such questions must be postponed for the time being, as there are more 
complications in store for any attempt to get a grip on the Derridean other, since 
according to him, the wholly other can never be present. This is not quite the same thing 
as suggesting that the wholly other can never be encountered, since for deconstruction, 
the impossible, in the peculiar sense that Derrida imbues the term with, can very much be 
encountered. Nevertheless, the first and most obvious question is what is Derrida getting 
263Caputo, J. , The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida, p 22. 
264Caputo, J. , The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida, p 24. 
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at by these apparently absurd questions, which like the question of Being ( although he 
would insist in an importantly different way), seem to exceed all of our resources for 
attempting to answer them? Derrida thinks that the notion of the wholly other is 
important to all of us, and also retains a practical and everyday relevance, because in 
some way or another we are all perpetually waiting for something wholly other. To 
borrow an image of Caputo's, Derrida's point is that we persistently set a place at the 
table for the wholly other even if we never actually expect them to tum up. His 
conception of the wholly other hence does have something to do with our lives, and is 
always tethered to the horizon of the same265• The wholly other is not opposed to the 
other as known, and it does not simply occupy a different and more ephemeral realm, but 
insists that given any other that we do know, something about them must forever remain 
aloof and unthematisable. 
But if we ask "what is the wholly other?", then we are equally missing the point. 
Deconstruction insists that it has no place in identifying the wholly other, for that would 
be to propose a theism. This brings us to a term that Derrida has resuscitated from its 
association with Walter Benjamin and the Judaic tradition more generally, to shed some 
explanatory light upon why this notion of the wholly other is relevant to all of our lives 
and yet why it also cannot be identified with any determinate characteristics. That term is 
the messianic and it relies upon a distinction with messianism. Given Derrida ' s mistrust 
of any philosophy that is not "contaminated by negative theology"266 , it is apt that this 
exegesis should proceed negatively and with the latter term first. It is certainly easier to 
explicate what the messianic is not ref erring to - that being a messianism - rather than 
precisely what it is referring to. 
According to Derrida, the term messianism refers predominantly to the religions 
of the Messiahs - ie. the Muslim, Judaic and Christian religions. These religions proffer a 
Messiah of known characteristics, and often one who is expected to arrive at a particular 
time or place. The Messiah is inscribed in their respective religious texts and in an oral 
tradition that dictates that only if the other conforms to such and such a description is that 
person actually the Messiah. The most obvious of numerous necessary characteristics for 
the Messiah, it seems, is that they must invariably be male. Sexuality might seem to be a 
strange prerequisite to tether to that which is beyond this world, wholly other, but it is 
265Caputo, J. , The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida, p 69 
266Caputo, J. , The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida, p 48 & 146. 
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only one of many. That said, Derrida is not simplistically disparaging religion and the 
messianisms they propound, and as has been previously mentioned, Caputo 's The 
Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida has revealed the significance that Derrida accords 
to the religious experience. In an important respect, the messianic depends upon the 
various messianisms and Derrida admits that he cannot say which is the more 
originary267 • The messianism of Abraham, for example, in his singular responsibility 
before God, for Derrida ( although perhaps not for Kierkegaard) reveals the messianic 
structure of existence more generally (and vice versa), in that we all share a similar 
relationship to alterity even if we have not named and circumscribed that experience 
according to the template provided by a particular religion. 
However, Derrida's call to the wholly other, his invocation for the wholly other 
"to come", is not a call for a fixed or identifiable other of known characteristics, as is 
arguably the case in the archetypal religious experience. His wholly other is 
indeterminable and can never actually arrive. Derrida more than once recounts a story of 
Blanchot' s where the Messiah was actually at the gates to a city, disguised in rags. After 
some time, the Messiah was finally recognised by a beggar, but the beggar could think of 
nothing more relevant to ask than: "when will you come?"268 • Even when the Messiah is 
'there', he or she must still be yet to come, and this brings us to the distinction between 
the messianic and the various historical messianisms. The messianic refers predominantly 
to a structure of our existence that involves waiting - waiting even in activity- and a 
ceaseless openness towards a future that can never be circumscribed by the horizons of 
significance that we inevitably bring to bear upon that possible future. In other words, 
Derrida is not ref erring to a future that will one day become present, but to an openness 
towards an unknown futurity that is necessarily involved in what we take to be 'presence' 
and hence also renders it 'impossible'. 
Despite his invocation of the term 'messianic' with all of its religious 
associations, Derrida 's position verges on being an agnosticism in regard to the Messiah 
in that there is an obvious refusal to definitively say whether or not the Messiah will ever 
come. This type of question is bracketed away, in favour of pointing out that the wholly 
other must always be a surprise and that it hence makes no real sense to imbue the 
messianic with determinate qualities, because the surprise is precisely that which resists 
267Denida, J. , as cited in Caputo, J. , Deconstruction in a Nutshell, p 24. 
268Denida, J., as cited in Caputo, J. , Deconstruction in a Nutshell, p 24. 
expectations ( although it also tacitly depends upon expectations, as shall become 
apparent). 
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Derrida ' s notion of the messianic also contains a more psychological register, in 
that he argues that while we persistently hope for the arrival of the wholly other, there is 
also a sense in which we do not actually want the Messiah to tum up. The prospect scares 
us, and we harbour a desire for the coming of the Messiah to be indefinitely postponed. 
As Derrida has suggested, "we wait for something that we would not like to wait for"269 , 
and like Samuel Beckett's play Waiting for Godot, this suggests that the wait for 
something unknown (the wholly other, the future) is our predominant mode of being. 
Indeed, the wait to encounter Derrida's tout autre seems destined to be just as unfulfilled 
as that which preoccupies Vladimir and Estragon270 • The messianic is a general structure 
in which the "to come" is absolutely undetermined and deferred, although the 
responsibilities assigned by the messianic are nevertheless here and now. Just because 
Godot is not actually going to tum up, does not mean that Vladimir and Estragon can, or 
should, simply give up their impassioned wait. 
However, it is also wo1ih observing that in another of his recent texts, Derrida 
enigmatically suggests that this type of messianic structure refers to: 
A sort of relationship without relation, with one guarding itself from the other, in 
the waiting without horizon, for a language that only knows how to keep people 
waiting. That is all it knows how to do, to keep people waiting, and that it is all I 
know about it (my italics, MO 71). 
This thematic of the "relationship without relation", which Derrida also uses in The Gift 
of Death to describe the asymmetrical relation that obtains with something absolutely 
transcendent (GD 72-3), refers to Blanchot, and more importantly for the purposes of this 
chapter, again to Levinas, who have both used similar formulations in describing alterity. 
Moreover, as Derrida himself implies in suggesting that this relationship without relation 
refers to a "waiting without horizon", such a position involves a denial of the 
phenomenological insistence upon horizons of significance, as well as its tacit suggestion 
that the other is inevitably conditioned, and some might say curtailed, by the tools and 
experiences that we bring to bear upon any attempt to appreciate alterity ( eg. the 
269Derrida, J. , as cited in Caputo, J. , DeconstnLction in a Nutshell, p 25. 
270Beckett, S. , Waiting for Godot, London: Faber & Faber, 1956. 
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forestructures of our understanding)27 1• The problem with this, however, is that the notion 
of the messianic has been primarily associated with the notion of a surprise. It has also 
been established that the surprise cannot but be relative to our expectations, and this 
suggests that the wholly other cannot actually be absolutely other, for if it were, it would 
not be conceivable as a surprise. Formulations of Derrida's like "waiting without 
horizon" and "relationless relation" tend towards denying this more phenomenological 
and relative aspect of alterity, and yet both the notion of the messianic and the wholly 
other (which his above formulations are attempting to describe) are inconceivable 
without some recognition of the "imperialism of the same" - that is, of the ways in which 
alterity is never absolute but is always conditioned and even partially prefigured by the 
forestructures of our understanding. It seems that Derrida cannot do away with 
phenomenology as easily as his later work sometimes seems to presume. 
It is worth digressing to reaffirm that these related notions of the messianic and 
the wholly other are not merely isolated aspects of his conception of alterity, or simply 
unimportant rhetorical devices. Derrida's emphasis upon the messianic aspects of alterity 
that elude any attempt to grasp them - which contains an implicit treatise on how to treat 
alterity responsibly: ie. messianically, rather than via a messianism that attempts to imbue 
the other with a certain concrete exigency - are part of his larger deconstructive 
enterprise that insists upon the radical singularity that constitutes such an important part 
of responsibility and that also emphasises the solitude of the deconstructive thinker. 
In this respect, it seems that Derrida's conception of alterity, particularly in regard 
to his later philosophy, actually bears an increased proximity to the work of Levinas. This 
radical othe1ness, and the singularity of this otherness of which Derrida speaks, return us 
to a Levinasian account of the radical singularity involved in the face-to-face 
confrontation. Even though Derrida has again criticised aspects of Levinas' position in 
The Gift of Death (cf. GD 84), this same text ultimately privileges responsibility 
conceived of in terms of a demand that the wholly other has made upon a singular person, 
and pays less attention to the ways in which this very personhood and identity of the 'I' 
can never be extricated from the communal society and responsibilities in which it 
partakes. What has happened to the Derrida who relativised the Levinasian conception of 
271 In Being and Time , Heidegger has famously emphasised the forestructures of our understanding and 
illustrated that all interpretation must be grounded in something that we see in advance. In some sense, we 
must know what we are looking for, otherwise we would not be looking. See Heidegger, M. , Being and 
Time, Sections 18 8-192. 
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alterity in "Violence and Metaphysics", and who supported Husserl's notion of the alter-
ego against Levinas' rather aggressive criticisms of it (WD 120-1)? Derrida now 
propounds a position that is closely related to Levinas, and it seems that some of 
Derrida's earlier criticisms of Levinas are, in fact, relevant to his own increasingly 
prophetic concerns. At the very least, it is apparent that he cannot easily rid his 
conception of alterity of its more relational and phenomenological implications - that is, 
of the way in which something that is other, even wholly other, must always still be 
conceivable as "other than the self' (cf. WD 126). 
But what does Derrida's apparent rejection of these phenomenological horizons, 
at least as they apply to the tout autre, entail? If the wholly other is never simply present 
as Derrida repeatedly insists, there is a political significance to this - that being a denial 
of fundamentalisms of all sorts, for any claim to a privileged access to the sovereign 
words or intent of the Messiah is immediately looked upon with suspicion. According to 
Caputo, the exaltation of the wholly other releases a politics of the singularity of the other 
and a respect for this singularity272 , and there is something valuable about this. After all, 
there is an irreducibility of the other to the self, which is equally pertinently described as 
a messianic openness to the future. However, the important question is whether 
responsibility consists in paying due attention to the aspects of the other that resist any 
transformative interaction with the self ( eg. the radically singular encounter between 
Abraham and God), or to the ways in which the self inevitably overlaps with that which 
is other. In The Gift of Death, Derrida acknowledges this second aspect of alterity, but is 
it accorded its due importance? His treatment of the other seems to place an inordinate 
amount of importance upon the singularity of the individual, and does not always 
recognise the ways in which that singularity is itself a product of others and is intertwined 
with the world in a way that renders any easy distinction between self and other tenuous. 
This is immensely paradoxical since Derrida's thought, and particularly his early thought, 
sought the exact opposite: ie. to banish reference to an individual subjectivity (but not to 
deny that it exists) and to suggest that to the extent that the effects of subjectivity are 
undeniable, they remain a product of the play of differance (SP 82). 
It seems that there is an unequal tension in his later work between a privileged 
conception of responsibility as involving respect for the radical singularity of the wholly 
other, and a conception of alterity that acknowledges the importance of the relation, in 
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that the wholly other must be an other that is at least partially relative to ourselves (WD 
126) and to what we have experienced and anticipated. Can these apparently 
incompatible thoughts be reconciled? Perhaps not, as Derrida very rarely wants to get rid 
of aporias, but to accord them their due import. Deconstructive epistemology privileges a 
"both-and" rather than an "either-or" response to such questions, and his philosophy is 
not a dialectic that seeks eventual re-unification. The question that remains, however, is 
what are we to make of these competing accounts of the other as wholly other, and yet 
also as always encroaching upon the self (a problem that is structurally isomorphic with 
the aporia that The Gift of Death discerns between being responsible to an individual who 
is wholly other, and the ethical responsibility required for all humanity)? 
In regard to a resolution of this problematic, it is worth recognising that Derrida 
consistently asserts that it is the privilege granted to unity, to totality, and even to 
community as an organised whole, that is dangerous for the other, as well as for 
responsibility, the decision, and ethics273 • This is not to deny that unity and gathering are 
indispensable to the human condition. However, Derrida maintains that it is what disrupts 
this totality, rather than what preserves this totality, which is the condition of relating to· 
the other. This reaffirms that responsibility consists more in the recognition of that which 
disrupts the totality, rather than that which unifies the totality. 
Regarding this privilege that he accords to disruption and disassociation, Derrida 
goes on to elaborate: 
Once you grant some privilege to gathering and not disassociating, then you leave 
no room for the other, for the radical otherness of the other, for the radical 
singularity of the other ... disassociation is not an obstacle to society but the 
condition ... I can address the other only to the extent that there is a separation, a 
disassociation, so that I cannot replace the other and vice versa [my italics]274 • 
One question worth asking in response to this, is whether Derrida's final suggestion that 
one can only address the other if there is a separation or disassociation - which 
depending upon the way this disassociation is characterised, this thesis does not want to 
contest - necessarily also affirms the radical singularity of the other. This is not a fait 
accompli or some irrefutable logical deduction, and an alternative response to this type of 
problematic is that presented by Merleau-Ponty in The Visible and the Invisible. 
272Caputo, J. , The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida, p 54. 
273Caputo, J. , Deconstruction in a Nutshell, p 13. 
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As has been explored in greater detail in earlier chapters, Merleau-Ponty also 
posits a constitutive disassociation that he terms a divergence (ecart). To recapitulate, the 
divergence that Merleau-Ponty discerns between the sentient and the sensible is not such 
that it can ever allow us to access solely the sentient or the sensible paradigm. Our 
embodied existence precludes us ever managing to simply touch someone without also 
feeling touched. More importantly for the purposes of this chapter, Merleau-Ponty also 
argues that a similar chiasmic logic applies to the domain of alterity, and he defines self 
and other as "the obverse and reverse of each other" (VI 83, 160). According to Merleau-
Ponty' s position, there is a divergence or disassociation between self and other, but they 
are also chiasmically intertwined with one another in such a way that to speak of the 
radical singularity of the self, or the radical otherness of the other, is to ignore the fact 
that both paradigms are conceivable only on account of partaking in the one flesh (VI 
248-51). 
Merleau-Ponty's position does not require, and arguably even condemns, an 
affirmation of the radical singularity of the other. His notion of this divergence 
'deconstructs' the dictum that the self is not other, because the self is revealed as other 
than itself, in that a non-dualistic divergence between the sentient and the sensible is 
conceived of as being that which makes subjectivity possible at all. As is the case for 
Derrida, Merleau-Ponty hence emphasises that we can address the other only on account 
of this separation. However, the important point to ascertain from Merleau-Ponty' s 
philosophy is that responsibility to the other requires a recognition of the overlappings, 
intertwinings, and encroachments that typify any relation between self and other, and also 
problematise the very ease of this distinction (VI 123). This is not to encourage a 
domesticated conception of alterity, which Gasche has rightly criticised275 , but it is a 
recognition of the empirical status of the other for us - that is, as someone or something 
at least partially known, and to some degree always encroaching upon us in a way that 
problematises any conception of a radically singular confrontation with the wholly other. 
If we are always already intertwined with the other, then responsibility to the alterity of 
the other consists precisely in not respecting an "absolute singularity" that downplays our 
inherence in a shared world. 
Let me present this alternative in a slightly different way. Merleau-Ponty's 
274Derrida, J., as cited in Caputo, J. , Deconstruction in a Nutshell, p 14. 
275Gasche, R. , as cited in Critchley, S. , The Ethics of Deconstruction, p 29. 
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position has been aptly characterised as suggesting that the other's difference inspires an 
attempt at communion (not union)276 . In other words, responsibility to the other's 
difference ( alterity) demands the transformation and intertwining of these notions of self 
and other, such that we can affirm what he terms our "natal bond" (VI 136) and "deepen 
our inherence in Being" (S 123). The implication of this is that alterity is best 
encountered in an interaction between two or more people in which the lives of both 
participants are irretrievably altered, and in which this transformative interaction between 
self and other is deepened rather than resisted (PW 142-3). While Derrida acknowledges 
that such an intertwining exists, he emphasises that responsibility involves respecting the 
radical singularity of the other and the qualities of their alterity that resist this 
encroachment of self upon other, and this is an important difference between him and 
Merleau-Ponty. 
Indeed, it would seem that as well as a methodological agnosticism (ie. a refusal 
to propound a single thesis), Derrida's later philosophy also exhibits an agnosticism in 
regard to the other. He repeatedly demands that one must, above all, respect the otherness 
of the other - that being their messianic qualities and their radical singularity. For 
Derrida, genuine responsibility towards the other's radical singularity necessitates that 
that alterity must not be imbued with any determinate characteristics. To put the problem 
somewhat crudely, the idea motivating such a claim is that the radical singularity of the 
other cannot be accessed, for even if it could be, that which was accessed would no 
longer be radically singular. Derrida implies that the answer to this problem is to refuse to 
limit that alterity to any determinate shape or form ( a refusal to decide) and to be open to 
the aspects of that alterity which might yet come (the messianic). In his own passion for 
certitude, Derrida will not say more than is true, and not being able to find any a priori 
fo1m of responsibility to the other, he makes a religion of the other's elusiveness (it is 
called deconstruction) and a religion of agnosticism. Whatever the other qualities of this 
religion, such an understanding threatens to fetishise responsibility towards the other as 
simply the prioritising of that which resists transformative encroachment with the self. As 
well as omitting from consideration some alternative and compelling explanations of 
what a responsible appreciation of alterity might consist in ( eg. Merleau-Ponty' s ), such 
an account also downplays the significance of Derrida's own critique of Levinas in 
276This particular tum of phrase is indebted to Rosalyn Diprose and more specifically to her paper, "Here I 
Am by the Grace of the Other and Politics Is in Disgrace", as it was given at the Australian Society for 
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"Violence and Metaphysics". Derrida 's more recent exaltation of themes like the 
messianic and the wholly other seeks to reverse the traditional hierarchical opposition 
between self and other, but it often does so without due recognition of phenomenological 
considerations, including the inevitability of a certain 'imperialism' of the self/same. 
Continental Philosophy Conference, University of New South Wales, November 2000. 
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10. Possible and Impossible, Self and Other, and the Reversibility of Merleau-Ponty 
and Derrida 
Drawing together the various themes that have concerned this comparative juxtaposition 
of Merleau-Ponty and Derrida is a task of no small order, particularly without 
superficially privileging the one philosopher at the expense of the other. Of course, a 
conclusion inevitably necessitates some degree of subjugation, in that it must foreclose 
on certain alternative possibilities, and in this respect it will continue to be argued that the 
Derridean account of alterity too often downplays the importance of the more relational 
and chiasmic conception of alterity that Merleau-Ponty theorises. This has already been 
partially illustrated, but this final chapter will reaffirm this in regard to Derrida's recent 
preoccupation with what has come to be termed "possible-impossible" aporias - that is, 
with themes in which the condition of their possibility is also, and at once, the condition 
of their impossibility. In order to reveal the shared logic upon which these aporias rely, 
and also to raise some questions about their persuasive efficacy, Derrida's paradoxical 
discussions of giving, forgiving, hospitality, and mourning will be considered. Moreover, 
it will be argued that of the two polarities evoked by each of his possible-impossible 
aporias, one term of the opposition almost invariably posits a separation between two 
"radical singularities", or in somewhat more controversial terms, between a self and an 
other. In this respect, Merleau-Ponty's abiding emphasis upon the chiasmic intertwining 
of self and other provides the resources to challenge the aporetic oscillation between 
possible and impossible that Derrida rather frequently delineates. 
Moreover, it will be highlighted that Derrida's methodology again equivocates 
between two main alternatives: he either remains within a possible-impossible aporia 
( and hence implies that there is no way of escaping the paradox in which all giving is also 
always a taking); or he becomes prophetic in the face of this aporia and hence tacitly 
privileges a rather absolute conception of an alterity (tout autre) that might yet come and 
disrupt this type of calculative exchange. It will be argued that Merleau-Ponty would 
accuse the latter tendency of being tantamount to what he refers to as an "agnosticism in 
regard to the other" (VI 79), and his philosophy also has some correlative implications 
regarding the problem of respecting the alterity of the other, which has been an enduring 
concern of deconstruction and motivates Derrida's particular focus upon possible-
impossible aporias. Despite the fact that two of Derrida's recent texts have 
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sympathetically engaged with the work of Merleau-Ponty-Memoirs of the Blind, and Le 
Toucher: Jean-Luc Nancy - there remain some important differences between these 
theorists that are worth examining. Firstly, however, a sustained exegesis of Derrida's 
possible-impossible aporias is required. 
The gift: 
The aporia that surrounds the notion of the gift revolves around the paradoxical thought 
that a genuine gift cannot actually be understood to be a gift. In his text, Given Time, 
Derrida suggests that the notion of the gift contains an implicit demand that the genuine 
gift must somehow reside outside of the oppositional demands of giving and taking, and 
beyond any mere self-interest or calculative reasoning (GT 30). According to him, 
however, a gift is also something that cannot appear as such (GD 29), as it is destroyed 
by anything that proposes equivalence or recompense, as well as by anything that even 
proposes to know of, or acknowledge it. This may sound somewhat counter-intuitive, but 
even a simple 'thank-you' for'instance, which both acknowledges the presence of a gift 
and also proposes some form of equivalence with that gift, can be seen to annul the gift 
(cf. MDM 149). By politely responding with a 'thank-you', there is often, and perhaps 
even always, a tacit presumption that because of this acknowledgement one is no longer 
indebted to the other who has given, and that nothing more can be expected of an 
individual who has so responded. Significantly, the gift is hence drawn into the cycle of 
giving and taking, where a good deed must be accompanied by a suitably just response. 
As the gift is associated with a command to respond, it becomes an imposition for the 
receiver, and it even becomes an opportunity to take for the 'giver', who might give 
precisely in order to receive the acknowledgement from the other that they have in fact 
given. There are undoubtedly many other examples of how the 'gift' can be deployed, 
and not necessarily deliberately, to gain advantage. Of course, it might be objected that 
even if it is psychologically difficult to give without also receiving (and in a manner that 
is tantamount to taking) this does not in-itself constitute a refutation of the logic of 
genuine giving. According to Derrida, however, his discussion does not amount merely to 
an empirical or psychological claim about the difficulty of transcending an immature and 
egocentric conception of giving. On the contrary, he wants to problematise the very 
possibility of a giving that can be unequivocally disassociated from receiving and taking. 
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The important point to ascertain is that, for Derrida, a genuine gift requires an 
anonymity of the giver such that there is no accrued benefit in giving. The giver cannot 
even recognise that they are giving, for that would be to reabsorb their gift to the other as 
some kind of testimony to the worth of the self - ie. the kind of self-congratulatory logic 
that rhetorically poses the question "how wonderful I am to give this person that which 
they have always desired, and without even letting them know that I am responsible?". 
This is an extreme example, but Derrida claims that such a predicament afflicts all giving 
in more or less obvious ways. While this point will eventually be disputed, for Derrida, 
the logic of a genuine gift actually requires that self and other be radically disparate, and 
have no obligations or claims upon each other of any kind. He argues that a genuine gift 
must involve neither an apprehension of a good deed done, nor the recognition by the 
other party that they have received277, and this seems to render the actuality of any gift an 
impossibility278 . Significantly, however, according to Derrida, the existential force of this 
demand for an absolute altruism can never be assuaged, and yet equally clearly it can also 
never be fulfilled, and this ensures that the condition of the possibility of the gift is 
inextricably associated with its impossibility. 
In all of Derrida's diverse ruminations there is no easy solution to this type of 
problem, and no hint of a dialectic that might unify the apparent incommensurability in 
which possibility implies impossibility and vice versa. At the same time, however, he 
does not intend simply to vacillate in hyperbolic and self-referential paradoxes, as he has 
been accused ofby some philosophers279 • As will become apparent towards the end of 
this chapter, Derrida also intermittently calls for the breaching of this possible-impossible 
dilemma and often through an exaltation of that which is wholly other (tout autre). The 
wholly other is envisaged as a heterogeneity that might disrupt this type of aporetic 
economy, and that might, potentially at least, allow one to avoid the more calculative 
systems of exchange in which giving inevitably becomes a taking, and the analogous way 
in which our most well-intentioned conceptions of hospitality have a tendency to render 
277Derrida, J. , as cited in Caputo, J., Deconstruction in a Nutshell, p 18-9, cf. p 144. 
278For Derrida, it is undecidable whether the notion of the gift is a possible or an impossible ideal, as it is 
inordinately difficult to justify any suggestion that a gift beyond the economy of exchange (ie. calculative 
giving and taking) exists. How could anybody conceive of a giver who had forgotten their own act of 
giving in the act itself, and hence forgotten and abandoned their own irremediable individuality? And yet it 
cannot be said, a priori, that the gift does not exist. From what Archimedean perspective could one 
sceptically repudiate altruism? 
279McCarthy, T. , "The Politics of the Ineffable: Derrida 's Deconstructionism" in The Philosophical Forum, 
Vol. XXI, Numbers 1 & 2, Fall-Winter 1989-90, p 146. 
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"other others" as strangers and refugees (cf. OH 135, GD 68). Of course, the tout autre 
might also make things worse, and it certainly cannot be imbued with any determinate 
positive content, but it is important to recognise that there is a paradoxical sense in which 
deconstruction actually seeks genuine giving, hospitality, forgiving and mourning, even 
where it acknowledges that these concepts are forever elusive and can never actually be 
fulfilled. 
How Derrida can accomplish these different and perhaps even mutually exclusive 
intentions will be an enduring concern of this chapter. Indeed, it remains to be seen 
exactly how we can open ourselves to a gift that is beyond the systems of opposition that 
Derrida argues are intent on reinscribing it back into their calculative logic. According to 
John Caputo, the impasse that afflicts the notion of the gift is "not conceptually resolved 
by a bit of intellectual adroitness, but strained against performatively, by an act of 
generosity, by a giving which gives beyond itself, which is a little blind and does not see 
where it is going"280 • Deconstruction, according to this interpretation, is hence envisaged 
as encouraging the possibility of something more fruitful than the oppositional logic that 
it so persuasively delineates, but what does Caputo's "giving that gives beyond itself' 
really mean, and what could a "giving that gives beyond itself' entail, if the gift is never 
present? Such questions will be indirectly returned to, but for the moment an alternative 
interpretation is also worth considering. 
Unlike Caputo, Cathryn Vasseleu argues that "the impossibility of the gift, is the 
impossibility of a difference beyond oppositional significance"281 • According to her 
position, a genuine gift really is rendered impossible by Derrida, and we hence cannot 
escape the economy of exchange. However, if this were entirely true, then there would 
also be no strategy that could even shuffle just a little bit away from metaphysics and 
deconstruction's various interventions would hence be largely meaningless. Moreover, if 
difference can only ever be encountered through a system of possible-impossible aporias, 
then it seems that a human other could never be encountered without presupposing an 
oppositional relation - perhaps one not unlike the master-slave role-playing that Sartre, 
borrowing from Hegel, famously describes in Being and Nothingness. It is worth 
recalling that Sartre argues that our relations with others - love, hate, indifference, 
sadism, and masochism, etc. - are all impossible projects and yet they are nevertheless 
28
°Caputo, J., Deconstruction in a Nutshell, p 112. 
281 Vasseleu, C., Textures of Light, p 63. 
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envisaged as existential necessities. We are compelled into seeking variations on these 
attitudes towards the other, but none of them can be satisfactory. Unable to reconcile this 
fundamental paradox, Sartre concludes that humanity is a useless passion282 , and an 
important question for this chapter will be whether deconstruction also necessitates that 
any relation with the other must be afflicted by a similar type of paradoxical logic in 
which possibility is inextricably associated with impossibility. Is a "giving that gives 
beyond itself' ultimately possible or impossible, if we can momentarily resist the logic of 
Derrida's work that seeks to collide these two notions? According to Derrida, even if 
there is no absolute altruism, there are degrees and economies of narcissism (P 199), and 
this chapter will examine deconstruction's claim to minimise this narcissistic element. 
Hospitality: 
In order to begin to answer the questions just posed, it is also worth considering the 
aporia that Derrida associates with hospitality. The notion of hospitality explicitly opens 
itself to themes that have concerned us throughout this thesis, including the problem of 
respecting the alterity of the other. According to Derrida, genuine hospitality before any 
number of unknown others is not, strictly speaking, a possible scenario (OH 135, GD 70, 
AEL 50, OCF 16). If we contemplate giving up everything that we seek to possess and 
call our own, then most of us can empathise with just how difficult enacting any absolute 
hospitality would be. Despite this, however, Derrida simultaneously insists that the whole 
idea of hospitality depends upon such an altruistic concept and is inconceivable without it 
(OCF 22). In fact, he argues that it is this internal tension and aporia that keeps the 
concept alive. He makes no attempt to defuse the paradoxical nature of such suggestions. 
On the contrary, his interest is drawn towards the notion of hospitality because the word 
carries its opposite within itself: it derives from 'hostis', which originally meant stranger, 
but has now come to mean hostile283 • 
The significance of Derrida's point is not restricted only to the etymological 
domain, however. For him, the concept of hospitality is itself involved in an aporia, in 
that it inevitably makes claims to property. Because it partakes in the desire to establish a 
form of self-identity, any attempt to behave hospitably is also always partly betrothed to 
282Sartre, J. P. , Being and Nothingness, p 258-70. 
283Derrida, J. , "Hostipitality" in Angelaki: Journal of the Theoretical Humanities, Vol. 5, Number 3, Issue 
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the closing of boundaries, and to the exclusion of particular groups or ethnicities, and 
often to nationalism (OH 151-5). Whether one invokes the current Australian insistence 
upon border control (ie. its territorial waters that cannot be traversed), or simply the 
ubiquitous suburban fence and alarm system, it seems that hospitality always posits some 
kind of limit upon where the other can trespass, and hence has a tendency to be rather 
inhospitable. 
For Derrida, there is also a more existential example of this tension, in that the 
notion of hospitality requires one to be the 'master' of the house, country or nation (and 
hence controlling). On the other hand, it simultaneously demands a certain welcoming of 
whomever may be in need of that hospitality, and it hence involves a relinquishing of 
judgement and control in regard to who will receive that hospitality. Caputo expands 
upon this suggestion to make an interesting and significant point. According to him, the 
person capable of being hospitable: 
Is someone who has the power to host someone so that neither the alterity of the 
stranger, nor the power of the host, is annulled by this hospitality. There is an 
essential self-limitation built right into the idea of hospitality, which preserves the 
distance between one's own and the stranger284 • 
In treating a guest hospitably, the host is forced to negotiate a delicate balance between 
respecting the alterity of their guest and not relinquishing their own power. Moreover, 
accomplishing this relies upon establishing an important difference between the two 
parties and a relatively clear demarcation of the boundaries between self and other. It also 
implies that hospitality to the other, or to the foreigner, consists in retaining and even 
valorising this difference between them and 'me'. There are some problems associated 
with such a position, and for the moment it suffices to point out that it risks legitimising 
an attitude of "benevolent humility towards an other that is not me"285 , particularly if the 
other is the prioritised term of this disjunction. It will be argued that this is an 
ontologically problematic and ethico-politically dangerous way of conceiving of our 
relation with alterity. It is also a position that deconstruction sometimes inclines towards, 
Dec 2000) p 3-4. Also see Caputo, J. , Deconstruction in a Nutshell, p 110. 
284Caputo, J. , Deconstruction in a Nutshell, p 110. 
285This is a phrase Vicki Kirby uses to encapsulate a certain interpretation of Derrida that she associates 
with Drucilla Cornell, among other theorists. However, Kirby rather vehemently disagrees with this 
interpretation of Derrida that makes alterity forever elusive and a "difference that is so foreign to me that it 
cannot be known". While Kirby is right to be wary of this tendency on the grounds that it prohibits a 
genuinely ethical relation to the other, I think that Derrida equivocates on this issue rather more often than 
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although this applies more to secondary proponents of deconstruction than to the work of 
Derrida himself. 
Indeed, there is a sense in which any self-other opposition at least appears to be 
broken down by the notion of hospitality. As well as involving claims to mastery and 
ownership of the house, hospitality also requires that one be graciously open to the other, 
disavowing all judgement, and it could be argued that this openness to alterity without 
discrimination is precisely that which eludes the oppositional logic of self and other. This 
is true in one sense, but it is also important to recognise that for this openness to alterity 
to count as hospitality, it must nevertheless involve two radically disparate singularities. 
According to Derrida, it is not hospitality when commerce enters into the equation and 
either party becomes aware of the ways in which they are indebted to the other. On the 
contrary, genuine hospitality must retain a disjunction between a self ( or a radical 
singularity in Derrida's terminology) and someone that is wholly other, such that neither 
the alterity of the host, nor the visitor, can be annulled. The question that remains is: in 
what does that alterity consist, and how could it be annulled? What is this alterity that 
should be so preserved, as if sacrosanct? If we must be responsible to the inaccessible · 
part of an other that should remain somehow pure and untainted, then this would appear 
to be simply the reverse of the traditional philosophical exaltation of an interior mental 
reserve (ie. subjectivity). Were Derrida maintaining such a line of thought, he would still 
be succumbing to the metaphysical temptation of privileging purity and simplicity at the 
expense of what is complicated and contingent (cf. M 195, LI 130). 
Of course, it is difficult to assert that Derrida is making such a mistake. He is not 
unaware that conceiving of self and other in such a clearly distinct manner artificially 
posits a unity to the self that is not only misleading, but also potentially inhibiting in 
regard to our experience of and for the other. Indeed, this is precisely what his notion of 
differance sought to guard against, and it is also what his criticisms of the Husserlian 
'now' moment sought to preclude ( cf. SP 154). However, despite his earlier philosophy' s 
insistence that the other is always entangled with the self/same, it will be argued that 
many of Derrida 's more recent texts on aporia actually presuppose a disjunction between 
self and other that denies the ways in which such differences are always partially 
breached. This is not to allege that Derrida is a simple dualist, as other theorists have 
she allows. See Kirby, V. , Telling Flesh, p 99. 
208 
alleged286 , since whenever he insists upon a radical disjunction between self and other in 
one term of his aporia, this is usually accompanied by the converse in the other term of 
his aporia. That said, his account nevertheless presumes that such dualisms are an 
important and constitutive factor in the various concepts that he considers. This, however, 
is something that Merleau-Ponty would deny, and not only on ontological grounds, as 
will soon become clear. Merleau-Ponty's philosophy can be envisaged to challenge 
Derrida ' s descriptions of the possible-impossible aporia, and in introducing two more 
aporias with which Derrida is concerned (forgiving and mourning), this chapter will 
begin to suggest how this less oppositional conception of the aporia may be conceived. 
Forgiveness: 
De1rida discerns another aporia in regard to whether or not to forgive somebody who has 
caused us significant suffering or pain. This particular paradox revolves around the 
premise that if one forgives something that is actually forgivable, then one simply 
engages in calculative reasoning and hence does not really forgive. Most commonly in 
interviews, but also in his recent text On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness, Derrida 
argues that according to its own internal logic, genuine forgiving must involve the 
impossible: that is, the forgiving of an 'unforgivable' transgression - eg. a 'mortal sin' 
(OCF 32, cf. OH 39). Like the decision itself (cf. PF 69), there is hence a sense in which 
forgiving must be 'mad' and 'unconscious' (OCF 39, 49), and it must also remain 
heterogenous to political and juridical rationality. This unconditional 'forgiveness' 
explicitly precludes the necessity of an apology or repentance by the guilty party, 
although Derrida also acknowledges that this pure notion of forgiveness must always 
exist in tension with a more conditional forgiveness where apologies are actually 
demanded. However, he argues that this conditional forgiveness amounts more to 
amnesty and reconciliation than to genuine forgiveness (OCF 51 ). The pattern of this 
discussion is undoubtedly beginning to become familiar and Derrida 's various 
discussions of forgiving are orientated around revealing a fundamental and unavoidable 
paradox that ensures that forgiving can never be finished or concluded - it must always 
be open, like a permanent rupture, or a wound that refuses to heal. 
286Dillon, M., Semiological Reductionism, p 3. Moreover, in their respective essays in Ecart and 
Differance, Patrick Burke and Leonard Lawlor also maintain that Derrida introduces a new binary 
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However, this paradox that Derrida discerns in relation to forgiveness also 
depends, in one of its dual aspects, upon a disjunction between self and other. Derrida 
argues that "forgiveness must engage two singularities: the guilty and the victim. As soon 
as a third party intervenes, one can again speak of amnesty, reconciliation, reparation, 
etc., but certainly not of forgiveness in the strict sense" (my italics, OCF 42). Given that 
he also acknowledges that it is difficult to conceive of any such face-to-face encounter 
without a third party - as language itself must serve such a mediating function (OCF 48) 
- forgiveness is caught in an aporia that ensures that its empirical actuality looks to be a 
decidedly unlikely occurrence. To recapitulate, the reason that Derrida's notion of 
forgiveness is caught in such an inextricable paradox is because absolute forgiveness 
requires a radically singular confrontation between self and other, while conditional 
forgiveness requires the breaching of categories such as self and other, either by a 
mediating paiiy, or simply by the recognition of the ways in which we are always already 
intertwined with the other (eg. Merleau-Ponty's chiasmic conception of self and other). 
Indeed, Derrida explicitly argues that when we know anything of the other, or even 
understand their motivation in however minimal a way, this absolute forgiveness can no 
longer take place (OCF 49). Derrida can offer no resolution in regard to the impasse that 
obtains between these two notions, except that a hyperbolic oscillation between them is 
necessary for responsibility (OCF 51 ). But this hyperbolic oscillation between the two 
terms presumes that both of these den1ands are equally insistent. However, even if we 
accept some type of originary disjunction ( cf. to Merleau-Ponty' s ecart), this aporia is 
diminished if we accord an ontological ptiority to either horn of this dilemma. 
For example, while Merleau-Ponty also insists upon a divergence that obtains 
between touching and being touched (VI 148), self and other (VI 83 , 160), he 
neve1iheless argues that it is not simply a hyperbolic oscillation that obtains between 
these respective polarities. There is also an overlapping and encroachment, such that the 
experience of being touched is always betrothed to the experience of touching, and vice 
versa (VI 123). When one hand touches the other, there is never a situation where 
touching is radically opposed to being touched. Rather, there is always an ambiguity, and 
Merleau-Ponty hence argues that to speak of touching as if it could be disassociated from 
being touched, is to represent the phenomenon falsely (PP 93). 
This might not seem immediately related to Derrida's various discussions of the 
opposition (p 63) , and a dualism that severs the linguistic from the perceptual (p 72). 
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possible-impossible aporia, but as has been consistently illustrated throughout this thesis, 
Merleau-Ponty also propounds a similar argument regarding the relationship between self 
and other. Rather than self and other being radically opposed, there is a difference 
between them, but not a dualistic difference, and not even a hyperbolic oscillation 
between them (Sartre's master-slave dialectic stages just such an oscillation). According 
to Merleau-Ponty: 
The self and the non-self are like the obverse and the reverse, and since our own 
experience is this turning around that installs us far indeed from ourselves, in the 
other, in the things ... by a sort of chiasm, we become the others and we become 
the world (VI 160). 
Merleau-Ponty's intention in this rather enigmatic passage is not to deny alterity, or to 
propound an "imperialism of the same" that ignores difference. His chiasmic ontology 
endorses an encroachment between self and other, but it will not admit of a fusion (VI 
123), and his point is that an ambiguous intertwining between self and other obtains 
precisely because "the gaze of the other reveals an alterity that is already articulated in 
my own visibility"287• There 'is a symmetry between the problem of our embodiment in 
the world - typified as it is by a divergence between the sentient and the sensible that 
makes any conception of subjectivity possible at all - and the problem of the other. The 
other is inconceivable without this divergence that is already within the self, and this 
divergence between the sentient and the sensible is also inconceivable without the alterity 
of the other. These problems encroach upon each other - and this is what Claude Lefort 
fails to appreciate288 - to such an extent that as James Hatley argues: 
Because the self of each particular chiasmic body is already articulated as a multi-
dimensional differentiation of itself with itself, the encounter with the other 
becomes inextricably intertwined with one's encounter with one 's self89 • 
Hatley's position represents Merleau-Ponty well, and there can be no encounter with the 
other as absolutely other, but only with the other as they impact upon and transform the 
alterity and divergence that are already involved in our own embodiment. There is a 
287Hatley, J. , "Recursive Incarnation and Chiasmic Flesh: Two Readings of Paul Celan 's ' Chymisch"' in 
Chiasms, eds. Evans & Lawlor, Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000, p 237. 
288As has been argued in chapter eight, Lefort's criticisms of Merleau-Ponty are misplaced because he 
argues that Merleau-Ponty accords a foundational priority to the body's relationship to itself, which is then 
superimposed upon the problem of others (See Lefort, C. , "Flesh and Otherness", p 3-13). However, 
Merleau-Ponty 's point is precisely that the sentient-sensible relationship is inconceivable without the 
alterity of the other, and that these two aspects of alterity mutually encroach upon one another. 
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genuine interdependency between these two issues for Merleau-Ponty, and self and other 
are hence intertwined on several different levels. Now, Derrida has frequently said 
similar things regarding the encroachment that applies between what we think of as ' self 
and 'other' (as well as 'inside' and ' outside '), especially in his earlier work (cf. WD 
126)290 • Nevertheless, it remains the case that his possible-impossible aporias retain their 
aporetic nature only if we acquiesce to this disjunction between self and other ( or at least 
between two radical singularities), neither of which Merleau-Ponty would countenance. 
If this is not already apparent, despite insisting that an oscillation between an 
absolute and a more conditional notion of forgiveness is necessary for responsibility, 
Derrida's concrete discontent with the current French and international discussions about 
forgiveness - in relation to the Algerian oppression, for example - clearly revolves 
around forgiveness being deprived of what he describes as its absolute, "mad" and 
extraordinary aspect (OCF 39). In On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness at least, Derrida 
exhibits a nostalgia for a notion of forgiveness that is indebted to a radically disjoined 
conception of self and other that can admit of no mediation (for that would simply be 
amnesty and reconciliation). Of course, he also concludes this text by suggesting that· 
while he retains this rather absolute conception of forgiveness, he intends to do so 
without the notion of sovereignty that is commonly involved in it (OCF 59). 
Unfortunately, however, sovereignty seems to be a rather necessary consequence of his 
forgiveness aporia, which emphasises that a disjunction between "two singularities" is 
necessary for genuine forgiveness to take place (OCF 42). 
Now, there are at least two Merleau-Ponty inspired responses to this predicament. 
The first has already been partially explicated, and that would be to deny outright that this 
strange negotiation between radical singularities is a major and important factor in the 
various concepts that Derrida considers. If self and other are necessarily intertwined 
together, then the argument from Merleau-Ponty, to bring him artificially into the 
problem of forgiveness, would be that forgiveness is always conditional (ie. amnesty and 
reconciliation) and that there is no reason to presume that we are actually motivated by a 
desire to forgive in the absolute and pure way that Derrida wants us to .. This would 
289Hatley, J. , p 238. 
290Moreover, Derrida 's notion of dijferance also arguably entails a quite closely related position, even if it 
is not, strictly speaking, within the purview of phenomenology. For a collection of es~ays that explores the 
relationship between Merleau-Ponty 's notion of ecart and Derridean dijferance, see Ecart and Dijferance: 
Merleau-Ponty and Derrida on Seeing and Writing. 
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simply be "high-altitude thinking" that is not grounded in the chiasmic intertwining that 
Merleau-Ponty argues is the ultimate truth (VI 69). 
And it does seem that Derrida ' s paradoxical insistence that genuine forgiving 
must involve forgiving the 'unforgivable ', is ameliorated by this fact that it is never 
simply a self-contained 'I' that must forgive an act of another who is wholly other, 
radically disjoined. For Merleau-Ponty, this is ontologically the case, but it is also more 
empirically true. Habitual associations, or just associations per se, make self and other 
related and somehow even conjoined (eg. family and friends), and the whole aporia of 
which Derrida speaks is hence rendered capable of change. After all, the 'unforgivable' 
has almost always been contributed to by both parties, and forgiving is rather difficult to 
accomplish alone. These axiomatic observations are not the main focus of Derrida' s 
work, but they do suggest that the compulsion of the paradox that he presents depends 
upon a notion of forgiveness that consistently invokes a radical singularity that admits of 
no mediation. He mentions this radical singularity in many of his more recent texts (PF 
37, GD 60), and it seems that there is a latent individualism in Derrida's work that 
Merleau-Ponty does not have29 1• 
For Merleau-Ponty, there can be no confrontation between two radical 
singularities; on the contrary, the dehiscence of the tangible-touching is the condition of 
subjectivity and also ensures that the other is always presupposed by and intertwined 
within the self, albeit in an immensely complicated manner. As Cornelius Castoriadis has 
pointed out, this almost renders the individual unthinkable292 , and while this might be 
understood as a criticism of Merleau-Ponty's work, there is also a sense in which it is an 
accurate account of the complexities of the life-world. 
The second response to Derrida's possible-impossible aporias which is also 
indebted to the work of Merleau-Ponty, is to emphasise the way in which our embodied 
situation itself inclines us towards forgiving, and towards the dissolution of the aporia. 
Even if both polarities of the Denidean aporia could be said to be prescient and defining 
features of the various concepts that he considers (and I think this can be disputed), 
291 Derrida 's references to singularity are not precisely the same as advocating individuality, but his 
persistent juxtaposition of terms like radical singularity and wholly other cannot but engender 
individualistic overtones. 
292Castoriadis, C. , "Merleau-Ponty and the Weight of the Ontological Tradition" in Th esis Eleven , Vol. 36, 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1993 , p 18. Despite the fact that Castoriadis argues that Merleau-
Ponty 's work avoids many of the faults that have befallen post-structuralist thought since, he expresses 
some reservations regarding what he suggests is Merleau-Ponty 's tendency to make individuality 
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according to a common-sense conception of things, it would nevertheless seem that many 
of us do eventually give, forgive, mourn, etc. One explanation of this might be that a past 
misdeed by those close to us, for example, is gradually reabsorbed into the entirety of our 
situation, and our lives structured around it such as to overcome the problem. As has been 
illustrated in chapter six, this is something that Merleau-Ponty's discussion of the body-
subject's movement towards an equilibrium also implies (PP 153). According to his 
analysis in Phenomenology of Perception, in order to cope with our environment we 
consistently adjust our behavioural modes in order to minimise confrontations, aporias, 
and anything that might disrupt our "intentional arc" towards the world (PP 136, 153, 
250). Although Merleau-Ponty does not explicitly suggest this himself, this might also 
involve excluding anything likely to induce painful recollections. 
Derrida and Merleau-Ponty are not necessarily in opposition to each other here. 
By changing one's behaviour in order to maintain an equilibrium with the environment, 
or to retain a semblance of sanity given an unforgivable betrayal, one is also testifying to 
that which has induced that alteration, and it might hence be argued that forgiving has not 
really taken place, as grievances are still tacitly held. But it is important to recognise that 
this is not a consciously reflective activity, and the fact that the body excludes things 
from our particular horizons of significance is not something that should be ignored. 
Nietzsche has remarked that "without forgetfulness, there can be no happiness, no hope, 
no present"293 , and Merleau-Ponty describes an embodied habituality that is an 
abandoning of the "I think" in favour of an "I can" (PP 137); it is a forgetting that is 
simultaneously a recognition of a way beyond that which has caused the consternation. 
Our corporeality accommodates us to our situation, it turns a wound into a scar, and it 
almost forgives and forgets for us. Of course, forgetting and forgiving are not the same 
thing, but this type of habitual forgetting, which occurs as the body-subject adjusts to its 
environment over a period of time, is a necessary accompaniment to the possibility of 
forgiving and it also blurs the boundaries between these two apparently distinct notions. 
If the point of this discussion is not yet apparent, there seems to be a way in 
which the impasse involved in the paradoxical necessity to forgive the unforgivable can 
be gradually ameliorated through our embodied situation. The structure of Derrida's 
possible-impossible aporias - in which the terms of an opposition rely upon each other 
unthinkable. 
293Nietzsche, F., On the Genealogy of Morals and Ecce Homo, trans. Kaufman, Vintage Books, 1969, p 
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(in that they are considered to be indissociable) but never actually manage to interact ( eg. 
a wound that refuses to heal) - seem to be capable of a recuperation that gradually 
diminishes the aporia and allows forgiveness to take place. Time, as they say, heals all 
wounds. Derrida might respond that this claim that our corporeal comportment towards 
the world inclines us towards forgiving, mourning, etc., is simply equivalent to 
conditional forgiveness (ie. amnesty) and hence does not refute the more transcendental 
and absolute notion of forgiveness that inspires it. Perhaps this is so, but what does it 
mean for the Derridean aporia if it is the case that this conditional forgiveness is inscribed 
in our embodied temporality? Our embodiment in the world compels us into action, and 
into moving on, and this situation delimits the range and extent of our experience of the 
forgiveness aporia. Merleau-Ponty's philosophy can hence be envisaged to provide an 
important supplement to the forgiveness aporia, in that the structure of the possible-
impossible opposition can be gradually diminished via the body's increasingly refined 
adjustment to the particularities of its environment. Of course, this is not a supplement 
that Derrida would be likely to endorse. 
This notion of an embodied comportment cannot be pursued in further depth here 
(it has been considered in chapter six), but the main point to ascertain from the preceding 
discussion is that Derrida's forgiveness aporia partially relies upon a conception of self 
and other that admits of no mediation. Moreover, in prioritising the necessity of 
preventing the alterity of the other from being annulled, his understanding of hospitality 
has also been seen to depend upon a rather precise self and other demarcation. Similarly, 
in the previous chapter it was highlighted that The Gift of Death repeatedly insists that 
responsibility towards the alterity of the other relies upon a conception of "radical 
singularity" (GD 60, 68, 79, 87), and it is worth recalling that the negotiation between 
Abraham and God quickly makes all other considerations - including wife, son, and 
community- superfluous (GD 73). Derrida's later work hence exhibits a surprising 
tendency to emphasise the separation of self and other, rather than the breaching of these 
categories. Of course, this is a disputed and contentious claim. According to Kirby, on the 
contrary: 
57-8. 
The breach in the identity and being of the sovereign subject, and in the very 
notion of cognition itself, is not merely nostalgic loss, nor anticipated threat or 
promise. It is a constitutive breaching, a recalling and differentiating within the 
subject that hails it into presence. As impossible as it may seem, the ethical 
relation to radical alterity is to an other that is, also, me294 • 
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Kirby 's position undoubtedly captures one aspect of the Derridean account, particularly 
in regard to his early writings, which she focuses upon. However, the important question 
revolves around how we are to balance her interpretation with the Derrida who frequently 
espouses a radical singularity, a wholly other, a "relationless relation" (MO 71 , GD 72-
3), a "waiting without horizon" (MO 67), and partially relies upon a distinct conception 
of self and other in his possible-impossible aporias. It has already been argued that he 
more often prioritises a difference between self and other that precludes encroachment 
(see chapter nine), but it is worth devoting further analysis to another of his possible-
impossible aporias, and one in which this type of self-other dualism is more difficult to 
discern. 
Mourning: 
In Memoires: for Paul de Man, which was written almost immediately following de · 
Man's death in 1983, Derrida reflects upon the political significance of his colleague' s 
apparent Nazi affiliation in his youth, and he also discusses the pain of losing his friend. 
Given that it is difficult to conceive of the process of grieving without some recognition 
of the intermingling of self and other that ensures that the death of a loved one is so 
traumatic, it is not surprising that in this text, Derrida envisages the other as being 
'within' the self more consistently and obviously than he does in many of his more recent 
texts. 
Derrida 's argument about mourning adheres to a similarly paradoxical logic to 
that which has been associated with him throughout this chapter. He suggests that the 
'successful ' mourning of the deceased other actually fails - or at least is an unfaithful 
fidelity - because the other becomes a part of us, and in this interiorisation their genuine 
alterity is no longer respected. On the other hand, failure to mourn paradoxically appears 
to succeed, because the presence of the other in their absolute exteriority is prolonged 
(MDM 6). As he suggests, there is a sense in which "an aborted interiorisation is at the 
same time a respect for the other as other" (MDM 3 5). Hence the possibility of an 
impossible bereavement, where the only possible way to mourn, is to be unable to do so. 
294Kirby, V. , Telling Flesh, p 95 . 
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If Derrida remained within such a schematic and insisted that this aborted interiorisation 
was a respect for the other as other, then this would return us to the type of problematic 
that this chapter has expressed some significant reservations about - that being the threat 
of deconstruction engendering a passive humility before an other that is elusive. 
However, even though this is how he initially presents the problem, Derrida also 
problematises this "success fails, failure succeeds" formulation (MDM 3 5). 
Moreover, in his essay "Fors: The Anglish Words of Nicolas Abraham and Maria 
Torok", Derrida again considers two models of the type of encroachment between self 
and other that is regularly associated with mourning. Borrowing from post-Freudian 
theo1ies of mourning, he posits ( although later undermines) a difference between 
introjection, which is love for the other in me, and incorporation, which involves 
retaining the other as a pocket, or a foreign body within one's own body. For Freud, as 
well as for the psychologists Abraham and Torok, whose work Derrida considers, 
successful mourning is primarily about the introj ection of the other. The preservation of a 
discrete and separate other inside the self is considered to be where mourning ceases to be 
a 'normal' response and instead becomes pathological. Typically, Derrida reverses this 
hierarchy and order of subordination by highlighting that there is a sense in which the 
supposedly pathological condition of incorporation is actually more respectful of the 
other's alterity. After all, incorporation means that one has not totally assimilated or 
digested the other, as there is still a heterogeneity (EO 57). On the other hand, Abraham 
and Torok' s 'normal' mourning can be accused of interiorising the other to such a degree 
that they have become assimilated and even cannibalised295 . Derrida considers this 
introjection to be an infidelity to the other, although it will be argued that this type of 
mourning has more to recommend it than he allows. Indeed, it will be shown that 
Merleau-Ponty 's notion of responsibility towards alterity is more 'digestive' and 
appropriative, and it will also be argued that this is not necessarily a bad thing. 
Before we get ahead of ourselves, however, it is worth recognising that Derrida's 
account is not so simple as to unreservedly valorise the incorporation of the other, even if 
he consistently emphasises this paradigm in an effort to refute the canonical interpretation 
of successful mourning. He also acknowledges that the more the self "keeps the foreign 
element inside itself, the more it excludes it" (Fors xvii). Refusing to engage with the 
295For a more detailed account of this predicament, see Deutscher, P. , "Mourning the Other, Cultural 
Cannibalism, and the Politics of Friendship" in Differences: A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies, 10.3 , 
217 
other, we exclude their foreignness from ourselves and hence prevent any transformative 
interaction with it. When fetishised in their externality in such a manner, the dead other 
really is lifeless and it is significant that Derrida describes the death of de Man in terms 
of the loss of exchange and of the transformational opportunities that he presented (MDM 
xvi)296 • Derrida's point hence seems to be that in mourning, the 'otherness of the other' 
resists both the process of incorporation as well as the process of introj ection. The other 
can neither be preserved as a foreign entity, nor introjected fully within. 
While Merleau-Ponty has rarely written specifically on either death or 
mourning297, it is worth recalling a predicament that this thesis has previously associated 
with his general writings on alterity. Like Derrida, Merleau-Ponty is also dissatisfied with 
two main paradigms of responsibility towards alterity. He is unhappy with the Sartrean 
account, where the other is forever elusive and/or nothing but a threat (VI 79). In the 
Sartrean paradigm, we have a Being-for-others, but this is an ontologically separate mode 
of our existence that is not envisaged to impact upon our Being-for-itself in any sustained 
way ( cf. to incorporation), and this is why Sartre cannot thematise oppression, or a 
freedom devoid of projects298 . Moreover, Merleau-Ponty is also unhappy with the idea of 
self and other being reduced to each other by the insistence upon contextual horizons ( cf. 
to introjection). They are intertwined together, but not reducible to each other (VI 123). 
His chiasmic ontology intends to avoid this 'either-or' alternative - eg. either conceiving 
of alterity as so far beyond the comprehension of the subject that it cannot be digested 
(cf. to 'pathological' mourning), or as being domesticated by the subject (cf. to 'no1mal' 
mourning) - and this seems to be closely related to the incorporation/introjection problem 
that Derrida has delineated and then sought to avoid. Does this mean that Den·ida tacitly 
presupposes a chiasmic ontology that is closely related to a thinker that he has rarely 
written about until recent times? While both philosophers reject similar paradigms, their 
solutions to the problem of alterity are nevertheless importantly different. 
Indeed, neither model of reducing the other to the self via mourning can be 
1998, p 166. 
296This is a persistent theme of Derrida's eulogies in regard to his colleagues. See his collection of essays 
entitled The Work of Mourning, and in particular his evocative essay on Deleuze. 
297Merleau-Ponty's personal life was shaped by both death and mourning, however. As well as the 
perpetual absence of his father, who died in World War I, according to Sartre, the death of Merleau-
Ponty' s mother in the 1950s induced depression in him for a very long period of time. Sartre even goes so 
far as to suggest that Merleau-Ponty was himself "born to die" (see Sartre, J, P. , Situations, p 246), and in 
Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty also briefly claims that we live in an atmosphere of death in 
general (PP 3 64). 
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successful for Derrida, and he instead emphasises that the other must always resist my 
memory and interiorisation of them. The other is neither introjected within, nor 
incorporated within, but instead remains outside the grasp of subjectivity- that is, wholly 
other (tout autre). Towards the end of Memoires: for Paul de Man , Derrida suggests that 
responsibility towards alterity is precisely about respecting and even emphasising this 
resistance of the other (MDM 160, 23 8), and it is on this point that he parts company with 
Merleau-Ponty. Merleau-Ponty regularly implies that responsibility towards alterity is 
precisely about respecting the ways in which self and other, as well as self and world, are 
inextricably intertwined together. 
It is worth recalling that where Sartre tries to respect alterity by maintaining that 
the other is that which is forever elusive and can never be known, Merleau-Ponty accuses 
him of propounding an "agnosticism in regard to the other" (VI 79). What Merleau-Ponty 
is trying to elucidate via this phrase, is the way in which when Sartre tries to guarantee 
the alterity of the other, he does so by arguing that there can be no genuine perception of 
the other, because any attempt to describe alterity inevitably marks the triumph of a 
"disguised solipsism" (VI 79). Rather than limit alterity to any determinate shape or 
form, Sartre simply describes the other as a "freedom that transcends my freedom", and 
Merleau-Ponty's dissatisfaction with this "agnosticism" is equivalent with Vicki Kirby's 
disenchantment with what she refers to as an attitude of "benevolent humility towards an 
other that is absolutely elusive". For both Kirby, and Merleau-Ponty, the worst of 
infringements upon alterity is to privilege it simply as that which is forever elusive. In the 
end, this engenders an "anonymous, faceless obsession, an other in general" (VI 72) that 
ignores the importance of the ways in which we are always intertwined with the other- a 
recognition which is, of course, necessary for the other to challenge or de-centre us at all. 
Now, Derrida is no Sartrean, and he would undoubtedly criticise the humanistic 
tendencies of Sartre's conception of alterity, but as has already been argued, Derrida' s 
later work also downplays the significance of the ways in which self and other are 
intertwined together. Firstly, Derrida insists upon the importance of two radical 
singularities to each of his possible-impossible aporias, and secondly, he privileges 
something wholly other (tout autre) that might disrupt this type of self-other, possible-
impossible exchange. 
Indeed, after emphasising that the other whom we mourn is necessarily caught in 
298This conclusion is justified in more depth in chapter seven. 
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the aporia of introj ection and incorporation, Derrida then claims that "there remains to be 
thought an other undecidability, one no longer bound to the order of calculation between 
two poles of opposition, but to the incalculable order of a wholly other" (MDM 137). 
These references to the incalculability of the wholly other are not, of course, isolated 
comments (cf. GD 83) but are symptomatic of his responses to many of the aporias that 
he discerns, as well as his intent to legitimise an ethics of the otherness of the other. 
However, even if the wholly other paradoxically is, as Derrida repeatedly insists, this 
exaltation of that which is wholly other nevertheless reaffirms that responsibility towards 
alterity should be directed at that which is outside of the self-other dialectic (see chapter 
nine). For Merleau-Ponty, on the other hand, responsibility towards alterity is precisely 
about immersion in the "natal bond" where self and other encroach upon one another (VI 
136). This claim has been justified in detail in chapter eight and particularly through 
recourse to The Prose of the World, but Merleau-Ponty's philosophy affirms the 
transfo1mation of self and other ( a mutual devouring, and alterity is construed as that 
which literally alters), whereas Derrida more actively affirms an ethics of the other's 
resistance to this transformative dialectic (an aversion to digestion). 
There are undoubtedly some significant issues that remain to be addressed in 
regard to Merleau-Ponty's conception of alterity, but his embodied focus provides the 
resources for a more recuperative account of the aporias that Den-ida discerns, and his 
chiasmic ontology also represents a more relational aspect of alterity that Derrida' s later 
work does not thematise so frequently, or so well. While Derrida argues that genuine 
forgiveness requires the separation of self and other, before then bemoaning the 
impossibility of this ever occurring, Merleau-Ponty argues that it is in the transformation 
and intertwining of categories like self and other that meaning actually resides. Den·ida' s 
possible-impossible aporias harbour a nostalgia for a neat demarcation between two 
radical singularities, but this is not something that Merleau-Ponty would endorse, and it 
seems that without such a presumption, the paradoxical force of Derrida's aporias is also 
diminished. 
Conclusion: 
In an attempt to explain a similar disparity between Merleau-Ponty and Derrida, Martin 
Dillon perceptively observes that in phenomenology "there is an intertwining of 
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experience and reflection that serves to discipline the other"299 . Phenomenology has been 
famously espoused as a return to our experience of the things themselves, and Merleau-
Ponty' s particular contribution to phenomenology - ie. freeing it from its 
Cartesian/idealist inclinations - affirms the importance of our embodied and existential 
experience of the things themselves. Dillon argues that if this phenomenological 
disposition is combined with reflection, or a hyper-reflection that is aware of its own 
necessarily finite point of view and does not aim at an ultimate synthesis (VI 95), then 
our experience of the other can be explained in terms of the entire situation, rather than 
by oscillating between idealist and realist perspectives. The 'truth' of Merleau-Ponty's 
embodied phenomenology is hence his "inscription of difference within the same"300 that 
highlights that alterity is primarily experienced through the chiasmic recognition that you 
are like me, but you are also other than me. Moreover, Dillon implies that it is precisely 
' 
because Derrida's work lacks this experiential and embodied element of phenomenology 
that his conception of the other is "undisciplined" and wild301 • 
Of course, this raises all so1is of questions regarding whether alterity should be 
disciplined, and how, for that matter, alterity could actually be disciplined. At least 
ostensibly, the desire for a disciplining of alterity appears to be a contradiction in terms. 
However, in chapter nine it emerged that alterity is inconceivable without some 
"imperialism of the same". The infinitely other would have no criteria upon which to be 
recognised, and for alterity to be comprehensible as "other than myself'' ( cf. WD 126), it 
needs to be relative to certain expectations and partly disciplined by the forestructures of 
our understanding. In this respect, it has hence been argued that Merleau-Ponty ' s account 
is faithful to the manner in which we do encounter alterity; that is, as always partly 
disciplined by the horizons and contexts that are brought to bear upon a situation, but also 
as partly beyond those expectations. Merleau-Ponty's enduring emphasis upon embodied 
subjectivity disciplines alterity, by revealing that any other is always other than 
something else - usually the subject, or the same - but as has been illustrated in chapter 
eight, this recognition need not necessarily subordinate alterity to an "imperialism of the 
same" in which subjectivity is the dominant term of an unequal opposition. This is 
because, for Merleau-Ponty, subjectivity is itself premised upon a gap, or ecart, and he 
affirms the reversible transformation of self and other in a manner that breaches the 
299Dillon, M. , Semiological Reductionism, p 158. 
300vasseleu, C., Textures of Light, p 26. 
discrete sanctity of these notions. Equally importantly, he consistently implies that 
responsibility towards alterity involves deepening this transformative interaction. 
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This is a direction that deconstruction ' s own treatment of alterity has generally 
eschewed in favour of emphasising the more asymmetrical aspects of alterity that elude 
any such transformative dialectic ( eg. the messianic, the wholly other, the 'relationless 
relation ', the 'waiting without horizon' , etc.). Without deigning to suggest that Merleau-
Ponty' s position is in-itself wholly satisfactory, it has been argued that a wholly 
satisfactory account of alterity must draw upon, or be inspired by this embodied focus 
that he so insistently presents. The reservations that have been expressed throughout this 
thesis in regard to Derrida's account of alterity, whatever its other inestimable qualities, 
are all tacitly related to his minimal exploration of this embodied thematic. While there is 
no reason why this omission should be a necessary component of deconstruction ( see 
chapter three), a more embodied analysis is necessary for a sustained recognition of the 
ways in which we both conjoin and disjoin with the other, and this is important for 
several reasons. 
To summarise, in chapter six it emerged that Merleau-Ponty's embodied acc·ount 
can thematise varying degrees of undecidability (because habitual behaviour might alter 
and even recuperate the aporetic framework that Derrida discerns), whereas Derrida's 
quasi-transcendental position is committed to an absolute conception of the 
undecidability that precedes and conditions every decision. Merleau-Ponty's capacity to 
thematise an embodied oppression at the level of decision-making means that there are 
salient political reasons for wanting to incorporate something of his position (see chapter 
six). In this final chapter, it has also become apparent that a similar argument applies to 
many of the other possible-impossible aporias that Derrida discerns. As has been 
illustrated most clearly in relation to the forgiveness and mourning aporias, it seems that 
over periods of time our embodied situation can actually alter the structure of the impasse 
that obtains between the dual terms of a possible-impossible aporia. For example, if our 
embodied and habitual adjustment towards our environment can induce us to forget, then 
this also makes forgiving a decidedly more likely occurrence (in fact, it makes the 
difference between forgetting and forgiving 'undecidable'). This recuperative aspect of 
our embodied situation is an important supplement to Derrida's own writings on aporia, 
in that that the structure of the possible-impossible opposition can be gradually 
301 Dillon, M., Semiological Reductionism, p 158. 
diminished ( or at least altered) via the body's increasingly refined adjustment to the 
particularities of its environment. 
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Equally significantly, it has also been established that there are important ethical 
considerations in favour of Merleau-Ponty' s position, most particularly in regard to the 
consequences that his and Derrida's respective positions have for responsibility. The 
compulsion to immerse oneself in the chiasmic intertwining, and to recognise the 
interdependence that we have with both others and the world, is a promising way of 
characterising our relationship with alterity. This is certainly so in comparison with 
Derrida's more recent work, which in various different ways downplays the importance 
of the encroachment of self and other, and in the process verges on legitimising an 
attitude of benevolent humility before an other that is elusive. More generally, it has been 
argued that Merleau-Ponty' s account of the self and other relationship is the more 
ontologically and existentially convincing of these two theorists. 
Contrary to what Martin Dillon suggests, however, it is not satisfactory to simply 
rest content with privileging Merleau-Ponty at the expense of Derrida. Dillon's 'Derrida' 
is just a little too bad302 , arid his 'Merleau-Ponty' a little too good, to enable a productive 
discussion of their differences. What is called for is a philosophy that retains the best 
insights of both; a deconstruction that rediscovers its phenomenological heritage, admits 
what it owes to Merleau-Ponty, and can reinvigorate his thoughts with its own303 • Such a 
situation promises to be more productive than the dismissive criticisms and the refusal to 
countenance any sustained textual analysis that is the pervasive attitude of some recent 
theorists in regard to their French predecessors. Derrida, at least, is increasingly receptive 
to the work of Merleau-Ponty (see Memoirs of the Blind)304 , and this thesis intends to 
have contributed to the furthering of this dialogue through a recognition of the important 
and intimate relationship that obtains between the themes of embodiment and alterity. 
302Derrida's later philosophy does not merely install another dualism, as Dillon argues, although the 
recognition of the ways in which self and other encroach upon one another is usually a secondary aspect of 
his writings on possible-impossible aporias. 
303While this thesis has not accorded much attention to the weaknesses in Merleau-Ponty 's thought that 
deconstruction can help us to see, such a project obviously remains tenable. For strategic reasons, however 
(ie. the current dominance of the Derridean account in contemporary European philosophy), it has been 
more important to argue that an analysis of embodiment need not succumb to the metaphysics of presence, 
and is actually important for thematising a suitably refined conception of alterity. 
304Christina Howells argues that Derrida has also recently abandoned his early dislike for Sartre and has 
become more receptive to some of his ideas. See Howells, C. , Den-ida: From Phenomenology to Ethics, p 
135. 
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